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THESIS ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the political economy of the initial development of the Argentine iron and 
steel industry between circa 1920 and 1952. It analyses the reasons for the failure of those initiatives and 
shows that the main impetus to establish the industry was provided by the Second World War, not the Great 
Depression. The thesis accounts for the adverse impact of domestic factors such as the predominance of 
military strategic demands over business considerations, inadequate national supplies of raw materials, output 
bottlenecks, demand constraints and the politics of the period which frustrated policy continuity. The 
unfavourable effects of the international conjuncture are also assessed. These include the role of the 
International Steel Cartel in inhibiting the growth of domestic iron and steel production through a web of 
controls prior to 1939, and wartime constraints and the US embargo which limited access to essential capital 
goods and technology thereby frustrating positive incentives for the development of heavy industry.
For most of the period, Argentina was one of the few ’open’ markets for iron and steel products. 
The depth of the market and its ability to sustain domestic production is assessed through three case-product 
studies: rails, construction materials and rural implements. The research shows that demand was associated 
with traditional economic sectors. Organisational structures also frustrated development. The thesis proves 
that the history of the sector was characterised by organisational instability: a small number of ephemeral 
firms specialised in the production of a small number of items. Attempts to foster efficiency through large- 
scale integrated industrialisation involving State and private capital in a mixed corporation failed because 
the project was tailored to security rather than market requirements.
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INTRODUCTION
Two of the big questions about Argentina are how and why did the country, which most economists 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century would have placed among the most advanced economies, 
go wrong.1 Traditionally, Peronista policies of the Forties and Fifties are blamed for the ills that beset the 
Republic. Although the Perons played a significant part, the roots of failure lie much deeper. Argentine 
economic growth, which had enjoyed high rates during the first two decades of the century, slowed down 
long before the advent of Peronismo. Constraints arose from the consequences of the agro-exports model 
and the expansion of the Pampas frontier. Limits to growth surfaced as the best land was taken up and 
increases in productivity were gradually reduced, and there were also problems inherent in the system which 
were not dealt with.2 Yet, by the point when the weaknesses of the agro-exports model became apparent 
in the second quarter of this century, the country was in a position where the degree of industrialisation 
should, apparently, have been deeper. It had attained various basic traits of economic progress often 
declared as ’prerequisites’ of modem industrialisation - eg, a large unified territory, and a legal system 
assuring the rights of the individual and satisfactory protection of property.3 Furthermore, the economy had 
a diversified production structure and had reached some thresholds characteristic of a semi-industrial 
country.4 Nevertheless, thorough industrialisation had not taken place.
Reflecting the truncated and incomplete nature of Argentine industrialisation, this thesis assesses 
attempts to foster domestic iron and steel production between the Twenties and Fifties. However, its scope 
is far broader than merely mirroring general trends of economic development. The dissertation contributes
1 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic (New Haven, 
1970), p.l.
2 Hector L. Dieguez, ’Argentina y Australia: algunos aspectos de su desarrollo economico comparado’, 
Desarrollo Economico (DE) 8 (1968-1969) No.32, p.552; Tulio Halperin Donghi, ’Cancion de otono en 
primavera: previsiones sobre la crisis de la agriculturacerealeraargentina (1894-1930), DE 24 (1984-1985) 
No.95, pp.367-386.
3 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1962), pp.32,33.
4 For example, a level of income sufficient to support a shift towards manufacturing. Hollis Chenery, 
Sherman Robinson and Moshe Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth (Washington, 1986), pp. 84,85.
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to the knowledge of constraints, both external and domestic, affecting the development of heavy industry 
in a ’small, late developing’ economy. Two types of external constraints are identified: (i) those which 
arose from the policies of major iron and steel producer-exporters, which aimed to retard the growth of iron 
and steel manufacturing in traditional export markets, and (ii) those which arose from circumstancial factors. 
The first category comprises the deliberate attempts to prevent the expansion of overseas production by 
Continental European producer-exporters before 1939 and by the USA thereafter, fearful of competition 
against their own industries as export markets shrank. European steelmakers tried to achieve their goals 
through an International Steel Cartel (ISC) that aimed to control worldwide iron and steel production and 
distribution by means of a most complex web of controls and oligopolistic practices. The cartel collapsed 
at the outset of the Second World War, and the Europeans did not regain their prewar predominance nor 
control over the trade. However, they had been replaced by a United States of America which was 
unwilling to promote industrialisation in Latin America and provide the necessary capital and technology. 
Although Washington promoted some industrial projects south of the Rio Grande during the war owing to 
strategic considerations, it was disinclined to meet Latin American expectations that wartime hemispheric 
cooperation extend into peacetime economic collaboration. In the Argentine case, there was an additional 
incentive: the rift with Buenos Aires over its wartime neutrality and the conflation of post-1943 Argentine 
regimes with fascism.
The circumstancial factors affecting the advancement of heavy industry arose from the Second 
World War and its aftermath. The Great Depression, which is traditionally regarded as a ’window of 
opportunity’, did not encourage the development of iron and steel production. The national economy rapidly 
recovered and the market for iron and steel was well served by ISC members. Therefore this thesis argues 
that, unlike other import substituting industries, the impetus to establish steelmaking was provided by the 
outbreak of the Second World War, which brought about the collapse of the ISC and severe import 
shortages. The few existing local metallurgical manufacturers, aided by the competence and ingenuity of 
their engineers who copied old foreign machinery designs and adapted second-hand equipment, engaged in 
steel production for ’in house’ consumption. However, as manufacturing had been undertaken with 
relatively obsolete equipment and shielded from competition by the war, production capacity and plant
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would have to be upgraded in the postwar period. This was not possible as the Americans would not supply 
the required technology and Peronista policies were not concerned with the promotion of basic industries.
As this thesis shows, external constraints combined with adverse domestic political and economic 
factors to conspire against the establishment of a successful iron and steel industry. Political determinants 
manifested themselves in the form of instability and subsequent discontinuity in policy-making, and the 
powerful role acquired by the Armed Forces in the aftermath of the 1930 military coup. Three political 
groups were in power during the period, and all were unwilling or unable to introduce the necessary 
structural changes in the configuration of the economy that would have facilitated industrialisation. The 
Radicals, who held office in the Twenties, had come to power owing to the their committment to extending 
democracy, and strove for accomodation within the existing system as the export-led growth model appeared 
to serve the country well. With the onset of the world crisis and the overthrow of the Radicals in a civilian- 
military conspiracy in 1930, the Conservatives were returned to power. Forced to deal with the effects of 
the Depression, they introduced economic measures which were not bold but designed to overcome the 
crisis. The Conservatives, which lacked any political legitimacy and struggled to cope with the economic 
difficulties caused by the Second World War, were in turn overthrown by the Army in 1943. The military 
regime paved the way for the 1946 election of the labour-based Peronista government. The latter, favoured 
by highly auspicious economic conditions, had possibly the best opportunity to introduce the necessary 
economic reforms, but squandered the opening by implementing erroneous populist policies. It should be 
noted that, although Peron was re-elected in 1952 and he remained in office until ousted by the military in 
1955, this dissertation does not extend beyond his first presidency. Implicit in the varied nature of the three 
regimes in power during the second quarter of the century, the reason is that Peron attempted to overcome 
severe economic difficulties in his short-lived second presidency not through a distinctive programme of his 
own but by reverting to policies more in tune with those of the Conservatives (a group he hated intensely).
Political turmoil had resulted in a new and powerful role for the Armed Forces. In the absence of 
any government attempt to deepen industrialisation, the military became crucial to the development of heavy 
industry. Concerned with establishing ’strategic’ industries related to national defence since the Twenties,
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the Army made most progress in the field during the early Forties. A vast military-industrial empire known 
as the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM) was set up in 1941, whose cost to the 
Argentine economy is unknown to this day. Of the various industries controlled by the DGFM, only the 
Fabrica Militar de Aviones has been studied - within the limits imposed by official secrecy.5 This thesis, 
which provides new insights into private sector steelmakers, aims to expand the knowledge about the DGFM 
iron and steel industry proj ect, which was far more significant to the national economy than aircraft-making. 
However, the focus is on the preparatory phase of the ambitious Plan Siderurgico Argentino (PSA) as the 
Plan was not implemented on schedule by the early Fifties.
The PSA appeared sound on the surface, since it proposed economically competitive production 
based on the use of both national and foreign raw materials, which aimed to satisfy domestic requirements. 
This project would comprise three industrial units: a resource-oriented pig iron plant near the Zapla iron 
deposit in northwestern Argentina, a market-oriented integrated steelworks in the industrial belt along the 
Parana river, and existing manufacturers of finished goods located in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. 
However, once closely scrutinised, it is clear that the PSA was flawed from its inception. As argued in the 
thesis, it was tailored to military rather than basic development considerations and took no account of three 
critical domestic economic factors that would ultimately impede its successful implementation. First, 
production targets were guided by self-sufficiency goals and bore no relation to the size of the market. As 
the growth of manufacturing was restricted to light industries, most demand for iron and steel arose from 
small-scale finishers supplying highly segmented markets. Construction alone accounted for over Vi of total 
consumption. Yet the DGFM designed the PSA centrepiece, the integrated steelworks project, to produce 
every iron and steel good conceivably required by the national economy. Given the nature of demand, this 
military goal did not justify the use of the most modem, large-scale methods of production. The 
manufacture of a wide range of items in relatively small amounts only resulted in inefficient use of 
equipment and increased costs of production and delivery prices. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that there 
were two alternatives that could have prevented these difficulties. One would have been for the PSA to
5 See Maria del Carmen Angueira and Alicia del Carmen Tonini, Capitalismo de Estado (1927-1956) 
(Buenos Aires, 1986), and Ricardo Burzaco, Las alas de Peron (Buenos Aires, 1995).
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incorporate the development of other associated industries. This would have deepened industrialisation and 
increased iron and steel consumption, but might have only succeeded with a different economic policy to 
that pursued by Peron. The second option was a specialisation in certain product lines, which was feasible 
and would take into account both costs and market considerations.
The second factor adversely affecting the PSA was the inadequacy of domestic raw material 
supplies. Nevertheless, in the wartime military drive for self-sufficiency, national iron and coal deposits 
were discovered and developed. The difficulty was that their exploitation was far from economic, since 
deposits were situated in remote areas, the quality of the minerals was poor, and reserve levels were 
insufficient. This dissertation, which discloses extensive new information on national minerals, reveals the 
extent of the unsuitability of local iron and coal resources and exposes the obstinacy of the military in 
employing such raw materials. In the case of Zapla, a wartime project processing ores from a nearby iron 
deposit, total reliance on domestic resources was initially inevitable despite the high costs - but in peacetime 
should have employed foreign raw materials. The problem was more severe in the case of the integrated 
steelworks. Although the DGFM accepted the need to use a mix of foreign and national raw materials in 
order to reduce costs, it remained insistent on the utilisation of a proportion of domestic inputs. In line with 
their goals, the military could increase this proportion in times of emergency or import shortages, thereby 
maintaining production at higher costs than were practicable.
The final factor conspiring against the PSA was the nature and timing of the project itself. 
Contrary to common assumptions, the integrated steelworks proposal is not an example of deliberate State 
intervention which is usually associated with the Peron regime. As is shown in the thesis, the DGFM sought 
the collaboration of private and even foreign interests in a sociedad mixta to attain its goals, given that it 
could not provide all the required capital from its budget and also lacked the necessary technical and 
commercial experience. Therefore, tenders were invited, and the successful one (which was tailored to 
military requirements) was presented by three leading national steel producers and the subsidiary of the US 
firm ARMCO. Launched in an age of increased economic nationalism, the proposal came under heavy fire - 
not least because of opposition to participation by the ARMCO subsidiary. The National Congress, in a
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clear demonstration that it was not initially controlled by Peron despite the impressive scale of his election 
victory and his authoritarian tendencies, pushed to restrict private and foreign involvement in the project. 
The DGFM, determined to ’have’ heavy industry and thereby desperate to salvage its Plan, yielded to 
congressional pressure and was landed with greater control over the steelworks than originally envisaged. 
The timing of the PSA also proved as fatal. Prepared in wartime, the project was not a priority for the 
peacetime elected Peronista government. Although Peron was himself a military man and had supported 
the PSA during his tenure as Minister of War under the military regime and at the start of his own 
presidency, he displayed little committment thereafter as he had developed his own agenda. Even though 
this in itself had a negative effect on the implementation of the Plan, this thesis argues that the economic 
difficulties arising from government policies had an even more severe impact. The depletion of financial 
resources and foreign exchangereserves by the late Forties effectively prevented the execution of the proj ect. 
The State could not provide its capital contributions or any other funds, and equipment purchases were 
impossible.
Having identified the various themes associated with the external and domestic constraints on the 
development of iron and steel production in Argentina, two items remain to be assessed. These are the 
sources of historiography on which the thesis is based, and the organisation of the dissertation.
The secondary and primary sources o f historiography
Existing literature has dealt with the international and domestic contexts around the attempts to 
develop iron and steel production. On the subject of external constraints, there are few but nevertheless 
useful works on the steel cartel, and a wide range of sources on US-Argentine antagonism as well as 
steelmaking in other ’small’ economies (which can provide counterfactuals). Scholars studying Argentina 
in this crucial period of its modem history have focused largely on the turbulent domestic politics and also 
dealt with the more controversial aspects of policy-making. Some attention has also been devoted to 
economic developments and the rise of manufacturing, with the debates about industrialisation being at the 
heart of the discussion. As will be seen in Chapter 1, major contributions have been made by Alejandro
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E. Bunge, Adolfo Dorfman, Ricardo Ortiz, Raul Prebisch, Aldo Ferrer, Guido Di Telia and Manuel 
Zymelman, and Ezequiel Gallo. With the exception of the works by Dorfman and Ortiz, insufficient 
emphasis has been placed on individual manufacturing sectors - not least iron and steel production. As will 
also be seen in Chapter 1, references to the latter in secondary sources are few. The leading private 
metallurgical firms that expanded into steelmaking are only considered by Jorge Schvarzer. The growth of 
military interest with industrialisation and the formation of defence-related industries, particularly with 
reference integrated steelworks project to be developed through a sociedad mixta between the DGFM and 
private enterprise, has been given more heed not only by Schvarzer but also Raul Larra, Laura Randall and 
Robert A. Potash. In the relevant chapters, whose organisation is described below, the thesis extends the 
work of Schvarzer, Larra, Randall and Potash. Factual errors are corrected, and the issues pinpointed by 
these authors are the subject of detailed attention in the appropriate context. Information on these and other 
matters addressed in the dissertation were obtained from a fairly broad range of primary sources. However, 
there were two major limitations: (a) the failure to gain access to corporate documents of Argentine and 
international firms, and (b) the impossibility of holding interviews with any people involved with attempts 
to develop the Argentine iron and steel industry.
Although the severe industrial unrest afflicting steelmakers when fieldwork was undertaken in 1991 
did not help, the key problem in Argentina was that neither private nor State companies would open their 
archives. La Cantabrica was rapidly heading towards bankruptcy, TAMET had destroyed its papers, 
ACINDAR only made available published material, and the DGFM wrapped itself under the banner of 
official secrecy. Although the Archivo General de la Nacion was appointed the depository of documents 
belonging to the military-controlled iron and steel companies when these were privatised in 1992, it has not 
received any of the relevant papers to this day. It was also impossible to obtain access to the papers of 
ARBED-Terres Rouges and ARMCO. Attempts to shed any light on the operations of the Argentine 
subsidiary of British steelmaker Dorman Long, which might have been a useful source of comparison with 
the activities of firms like TAMET, also failed. The Dorman Long archives only hold papers relating 
exclusively to the parent company - eg, reports of annual general meetings, minutes of various company 
committees, and annual accounts files. Had access to ARBED-Terres Rouges and ARMCO been granted,
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it might have been possible to uncover the true extent to which ARBED used its substantial shareholding 
in TAMET to advance ISC policies in Argentina and to clarify with precision some of the oddities 
surrounding ARMCO collaboration in the PSA. Nonetheless, some lines of argument in the thesis relating 
to ARBED and ARMCO can be sustained through well-informed inferences arising from information in 
published primary sources. In addition, research in the Public Records Office (PRO), the Bank of England 
Archive, and the British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES) unearthed a variety of 
important papers. The subjects of those available at the PRO and the Bank of England are associated mostly 
with external constraints affecting the PSA, such as the lengths to which the USA went to try and extend 
its embargo against Argentina in relation to sales of ’strategic’ inputs, British assessments of ARMCO 
participation in the DGFM project, and the increasing British inability to supply Argentina with essentials 
such as coal. American documents available on microfilm in the BLPES reveal US official perceptions on 
DGFM projects and information about one of the few proven cases of corruption, implicating leading 
Argentine government officials and involving the award of contracts for SOMISA.
Combined with the unavailability of some corporate documents was the impossibility of holding 
interviews with any people associated with private steel manufacturers or the project for an integrated 
steelworks. The only surviving personage at the time was Arturo Frondizi, a Radical member of the Lower 
House of Congress and leading opponent to private sector participation in SOMISA, who had become far 
too senile. Although the inaccessibility to documents or first hand accounts is something of a setback, it 
has been partially compensated with printed primary sources. Comprehensive data on imports, the 
predominant Argentine source of iron and steel throughout the period under study, was obtained from two 
invaluable sources: (i) the highly detailed annual national trade statistics, and (ii) interwar period reports on 
Argentina by the British Board of Trade. As for domestic production and supplies of raw materials, there 
is an adequate range of printed materials. Those from the State sector include Army-backed Government 
reports promoting the possibilities of local steelmaking, published speeches outlining military ideology and 
’visions’ for the development of heavy industry, Congressional debates, the Plan Siderurgico Argentino 
booklet supplementing the Draft Bill of the PSA, publications promoting the DGFM and its two iron and 
steel producing companies, official mining and industrial statistics, and pamphlets on domestic sources of
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iron ore and coal published by the relevant State agencies. Printed primary sources from the private sector 
comprise company histories, annual reports, the TAMET ’in house’ periodical, and a report prepared by the 
(then privately run) Banco Central de la Republica Argentina. These printed materials by both Government 
departments and private companies, despite an abundance of self-promoting rhetoric, contain much useful 
information and data. However, Argentine printed primary sources lack supplementary information and 
statistics necessary to extend and carry some of the arguments presented in the thesis. This problem has 
been solved by using relevant official publications from the United Nations and its various regional 
economic commissions. Finally, by drawing on printed primary sources of Australian, Brazilian and South 
Korean origin it was possible to gain additional insights into the Argentine case by constructing a 
counterfactual based on the experience of other ’small’ developing economies.
Organisation o f  the thesis
The external and domestic constraints affecting the attempts to develop iron and steel production 
in Argentina are explored at length. As these constraints gave rise to a number of key themes over the 
period as a whole rather than to the years when national iron and steel manufacturing finally emerged, the 
thesis approaches the subject thematically through seven chapters.
Chapter 1 focuses on general issues regarding industrialisation, heavy industry and development, 
and also reviews both the debates on industrialisation in Argentina and the historiography on attempts to 
develop Argentine iron and steel production. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first of these 
reviews the issue of industrialisation and its role within the long-term process of economic growth, and 
assesses the notion that an iron and steel industry had a fundamental part in development, which was based 
on two elements: (a) historically, the sector had provided the lead during the industrial take-off of the major 
economies, and (b) the nature of the product that the industry provided. Since both these foundations are 
intertwined and arise in the technology of iron and steel production, the section also describes the process 
of iron and steel manufacturing - which is of an integrated nature and comprises three stages of production 
(pig iron production, steel production and rolling). In order to understand much of the subsequent discussion
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in the dissertation, emphasis is laid on the processes relevant to the Argentine case. The second section 
evaluates the Argentine discussions on industrialisation, which in large measure responded to the fact that 
the export-led growth which had made Argentina so prosperous was not a sustainable economic strategy in 
the long-term. Finally, the chapter reviews the existing historiography on the focal subject of the thesis, 
which is limited but nevertheless provides helpful pieces of information around which the the frustrated 
efforts to develop modem steelmaking in the Republic can be discussed.
Chapter 2 sets out the historical context within which iron and steel production developed in 
Argentina, and is divided into two sections. The first of these examines the international context, and shows 
that the major iron and steel producer-exporters prevented the growth of production in overseas markets such 
as Argentina which would compete with their own industries. The second section surveys the domestic 
limitations on the development of an iron and steel industry arising from the configuration of the national 
economy. It shows that, although the country was undergoing change, rural production and exports retained 
a key function and thereby structural reform was not extensive - not least because of institutional failure.
Chapter 3 discusses the role of the State, the private sector and foreign interests in the development 
of the iron and steel industry. It examines the origins of the private sector metallurgical firms that expanded 
into steel manufacturing during the Second World War and their early organisational instability, the ideas 
behind the military drive to establish heavy industry, and the preparation of the two major projects of the 
period by the DGFM. The early organisation of the military integrated steelworks project in a sociedad 
mixta with private and foreign interests is assessed in detail, since it refutes traditional assumptions about 
excessive State intervention in the economy under Peron, as is the political failure of the proposal.
Chapter 4 addresses the critical issue of size of the market. Argentina already had the 
characteristics of a semi-industrial country and could have deepened industrialisation, thereby expanding the 
demand for iron and steel. The chapter argues that in terms of population, income and a shift from primary 
production towards manufacturing, this should have been possible - at least on paper. However, this does 
not occur and the problems are reflected in the nature of the market for iron and steel. Consumption of the
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latter was largely by sectors whose requirements could not sustain domestic production. Demand by 
transportation (its largest source until the First World War) was affected by changed economic conditions 
after 1914 and the financial difficulties of the railway companies, which resulted in steadily falling purchases 
of new materials or renewals of permanent way. Construction, which had the largest share of the market, 
could not sustain production as the iron and steel content employed in the industry decreased. Demand by 
the emergent metallurgical sector was insufficient to sustain a domestic steel industry as its product-range 
was very wide and produced in relatively small volumes - which was inefficient and resulted in high costs.
Chapter 5 considers the many problems related to the supply of domestic and imported raw 
materials. It argues that, despite its many apparent advantages, scrap was far from an adequate resource on 
which to base domestic steel manufacturing as its sources were limited and stocks could not be easily 
replenished once used. Any shortfall in scrap had to be compensated with imported pig iron, whose supplies 
in this period fluctuated sharply (not least during the world economic crisis and the Forties). The chapter 
also evaluates the cost-effectiveness of domestic sources of minerals and fuels, and discloses the extent of 
their inadequacies. Finally, the option enshrined in the PSA - namely, the use of a mix of foreign and 
national inputs - is considered, and demonstrated to be somewhat unfeasible at the time as imported raw 
materials such as coal would not have been easily available.
Chapter 6 assesses the impact of two major international factors on technology transfers. These 
are the calculated attempts of the principal Continental steel producer-exporters to thwart growth in local 
production during the Twenties and Thirties, and American antagonism towards Argentina following the 
1943 coup and the Peronista rise to power. However, the chapter reveals that three domestic factors had 
distinct repercussions on the availability of technology: (i) the skill of Argentine engineers to skirt 
restrictions on foreign technology transfers, as exemplified by the Fabrica Militar de Aceros in the Thirties; 
(ii) the little known matter of nationalist objections to participation by the subsidiary of the US firm 
ARMCO in the PSA, which arose critically during the Congressional debate on this project in 1947 as a 
result of US-Argentine antagonism; and (iii) the shortages of foreign exchange in the late Forties, which was 
essential to cover imports of equipment.
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Finally, Chapter 7 examines the gap b etween the ideology b ehind the military heavy industry proj ect 
and the economics of iron and steel production. It assesses the consequences of bad planning guided by 
national defence requirements, which entailed contrived projections, the use of expensive national resources 
and little regard for business considerations, and appraises alternatives that would have made the military 
proposals economically viable. It is this chapter which reflects the most important lesson from the Argentine 
experience with attempts to develop an iron and steel industry: that ’having’ an industry to meet political 
objectives, even if  the circumstances appear auspicious for such an undertaking, is not sufficient enough 
reason for its establishment.
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Chapter 1
INDUSTRIALISATION, DEVELOPMENT AND HEAVY INDUSTRY: 
GENERAL AND ARGENTINE DEBATES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
A key proposition in this thesis is that Argentina in the second quarter of the century failed to 
thoroughly transform its economic structure and achieve its aspiration of becoming what is now labelled a 
developed nation - a fact not least reflected in floundering attempts to establish a modem iron and steel 
industry. Rural production and exports retained a key function in the economy, notwithstanding that 
Argentina had acquired the characteristics of a semi-industrial country by the Twenties. As will be seen in 
Chapter 4, the economy had diversified its production and had attained several benchmarks which 
differentiated it from exclusively primary-oriented countries (ie, a minimum per capita income, shifts in 
production from the primary sector to manufacturing, and the contribution of industry to growth).1 
Although this should have enabled a deepening industrialisation, the Republic instead took what many 
describe as a wrong turn and set off on a perverse downhill course. This has given rise to much 
controversy, whose various facets are covered in the Argentinianist literature reviewed in the third section 
of this chapter. Such specific debates cannot be discussed without an understanding of the broader context 
of the roles of industrialisation generally and heavy industry in particular had in development. This chapter 
consists of four sections. The first defines the concept of industrialisation, which was one component in 
long-term economic growth, and appraises the key viewpoints on the opportunities to undertake the process. 
The second section assesses the perceived role of heavy industry in economic transformation, with attention 
being paid to the nature of iron and steel making as this influenced the ideas as to what could be achieved 
if there was domestic steel production. The third section evaluates the debates on Argentine 
industrialisation, which were in large measure responding to the fact that the export-led growth that had 
made the country so prosperous was not a sustainable economic strategy in the long-term. The final section 
of this chapter reviews the existing historiography on the central topic of this dissertation, which is limited 
but nonetheless provides useful pointers around which to discuss the frustrated attempts to develop modem 
steelmaking in Argentina.
1 Hollis Chenery, Sherman Robinson and Moshe Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth (Washington, 
1986), pp.84,85.
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INDUSTRIALISATION: ITS FUNCTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The term industrialisation can be defined in two ways, (a) It is described as the establishment of 
a modem, integrated, urban-based manufacturing sector.2 (b) More importantly from the perspective of this 
thesis, it is explained as the shift of the centre of economic gravity away from primary production towards 
manufacturing and the central factor in modem growth and in development - the latter being a successful 
structural transformation of the economy.3 Interpreting industrialisation in terms of the second definition, 
developing countries have sought the process as an essential component of the expansion, diversification and 
modernisation of their economies.4 Industrialisation was perceived to have three significant advantages, 
(i) It improved living standards. Rises in the shares of national income derived from manufacturing and of 
the working population employed in these activities led to increases in the per capita income of the 
population - excluding at times of cyclical interruptions.5 (ii) Economies of scale and growth in 
productivity became important and brought cumulative benefits in the form of external economies. This 
realisation arose from early arguments favouring industrialisation, which were largely based on the assumed 
properties of technology in manufacturing and related sectors.6 (iii) Industrialisation offset disadvantages 
of specialisation in primary production and the related deterioration in the terms of trade.7 As is shown 
below, the latter perceived benefit was heavily promoted in Argentine (and broader Latin American) debates
2 Colin H. Kirkpatrick and Frederick I. Nixson, The industrialisation o f less developed countries 
(Manchester, 1983), p.2.
3 Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, Industrialization, p.ix; Simon Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth 
(New Haven, 1966), p.l.
4 John Cody, Helen Hughes and David Wall (eds.), Policies for Industrial Progress in Developing 
Countries (Washington, 1980), p .ll.
5 See BhabatoshDatta, The Economics o f Industrialization (Calcutta, 1952); Kuznets, Economic Growth 
o f Nations (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971).
6 See Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, ’Problems of Industrialization in Eastern and Southeastern Europe’, 
Economic Journal LIII (1943) Nos.210-211, pp.202-211; Kurt Mandelbaum, The Industrialisation o f 
Backward Areas (Oxford, 1945).
7 See H.W. Singer, ’The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries’, American 
Economic Review XL (1950) No.2, pp.473-485; United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), The economic development o f Latin America and its principal problems (Lake Success, 
1950).
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as a justification to pursue industrialisation.
Since industrialisation is just one component in the long-term process of economic transformation, 
theories such as that developed by W.W. Rostow in the Fifties emphasize the stages of growth. The 
Rostowian model comprises the following five clearly identified phases. The first is one in which traditional 
society, whose structure developed within limited production functions based on pre-Newton science and 
technology, predominated. The second is one in which the preconditions for take-off evolved, with the 
insights of modem science being translated into new production functions in agriculture and industry in a 
setting given dynamism by the lateral expansion of world markets and international competition for them. 
Rostow believed that the arrival of new types of enterprising men, the appearance of banks and other 
institutions for mobilising capital, and increased investment in transport and communications as well as in 
raw materials of economic interest were necessary for an initial spurt in manufacturing. The third stage was 
that of the take-off, which was described as the interval when old blocks and resistances to steady growth 
were removed. The beginning of the take-off was traced to a sharp stimulus such as a technological 
revolution or an unfavourable shift in the terms of trade requiring the rapid development of manufactured 
import substitutes, and two conditions were required, (a) The existence or quick emergence of a political, 
social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expand the modem sector and give an on­
going character to growth, (b) The development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors with a 
high rate of growth - including the processing of agricultural products or raw materials by modem methods. 
Rostow argued that the key lead sector were railways, not only by providing forward transport linkages for 
many sectors but because of a ’backward’ demand for coal and iron and steel (see below). The fourth stage 
identified by Rostow was the drive towards maturity, in which the make-up of the economy changed 
relentlessly as technology improved, new industries accelerated and older ones levelled off. The fifth phase 
of the stages of economic growth model was the age of mass consumption, in which the leading sectors 
shifted towards consumer durables and services and real income per capita had risen to the point where most 
people gained a command of consumption which trascended basic food, shelter and clothing.8
8 W.W. Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth (3rd ed., Cambridge, 1990), pp.4-10,36-37,39.
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Also in the Fifties, Alexander Gerschenkron elaborated a model of late-comer economic 
development whose appeal derives from its logical and consistent ordering of the process of European 
development, the conditional nature of its predictions, and its generalisability to the experience of late­
comers in the present array of underdeveloped nations. Gerschenkron’s hypothesis can be summarised in 
the following manner. (1) Relative backwardness creates a tension between the promise of economic 
development, as achieved elsewhere, and the reality of stagnation. Such a tension motivates institutional 
innovation and promotes locally appropriate substitution for the absent preconditions of growth. (2) The 
greater the degree of backwardness, the more interventionist was the successful channelling of capital and 
entrepreneurial guidance to nascent industries by agents such as the State. Also, the more coercive and 
comprehensive were the measures to reduce domestic consumption. (3) The more backward the economy, 
the more likely were an emphasis on producer goods rather than consumer goods, the use of capital intensive 
rather than labour intensive methods of production, the emergence of larger rather than smaller units of both 
plant and enterprise, and dependence on borrowed, advanced technology rather than indigenous techniques. 
(4) The more backward the country, the less likely was the agricultural sector to provide a growing market 
to industry through rising productivity and the more unbalanced the resulting productive structure of an 
economy.9
As from the late Sixties, led by analysts such as Simon Kuznets, Hollis Chenery and Moshe 
Syrquin, the debate on industrialisation focused on the issue of structural change. Kuznets identified, 
documented and analysed the emergence of a new stage in economic history which he defined as modern 
economic growth, in which there was a vast diversification away from primary, extractive sectors and a 
proliferation of industries and occupations. He argued that three conditions particularly set modem 
economic growth apart from previous forms of economic organisation. These were the growth rate of real 
per capita income, the industrial and occupational distribution of the labour force, and the form of population 
settlement. In economies experiencing modem economic growth, the rate of increase of real per capita 
income usually averaged 15% or more per decade over a century or longer periods - an unprecedented feat.
9 See Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1962).
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The shift out of agriculture led to a transformation in population distribution, characterisedby the emergence 
and subsequent predominance of spacial concentration in cities and their suburbs. Underlying the 
acceleration in the growth rate of real per capita income and the associated reallocation of resources by 
industry, occupation and location was a technological revolution. The latter resulted in a reliance on 
inanimate sources of power, the growth in significance of minerals relative to fibres as raw material, the 
spread of mechanisation and an associated rise in the optimum scale for manufacturing production leading 
to factory organisation, and new forms of transport and communication. The analysis of modem economic 
growth enabled Kuznets to demonstrate that its features described above were essentially similar in large 
parts of the world (markedly in the developed nations and in incipient form in some underdeveloped 
countries), and he therefore subsequently contributed a major empirically founded comparative study of the 
economic growth of nations.10
Other structural change analysts such as Chenery and Syrquin assessed the process of economic 
transformation itself, and defined it in terms of only three periods. The first was identified by the 
predominance of primary production, and was followed by a phase of industrialisation in which the emphasis 
shifted towards manufacturing; the final stage was that of a developed economy. The initial period of 
transformation had three characteristics, (a) The share of agriculture and related branches in total national 
production was relatively high while that of the extended industrial sector - mining, manufacturing, 
construction, water, energy, transport and communications - was relatively low. (b) The nature of 
manufacturing activities was limited, (c) The presence of services such as trade, finance and real estate was 
of considerable significance. The initial rise of industry stemmed from growth in domestic demand, as rises 
in per capita income led to a fall in the share of food consumption and an expansion as well as change in 
the composition of non-food demand. Since initially there was no market for intermediate goods, 
industrialisation began with two types of industries: (i) those that transformed domestic or imported primary 
products into goods required by final demand (textiles, construction materials industries); and (ii) those that 
transformed imported semi-manufactures into goods needed by final demand (assembly and mixing plants, 
pharmaceutical laboratories, metal-fabricating industries). The result was a gradual shift away from primary
10 See the two major works by Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth and Economic Growth o f Nations.
26
production, and the extent to which economies became semi-industrial is measured by a series of ’threshold’ 
indicators - the point at which the contribution of manufacturing to growth exceeded that of primary 
production, a minimum per capita income as a proxy for domestic demand for manufactures, and a minimum 
share of manufacturing in production. As industrial activities increased purchases of manufactured 
commodities and substituted them for primary ones, demand for intermediate use goods expanded rapidly. 
This led to the development of backward linkages.11
Although the various works discussed above all viewed industrialisation as being one component 
in economic development, they differ in their interpretation as to how it occurred within the long-term 
process. While Rostow’s model of stages of economic growth had discontinuities such as the ’take-off, 
Gerschenkron conceptualised industrialisation in late industrialising countries as a ’big spurt’ (ie, the more 
backward the country, the more rapidly it wanted to catch up with advanced nations). Structural change 
analysts presented different perspectives on the economic process. While Kuznets identified, documented 
and analysed the features of modem economic development, Chenery and Syrquin concentrated on the actual 
transformation of an economy - ie, the shift of gravity away from primary activities towards manufacturing. 
However, there was a weakness inherent in the various propositions: they had to be adjusted to the realities 
of the development paths taken by underdeveloped countries. In the case with the Gershenckron model, this 
was necessary bercause his concept which had been rooted in the special characteristics of the historical 
European experience. In the instance of the Rostowian and structural change paradigms, economic 
development was constrained in practice by international restrictions (access to capital and technology, 
foreign trade). As regards specifically the Rostowian model, Rostow’s argument that it could be applied 
to all economies is at odds with conditions in a large number of underdeveloped countries. Many of these 
lacked well-integrated commodity and money markets, highly developed transport facilities, a well-trained 
and educated workforce, motivation to succeed, and an efficient government bureaucracy. Regarding the 
framework proposed by structural change analysts, it was affected not only be external constraints but also 
domestic limitations such as a country’s physical size and its population, resource endowment, and
11 See Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, Industrialization, pp.56-57,62,72-73,85; Kuznets, Modern 
Economic Growth, p.409; Kirkpatrick andNixson, Industrialisation, p. 10; Albert O. Hirschman, The strategy 
o f economic development (Boulder, 1988), pp. 100,111.
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institutional constraints. The latter were not only in the form of specific government objectives and policies. 
As Kuznets acknowledged, there were three minimum political requirements for modem economic growth. 
Foremost was the need for stability, as much growth could not be expected under turmoil conditions and 
unpredictable changes of regime. Second, governments had to resolve conflicts of interest that arose in the 
process of economic change. And third, a minimum level of representativeness was necessary.12
THE ROLE OF HEAVY INDUSTRY IN  INDUSTRIALISATION
Of the various propositions discussed above, the one which is of the utmost importance to the thesis 
is the analysis of the actual process of economic change. A key underlying issue in this dissertation is that 
Argentina failed to achieve a thorough structural transformation of its economy, and that one of the reasons 
for this was institutional failure. However, a further observation must be made about Rostow’s model. By 
incorporating the notion of lead sectors, the Rostowian concept of a take-off has major connotations in the 
perceived role of iron and steel production in economic development. Rostow has argued that, historically, 
in most major economies (and particularly the USA) the lead sector had been heavy industry complexes, 
whose growth can be traced directly to the building and maintenance requirements of the sunstantial railway 
systems that developed. His view was that, by giving impetus to the development of the modem coal, iron 
and steel, and engineering industries, the introduction of railroads had been the most powerful single initiator 
of a take-off. To a much lesser extent, the rise of heavy industry as a lead sector can be tracked to the 
enlargement and modernisation of Armed Forces, which required iron and steel military end-products.13 
Although historically the role of modem armaments has been ancillary rather than central to the take-off 
being led by basic industries, more recently underdeveloped countries have made independence in economic 
and military matters a central theme of industrialisation. The problem with this strategy was that the 
political considerations of independence often ran counter to both economic efficiency and growth, as 
priority was given to self-sufficiency in basic and defence industries.14
12 Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth, p.451.
13 Rostow, Stages, pp.55,56.
14 Cody, Hughes and Wall (eds.), Policies, p. 18.
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Although initially based on a limited range of markets, heavy industry satisfied the Rostowian 
requirements for a sector to lead by bringing in new production functions and backward, lateral and forward 
linkage effects.15 With time, the Rostowian argument was criticised on two accounts, (a) The empirical 
evidence gathered by historical research showed large differences over time and between different economies 
as regards the notion of heavy industry as a leading sector, (b) Railways had not been significant for the 
formation of US heavy industry in terms of a consumption of domestic iron and steel products. Although 
these criticisms are now widely accepted, Rostow’s theories were in the vogue in the middle of this century 
and policy-makers acted on the assumption that his analysis was correct. Rostowian views influenced the 
notion, particularly in underdeveloped countries, that the undertaking of domestic iron and steel production 
was critical to economic development. Never consumed directly by man, steel was a means of production 
and industrial raw material that, after technical transformation, was incorporated in finished consumer goods 
and investment goods. The production of sophisticated goods in which steel was the essential input was 
argued to have spillover effects on the rest of the economy, transforming agriculture, construction, transport 
and other industries into highly productive sectors.16
To understand fully why these perceptions arose, one final item must be considered before going 
on to discuss the debates on Argentine industrialisation. This is the process of iron and steel production, 
which is of an integrated nature, and the technology involved. Iron and steel making is considered a heavy 
industry owing to the volume of inputs treated in gigantic installations, which in turn require particularly 
large investments. Based on iron ore, production consists of the reduction of iron oxides into a molten state 
and the subsequent refinement of the cmde metal for the manufacture of various steel types dependent on 
the requirements of the finishing industry.17 This process comprises three integrated stages. The first stage 
is pig iron production in blast furnaces, and special attention is paid to charcoal-based production since this 
was the technique employed by the Altos Homos Zapla in the Republic. The second stage is steel
15 Rostow, ’Leading Sectors and the Take-Off, in Rostow (ed.), The Economics o f Take-Off into 
Sustained Growth (London, 1963), p.7.
16 Franco Peco, L ’acierface aux theories economiques (Milan, 1971), p.27; Cody, Hughes and Wall 
(eds.), Policies, p. 13.
17 Daniel Rivet, L ’acier et Vindustrie siderurgique (Paris, 1978), pp.7,57.
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production itself. Emphasis is laid on the most widely employed method: the basic open-hearth process, 
which had many advantages and was viewed as the most appropriate for the development of the Argentine 
industry. The third and final stage described is rolling of steel into finished goods. Distinction will be made 
between the two types of goods, non-flats and flats.
The first stage o f  iron and steel making: pig iron production in blast furnaces
Iron has been produced for many centuries. Originally, a spungy lump of iron was obtained in a 
crude furnace by blowing air with a pair of bellows through a mixture of iron ore and wood charcoal at high 
temperature. In time, the air was blown by mechanical means: this gave rise to the name ’blast furnace’.18 
Although technological innovation resulted in the replacement of charcoal by coke in time, pig iron 
production remained charcoal-based in countries lacking access to other fuels.19 Blast furnaces employing 
charcoal had two advantages over those using coke. First, the pig iron manufactured was of a better quality, 
and had a low sulphur content. And second, their consumption of fuel was lower owing to the possibility 
of producing pig iron at a lower temperature, despite the greater losses of heat per ton of pig iron arising 
from irradiation, convection, etcetera.20 However, charcoal had serious drawbacks. It was an expensive 
reducing agent and fuel, except in regions distant from coal supplies and/or exceptionally rich in forest 
resources.21 A huge volume of wood was required in its production: the cutting of 3 hectares of forest 
were needed to produce a mere 100 tons of charcoal, which in turn produced only 50 tons of pig iron. 
Therefore, 2 tons of charcoal were necessary to produce 1 ton of pig iron.22 Charcoal production was only 
possible so long as forests were available as sources of supply, and became increasingly problematic as
18 Douglas A. Fisher, Steel Serves the Nation (New York, 1951), p. 119.
19 Kenneth Warren, World Steel (Newton Abbot, 1975), p.49.
20 UN, ECLA, A study o f the iron and steel industry in Latin America, Volume II (New York, 1954), 
p.157.
21 Kris E. Inwood, The Canadian charcoal iron industry, 1870-1914 (New York, 1986), p.68.
22 Carlos Manuel Pelaez, Historia da Industrializagao Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1972), p. 157.
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reforestation near plants was not regulated and occasional.23 With the rapid depletion of timberland, the 
radius of wood collection widened and it became harder to secure steady supplies at economic prices.24
Modem coke-fuelled blast furnaces, which became predominant in the world at large, date from 
1859.25 Their use had four great benefits. First, coke was a less expensive fuel and its production was 
more easily expanded in the long-mn than that of charcoal.26 Second, coke had better mechanical 
resistance than charcoal. Coke was hard and porous and thereby able to withstand the cmshing load of 
materials in the furnace and allow the passage of the blast.27 Third, coke-based furnaces required a smaller 
investment per ton of pig iron and had lower costs per ton. And fourth, large-scale production was possible. 
While charcoal-based furnaces had their size restricted by the low calorific value of charcoal, coke-based 
furnaces could be large as they incur less loss of heat per ton of pig iron.28
Figure 1.1 shows the common shape of a blast furnace, and its components. The blast furnace 
functions as an exchanger between a descending flow of materials which turn from solids to liquids, and 
an ascendant flow of gas. The mineral is reduced into pieces of calibrated dimensions averaging 3 
milimetres, which favours the passage of the gas, and are then agglomerated. The charge has an average 
weight of 60 tons (80% consisting of ore agglomerations, and 20% of fuel), and is received at the top of 
the blast furnace from an inclined hoist with either buckets or skip cars. After entry, the charge slowly sinks 
down the stack and passes through different zones of temperature produced by hot gas blown in from below. 
The cold material charge is pre-heated and rapidly absorbs the heat of the gas: as it descends the quantity 
of iron increases with the rise in temperature. Liquid pig iron is obtained in the belly of the furnace, but 
it only comprises Vs of the charge and is rich in impurities such as sulphur, phosphoms and manganese. In
23 John Dearden, Iron and Steel Today (2nd ed., London, 1956), p.39; Pelaez, Historia, p. 159.
24 Warren, Steel, p.49.
25 Fisher, Steel, p. 119.
26 Inwood, Charcoal, p.68.
27 Dearden, Iron, p.40.








1. Top, 2. stack, 3. belly, 4. bosh, 5. hearth.
Source: Ernest Arthur Boas, Latin America's Steel Industry (Berlin, 1968), p.42.
the bosh, which is located below the belly and where the heat is blown in, the temperature of the gas is over 
2,000°C and improves the chemical composition of the pig iron through oxidation of the impurities, which 
are separated from the pig iron at the hearth.29
The second stage o f  iron and steel making: steel production and the basic open-hearth furnace
Since pig iron contains many impurities (particularly carbon) as it comes out of the blast furnace, 
it must be refined in the mill. The most common steel manufacturing method is the basic open-hearth 
process, whose’share in total world steel production increased from 11.9% in 1880 to 41.5% in 1900, 72.2% 
in 1929 and 79.0% in 1950.30 Figure 1.2 shows a Siemens-Martin open-hearth furnace. Heated with either 
liquid or gaseous fuel, it is a reverberating furnace that functions on the principle of the pre-heating of the
29 Rivet, Acier, pp.22,23,28.




THE SIEMENS-MARTIN OPEN-HEARTH FURNACE
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1. Checkers, 2. burnt gases, 3. molten steel, 4. air, 5. fuel.
Source: Boas, Industry, p.61.
air for the combustion and also of the fuel gas. Pre-heating takes place in the checkers, chambers lined with 
refractary brick checker work that are made hot by the heat still remaining in the burnt gases as they leave 
the furnace.31 The burning fuel causes flames to surge from the sides of the furnace walls and sweep over 
the surface of the charge, which is contained in a large, shallow furnace. This exposure of the charge to 
the flames is what gives the name ’open’ to the process. The charge also includes fluxes such as lime and 
limestone for the formation of slag, which is to contain all the impurities to be removed from the liquid 
metal. The molten steel is poured into a refractary-lined ladle and lifted by crane to the pouring platform, 
where the steel is poured into moulds.32
Since the source of heat in this process is outside the charge, its advantage was that it could produce 
steel using inputs other than hot iron.33 This was quite crucial for countries lacking adequate coal and iron 
resources. Siemens-Martin furnaces could utilise large volumes of cheap low-grade scrap, cast-iron and 
wrought-iron scrap, which could be obtained in three forms. First was that produced in the steelworks, in 
the shape of crop ends, shearings and rejected materials. Second was ’home brought’ scrap arising from
31 Ernest Arthur Boas, Latin America’s Steel Industry (Berlin, 1968), p.61.
32 Werner Baer, The Development o f the Brazilian Steel Industry (Nashville, 1969), pp. 11,12.
33 UN, ECE, Comparison, p.2.
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iron and steel goods that had outlived their usefulness. And finally there was imported scrap.34 However, 
the major drawback was that production could not depend excessively on scrap. Although it was cheaper 
than pig iron, scrap was often relatively scarce and if the available supply was insufficient to maintain the 
desired level of ingot production, output could only be sustained through additional pig iron capacity to 
replace the scrap shortage.35 Such a disadvantage did not discourage ’small’ countries determined to 
develop domestic steel production. From their viewpoint, the open-hearth process had important 
advantages: there was flexibility in both the combination of inputs employed in the metallic charge and the 
quality of ores used in the pig iron included in the charge.
The third stage o f iron and steel making: the rolling o f finished goods
In this phase, which is illustrated in Figure 1.3, the steel is processed into finished products in 
rolling mills which form part of the steelworks. The molten steel is poured into ingot moulds of various 
shapes and sizes. After the necessary solidification, ingots are removed from their moulds by cranes and 
placed into soaking pits. The latter are heated with liquid or gaseous fuel and give the ingots a uniform 
temperature. The ingots are then lifted by crane from the soaking pits on to the rolling mills, which are 
highly specialised departments. These are generally known by the name of the product upon which they 
are engaged, the principal ones being bar, rail, rod, wire, plate, structural, sheet, strip and pipe mills.36 
Initially, ingots are rolled into two kinds of shapes, blooms or slabs. Blooms are usually square or 
rectangular in cross section, and are used for making non-flat products. Slabs are usually wider and thinner 
than a bloom, and are utilised in making flat products.37 As is seen in Figure 1.3, in the blooming or 
slabbing mill the ingot is passed between two huge steel rollers, passing back and forth as the rollers are 
brought closer together. The good is then sheared into shorter lengths while still red hot.
34 Dearden, Iron, p. 107.
35 UN, ECLA, Study, Volume II, p.244.
36 E.D. McCallum, The Iron and Steel Industry in the United States (London, 1931), pp.81,82; Warren, 
Steel, p.64.
37 Baer, Development, pp. 13,14.
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Figure 1.3
THE ROLLING MILL AND THE PRODUCTION OF FINISHED GOODS
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Source: Daniel Rivet, L ’acier et I’industrie siderurgique (Paris, 1978), p.33.
Blooms are produced in the blooming mill and then delivered to billet mills for billet production. 
Billets are generally square in cross section, with their size depending on the bloom from which they 
originated, and are an intermediary form of steel.38 Billets are then processed into rails and heavy 
structural materials, bars for use in metallurgy and engineering, and light structural materials (ie, rods that 
may be used to reinforce concrete but are largely drawn into wire, strip that is used for welded tubes, and 
various shapes).39 Originally, the reduction of billets was done by reversing the matel through the same 
rolls again and again. As this method was slow and expensive, it was substituted with continuous mills.40 
As seen in Figure 1.3, these mills are continuous finishing trains consisting of a series of rollers placed in 
tandem, with the semifinished steel emerging straight from one set of rolls to another. Each stand of rolls 
constitutes one pass for the billet, and the number of stands in the mills were dictated by the number of
38 Ibid., p. 14.
39 William A. Johnson, The Steel Industry o f India (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966), p.6; P.W.S. 
Andrews and Elizabeth Brunner, Capital Development in Steel (Oxford, 1951), p.66.
40 Norman J.G. Pounds, The Geography o f Iron and Steel (revised 5th ed., London, 1971), p.53.
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passes required to obtain individual final products.41
Slabs are produced in the slabbing mill and then processed into flat products such as plates, sheets, 
hoops, strips, cold-rolled sheets and tinplate.42 As with blooms, the reduction of slabs was originally done 
by reversing - ie, passing the semifinished steel through the same rolls again and again.43 The process was 
revolutionised with the introduction of the continuous wide-strip mills, which are of two types (fully 
continuous and semicontinuous) and used for producing hot-rolled flat products. Fully continuous mills 
comprise a roughing train of two or more stands of rollers placed in tandem and a finishing train of several 
stands placed in tandem, with the steel travelling continuously through the roughing and finishing trains 
without reversing at any stage. Semicontinuous mills comprise a reversing roughing train of one or two 
stands and a continuous finishing train of various stands placed in tandem. For cold-rolling, two types of 
cold-strip mills are used: (a) continuous, and (b) reversing. In the continuous mill, the strip is cold-rolled 
in coils in a train of mills consisting of several stands placed in tandem. In the reversing mill, the strip is 
cold-rolled in coils through reversing in a single stand.44 Flat products produced in wide-strip and cold- 
strip mills are used in a wide range of goods such as automobiles, kitchen white goods, and office furniture.
INDUSTRIALISA TIONIN ARGENTINA: DEBA TES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
One of the earliest works on Argentine economic conditions and the state of industrialisation was 
The Economic Development o f the Argentine Republic in the Last Fifty Years, published by the Tomquist 
group in 1919. Largely comprising detailed statistics, it was influenced by the existing framework of export- 
led growth and provides useful insights from the perspective of interests largely associated with banking, 
foreign trade and sugar mills. Industry was still regarded in terms of processing arable and pastoral 
commodities. This is reflected in the manner the work classifies particular sectors in the statistics, eg what
41 Dearden, Iron, p. 166.
42 UN, ECE, The European steel industry and the wide-strip mill (Geneva, 1953), p.l.
43 Pounds, Geography, p.53.
44 UN, ECE, Wide-strip mill, p.98.
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is currently termed as food-processing industries appeared as ’extractive’ industries. Moreover, further 
industrialisation was envisaged through the use of raw materials such as fibre, which were in abundant 
supply and used to manufacture sacks, vegetable oils, wood-pulp, and woollen and cotton yams.45
However, there was growing concern and dissent over the path the country had taken. The 
determinants of pre-1914 growth had been the rise of world demand for food and availability of fertile land 
in the Pampas. In statistical terms, the economy in the Twenties appeared to behave much the same way 
as in the past.46 However, conditions at that time had changed. According to the literature, they 
manifested themselves in three ways. First, Argentina was surpassed by Canada as the major exporter of 
wheat, a key cereal export.47 Second, the value of the close Anglo-Argentine economic and political links 
was decreasing, not least because the heavy reliance on Britain as an export market could not be 
reciprocated.48 The final and perhaps most important condition were the inherent problems in the process 
of horizontal expansion across the Pampas, which remain a critical issue although the interpretation of their 
nature is changing. Traditionally, three factors are blamed for the failure of export-led growth to translate 
into sustained development: land concentration, the tenancy system, and the fact that the domestic market 
was no substitute for exports.49 Recent historiography has argued that the real problems were the
45 See Emesto Tomquist & Co., The Economic Development o f the Argentine Republic in the Last Fifty 
Years (Buenos Aires, 1919), especially pp.xviii,36-37.
46 See the data on exports in Vemon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position o f Argentina 
(Philadelphia, 1938), pp.136,141; and in Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica de la 
Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina, volumes for the period 1920-1930.
47 For a detailed explanation as to why this occurred, see John Fogarty, ’Staples, Super-Staples and the 
Limits of Staple Theory: the Experiences of Argentina, Australia and Canada Conmpared’, in D.C.M. Platt 
and Guido Di Telia (eds.), Argentina, Australia and Canada (London, 1985), pp.27-30.
48 Callum A. MacDonald, ’End of Empire: the Decline of the Anglo-Argentine Connection 1918-1951’, 
in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), The Land That England Lost (London, 1992); Pedro R. Skupch, 
’Deterioro y fin de la hegemonia britanica sobre la economia argentina (1914-1947)’, in Marta Panaia, 
Ricardo Lesser and Pedro Skupch (eds.), Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo, Volume 2 (Buenos 
Aires, 1973); Roger Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939 (Boulder, 1985).
49 See Tulio Halperin Donghi, ’Cancion de otono en primavera: previsiones sobre la crisis de la 
agricultura cerealera argentina (1894-1930)’, Desarrollo Economico (DE) 24 (1984-1985) No.95, for an 
account of contemporary perceptions; also see Fogarty, ’Staples’, p.20, and Roberto Cortes Conde, ’Export- 
Led Growth in Latin America: 1870-1930’, Journal o f Latin American Studies (JLAS) 24 (1992) 
Quincentenary Supplement, p. 169.
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unforeseen consequences of the horizontal expansion, which only surfaced when the frontier closed, and the 
unwillingness of landowners and tenants to accept the necessary reforms in property relations. Historians 
such as Jeremy Adelman found claims that land was monopolised by the few and that the estancia-based 
regime was retrograde as deceptive. It is argued instead that the tenancy system suited both landowners and 
tenants and was the victim of its success, particularly as immigrants continued to converge on the Pampas 
once the open frontier evaporated.50 As regards the domestic market, the literature has demonstrated the 
inaccuracy of the assertion that imports entering the country as a result of the increase in exports hampered 
the rise of domestic manufacturing by being cheaper than national production. As is fully discussed in 
Chapter 4, some industry had arisen on account of the expansion of agro-exports, rapid population growth 
(particularly in the urban sector), and a shift in the nature of foreign investments following the First World 
War.51 Furthermore, there was pressure from within the Army for the establishment of essential strategic 
industries (see below).
The earliest writings advocating the need for a reappraisal of the development model and for 
industrialisation were those of Alejandro E. Bunge. In 1914 he began writing a series of books and articles 
describing and analysing the economic scene, and in 1918 he founded the Revista de Economia Argentina 
(REA), which soon became a vehicle to promote his views. Bunge, convinced that the unsettlement created 
by the First World War underlined the need for a major effort to reduce dependence on foreign markets, 
criticised the existing structure of the economy and the control of trade by foreigners. Bunge believed that 
the pre-1914 system of trade could not be restored, as the United Kingdom was moving towards a policy
50 Jeremy Adelman, Frontier Development: Land, labour and capital on the wheatlands o f Argentina 
and Canada, 1890-1914 (Oxford, 1994).
51 See Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic (New 
Haven, 1970), p.211; Bill Albert, South America and the First World War (Cambridge, 1988), pp.215-217; 
Colin M. Lewis, ’Railways and Industrialization: Argentina and Brazil, 1870-1929’, in Christopher Abel and 
Colin M. Lewis (eds.), Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State (London, 1985), pp.215,217, 
and ’Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Manufacturing and Industrial Policy in the Argentine, 1922-28’, The Journal 
o f Imperial and Commonwealth History XVI (1987-1988) No.l, p.78, on the impact of export-led growth 
and urbanisation; see Eduardo F. Jorge, Industria y  concentracion economica (Buenos Aires, 1971), 
pp.90,98; Mira Wilkins, The Maturing o f Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 
to 1970 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), pp.60,62; Jorge G. Fodor and Arturo A. O’Connell, ’La 
Argentina y la economia atlantica en la primera mitad del siglo XX’, DE 13 (1973-1974) No.49, p. 19 on 
the shift in the nature of foreign investment.
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of imperial preference and the USA was no substitute market given the protectionism aimed at defending 
American farmers. His solution lay in a programme of diversification through import substitution and the 
growth of manufacturing. He argued that reforms to the existing tariff structure, which he regarded as 
inadequate, would encourage ’natural’ industrialisation and the export of manufactured goods. In addition, 
Bunge and his ’disciples’ envisaged increased investment and an expanded role of the State in the 
economy.52
The ideas espoused by Bunge and the group coalescing around the REA had some relevance to 
military thinking. Leading members of the Army, increasingly discontented over the precariousness of the 
traditional economic system and the Argentine international economic position, became interested in the 
possibilities of economic change and industrialisation as a result of import shortages during the First World 
War, the restricted nature of existing industry and an increase in the labour supply resulting from rapid 
urbanisation. Technocrats from the Army Engineering Corps, convinced that they possessed the necessary 
technical skills to attain this goal, began to champion industrialisation and self-sufficiency as essential 
foundations for national defence and economic security. Furthermore, they initially believed that the State 
should intervene in critical industries such as steel and oil with military assistance.53 Although the Army 
would remain guided by preoccupations with strengthening national defence by achieving self-sufficiency 
in key basic industries and the production of weapons, its perceptions on the role of the State would change. 
The military increasingly upheld the notion that the best solution to developing basic industries was not State 
monopolies but public-private sociedades mixtas (see Chapter 3).
With the exception of the Armed Forces, the ideas for change advanced by Bunge carried little 
weight. They had no bearing on government policy, at least until 1940. The Union Civica Radical (UCR),
52 Mark Falcoff, ’Economic Dependency in a Conservative Mirror: Alejandro Bunge and the Argentine 
Frustration, 1919-1943’, Inter-American Economic Affairs 35 (1981-1982) No.4; David Rock, Authoritarian 
Argentina (Berkeley, 1993), especially p.70; many of these ideas were reprinted in Alejandro E. Bunge, Una 
nueva Argentina (2nd ed., Buenos Aires, 1984), originally published in 1940.
53 Robert A. Potash, El ejercitoy lapolitica en la Argentina, 1928-1945 (10th ed., Buenos Aires, 1982), 
p.45; Benjamin A. Most, Changing Authoritarian Rule and Public Policy in Argentina, 1930-1970 (Boulder, 
1991), p.84; Carl E. Solberg, Oil and Nationalism in Argentina (Stanford, 1979), pp.76,82.
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which governed from 1916 until it was overthrown in the 1930 coup, had no reason to overturn the existing 
strategy and merely strove for accomodation - a decision whose roots lay in the composition of the party 
and its limited objectives.54 The Conservative-dominated Concordancia regime, which came to power in 
the aftermath of the 1930 coup and mled through the so-called decada infame of Argentine politics, had 
little scope for maneouvre in policy-making as a result of the severe economic difficulties caused by the 
Depression. It implemented short-term policies which dealt effectively with the crisis and its only permanent 
achievement was the ’fiscal revolution’ that made government reliant for the first time on direct rather than 
indirect taxation for its revenue.55 Even without the economic difficulties it faced, the Concordancia could 
not have sought to change course during the Thirties. Raul Prebisch, who held public office under this 
regime and generated major ideas on development in the Forties (see below), has revealed that the 
continuing prevalence of the international division of labour theory and the weight of public opinion forced 
government officials as himself not to speak openly about the need for industrialisation.56
Renewed economic problems arising from the Second World War altered government perceptions. 
Many of the notions championed by Bunge were articulated in late 1940 in the Plan Pinedo, which aimed 
to reactivate the economy and whose most remarkable feature was a tacit acknowledgement that the existing 
framework was no longer functioning. It did not intend to foster industry as a short-term strategy. It
54 See David Rock, El radicalismo argentino, 1890-1930 (Buenos Aires, 1992), especially pp. 15,16,20, 
31,33,34-35,273,287; OscarComblit, ’Inmigrantesy empresariosenlapoliticaargentina’,D E6 (1966-1967) 
No.24, pp.671,672,681; Peter H. Smith, ’Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 
1916-1930’, DE 7 (1967-1968) No.25, p.798,804,805, and Politics and Beef in Argentina (New York, 1969), 
especially pp.48,50,280; John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford, 1958), p.98; David 
Rock, Argentina 1516-1987 (London, 1987), pp. 184,185; Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart, ’Political 
Developments’, in Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart (eds.), Prologue to Peron (Berkeley, 1975), pp.42, 
43, on the composition of the party, its limited objectives and inability to formulate a programme.
55 See Daniel Drosdoff, El gobiemo de las vacas (1933-1956) (Buenos Aires, 1972); Peter Alhadeff, 
’Public Finance and the Economy in Argentina, Australia and Canada during the Depression of the 1930s’, 
in Platt and Di Telia (eds.), Argentina, and ’Dependency, historiography and objections to the Roca Pact’, 
in Abel and Lewis (eds.), Imperialism', Roger Gravil, ’La intervencion estatal en el comercio de exportacion 
argentino entre las dos guerras’, DE 10 (1970-1971) Nos.39-40, especially pp.400,408,410; Javier 
Villanueva, ’Economic Development’, in Falcoff and Dolkart (eds.), Prologue, especially pp.62,63; Carlos 
F. Diaz Alejandro, ’An Interpretation of Argentine Economic Growth since 1930: Part I’, The Journal o f  
Development Studies 3 (1966-1967) No.l, pp.31,33, on Concordancia policies and achievements.
56 Raul Prebisch, ’Argentine Economic Policies since the 1930s: Recollections’, in Guido Di Telia and 
D.C.M. Platt (eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1880-1946 (Basingstoke, 1986), p. 134.
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stressed the need to stimulate only sectors that had a plausible chance of evolving efficiently and at a low 
cost, and that the industries to be developed should be able to export substantially both to other Latin 
American countries and the US market. Whether this innovative Plan, which went beyond the wartime 
conjuncture, would have actually succeeded will never be known. Not only was it rejected by Congress in 
response to the increasingly transparent undemocratic nature of the Concordancia regime, but doubts also 
remain over its sustainability. Exports of manufactures could not include capital goods, a major import 
requirement in neighbouring Latin American countries, as domestic capacity to produce them was 
embryonic. Moreover, trade links with the USA would have been dependent on Argentine-American 
relations, which during the war and early postwar years were at an all-time low.57
The writings of Bunge were not alone in their concern with industrialisation. There were two 
’contemporary’ standard works on the history of Argentine industry: (i) Historia de la industria argentina 
by Adolfo Dorfman, which outlined an overview of industrial development until 1930, and (ii) Historia 
economica de la Argentina by Ricardo Ortiz, which devoted several chapters to industry while covering 
Argentine economic history up to 1939 in its entirety. Although they were ingenieros rather than historians, 
Dorfman and Ortiz sought to understand contemporary reality by going back over the past. They adopted 
a path of systematic description in which individual sectors were evaluated, data supplied by both the State 
and private sectors as well as secondary literature was examined, government financial policies and their 
presumed impact on national manufacturing were investigated, and the features of the domestic market and 
its changes were pointed out. The difficulty was that Dorfman and Ortiz could not explain the importance 
and limitations of Argentine industrial development from their descriptions, and invariably resorted to 
prevailing views on the character of the countryside and the presence of a dominant landowning oligarchy 
to resolve this analytical problem.58 Nevertheless, their work had one major legacy: it discussed and
57 Juan Jose Llach, ’El Plan Pinedo de 1940, su significado historico y los origenes de la economia 
politica del peronismo’, DE 23 (1983-1984) No.92; Guido Di Telia, ’Economic Controversies in Argentina 
from the 1920s to the 1940s’, in Di Telia and Platt (eds.), Argentina, pp.128-129; Gabriel Porcile, ’The 
Challenge of Cooperation: Argentina and Brazil, 1939-1955’, JLAS 27 (1995) No.l, pp.154-155.
58 See Adolfo Dorfman, Historia de la industria argentina (Buenos Aires, 1942) and Ricardo Ortiz, 
Historia economica de la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1955).
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processed information that was of permanent value to experts and researchers requiring such material.
The economic hardship endured in the early Thirties and early Forties encouraged further debate 
on development problems and their solution. Key to the discussions was Raul Prebisch, who held public 
office in the Ministry of Finance and the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina under the Concordancia 
and went on to become closely associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) set 
up by the United Nations in 1948. Initially an advocate of orthodox economics, he shifted away from 
orthodoxy during the Thirties as he increasingly questioned issues in Argentine (and more broadly Latin 
American) development. His doctrine, which would subsequently be promoted by ECLA economists, was 
deeply rooted in an analysis of the Latin American experience. It began with a critique of theories of 
growth and international trade, showing to what extent the international division of labour had favoured the 
centre (i.e. the industrial nations) over the countries of the periphery. The latter had bome the repercussions 
of the deterioration of the terms of trade and the drawbacks of a lack of industrialisation, a process critical 
to improving the position of these countries in the international market as well as advancing in technical 
fields and consequently in productivity. Prebisch argued that industrialisation could only be accomplished 
through a series of State-sponsored measures. These included the use of modest and efficiently-managed 
tariff protection to overcome market failure, and of public foreign funds to ease bottlenecks and facilitate 
the process.59 The most interesting feature in the Prebisch proposals was that they did not directly tackle 
the fact that policy options could be limited by external constraints. In practice this was unrealistic as 
external constraints did materialise, not least in terms of the availability of public foreign (and particularly 
US) money to finance industrial development - see Chapter 6.
The Prebisch critique engendered a number of Latin American economic histories written from a
59 United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, The economic development o f Latin 
America and its principal problems (Lake Success, 1950); Raul Prebisch, ’Cinco etapas de mi pensamiento 
sobre el desarrollo’, El Trimestre Economico 50 (1983) No.198, especially pp.1077-1082; Joseph L. Love, 
’Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange’, Latin American Research Review 15 
(1980) No.3, pp.45-72; E.V.K. FitzGerald, ’ECLA and the Formation of Latin American Economic 
Doctrine’, in David Rock (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s (Berkeley, 1994); Rosemary Thorp, ’A 
Reappraisal of the Origins of Import-Substituting Industrialisation, 1930-1950’, JLAS 24 (1992) 
Quincentenary Supplement, pp. 188-189.
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structuralist perspective. Attempting to analyse the formation of the Argentine economy, Aldo Ferrer 
published La economia argentina in 1963. His method of analysis was through the differentiation of four 
historical phases (regional economies of subsistence, transition, primary exports economy and non-integrated 
industrial economy) within which the economic system developed and conformed to certain patterns. The 
explanation of each stage was based on the examination of macroeconomic variables, particularly those 
emphasised in the ECLA model: aggregate demand, GDP, income distribution, investment, savings and terms 
of trade. Although Ferrer was concerned with industrialisation as a result of its perceived function in 
economic development, he devoted most attention to the subject in the fourth historic phase (post-1930). 
He labelled the latter as a non-integrated industrial economy because, although the economic structure had 
diversified, it depended on imported supplies due to the insufficient development of basic industries.60 The 
only unfortunate aspect of La economia argentina is that, having its intellectual origins in a critique of 
neoclassical economics, Ferrer rejected the use of the strong analytical and quantitative tools of growth 
economics. He employed data selectively to support particular points and, in fact, his book contains few 
statistical tables.
In the late Sixties, the discussion on industrialisation was further influenced by the stages of 
economic growth model developed by W.W. Rostow. Given that Argentina satisfied Rostow’s criteria for 
take-off by 1914, the debate centred on the issue of when the take-off actually occurred. The beginning of 
the take-off could be traced to a sharp stimulus, such as a war or an unfavourable shift in the terms of trade 
requiring the rapid development of manufactured import substitutes. Rostow himself argued that in one 
sense the take-off began during the First World War, but that it actually took place in the mid-Thirties as 
the growth of the sectors stimulated by the war slackened until the Depression because during the Twenties 
the country had sought a return to pre-1914 ’normality’.61 Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman used 
the stages model in their work on Argentine economic development, and added an extra phase extending 
from 1914 to 1933. Described as la demora, it was a period in which self-sustained growth was not 
achieved. They argued that industry established itself as the leading economic sector and force of self­
60 See Aldo Ferrer, La economia argentina (Buenos Aires, 1963), especially pp.9,11-12.
61 W.W. Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth (3rd ed., Cambridge, 1990), pp.37-38.
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sustained growth in the mid-Thirties, but that the take-off was a drawn-out process. It was first stimulated 
by the world economic crisis, the deteriorating terms of trade and the shortage of foreign exchange. Further 
incentives were provided by the Second World War, when new industries were established owing to the 
scarcity of imported materials and strategic products, and by the advent of the Peronista regime after the 
conflict.62 In contrast to these authors, Javier Villanueva placed the take-off in the Twenties and bases his 
assertion on ECLA investment figures. He argues that the First World War cut off foreign investment and 
imports of capital goods, and that investment in industry rose again after the war.63 However, the view 
that the take-off occurred in the Twenties is not sustainable, and was recently questioned by Paul H. Lewis. 
He argued that Villanueva’s view is only true in terms of the scale of investment. Since the take-off means 
a great upward and onward thrust leading to self-sustained growth, the Twenties were a false start and a 
period of make-shift industrialisation. However, Lewis did acknowledge that some kind of industrial 
transformation was taking place even though it was difficult to identify precisely when the process reached 
the take-off point.64
This line of debate proved rather inconclusive, and little new empirical evidence was produced. 
Moreover, given the reasoning that some sectors played a leading role in the take-off process, the various 
writings provided no detailed information or data on what could be regarded as key industries (eg iron and 
steel). In retrospect, the argument about Rostow’s take-off seems to have been a futile exercise. However, 
also at the end of the Sixties, Ezequiel Gallo took a different approach in discussing industrialisation. He 
pioneered the revisionist concept that no contradiction existed between agrarian expansion and industrial 
growth, arguing against the following two interpretations: (i) that the development of manufacturing was 
impeded by the landowners, who enjoyed unchallenged political and economic power (in some form or 
another, Ferrer as well as Di Telia and Zymelman subscribe to this view); and (ii) that insufficient pressure 
was brought to bear on those social groups with a direct interest in the expansion of manufacturing. There
62 Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo economico argentino (revised 2nd 
ed., Buenos Aires, 1973), pp.30,34-35,37.
63 Javier Villanueva, ’El origen de la industrializacion argentina’, DE 12 (1972-1973) No.47, p.458.
64 Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1990), pp.38,45.
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were three perceived adverse conditions supporting this latter view: (a) most industry was closely linked to 
the rural sector; (b) other manufacturing branches had developed in largely small establishments, thereby 
limiting their strength; and (c) a large share of foreign immigrants aloof from national politics predominated 
among the industrialists. In Gallo’s view, there was no relation of acute conflict between the agro-export 
sector and industrial groups, as the expansion of industry depended on the successful performance of the 
export sector. Fostered by export-led growth, industry had made considerable progress in the field of import 
substitution, particularly in consumer goods. Gallo saw the tariff structure as the problem. Although this 
was not an unsurmountable obstacle, the predicament was two-fold. First, industries requiring imported raw 
materials paid higher duties on the inputs than the actual finished product. And second, the oligarchs that 
wielded strong clout before the First World War cannot be held responsible for the rigidity of tariff policy 
in the Twenties as political power was slipping from their hands.65
Finally, there has been one recent major contribution to the historiography on industrialisation is 
La industria que supimos conseguir, published by Jorge Schvarzer in 1996. Schvarzer starts from the 
assumption that the exceptional circumstances and prosperity created by export-led growth were destined 
to end, and that therefore Argentina had to transform its economic structure and industrialise. He then 
narrates the history of manufacturing activities in the country until the present day, with an appropriate 
periodisation and contextualisation, and pays attention to some specific industrial sectors. Nevertheless, this 
work has significant faults. Data is used selectively in the narrative, and in fact the book does not include 
a single statistical table. This weakens the analysis of individual sectors, which consists of a general look 
at their evolution and lacks the mass of quantitative details that made the publications by Dorfman and Ortiz 
so valuable. Notwithstanding these problems, Schvarzer’s work has an important merit. It is the first 
adequate book-length interpretation of the socio-political history of Argentine industry written since Dorfman 
issued his Historia de la industria argentina in 1942.
La industria que supimos conseguir is the most recent major contribution to the long-running
65 See Ezequiel Gallo, ’Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina, 1880-1930’, in 
Raymond Carr (ed.), Latin American Affairs (St. Antony’s Papers, No.22, 1970).
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debate on Argentine industrialisation, which has been pursued obsessively ever since the weaknesses of 
export-led growth were exposed during the First World War. In retrospect, this discussion seems to have 
been misdirected and thereby achieved little in real terms. As the recent historiographical essay by Juan 
Carlos Korol and Hilda Sabato acknowledges, all the various studies have produced is a divergence in 
interpretation. The critical controversy arose between those who believed that the industrialisation process 
was weakened from the outset by the obstacles it faced during the period of export-led growth, and those 
who affirmed that no contradiction existed between agrarian expansion and industrial growth.66 Largely 
explaining national economic circumstances through foreign development models, the writings do not give 
a clear appraisal of what should have occurred in Argentina (a country which by the Twenties had already 
attained various characteristics of a semi-industrial economy and therefore could have apparently deepened 
industrialisation). Moreover, although a few works have produced some sectorial assessments, there has 
been no major specific studies on individual manufacturing activities (not least iron and steel production) 
and whether such industries could be successfully established domestically. And above all, the debate has 
blatantly ignored one of the most potent reasons why the country did not undergo thorough industrialisation. 
This was institutional failure, as the Republic did not meet the minimum political requirements for sustaining 
economic growth.67 The politics of the period were characterised by instability, embodied in a succession 
of different governments (both constitutional and military), and the inability or unwillingness of the various 
regimes to resolve conflicts of interest arising from changed conditions as they represented specific groups. 
Political instability was reflected in a failure to deepen industrialisation and the frustration of attempts to 
establish a modem iron and steel industry (the central topic of this dissertation).
IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION IN  ARGENTINA, c. 1920-1952: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
Unlike other import-substituting industries, iron and steel production emerged not as a result of the 
consequences of the Great Depression but of those arising from the outbreak of the Second World War.
66 Juan Carlos Korol and Hilda Sabato, ’Incomplete Industrialization: An Argentine Obsession’, Latin 
American Research Review XXV (1990) No.l, pp.19,20.
67 See Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth, pp.447-448 for the political characteristics,representativeness 
and leadership required for sustained economic growth.
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A major external constraint preventing its earlier rise had been the oligopolistic trade practices of the leading 
West European steel producer-exporters, which were formalised in the International Steel Cartel (ISC). 
Literature on this particular aspect is somewhat restricted. It traces the origins of the cartel to the political 
and economic geography of the Continental coal and iron basin as well as changed conditions after the First 
World War leading to major organisational problems in the European steel trade. The five key producer- 
exporters (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Saar) suffered from both excess capacity and 
output as a result of frontier changes and could not market surplus production nationally at a time when 
many overseas markets began to develop their own industries.68 Their response to these problems was the 
ISC, which was the most comprehensive attempt at controlling the international steel trade. The existing 
historiography has demonstrated that its controls went beyond general agreement, establishing subordinate 
sales comptoirs for specific products, dominating the distribution process in export markets, and dealing with 
competition from producer-exporters outside the cartel through market segmentation.69 Since Argentina 
was one of the few ’open’ markets at the time and satisfied its iron and steel requirements mostly through 
imports from participants in the cartel, it is little wonder that the latter effectively frustrated any opportunity, 
at least within the Argentine private sector, to develop steel production. Only with the collapse of the ISC 
at the start of the Second World War and the need to substitute previously imported steel with local 
production as a result of wartime scarcities did efforts to develop a domestic steel industry become possible.
68 See Nicolas Morard, Fonctionnement et perspectives de la Communaute Europeene du Charbon et 
de I ’Acier (Fribourg, 1962), pp.26-27; William Diebold Jr., The Schuman Plan (New York, 1959), p.27; 
AlanBullock, ’Steel and National Tensions’, Steel Review, No. 10, April 1958, pp.9-10; George W. Stocking 
and Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action (New York, 1946), p. 173 on the political and economic geography 
of the Continental coal and iron basin; see League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section, 
Memorandum on the iron and steel industry (Geneva, 1927), p.6; Stocking and Watkins, Cartels, 
pp.173,174,179,180; Johan de Vries, ’Benelux 1920-1970’, in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic 
History o f Europe, Volume 6 (Glasgow, 1976), p.48; John Gillingham, Coal, steel and the rebirth ofEurope,
1945-1955 (Cambridge, 1991), pp.3,23; Paul Reuter, La Communaute Europeene du Charbon etde I ’Acier 
(Paris, 1953), p. 10; Walter A. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924 (Princeton, 1978), 
pp. 104,207,208 on changes in capacity and output in Luxembourg, France and Germany.
69 See C. Nattan-Larrier,La Production Siderurgique de I ’Europe Continentale et I ’Entente International 
de I ’Acier (Paris, 1929), pp.274-276; M. Kypriotis, Les Cartels Intemationaux (Paris, 1936), pp.49, 
73,74,76,78,81; Ervin Hexner, The International Steel Cartel (Chapel Hill, 1943); Henri Rieben, Des 
Ententes de Maitres de Forges au Plan Schuman (Lausanne, 1954), p.255,256; Richard A. Lauderbaugh, 
American Steel Makers and the Coming o f the Second World War (Ann Arbor, 1980), p. 159; Gillingham, 
Coal, pp.28,29 on the various aspects of the cartel and its practices.
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Knowledge on these efforts is somewhat limited, but what literature exists on the subject provides 
important pointers (albeit briefly) around which much of the detailed discussion in this thesis revolves. The 
most basic information is available in La industria que supimos conseguir by Schvarzer. Despite its many 
factual errors, this work is useful on two accounts, (i) It provides a brief early history of the leading private 
metallurgical firms that expanded into steelmaking after September 1939. (ii) It explains the growth of 
military preoccupation with industrialisation and the development of defence-related industries. Schvarzer 
raises the issue of the concept of a sociedad mixta between the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares 
(DGFM), which was established in 1941 to implement military industrial projects, and private interests to 
develop an integrated steelworks. However, he fails to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the 
attempt to set up a genuinely ’mixed’ Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA) floundered.70 A 
biography of General Savio, head of the DGFM and key promoter of heavy industry, by Raul Larra also 
takes up the issue of military concerns with industrial development and the establishment of defence-related 
industries, with the emphasis being laid on both SOMISA and the more modest Altos Homos Zapla. 
Although the mass of detail in Larra’s work is fairly reliable, there are many factual errors and the nature 
of the information is largely anecdotal. The main value of this biography is that it provides a useful insight 
on Savio, even though it deliberately overrates his achievements.71 Laura Randall in her book An 
Economic History o f Argentina in the Twentieth Century places SOMISA within the broader context of 
government thinking at the start of the first Peron presidency, namely as an example of the idea to use 
mixed enterprises as a tool for promoting development. Nevertheless, her assessment of this particular 
venture is left hanging up in the air. She provides some details from the legislation aimed at establishing 
the corporation, but takes for granted that it is under those terms that the steelworks project was actually 
implemented over a decade later.72 This was certainly not the case, not least because Congressional 
objections to participation by the private sector led to the latter being squeezed out of the project. The only 
other secondary source with some information is the work by Robert A. Potash on the increasingly powerful
70 See Jorge Schvarzer, La industria que supimos conseguir (Buenos Aires, 1996), pp.134,137-138,175- 
177,178-181,207-208.
71 See Raul Larra, Savio: el argentino que forjo el acero (Buenos Aires, 1980).
72 Laura Randall, An Economic History o f Argentina in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1978), 
pp. 139-140.
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political role of the Armed Forces after 1930. He provides a few points of detail (military willingness to 
accept foreign involvement in the SOMISA project, the thwarting of attempts by corrupt government 
officials to profiteer from the award of contracts, and the insufficiency of the authorised capital of SOMISA) 
which also have a bearing on the arguments being put forward in this thesis.73
Table 1.1
ARGENTINE OUTPUT OF STEEL INGOTS AND ROLLED STEEL, 1937-1950
(in tons)
YEAR CONSUMPTION STEEL INGOTS ROLLED STEEL*
1937 916,700 13,690 12,400
1938 586,700 16,300 11,300
1939 621,500 13,900 10,400
1940 577,500 12,200 18,100
1941 401,700 24,100 37,200
1942 219,200 62,510 43,500
1943 144,600 82,260 66,200
1944 219,500 129,260 107,800
1945 255,300 144,460 110,400
1946 607,300 124,000 126,250
1947 914,900 115,000 152,217
1948 973,800 113,000 162,646
1949 912,600 115,000 212,629
1950 911,000 118,000 264,021
* The data for the period 1937-1945 excludes re-rolling.
Sources: The figures for total Argentine iron and steel consumption were compiled from United 
Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), A study o f  the iron and steel industry 
in Latin America, Volume I (New York, 1954), p.84; the production statistics were elaborated from 
Cuadros N°2 y N°4 in the Appendix of Eduardo A. Garimaldi, Industria siderurgica argentina (Buenos 
Aires, 1947), and from UN, ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin AmericaTV (1959) No.2, p.6.
What the historiography does not address is why the development of domestic iron and steel 
production does not make major progress after the Second World War. Table 1.1 shows total national iron 
and steel consumption between 1937 and 1950, and local output of steel ingots and rolled steel for those 
years. Although the production statistics are modest when compared to those of other larger steel producers, 
two significant features must be observed. First, local production rose sharply between 1941 and 1944.
73 See Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962 (London, 1980), pp.62-63,64- 
65,80,107-108,163-164.
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This increase arose from the growth in output capacity, which was due to the installation of steelmaking 
facilities by metallurgical firms and importers of finished items affected by wartime conditions. Second, 
domestic output covered a substantial share of national consumption of steel during the Second World War 
owing to the forced contraction of demand created by import curtailments. Although the data for the period
1946-1950 show levels of consumption restored to 1937 levels as a result of pent-up demand (that also 
implied the renewed availability of imports), they do not explain why national production levels stagnate. 
The answer lies in the literature on the economic policies of the Peronista administration in power at the 
time. Although as Minister of War during the military regime of 1943-1945 Peron had supported heavy 
industry projects, he developed his own agenda in his quest to take power. Elected in 1946, he missed one 
of the best opportunities to implement socio-economic reforms. In economic terms, Argentina had the 
means to achieve change. Foreign exchange worth US$ 1,500,000,000 had accumulated in the form of 
blocked balances obtained from sales of supplies to the Allies during the war; industrial development had 
progressed; the prices of food and agricultural commodities were rising relative to those of industrial goods; 
and most productive equipment was run down or worn out in a way that there arose the opportunity to 
modernise.74 Furthermore, stocks of exportables accumulated during the war were in high demand in the 
immediate postwar due to reduced European output capacity, and terms of trade improved in 1946-1947.75
The fact that Peron squandered the chance to set in motion the process of change has been widely 
condemned. In his masterly biography of Peron, Joseph A. Page has argued that the policies pursued by 
the President reflected his own political priorities rather than guidance by economic considerations.76 
According to Harry S. Fems, this resulted in errors and improvidences which were at first masked during 
the short-lived prosperity of the early postwar years but ultimately led to economic collapse by 1949.77 
David Rock has argued that all the first Peronista presidency achieved were pervasive economic decline and
74 Harry S. Fems, Argentina (New York, 1971), p. 184.
75 Eprime Eshag and Rosemary Thorp, ’Las consecuencias economicas y sociales de las politicas 
economicas ortodoxas aplicadas en la Republica Argentina durante los anos de postguerra’, DE 4 (1964- 
1965) No. 16, p.293.
76 Joseph A. Page, Peron: a biography (New York, 1983), p. 174.
77 Fems, The Argentine Republic (Newton Abbot, 1973), p. 150.
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stagnation.78 Felix Luna, one of the most prominent Argentine historians, has given the most sarcastic 
disapproval of the wastage of the period 1946-1949. He has potrayed that time as una fiesta with disastrous 
consequences for the country once it was over.79 There is sufficient evidence to support such criticisms, 
not least when comparing what course the country should have taken and the path it actually followed.
Argentina should have undergone thorough industrialisation, a process that would have absorbed 
the manpower no longer required in primary production and supplied all those industrial goods which could 
not be imported owing to the relatively slow growth of exports. Import substitution industrialisation 
consisted of two stages. The first was the establishment of light industries, which resulted in an expansion 
of capital goods imports. Since such imports were vulnerable to shortfalls in export earnings, 
industrialisation had to be deepened. The second stage was the development of heavy and capital goods 
industries, in which iron and steel had a vital role. The iron and steel industry not only would satisfy rising 
demand for its products in sectors as construction and transportation, but also constitute the basis for other 
industries as the manufacturing of machinery.80 Instead, given the populist tone of the regime, Peron 
encouraged over-emphasis on the light industries that had been developing rapidly before 1943 and were 
probably nearing maturity by the Forties. This excessive stress on the first stage of import substitution failed 
to deepen industrialisation, to generate sustained growth and to devote more attention to sectors struggling 
to emerge and the necessary social overhead capital. Furthermore, the promotion of mass consumption 
resulted in Peronista rural policy being aimed at ensuring cheap foodstuffs for urban workers. Export 
volumes of rural commodities declined and therefore opportunities to earn the foreign exchange to cover 
imports, not least of capital goods to modernise existing iron and steel producing facilities, were sacrificed. 
The wastage of exchange reserves on the nationalisation of run-down public utilities and the repatriation of 
the foreign debt only accelerated the dwindling of reserves and left the country exposed to cover unforeseen 
future problems in the balance of payments. Unsurprisingly, the economy showed increasing signs of
78 Rock, Argentina, p.266.
79 Felix Luna, Peron y  su tiempo (2nd ed., Buenos Aires, 1993), pp.341-342.
80 United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Problems o f the steel 
making and transforming industries in Latin America, Volume 1: Report of the Sao Paulo meeting (New 
York, 1958), pp.35-36.
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incapacity to support the Peronista strategy.81 The consequent economic difficulties severely affected 
metallurgical enterprises and importers of finished goods that had undertaken steel production during the 
Second World War to compensate for shortages of overseas supplies. Domestic steel output was based on 
increasingly depleted sources of scrap (see Chapter 5) and in the postwar period could only be sustained with 
imports of essential inputs. The curtailment of imports resulting from the economic crisis led to severe raw 
material shortages.82 Unable to obtain import permits, many large firms cut back production. The 
problems became so extreme and vital imports of pig iron so scarce that steel production for construction, 
transportation and public works was threatened with paralysis.83 These difficulties, combined with bad 
Argentine relations with the USA (the key source of capital and technology), ensured that further progress 
in the industry at the time became impossible.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed both the general and Argentine debates on industrialisation, as well as 
the historiography on the efforts to develop iron and steel production in the Republic. Although the various 
general writings on industrialisation viewed the latter as one element in a long-term process, it was seen that 
they differed in their interpretation as to how it occurred. One of these viewpoints, the Rostowian model, 
was particularly important as its notion of a take-off and the role of lead sectors within it (however 
discredited it may now be) influenced perceptions in developing countries on the role of heavy industry. 
As regards Argentine debates on industrialisation, they stemmed from the increasing concern and dissent 
over the path the country was taking. The divergence in the various writings was in their interpretations, 
but fundamentally all regarded industrialisation as a panacea. However, the discussion in Argentina did not
81 See Luna, Peron; Page, Peron, pp. 168-175; Rock, Argentina, pp.266-280,289-302; Lewis, Crisis, 
pp. 177-210; Mario J. Lattuada, La politico agraria peronista (1943-1983), Volume 1 (Buenos Aires, 1986), 
pp.81-88; Susana Novick, I  API: auge y  decadencia (Buenos Aires, 1986) for assessments of Peronista 
economic policy and its failure.
82 La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 48° Ejercicio cerrado 
el 30 de Junio de 1950’, Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, 4 December 1950, p. 1151; La Cantabrica, 
’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 50° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio de 1952’, Boletin, 1 
December 1952, p.499.
83 Metalurgia, November 1951, p. 14, and December 1951, p.7.
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really address the issue. It tended to explain national economic circumstances through foreign development 
models, and failed to deal with some of the major reasons as to why a deepening industrialisation was not 
achieved. The critical frustrating factor, which is discussed in the next chapter, were the unstable politics 
of the period, in which specific groups had vested interests at different times. The inability or unwillingness 
to thoroughly transform the economic structure was reflected in the ultimate failure of efforts to develop 
domestic iron and steel production in this period. However, there is an important lesson to be drawn from 
this particular example. The problem was also one of what industries could have been fostered successfully. 
In the case of steelmaking, this thesis argues it was both a matter of timing and of how the industry was 
set up. Critical inputs were not obtainable in sufficient quantities from either domestic nor foreign sources, 
and it was not possible to upgrade the technology that enabled private sector firms to engage in steel 
production for ’in house’ consumption during the Second World War. The major effort by the DGFM to 
establish a large-scale integrated plant was also unsuccessful, but its crucial problem was that it was unviable 
as the military emphasised strategic rather than economic considerations. Although this specific example 
mirrors the sorry state in which Argentine industry found itself, it was by no means a foregone conclusion 
that domestic steel production could not be developed successfully (see Chapter 7).
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Chapter 2
ARGENTINE ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP STEELMAKING: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
This chapter sets out the historical context within which heavy industry developed in Argentina in 
the second quarter of the century. It examines both external and domestic factors and the constraints they 
imposed, and is divided into two sections. The first of these discusses the international context, arguing that 
leading iron and steel producer-exporters prevented the growth of production in overseas markets such as 
Argentina, which would compete with their own industries. It shows that Continental European producer- 
exporters predominant before 1939 inhibited the expansion of heavy industry overseas in the Twenties and 
Thirties through an International Steel Cartel and that, although the Second World War provided a ’window 
of opportunity’ for growth in domestic steel production, American policies subsequently hindered Argentine 
attempts to develop heavy industry - not least because of bad relations between Washington and Buenos 
Aires. The second section of the chapter examines the domestic limitations on the creation of an iron and 
steel industry resulting from the configuration of the national economy. It shows that, even though the 
Republic was already undergoing some kind of industrial transformation, rural production and exports 
retained a key function and thereby structural change did not go far enough. Although the section argues 
that the severe economic difficulties caused by the world crisis of the early Thirties and the Second World 
War reduced the scope for maneouvre in policy-making, institutional failure is blamed for the Argentine 
inability to undertake economic structural reforms when conditions appeared to be good. The country did 
not meet the minimum political requirements to sustain economic growth. The politics of the period were 
characterised by instability and the inability or unwillingness of the various successive regimes to resolve 
conflicts of interest arising from changed conditions as they represented specific groups.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: THE WORLD IRON AND STEEL TRADE
Before the Second World War, the world iron and steel trade was dominated by the West European 
producer-exporters. Although Britain was among their ranks, the undisputed leaders were Germany, France, 
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volumes being supplied to overseas markets, the bulk of trade took place on the Continent as a result of the 
interdependence between the major producing and exporting countries of the West European coal and iron 
basin. Production was based on a common, single source of minerals concentrated approximately between 
Dortmund in western Germany, Strasbourg and Nancy in northeastern France, and Dunkirk in northern 
France.1 Divided by national boundaries, coal districts required more iron ore than was available locally; 
iron ore regions also had to obtain coal from elsewhere. Therefore complex, complimentary interrelations 
developed. These were sustained by a transport system based on the Rhine and its tributaries, supplemented 
by canals and the railways built along the river valleys (see Map 2.1). Lorraine and Luxembourg supplied 
iron to the Saar, Belgium, the Ruhr and the Netherlands. The Ruhr (and alternatively the Meuse and Sambre 
basins in Belgium) provided coal for France, Belgium and Luxembourg. In addition, crude or semifinished 
steel goods produced in one country were sent to others for processing.2
Since this coal and iron ore producing region was criss-crossed by international borders, West 
European steel manufacturing had an unusual and striking political dimension. Heavy industry was at the 
centre of Franco-German confrontations, and the steel-producing areas in the Ruhr, Lorraine, Luxembourg, 
the Saar, and the Belgian industrial districts of Liege and Charleroi lie at around 100 miles at most on one 
side or the other of the heavily contested Franco-German frontier (see Map 2.1). Three major wars were 
fought across this border between 1870 and 1945, which modified political frontiers already reinforced by 
tariffs.3 These changes had serious implications for the steel trade of the countries concerned. They created 
surplus capacity whose excess output could not be marketed nationally at a time when many overseas 
markets began to develop their own steel industries. Continental steel producer-exporters responded to this 
problem with trade oligopolisation through the International Steel Cartel (ISC) in the late Twenties and 
Thirties. As will be argued below, although the ISC was a means employed to respond to organisational 
problems in the Continental iron and steel trade, it had adverse effects on ’small’ economies such as
1 Nicolas Morard, Fonctionnement et perspectives de la Communaute Europeene du Charbon et de 
I ’Acier (Fribourg, 1962), p.26.
2 Willianm Diebold Jr., The Schuman Plan (New York, 1959), p.22; Morard, Fonctionnement, p.21.
3 Alan Bullock, ’Steel and National Tensions’, Steel Review, No. 10, April 1958, pp.9,10.
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Argentina by constraining production through a wide range of steel production and distribution controls 
which aimed to govern the international market.
The origins o f  the ISC, 1870-1926
In order to understand the problems which led to the creation of the ISC, attention must be paid 
to developments in the Continental iron and steel industry before the outbreak of the First World War. 
Germany increased its steelmaking capacity and replaced Britain as the leading world iron and steel exporter 
owing to technical and political changes. The technical change was the invention of the Thomas process, 
which enabled the commercial use of Lorraine ore for the first time. The political change was the frontier 
imposed by Bismarck on France following the Franco-Pmssian War of 1870-1871. This boundary, which 
was drawn solely on military and political considerations, had major economic implications. It brought 'A 
of the Lorraine deposits into the new German Empire, as well as the Saar coalfield. Furthermore, 
Luxembourg was at German disposal by remaining a member of the Zollverein even though it enjoyed a 
quasi-sovereign status.4
Well endowed with resources, Germany enmerged as the leading European steel producer by 1883 
and soon developed into a major exporter. German steel exports rose from 241,000 tons in 1871 to
1,136,000 tons in 1881, and continued to increase. With exports exceeding 5,000,000 tons (or 30% of its 
production) in 1913, Germany was the world’s largest steel exporter on the eve of the First World War.5 
However, the German industry was dangerously located in a disputed frontier region and based on an 
interdependent balance between Ruhr coal and Lorraine iron ore. Lorraine specialised in pig iron and heavy 
steel, and the Ruhr in coke, steel and finished products. While Ruhr coal moved as coke to blast furnaces 
in Lorraine, pig iron as well as some ore moved from Lorraine to Ruhr steel plants.6 When the First World
4 Ibid., p. 10.
5 Robert C. Allen, ’International Competition in Iron and Steel, 1850-1913’, The Journal o f Economic 
History XXXIX (1979) No.4, pp.912,913; Ervin Hexner, The International Steel Cartel (Chapel Hill, 1943), 
p.69.
6 George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action (New York, 1946), p. 173.
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War broke out in 1914, it was largely fought in the contested area.
The difficulties of the West European steel industry that began with the First World War were not 
restricted to the control of the coal and iron basin. World market conditions changed drastically. Production 
was increased by the European powers, and developed or expanded in Continental and overseas countries 
that had hitherto depended on imports from West European suppliers. As steel was a key strategic 
commodity, the belligerent powers relentlessly increased output to meet wartime demands; there was an 
abnormal expansion in steel consumption.7 Simultaneously, export markets that expanded rapidly before 
1914, with nations as Germany exporting around 30% of its steel in 1913 and Belgium around 50%, were 
severely disrupted. The volume of international transactions fell as some traditional European customers, 
deprived of their sources of supply by the war, developed or expanded their own steel production to meet 
their domestic requirements.8 However, Argentina was one country that deprived of foreign sources of 
supply could not develop or expand steel manufacturing. Lacking adequate raw materials, it was unable to 
take advantage of wartime opportunities. As late as 1914, Argentine iron resources had not been fully 
studied and were assumed to be scarce.9 When mineral deposits were found in the Andes, location factors, 
poor reserves and chemical properties discouraged the creation of a steel sector founded on domestic raw 
material supplies.10
The growth of domestic steel output in numerous former European export markets modified the 
world distribution of the iron and steel industry and had major consequences for West European producers. 
Increases in production capacity during the war was followed by further expansion after the conflict as a 
result of frontier changes. Under the Versailles Treaties, Germany lost Lorraine to France and Upper Silesia
7 Henri Rieben, Des Ententes de Maitres de Forges au Plan Schuman (Lausanne, 1954), pp.217,218; 
Stocking and Watkins, Cartels, p. 172.
8 Stocking and Watkins, Cartels, p.173; Rieben, Ententes, p.218.
9 Jose Garcia Vizcaino, Tratado de politica economica argentina, Volume II (Buenos Aires, 1975), 
p.257.
10 Colin M. Lewis, ’Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Manufacturing and Industrial Policy in the Argentine, 
1922-28’, The Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History XVI (1987) No.l, p.83.
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to Poland, the Saar was incorporated into the French customs area, and Luxembourg was detached from the 
Zollverein. Because of these changes, Germany lost 80% of its iron ore supplies, 30% of its coal supplies, 
75-80% of its blast furnace capacity, around 45% of its pig iron output, 30% of its steelworks, and 
approximately 30% of its rolling mills. However, the biggest blow was the loss of Lorraine, the key 
German source of iron ore and which incorporated 65 blast furnaces and 9 steelworks.11 The alteration 
of German frontiers resulted in the creation of a surplus export trade capacity in neighbouring steel 
producers such as Luxembourg and France, which was further aggravated by new construction in Germany 
which attempted to recover national self-sufficiency.
Having lost its considerable degree of prewar integration with Germany, Luxembourg was hard hit 
by the changed circumstances of 1919. Cut off from its supplies of Lorraine ore and German coke, and 
deprived of export opportunities, the Grand Duchy was forced to reorientate its steel sector. Furthermore, 
steel was the dominant industry in Luxembourg and, since production outstripped domestic demand and 90% 
of its output was sold elsewhere, new markets had to be found. In order to resolve these difficulties, the 
Grand Duchy pronounced itself in September 1919 in favour of an economic union with France. Powerful 
industrial interests in the latter rejected the proposal due to prevailing conditions in the French iron and steel 
industry.12 Barred from the French tariff area, Luxembourg had no choice but to conclude an economic 
union with Belgium in July 1921, which modified its conditions of supply of inputs, of production, and of 
markets. Before 1914, the steelworks of the Grand Duchy supplied pig iron and semifinished goods for 
further processing to Germany. During the Twenties, they developed from suppliers to integrated concerns, 
producing iron and steel goods for the world market. Emphasis shifted from blast furnaces to steel plants 
and rolling mills, and an extensive international network of sales outlets was established.13
11 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section, Memorandum on the iron and steel industry 
(Geneva, 1927), p.6; Stocking and Watkins, Cartels, pp.173,174.
12 Johan de Vries, ’Benelux 1920-1970’, in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History o f 
Europe, Volume 6 (Glasgow, 1976), p.48; John Gillingham, Coal, steel, and the rebirth o f Europe, 1945- 
1955 (Cambridge, 1991), p.23; Paul Reuter, La Communaute Europeene du Charbon et de I ’Acier (Paris, 
1953), p.10.
13 Reuter, Communaute, p. 10; De Vries, ’Benelux’, p.48.
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While Luxembourg’s problems originated in the detachment from the Zollverein in 1918, the 
French steel industry suffered from economic and political difficulties triggered by the recovery of Lorraine. 
The economic dimension is associated with overcapacity and dependence on German coal and coke. The 
political dimension was concerned with restraining German industrial might. France virtually doubled its 
iron ore production capacity, and increased its pig iron capacity by approximately % and ingots and castings 
capacity by about Vi. This was the result of three factors. First, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Second, 
plants were built during the war in districts other than the industrial areas of northern and eastern France 
to compensate for those captured or destroyed by Germany. And finally, works in the devastated districts 
were rebuilt, enlarged and modernised.14 Therefore, suffering from overcapacity and the loss of traditional 
markets by the plants acquired from Germany, the French steel industry was forced to export.
The Versailles Treaties broke the interdependence of the Ruhr and Lorraine. Since France had to 
renew this connection in order to procure cheap sources of coal and coke for its greatly expanded steel 
industry while simultaneously restraining Germany on national security grounds, the economic and political 
dimensions of the problem became intertwined. French policy towards Germany had two objectives. In 
the long-run, France wished to detach the Rhineland - either economically or economically and politically - 
from Germany. In the short-term, France sought to coerce Germany into accepting agreements that would 
serve the purpose of supplying immediate French industrial needs.15 The Versailles clauses were designed 
simultaneously to weaken German industry, whose steel capacity shrank by 30%, and ease the French 
incorporation of Lorraine. France was awarded a 15-year ownership of the mines in the Saar basin, and 
Germany was obliged to deliver 27,000,000 tons of coal annually (or its equivalent in coke) as reparations- 
in-kind at the internal price prevailing in Germany.16
Hence, the problems of the French steel industry were the need to find outlets for its enlarged 
capacity, and a heavy reliance on German resources dependent on the acquiescence of the powerful Ruhr
14 Stocking and Watkins, Cartels, pp.179,180.
15 Gillingham, Coal, p.3.
16 Walter A. MacDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924 (Princeton, 1978), p. 104.
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industrial barons. Difficulties were aggravated by the failure of French policy towards Germany, where the 
steel industry resurged in the Twenties. After 1918, the German government advancedhuge sums of money 
to private business to compensate for losses resulting from the peace treaties. The Ruhr industrialists used 
their sudden liquidity to modernise and expand the German industrial base, now concentrated in the Ruhr, 
and they made good the losses in iron and coal.17 The issue of iron supplies was resolved with imports 
of Swedish ore, the more intense exploitation of deposits discovered in central Germany during the war, and 
the recovery of scrap. Having been able to dispense with the Lorraine ironfield, the Ruhr industrialists 
solved the problem of coal supplies by not executing reparation deliveries. France responded by occupying 
Diisseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort in March 1921 and then the whole of the Ruhr in 1923-1924, but such 
moves failed to intimidate the Germans from relaunching their steel sector.18 German output rose to levels 
contrasting favourably with those of 1913. Production of steel ingots and castings attained 16,246,078 tons 
in 1929 and was comparable to the 18,935,089 tons produced in 1913, and that of finished steel amounted 
to 11,291,968 tons in 1929, which was also comparable to the 13,898,089 tons produced in 1913.19
Table 2.1
APPARENT CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL IN THE MAJOR 
CONTINENTAL PRODUCING-EXPORTING COUNTRIES IN 1929 
(in thousands of tons)
COUNTRIES CONSUMPTION PRODUCTION SURPLUS
Germany 12,954 16,246 3,292
France/Saar 8,202 11,553 3,351
Belgium-Luxembourg 1,844 6,812 4,968
TOTAL 23,000 34,611 11,611
Sources: The data on consumption was obtained from United Nations (UN), Economic Commission 
for Europe (ECE), Long-term trends and problems o f the European steel industry (Geneva, 1959), p.3, 
and that on production was compiled from UN, ECE, European steel trends in the setting o f  the world 
market (Geneva, 1949), p.120.
17 Ibid., p.207.
18 Ibid., pp.207,208; Bullock, ’Steel’, p .ll.
19 British Iron and Steel Federation, Statistics o f the Iron and Steel Industries, 1936 (London, 1936), 
pp.88,90.
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The creation of surplus capacity and the regrouping of enterprises in the major West European 
producer-exporters arising from frontier changes increased the gap between supply and demand for iron and 
steel. The figures in Table 2.1, which show crude steel consumption and production in Germany, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France and the Saar in 1929, are indicative of the extent to which output outstripped domestic 
steel requirements. To dispose of excess production, producers secured additional outlets by expanding 
exports through price cutting and the penetration of the few remaining open markets such as the Argentine, 
which lacked a domestic steel industry and was discouraged from establishing one as demand for iron and 
steel was satisfied by importing European products at prices lower than the estimated costs at which iron 
and steel goods could be manufactured locally. Export prices declined sharply as Continental producers 
competed against each other and also vis-a-vis Britain, the other leading exporter. Therefore, Continental 
producers were forced to combine into some sort of agreement to restore balanced market conditions. These 
arrangements frequently entailed the restoration of prewar international cartels and the establishment of new 
ones.20 These agreements attempted to solve the problems of expanding overseas sales by controlling the 
worldwide trade in iron and steel goods.
The ISC and other agreements, 1926-1939
Though cartelisation in the iron and steel industry had already existed in some form before 1914, 
the cartel established by Germany, the Saar, Luxembourg, Belgium and France was (particularly after 1933) 
the most comprehensive attempt at controlling the international steel trade through general agreements and 
arrangements for specific products. The International Steel Agreement signed in Brussels on 30 September 
1926 established the Entente Internationale de l’Acier (EIA), which embraced the domestic and export 
markets of Germany, the Saar, Belgium, Luxembourg and France.21 A similar arrangement had also been 
introduced by the smaller Central European steel producers, which faced promlems common to Western
20 United Nations (UN), Department of Economic Affairs, International Cartels (A League of Nations 
Memorandum, Lake Success, 1947), p.6.
21 Hexner, Cartel, p.72.
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Europe as a result of the break-up of Austria-Hungary.22 The agreement between Austrian and 
Czechoslovak producers of 1 January 1924, which fixed prices and stipulated terms for exports to Italy, 
Poland and the Balkans, came to encompass Hungarian producers and included Rumanian and Yugoslav 
manufacturers as associate members. This Central European Group of Austrian, Czechoslovak and 
Hungarian producers entered the ELA on 4 February 1927.23
The ELA countries accounted for over 70% of world steel exports between 1927 and 1930, and the 
centrepiece of their agreement was production of cmde steel. By controlling crude steel, which is defined 
as the molten steel poured into moulds for the manufacture of castings or steel ingots and is the basic input 
for all steel products, the ELA hoped to regulate international production of all steel goods. However, the 
agreement had little effect on markets like Argentina as it was short-lived and collapsed before the Wall 
Street crash in October 1929. Disappointing growth in the export trade caused considerable capacity to 
remain idle, and the Continental industry failed to turn a profit. Prompted by rapid growth in the domestic 
market, German overproduction broke the EIA. Its cartel partners were displeased by sales that deprived 
them of desperately needed export markets, and compromise was impossible. With the collapse of the ELA 
in May 1929 and the downturn in the market for steel and other commodities associated with the onset of 
the world crisis, the need for cartelisation became even more urgent for producers.24
To counteract the effects of the crisis, Germany (which also represented the Saar), Belgium, 
Luxembourg and France revived their cartelisation attempt more effectively in late 1932. A new 
comprehensive marketing control for steel was negotiated, and a general agreement was signed in 
Luxembourg on 25 February 1933. The volume of crude steel exports was regulated and exports of all steel 
commodities, which were evaluated in terms of an agreed-upon amount of crude steel needed for their 
production, were controlled.25 This new marketing control, known as the International Steel Cartel or ISC,
22 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section, Memorandum, p.6.
23 M. Kypriotis, Les Cartels Internationaux (Paris, 1936), p.49; Hexner, Cartel, p.73.
24 Hexner, Cartel, pp.73,75; Gillingham, Coal, pp.27,28.
25 Rieben, Ententes, p.232; Hexner, Cartel, p.83.
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represented a major advance on the ELA.. Its controls went beyond general agreement, establishing 
subordinate international sales comptoirs for specific products, dominating the distribution process in export 
markets, and dealing with competition from producer-exporters outside the cartel through market 
segmentation.
The ISC established ancillary sales comptoirs for the following products: semifinished steel, 
structural shapes, merchant bars, thick plates, medium plates and universal steel. However, this arrangement 
was not as innovative as it first appeared as similar agreements effected before 1933 already applied to three 
major steel products - heavy rails, wire rods and wire products, and tubular products.26 The cartel 
cooperated with these existing single commodity agreements, as they had also been designed to regulate 
exports of its members to overseas markets and served the ISC in its bid to control the steel trade. The most 
successful and best organised of these arrangements was the International Rail Makers Association (IRMA), 
originally founded in 1883 by British, Belgian and German producer-exporters of heavy rails to contain 
rising competition in export markets for these goods. Although it disintegrated in 1888, British, German, 
Belgian and Luxembourg producer-exporters relaunched the arrangement in 1904. American producers 
joined in 1905, and potential competition in the export market by smaller manufacturers was eliminated by 
the special agreements concluded with Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Italian steelworks in 1906. The 
accord collapsed again in 1914, but market conditions during the Twenties led to a new agreement (the 
European Rail Makers Association) between German, British, Belgian, French, Luxembourg and Saar rail 
producers on 12 March 1926. With the adherence of Austrian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak manufacturers 
on 1 January 1927 and of US producers on 1 April 1929, it became the International Rail Makers 
Association. Although in the form of a ’gentleman’s agreement’, the object of the IRMA was to stabilise 
export sales of heavy rails and their accessories by limiting the exports of its members. Renewed in 1929, 
it brought great stability to the market for these products.27 The other two existing single steel commodity 
cartels were the International Wire Export Company (IWECO), and the International Tubes Cartel.
26 Hexner, Cartel, p.86.
27 Ibid., pp. 18,19; Kyproitis, Cartels, pp.73,74; C. Nattan-Larrier, La Production Siderurgique de 
I ’Europe Continentale et VEntente Internationale de I ’Acier (Paris, 1929), pp.274-276.
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Constituted as a cooperative society with an export sales comptoir, the IWECO had been founded by 
German, Czechoslovak, Belgian, Dutch, Hungarian and Danish producers on 30 November 1931. The Tubes 
Cartel was originally established towards the end of the nineteenth century. American manufacturers joined 
in 1905, and it was reorganised by German, British, Austro-Hungarian and US producers in 1906. Having 
disintegrated in 1914, the Tubes Cartel was revived on 1 July 1926 by producers in Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria. Strong competition in export 
markets with non-members led to the adherence of British, US and Canadian producers in 1929. However, 
it came to a sudden end in March 1935. The collapse, which was formally ascribed to Franco-German 
differences over the reincorporation of the Saar into Germany, was caused by the failure to reach agreement 
on German export quotas.28
The individual comptoirs for specific goods were not the only means by which the ISC regulated 
export markets. The marketing process was controlled through licensed distributors. The latter operated 
from the producing-exporting countries, and in various instances had branch offices, agents or subsidiaries 
in importing countries.29 Licensed distributors were required to observe fixed resale prices and terms and 
to handle only products of ISC members; in return, the cartel guaranteed them a fixed profit margin and a 
definite market share. The ISC allotted import quotas to markets organised in this manner, and assigned 
the distribution of this tonnage to local licensees.30 In Argentina, there are two known examples of 
licensed distributors operating through local organisations. One was the Compagnie Luxembourgeoise 
Metallurgique or Columeta, the distributor set up by ARBED-Terres Rouges.31 Columeta operated through 
the major local firm Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET. ARBED had a substantial shareholding 
in TAMET, which could thus be depicted as a potential Argentine domestic steel producer ’captured’ by an 
ISC member to prevent the developnment of local steel production (see Chapters 3 and 6). The other 
example is Longovica, a subsidiary of the Acieries de Longwy and Marine Homecourt. The French group
28 Kypriotis, Cartels, pp.76,78,81; Nattan-Larrier, Production, p.276; Hexner, Cartel, p. 160.
29 Hexner, Cartel, p. 164.
30 Stocking and Watkins, Cartels, p. 190.
31 Carlo Hemmer, L ’Economie du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, Volume 2 (Luxembourg, 1953), p. 157.
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operated through Hierromat S.A., a local licensee it had already established.32
The cartel persistently tried to increase controls and expand the areas under its influence. The ISC 
dealt with competition from independent distributors or producers within export markets and from producer- 
exporters not participating in the cartel. If independent distributors or domestic steel producers operated in 
an ’organised’ market, the ISC first tried to bring them into the control scheme through special accords. 
Examples of success of such arrangements are found in Switzerland and Brazil. In Switzerland, they 
terminated the independence of distributors. The ISC cooperated closely with the Eisen-Verband, a local 
syndicate that coordinated the links between the Swiss market and the various steel marketing comptoirs, 
regulated the sales of the four national associations of iron and steel merchants, and fixed prices and sales 
conditions in line with those of the cartel.33 In Brazil, where steel production had been undertaken in the 
state of Minas Gerais, the accords joined producers in a steel trust dominated by the ARBED subsidiary 
Companhia Sidenirgica Belgo-Mineira. This firm was both the leading domestic steel producer and a major 
supplier of cartel products as local output did not keep pace with demand. To maintain its prominent 
position in the market, Belgo-Mineira organised an association with the other domestic producers which 
regulated output through quotas, set prices and even paid some blast furnaces not to operate.34
If independent (or politically independent) producers could not be incorporated into the cartel or 
controlled by local production and distribution agreements, the ISC dealt with competitors in the following 
manner. It segmented export markets into three categories: (i) the domestic markets of cartel members, (ii) 
’neutral’ or non-steel-producing markets where the ISC had the edge, and (iii) markets dominated by 
’outsiders’. The internal markets of cartel members were off-limits to competitors. The ’neutral’ markets 
where the ISC had the advantage were stabilised at prices determined by the cartel and divided according 
to the market share that each participant would have been able to maintain under conditions of free 
competition. The markets dominated by ’outsiders’ were those where ISC members could compete freely.
32 ACINDAR, Historia de una Voluntad de Acero (Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 104.
33 Rieben, Ententes, pp.255,256.
34 John D. Wirth, The Politics o f Brazilian Development 1930-1954 (Stanford, 1970), p.88.
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This complex but effective system enabled cartel participants to stabilise domestic prices at high levels and 
to maximise income from ’neutral’ markets, and to put pressure on competitors to enter the ISC. It was to 
escape this kind of pressure that ’outsiders’ joined the cartel.35 Britain joined as an associate member on 
30 April 1935 (though it was cooperating indirectly with the ISC through the ERMA), Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia became full members in 1936, and the USA affiliated in 1937. The cartel finally achieved 
its oilgopolistic objectives in 1938, when all the major steel producers excluding Japan and Sweden had 
joined. The ISC embraced practically the entire steel-producing world and controlled over 85% of the steel 
export trade while protecting the market share of its members.36 However, the agreement was unstable and 
success was short-lived. Until its collapse at the outset of the Second World War, the cartel was marred 
by organisational change caused by the German annexations of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Polish 
acquisition of the Tescin region, and the Nazi occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Following 
the Anschluss, the German export quota was increased by the ISC in proportion to the export quantities of 
Austria. Czechoslovakia resisted any change in the proportion of its quotas represented by the exports of 
the plants lost in the Sudetenland and the Tescin region and, despite the German invasion of the country in 
March 1939, nominally remained a full cartel member.37 The ISC ceased to exist when war broke out in 
September 1939, and the Diisseldorf meeting scheduled for October 1939 was never held.38
The impact o f  the Second World War and its aftermath, 1939-1952
The Second World War severely disrupted West European iron and steel supplies to the world 
market, and its long-term impact was even more far reaching for three reasons: it provided ’small’ 
economies with the opportunity to develop steel production, Continental producer-exporters lost control of 
the international steel trade, and the United States of America became the leading steel exporter and
35 Richard A. Lauderbaugh, American Steel Makers and the Coming o f the Second World War (Ann 
Arbor, 1980), p. 159.
36 Gillimgham, Coal, pp.28,29.
37 Hexner, Cartel, pp.90,91.
38 Rieben, Ententes, p.237.
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principal supplier of capital and technology. Countries like Argentina benefited from the collapse of the 
ISC as it brought an end to the web of trade controls. The wartime displacement of European producer- 
exporters from the trade system led to severe import shortfalls, thereby making domestic steel production 
the only alternative to overcome supply difficulties. Given that the growth of steel production in traditional 
European export markets was shielded from overseas competition during the war, new domestic firms faced 
the challenge of surviving the restoration of peacetime conditions. This depended in part on two factors: 
(a) the postwar shape of the West European iron and steel industry, and (b) the US role as a supplier of 
steel, capital and technology.
Concerning European producer-exporters, the war had detached Belgium, Luxembourg and France 
from their established trade currents owing to the Nazi occupation and prevented Germany and Britain from 
meeting their foreign committments because of their domestic wartime requirements. The end of the conflict 
did not restore prewar conditions in the world steel trade, as these countries had to deal with the wholesale 
destruction of their economies. The threat of creation of excess capacity and a glut in the world steel market 
was revived by the scale of reconstruction required and the changed conditions in the international market 
in 1945. European states aspired to rebuild or develop their steel capacities to the maximum. France, 
Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Norway and eventually Germany 
hastily launched themselves into the realisation of investment plans. Such plans, by leaving no room for 
coordination and taking little or no account of changes overseas, entailed a danger of overproduction. As 
between 1914 and 1918, the Second World War had stimulated the development of protected steel industries 
in major prewar markets and enormously increased US output levels.39 The problems soon became 
apparent. Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain and France were already exporters in 1948. West European 
exports, which also included contributions from Germany, Austria, Sweden and Italy, totalled 5,001,000 
tons. As production increased while the market remained tight, disquieting signals multiplied. Demand 
slowed down, prices tumbled and stocks expanded.40 A solution was urgently needed as European steel
39 Rieben, Ententes, p.317; Morard, Fonctionnement, p.33; Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction o f 
Western Europe, 1945-1951 (London, 1984), p.366.
40 Morard, Fonctionnement, p.33.
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production, which attained 48,000,000 tons in 1949, was forecast to reach 58,000,000 tons in 1953, a year 
when European steel consumption was calculatedat 50,000,000 tons and a huge surplus exceeding 8,000,000 
tons was expected. The latter would not be easily exportable, given increased US output and major growth 
in production overseas. Under the spectre of overproduction, European steel producers started talks in 
1949.41 The result was not the revival of cartelisation, but the supranational European Coal and Steel 
Community or ECSC. In the changed circumstances of the Cold War climate, this was a radical solution 
not only to problems in the Continental steel industry, but also to the crucial matter of strengthening the 
weak European economies through economic integration and the long-standing issues of restraining Germany 
and control of the Ruhr.
Owing to pressure from within the Continent and from Washington, the French foreign minister 
launched a successful initiative on 9 May 1950 aimed at Germany but open to other European countries. 
Known as the Schuman Plan, it resulted in the Treaty of Paris, which was signed by France, Germany, the 
Benelux countries and Italy on 18 April 1951 and established the ECSC. A common market was created 
by placing the coal and steel resources of ECSC members under the control of a supranational High 
Authority, by banning any form of cartelisation, and through the free circulation of coal and steel within 
the Community. To fully implement the treaty, the High Authority enforced a Code of the Common Market 
regulating production and competition. From the production perspective, the Code dealt with raw material 
supplies and modernisation of the sector. From the competition viewpoint, the Code established its 
principles, the free choice of suppliers, the freedom of sales, the elimination of cartels, the abolition of 
special tariffs and subsidies, the harmonisation of transportation, an end to discrimination, a ban on dumping, 
and the publication of prices.42
Although ’small’ economies attempting to develop domestic steel production were no longer 
threatened by the policies of European producer-exporters, they faced new problems as the United States
41 Carlo Ramacciotti, La Comunita Europea del Carbone e dell’Acciaio (Rome, 1953), pp.28,29.
42 Communaute Europeene du Charbon et de 1’Acier, Nous sommes deja 155.000.000... (Paris, November 
1951), unpaginated.
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of America became the main supplier of iron and steel, capital and technology. The USA had emerged as 
a major steel producer by the late nineteenth century, and by 1913 it exported almost 3,000,000 tons per 
annum. However, these sales merely represented 9% of production as strong domestic demand and intense 
foreign competition ensured that, until 1939, US predominance in iron and steel production was not matched 
by a predominance in the world steel trade.43 Steel output continually expanded as the United States of 
America was endowed with abundant resources, a numerous and qualified labour force, and a huge and 
wealthy domestic market in terms of both area and population. Crude steel production rose from 27,692,000 
tons in 1913 to 42,807,000 tons in 1920 and 49,069,000 tons in 1926, and the US share of world steel 
production increased from 42.9% in 1913 to 61.3% in 1920.44 Exports were limited, and their bulk went 
to adjoining markets where advantage could be taken of cheap water transport. Most trade was thereby done 
with North and Central American countries; the Far East and South America were secondary markets. 
Around 50% of total US steel exports went to British Commonwealth countries, Canada alone accounting 
for 40% of total exports.45
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the United States of America became the leading steel 
exporter. However, it was unable to compensate for the shortfall in the world steel supplies caused by the 
contraction in West European exports. While iron and steel exports from Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Britain and France had averaged 12,500,000 tons a year in 1934-1938, US exports had amounted to
3,500,000 tons in 1935, 8,500,000 tons in 1937 and 6,800,000 tons in 1939.46 Although they attained 
12,000,000 tons in 1940, exports decreased as the US commitment to the war effort (particularly following 
Pearl Harbor) increased domestic demand for iron and steel. Exports dropped to 8,000,000 tons in 1941
43 Allen, ’Competition’, p.913; E.D. McCallum, The Iron and Steel Industry in the United States 
(London, 1931), pp. 196,197.
44 Rieben, Ententes, pp.217,218.
45 McCallum, Industry, pp.201,202; William T. Hogan, Economic History o f the Iron and Steel Industry 
in the United States, Volume 3 (Lexington, 1971), p. 1091.
46 Maurice Fontaine, L ’lndustrie Si derurgique dans le Monde (Paris, 1950), pp.313,314; Hogan, History, 
Volume 3, p. 1431.
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and 5,200,000 tons in 1945.47 Since the priority was to meet the requirements of the Allied war machine, 
this drop affected markets unrelated to the war effort. American steel exports were unevenly distributed 
across the world, with the lion’s share of overseas sales going to Britain, Canada and the USSR.48 Trade 
with the Allies comprised semifinished and finished products as well as concealed or indirect sales in the 
form of military equipment and supplies.49 American steel exports averaged 7,300,000 tons annually in 
1941-1945, which was well below prewar European average export levels. This resulted in an annual deficit 
of 5,200,000 tons in the steel market, which by the end of the war had accumulated to 31,000,000 tons and 
was only partially offset through increased domestic production in markets that had traditionally drawn on 
imports.50
For countries like Argentina aiming to develop heavy industry, the role of the USA as a supplier 
of capital and technology was even more critical than that country’s dominance of world export production. 
The Americans had traditionally favoured limited development in commodity exporting countries, with US 
capital being the source of investment in industries which did not compete with North American industry.51 
However, owing to ulterior strategic motives, this policy temporarily shifted in wartime. To align the 
Americas behind the war effort, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles committed the United States of 
America to supporting Latin American economic development at the Inter-American Conference held in Rio 
in 1942. All the Latin American republics except Argentina and Chile agreed to economic mobilisation and 
broke off relations with the Axis.52 Argentina would pay dearly for not cooperating with Washington.
The change in US policy towards industrialisation south of the Rio Grande arose purely from
47 Hogan, History, Volume 3, p. 1433.
48 Fontaine, Industrie, p.315.
49 Hogan, Industry, p. 1434.
50 Ibid., p. 1433; Fontaine, Industrie, p.314.
51 Gerson Moura, Autonomia na Dependencia (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p. 182.
52 Stephen G. Rabe, ’The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 
1945-1952’, Diplomatic History 2 (1978) No.3, pp.279,280.
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wartime considerations. The priority was hemispheric unity in defence matters and Latin American 
collaboration in the Allied war effort through the supply of commodities. To attain these goals, Washington 
had to shift its policy towards the more strategically important countries such as Brazil and Mexico. 
Military considerations were at the heart of the American approach towards Brazil, and economic 
considerations were at the centre of the US attitude towards Mexico. In the Brazilian case, the timing of 
the Pan-American project coincided with continued nationalist pressure for the development of an integrated 
steelworks. A national steel policy was central to the Estado Novo regime, whose administrative programme 
hoped to achieve economic modernisation. Nevertheless, little progress had been made by the late 
Thirties.53 The opportunity to secure US assistance arose when Washington sought Brazilian cooperation 
in defence. Brazil was politically and strategically important owing to its great northestem ’bulge’, which 
was mostly defenceless and stretched far into the Atlantic.54 The establishment or use of naval and air 
bases in this region by American troops was critical to the hemispheric defence project, but was unacceptable 
to the Brazilians unless combined with US assistance for their steelworks project. The United States of 
America reluctantly agreed to cooperate in the Volta Redonda steelworks project, paying the price exacted 
by Brazil not to thwart the hemispheric defence project and remain neutral.55
In the Mexican case, wartime economic needs encouragedpositive US responses to industrialisation. 
The USA had to reduce the dependence of countries relying on it as a source of supply. Goods necessary 
for the war effort could not be diverted into the export trade, and scarce shipping was also vital. Mexico 
depended heavily on the United States of America for both basic foodstuffs and industrial goods, which 
Washington could not afford to provide in wartime.56 Furthermore, the Americans required Mexican 
strategic materials whose output had to be increased. Growth in the production of these exportables could
53 Various unsuccessful proposals for steelworks are assessed in Wirth, Politics, pp.90-113 and Werner 
Baer, The Development o f the Brazilian Steel Industry (Nashville, 1969), pp.68-75.
54 R.A. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, Volume One: 1939-1942 (London, 
1981), pp.138,139.
55 Moura, Autonomia, pp.150,153,154.
56 Luis G. Zorrilla, Historia de las Relaciones entreMexicoy los Estados Unidos de America 1800-1958 
(Mexico, 1966), p.494.
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only be attained with an economic expansion programme. Washington did everything possible to reduce 
Mexican dependency on US supplies and expand Mexican output of commodities essential to the war 
effort.57 The growth of Mexican steel production suited American material requirements. Mexico easily 
obtained equipment which was unavailable owing to wartime restrictions, on condition that it was used to 
manufacture steel plates for the USA - where demand for this product was unusually high.58
In sharp contrast, Argentina did not benefit from the wartime shift in US policy towards Latin 
America. The antagonism in Argentine-American relations, which intensified during the Forties as a result 
of US objections to the neutral stance adopted by Buenos Aires, was deep rooted. Three factors had played 
a part: (i) unrealistic Argentine perceptions of what export-led growth might achieve, (ii) the expanding US 
role in the Argentine economy, and (iii) strategic considerartions influenced by events in the Thirties and 
Forties. The latter factor proved decisive to the breakdown in relations during the Second World War, as 
Washington and Buenos Aires had different concerns.59 The USA capitalised polically on its increased 
influence over the Americas through the Good Neighbor Policy, whose basic principles were non­
intervention in the affairs of any country by any other and the creation of permanent collective mechanisms 
to resolve the diplomatic, economic and military problems of the continent.60 With increased German, 
Italian and Japaneses aggression after 1936, Washington shifted the emphasis of the Good Neighbor Policy 
towards its military aspects and aimed to establish a collective security organisation. From 1936 to 1941, 
the Roosevelt administration attempted to persuade the republics south of the Rio Grande to view their 
foreign policy interests as identical with those of the USA and to pledge to regard an attack on one as an 
attack on all.61
57 Humphreys, Latin America, Volume Two: 1942-1945 (London, 1982), pp.46,47.
58 William E. Cole, Steel and Economic Growth in Mexico (Austin, 1967), pp. 12,14.
59 See Chapter 6 for detailed information on these factors.
60 Mario Rapoport, Gran Bretaha, Estados Unidos y  las Clases Dirigentes Argentinas: 1940-1945 
(Buenos Aires, 1980), p.240.
61 Randall Bennett Woods, The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the ’Good Neighbor’ 
(Lawrence, 1979), p.7.
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Argentina vigourously resisted the attempt to establish a Pan-American alliance and remained 
strictly neutral. In January 1942 it rejected the US initiative for a collective continental rupture with the 
Axis. The State Department became convinced that Argentine policy exposed a vulnerable flank in 
continental defences and that the Republic could become a Nazi base for espionage, subversion and financial 
machinations in the western hemisphere.62 To bring Argentina into line with the rest of Latin America, 
Washington resorted to economic and political pressure. By September 1942, the Board of Economic 
Warfare had introduced a number of arbitrary restrictions on exports of critical materials and equipment. 
In 1943 and 1944, American pressure on the Republic hardened due to the failure of selective coercion and 
the advent of a military regime with fascist leanings. The two key recommendations in the programme 
devised by Secretary of State Cordell Hull were the non-approval of development projects for Argentina, 
and the ban on exports for the Armed Forces.63
At least on paper, these measures should have put paid to efforts by the Direction General de 
Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM) to develop heavy industry. The problem for the State Department was that 
US big business did not accept the embargo imposed by Washington. The war provided export and 
investment opportunities in Latin American markets formerly supplied from Europe, and American enterprise 
engaged in manufacturing activities to meet domestic requirements previously satisfied by imports.64 In 
Argentina itself, where the close economic ties with Britain were rapidly waning, US firms saw an 
opportunity to make substantial inroads by promoting industrialisation.65 Among the American enterprises 
willing to take advantage of this opportunity was ARMCO, which boosted DGFM attempts to establish an 
integrated steelworks. The local ARMCO subsidiary became involved in the Plan Siderurgico Argentino 
(PSA), a project entailing the creation of an integrated steelworks which was to be owned by a sociedad 
mixta controlled by the DGFM and private firms (see Chapter 3). However, the collaboration of US
62 Rapoport, Gran Bretana, pp.248,250.
63 Carlos Escude, ’Boicot norteamericano contra la Argentina: 1940-1950’, Todo es Historia, No. 177, 
February 1982, pp. 13,15.
64 Mira Wilkins, The Maturing o f Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 
1970 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), pp.252,262.
65 Rapoport, Gran Bretana, pp.256,259.
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interests did not guarantee the success of the scheme, for two reasons, (i) The preparation of the PSA 
coincided with sharp fluctuations in Argentine-American relations, which had a direct bearing on the project 
as ARMCO was involved in a ’sensitive’ industry, (ii) Even without the difficulties in relations between 
Washington and Buenos Aires, the USA would not have favoured industrial development anywhere south 
of the Rio Grande in the postwar period.
Regarding the issue of timing, the PSA was subject to a stop-go process which was initially the 
consequence of antagonism towards the United States of America but subsequently the result of national 
economic conditions. The submission of the project for government approval coincided with overt US 
interference in domestic politics, as Spruille Braden - the American Ambassador to Argentina and later 
Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs - intervened in the 1946 presidential election 
by conflating the outgoing military regime and Peron with fascism and openly but unsuccessfully opposing 
Peron’s election (see Chapter 6). The PSA was temporarily shelved, and a US-Argentine rapprochement 
proved insufficient for it to make substantial headway. Though the project was approved by the President, 
it faced considerable hostility in Congress.66 Following the enactment of the PSA into law in 1947, little 
progress then resulted from mounting problems arising from Peronista policies (see below) rather than US- 
Argentine antagonism.
Concerning postwar US attitudes towards Latin American development, the USA would not have 
supported projects such as the PSA. Washington was opposed to industrialisation in ’small’ economies and, 
like the ISC, did not favour the development of steel production in overseas markets. Although this policy 
had shifted temporarily during the Second World War, the Americans were less inclined to promote 
economic modernisation south of Rio Grande once the conflict had ended. However, Latin Americans 
expected that the USA would continue or expand its role in promoting industrial growth in the region and
66 See Chapters 3 and 6 for details on objections from the UCR (the leading opposition party) and some 
Peronista ’extremists’.
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as a source of development capital.67 The Latin American countries requested an economic conference, 
which the US State Department did not want to convene. The dispute with Argentina, which Washington 
viewed as an obstacle to Inter-American cooperation, provided the USA with an excuse to stall demands for 
the conference.68 However, the difficulties in US-Argentine relations ceased to be a useful ploy. 
Washington was increasingly concerned over the ’containment’ of communism and wanted a collective 
defence pact for the Americas, which required the inclusion of Argentina. Relations between Buenos Aires 
and Washington were ’normalised’ in 1947, and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was 
concluded in Rio.69 With the Argentine problem resolved, there were renewed Latin American attempts 
to convene an economic conference.
The US State Department continued to resist meeting the Latin American request for the 
conference, which arose from some economic difficulties in Latin America. Demand and prices for the 
region’s exports were uncertain, the inconvertibility of the sterling reserves accumulatedby Latin American 
countries during the war continued, and the real value of dollar reserves in Latin America was being eroded 
due to world inflation. From the Latin American viewpoint, only the substantial transfer of US capital and 
technology would enable industrialisation.70 Nevertheless, the Americans would not stimulate industrial 
development in the region for two reasons. First, Latin America had not suffered much during the war and 
emerged from the conflict in better shape economically than other parts of the globe. And second, owing 
to the onset of the Cold War, the American priority was the economic rehabilitation and security of Western 
Europe.71 Given these circumstances, the PSA or any other industrial development projects in the region 
could not expect any American assistance. By 1951, Latin America was the only region lacking a US
67 Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, ’Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold 
War: Some Reflections on the 1945-8 Conjuncture’, Journal o f Latin American Studies 20 (1988) No.l, 
p.185.
68 Rabe, ’Conference’, p.283.
69 Roger R. Trask, ’The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949’, 
Diplomatic History 1 (1977) No.3, p.277.
70 Bethell and Roxborough, ’Reflections’, p. 185.
71 Ibid., p. 186.
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Map 2.2 THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, c.1950
assistance programme. Belgium and Luxembourg alone had obtained more direct aid between 1945 and 
1950 than the whole of Latin America.72
THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT: ARGENTINA, FROMALVEAR TO PERON
External constraints on the development of heavy industry, which derived from the practices of the 
International Steel Cartel before 1939 and US unwillingness to promote Latin American industrialisation 
following the Second World War, were paralleled by domestic factors limiting the growth of a capital goods 
sector. The configuration of the national economy imposed limitations as the structural transformation that 
was taking place did not go far enough. The data in Table 2.2, which shows the structure of Argentine GDP 
during the second quarter of the century, indicates that the economy had diversified and was shifting away
Table 2.2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ARGENTINE GDP AT FACTOR COST, 1920-1949*
(based on 1935-1939 price weights)
SECTORS 1920-24 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39 1940-44 1945-49
Agriculture 17.0 16.6 15.8 15.1 15.0 10.1
Livestock 12.8 11.0 10.5 10.6 11.1 9.4
Fishing 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mining 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.5
Manufacturing 12.6 13.9 14.0 15.6 16.2 18.1
Construction 2.3 2.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.6
Commerce 15.5 16.3 14.3 13.8 12.6 13.1
Transport and 
communications 8.2 9.5 10.0 9.5 9.9 11.0
Other public services 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.0 6.5 2.2
Housing and finance 13.5 12.5 13.5 12.6 12.4 12.4
Personal services 8.6 7.9 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.3
Government services 7.8 7.4 8.2 8.4 9.0 11.0
TOTAL (in millions of
1935-39 pesos) 6,053 7,749 8,074 9,413 10,860 13,479
Totals do not always add up to 100% due to the rounding of decimals.
Source: Calculated from the data in Laura Randall, An Economic History o f  Argentina in the 
Twentieth Century (New York, 1978), pp.2,3.
72 Rabe, ’Conference’, p.292.
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from primary production towards manufacturing. Yet rural production and exports retained a key function, 
with agriculture and livestock accounting for approximately 25% of GDP (except in the years 1945-1949, 
as a consequence of Peronista policies), notwithstanding that Argentina had acquired the characteristics of 
a semi-industrial country. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the economy had attained several benchmarks which 
differentiated it from exclusively primary-oriented countries.73 Although this should have enabled a 
deepening industrialisation, the Republic took what many describe as a wrong turn. It squandered 
opportunities and set off on a perverse downhill course which in the long-run resulted in a belated, weak, 
incomplete and truncated industrialisation process.74 Growth in manufacturing had arisen initially from 
the demand effects of rising income, and was subsequently fostered by ’forced’ import substitution resultant 
from the Depression and the Second World War.75 However, the industrialisation process was not deep 
enough - a failure reflected in the manner that heavy industry emerged.
As is argued below, the incomplete alteration of the economic structure was the consequence of 
institutional failure. The country did not satisfy the minimum political requirements to sustain economic 
growth. Although the Great Depression and the Second World War restricted the scope for maneouvre in 
policy-making, the three different political groupings (the Union Civica Radical, the Concordancia and the 
Peronistas) that governed in this period represented specific interest groups and made their decisions on 
economic policy accordingly.76 Moreover, it was a time of considerable instability. The transfer of 
political power from one grouping to another coincided with particularly adverse conditions and was the 
result of military coups in 1930 and 1943 that overthrew politically weak regimes which were either 
unwilling or unable to combat the economic hardship confronting them.
73 These were a minimum per capita income, shifts in production from the primary sector to 
manufacturing and the contribution of industry to growth. See Hollis Chenery, Sherman Robinson and 
Moshe Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth (Washington, 1986), pp.84,85.
74 Juan Carlos Korol and Hilda Sabato, ’Incomplete Industrialization: An Argentine Obsession’, Latin 
American Research Review XXV (1990) No.l, p.3.
75 Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo economico argentino (revised 2nd 
ed., Buenos Aires, 1973), pp.124,125.
76 Laura Randall, An Economic History o f Argentina in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1978), p.6.
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The economy on the eve o f  the world economic crisis
The Twenties are part of a phase that has been identified by Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman 
as the periodo de la demora, which extended from the First World War to the Great Depression. Although 
some requisites necessary for industrial growth were present, the illusory restoration of pre-1914 conditions 
did not encourage industrialisation. The high rates of income in primary activities raised the opportunity 
costs of investing in industry, and what growth had taken place in manufacturing was based on rural exports 
and the expansion of a domestic trade reliant on imported capital and labour.77 Moreover, the dominant 
classes displayed complacency under favourable circumstances and also disinterest in economic and political 
change.78 This part of the chapter examines the inability of the Union Civica Radical, owing to the 
objectives and composition of the party, to introduce structural economic reforms in the face of increasingly 
transparent weaknesses inherent in export-led growth, and the nature and limits of industrial expansion 
generated by externally-oriented growth.
The determinants of pre-1914 growth had been the rise of world demand for food and availability 
of fertile land in the Pampas. In statistical terms, the economy in the Twenties seemed to behave much the 
same way as in the past. In 1925, Argentina ranked first in exports of maize, oats and linseed, and second 
or third in wheat and flour. It supplied 66% of world exports of maize, 72% of linseed, 50% of beef, 32% 
of oats, and 20% of wheat and wheat flour. Moreover, since 1914 it had overtaken the USA as the leading 
European source of beef.79 However, conditions had changed and, as seen when discussing the various 
debates about the weakenesses of export-led growth in Chapter 1, they manifested themselves in three ways, 
(i) Argentina was surpassed by Canada as the major exporter of wheat, a key cereal export, (ii) The phase 
of horizontal expansion across the Pampas, which depended on the availability of new lands for exploitation,
77 Jorge Schvarzer, La industria que supimos conseguir (Buenos Aires, 1996), p.80; Monica Peralta- 
Ramos, The Political Economy o f Argentina (Boulder, 1992), p .ll.
78 Di Telia and Zymelman, Etapas, p.67.
79 Vemon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic Position o f Argentina (Philadelphia, 1938), 
pp.136,141.
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had come to an end as all available fertile land was exhausted.80 Many of the unforeseen consequences 
of the process only became apparent once the open frontier evaporated, (iii) The Anglo-Argentine ’special 
relationship’ was withering away, and yet the country continued to depend heavily on the United Kingdom 
as an export market and had no apparent substitute for the British role in its foreign trade.81
Although the agro-exports based model had weaknesses, it appeared to function well in the 
Twenties. Therefore, the government of the day had no reason to overturn the existing strategy. With 
hindsight, it can be argued that this was a mistake rooted in the Argentine failure to meet one of the basic 
political requirements for sustained economic growth - namely, that the national government represented 
specific interest groups. The Union Civica Radical (UCR), which had displaced the Conservatives from 
government in the 1916 elections and remained in power until the 1930 coup, strove for accomodation as 
a consequence of two intertwined factors: (a) the composition of the party, and (b) its limited objectives. 
Radicalismo was a coalition of two groups, the less influential members of the landowning elite and the 
urban middle class, made possible by Argentine socio-economic and political development.82 The sections 
of the elite that supported the Radicals were old aristocrats based in the Pampas who lost the power they 
wielded before Rosas fell in 1852, and landowners from the interior.83 The old aristocrats aspired to regain 
their influence and the landowners from the interior yearned to overcome their political and economic 
weaknesses, which resulted from the concentration of power in Buenos Aires. The regional elites lacked 
the influence and wealth of Pampean oligarchs, which was determined by the proximity of their properties 
to the River Plate (the outlet for cereals and beef exports) and the quality of their land. The old aristocrats 
and landowners that strove to increase their leverage achieved their aspirations once the UCR was elected
80 Schvarzer, Industria, p. 120; Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (Berkeley, 1967), p. 124.
81 Gabriel Porcile, ’The Challenge of Cooperation: Argentina and Brazil, 1939-1955’, Journal o f Latin 
American Studies (JLAS) 27 (1995) No.l, pp. 131,132.
82 David Rock, El radicalismo argentino, 1890-1930 (Buenos Aires, 1992), p.287.
83 Oscar Comblit, ’Inmigrantes y empresarios en la politica argentina’, DE 6 (1966-1967) No.24, 
pp.672,681; Peter H. Smith, ’Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930’, 
DE 7 (1967-1968) No.25, p.798.
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to office in 1916, and had no interest in reforming an economic model which suited their needs.84 The 
old aristocrats were also members of the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), which was founded in 1866 to 
defend the limited but powerful estanciero interests. Given that they exercised considerable power in the 
party, it is no surprise that the SRA continued to wield enormous political clout and enjoy remarkable 
representation in government once the Radicals came to power.85 Approximately 45% of all UCR 
ministers, especially the Minister of Agriculture, were linked to the SRA between 1916 and 1930. 
Furthermore, President Marcelo T. de Alvear himself was an aristocrat and a member of the Sociedad 
Rural.86 Such a strong presence of interests associated with the ruling classes in government only served 
to reinforce the agro-exports based model.
The landowners that supported the UCR were allied to the urban middle classes. The feasibility 
of this alliance was rooted in the economic model. The growth of the middle class was determined by the 
domestic requirements of the elite, which were for labour and services (eg, administration, the judiciary and 
education). White-collar workers from the middle class performed these jobs, which demanded certain 
education standards and professional skills. Social mobility depended on patronage from the elite, which 
regulated the rise to careers in public administration and other professions through the State apparatus. The 
elite controlled the universities and the public sector and hindered the mobility of members of the middle 
class during the years of Conservative rule by two means: (i) it constrained the number of civil servants, 
and (ii) it reserved places in education and administration for members of the oligarchy.87 The middle 
class had to increase its political leverage to realise its social aspirations, which was attained with the 
Radical victory in 1916.
Concerning objectives, the UCR merely strove for the redistribution of economic power away from 
the Pampean oligarchy and towards its two groups of supporters. In order to achieve this end, the Radicals
84 Rock, Radicalismo, pp. 15,16,20.
85 Peter H. Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina (New York, 1969), pp.48,50.
86 Smith, ’Radicales’, pp.804,805.
87 Rock, Radicalismo, pp.31,33,34,35.
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had to challenge the political monopoly traditionally enjoyed by the Conservatives, who controlled the 
government through extensive electoral coercion.88 Pressure by the Radicals to increase political 
participation made the ruling class conscious of changes arising from urban growth and the rise of new 
social classes. The elite embraced democracy in order to protect stability, control the effects of social 
change, and buttress its own position.89 Electoral reform was attained with the sanction of the Ley Saenz 
Pena in 1912, which made universal male suffrage compulsory and secret. As a result, the share of voters 
actually participating in elections increased from 20% in 1910 to over 60% in 1916.90 Having succeeded 
in its political objectives and attained power, the difficulty for the UCR was that it lacked cohesion and was 
incapable of producing a formula that could conciliate the divergent interests within the party.91 By the 
mid-Twenties, the Radicals were gripped by bitter factionalism and had ceased to exist as a unified party. 
President Alvear resented the attempts of Hipolito Yrigoyen, his predecessor and party leader, to control the 
government once he was out of office. Yrigoyen was an autocrat with messianic delusions who operated 
as a modem caudillo. He viewed the party as a personal vehicle, strengthened his position within it and 
behaved tyranically. In contrast, Alvear was far more pragmatic and legalistic. As a result of these 
divergences of style, the President broke with the party leader and promoted the creation of the 
antipersonalista faction. The breach within the UCR was not healed in the presidential election that returned 
Yrigoyen to power in 1928, and the antipersonalistas sided with the Conservatives and the Armed Forces 
during the military coup that overthrew Yrigoyen in 1930.92
Notwithstanding that agro-exports retained a key economic function under the Radicals, industry 
had emerged before the Twenties. Four factors account for the growth of manufacturing output. The first 
two, the expansion of agro-exports and rapid population growth, were the product of the ’golden age’ of
88 Ibid., p.280; John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford, 1958), p.98.
89 Rock, Argentina, pp. 184,185.
90 Comblit, ’Inmigrantes’, p.671.
91 Rock, Radicalismo, p.273.
92 Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart, ’Political Developments’, in Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. 
Dolkart (eds.), Prologue to Peron (Berkeley, 1975), pp.42,43.
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externally-oriented growth. The third was a shift in the nature of foreign investments following the First 
World War, once the frontier closed. And fourth was pressure from within the Army for the establishment 
of essential strategic industries. Growth in agricultural exports induced substantive industrial expansion 
before 1930. The first modem food processing plants had already been established in the late nineteenth 
century.93 The only major foodstuffs exporters were meat-packing plants and grain producers. Although 
part of the output from meat-packing, flour milling, processing of dairy products and wool-washing was 
exported, production of derivatives of mral commodities was directed at the local market.94 Progress was 
also made in import substitution of key foodstuffs. Some 60% of total meat production was consumed 
locally by 1914, and this share continued to increase subsequently. Around 50% of the wheat harvest, 
subject to volatile annual production, and substantial volumes of other cereals were retained for home 
consumption.95 In addition, the development of the railway grid - often believed to have conformed to 
international trade - contributed indirectly to the rise of manufacturing. The formation of a national network 
linked the main wine and sugar producing areas in the interior with the leading market in Buenos Aires, 
which allowed concentration of production at the source of the raw materials. Before 1929, sugar and wine 
were almost the only major local food processing industries to have developed outside Buenos Aires.96
Urbanisation was generated by a significant immigrant influx. The urban population had virtually 
quadrupled between 1895 and 1914, having increased from 1,161,000 to 4,573,000 people.97 This 
expanding population, which owned steadily rising disposable incomes and was implanted with European 
consumption patterns, enabled the diversification of demand and initially led to an import boom. However,
93 Ezequiel Gallo, ’Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina, 1880-1930’, in 
Raymond Carr (ed.), Latin American Affairs (Oxford, 1970), p.49.
94 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic (New Haven, 
1970), p.211; Bill Albert, South America and the First World War (Cambridge, 1988), pp.215,216,217.
95 Colin M. Lewis, ’Railways and Industrialization: Argentina and Brazil, 1870-1929’, in Christopher 
Abel and Colin M. Lewis (eds.), Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State (London, 1985), p.217.
96 Ibid., p.215.
97 Vicente Vazquez-Presedo (ed.), Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas: Compendio 1873-1973 (Buenos 
Aires, 1988), p.33.
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domestic manufacturing capacity increased in response to the home market.98 As Table 2.3 shows, the 
share of food processing in the value of production declined while that of textiles and other branches rose.
Table 2.3
OUTPUT VALUE OF SOME MAJOR INDUSTRIES, 1911-1930 









TOTAL 754.4 100.0 762.7 100.0
Food processing 300.0 39.8 187.0 24.5
Textiles 93.7 12.4 147.8 19.4
Leather and its
products 21.6 2.9 18.2 2.4
Forestry 21.3 2.8 25.4 3.3
Printing 25.2 3.3 20.8 2.7
Oil, coal, etc. 39.7 5.3 73.5 9.6
Electricity 45.3 6.0 12.4 1.6
Machinery and
vehicles 68.6 9.1 62.5 8.2
Metals and their
products 42.1 5.6 54.7 7.2
Construction 26.4 3.5 51.1 6.7
Mining and
quarrying 19.5 2.6 6.6 0.9
Compiled from the data in Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia economica de la Argentina, Volume II (Buenos 
Aires, 1955), pp.217,218.
Among these sectors were those consuming iron and steel goods. For example, while the nominal value of 
total industrial output changed little between 1911-1920 and 1921-1930, the value of production virtually 
doubled in the construction and oil industries. As indicated in Chapter 4, construction would become the 
main iron and steel consumer, and the oil industry required tubes and pipes for the layout of pipelines and 
refineries. The value of output also increased in the emergent metallurgical sector, which also needed iron 
and steel inputs. However, growth in manufacturing had not led to a significant decline in imports owing 
to the small scale of domestic production, the quality of the goods produced and the need to import inputs.
98 Colin M. Lewis, ’Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Manufacturing and Industrial Policy in the Argentine, 
1922-28’, The Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History XVI (1987-1988) No.l, p.78.
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Although industry was initially stimulated by the rural expansion and urban growth, a shift in the 
nature of foreign investment resultant from the closure of the frontier also contributed to its rise in the 
Twenties. The most significant investments were undertaken by American corporations. The penetration 
of US economic interests in Argentina had begun in 1907 in the meat-packing industry but not been 
significant before 1914." The situation changed dramatically in the Twenties, as booming conditions at 
home forced American firms to find new markets.100 Therefore, the range of US investments in Argentina 
diversified as major industrial groups established subsidiaries. Among the companies that set up shop and 
consolidated their position in various market niches were producers of metal products, machinery, electrical 
goods and pharmaceuticals.101 However, opportunities for sales and obstacles to exports (ie, trade barriers) 
proved insufficient to justify large-scale investments. In most cases, American firms set up sales outlets and 
erected assembly, mixing, packaging and service plants rather than full-fledged factories.102 As is shown 
below, development from assembly into manufacturing only occurred in the Thirties. In addition to 
investing in industrial branches, US interests exploited the financial might of Wall Street and acquired weak 
British-owned public utilities companies.103
The final factor that generated industrial growth during the Twenties was the awareness and 
mounting discontent within the Army over the precariousness of the Argentine international economic 
position and of the traditional economic system. Import shortages during the First World War, the restricted 
nature of existing industry and an increase in the labour supply resultant from rapid urbanisation raised the 
interest of leading members of the Army in the possibilities of economic change and industrialisation.104 
However, these concerns were guided by military preoccupations with strengthening national defence by
99 Eduardo F. Jorge, Industria y  concentration economica (Buenos Aires, 1971), p.90.
100 Mira Wilkins, The Maturing o f Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 
1970 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), p.60.
101 Jorge, Industria, p.98; Schvarzer, Industria, p. 126.
102 Wilkins, Maturing, p.62.
103 Fodor and O’Connell, ’Argentina’, p. 19.
104 Robert A. Potash, El ejercitoy la politico en la Argentina, 1928-1945 (10th ed., Buenos Aires, 1982), 
p.45.
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achieving self-sufficiency in key basic industries and the production of weapons such as small arms, 
munitions, explosives and aircraft.105 Technocrats from the Army Engineering Corps, convinced that they 
possessed the necessary technical skills to attain this goal, began to champion industrialisation and self- 
sufficiency as essential foundations for national defence and economic security. Furthermore, they believed 
that the State should intervene with military assistance in industries crucial to self-sufficiency, such as steel 
and oil.106 There was little opportunity to develop a steel industry based on national resources during the 
Twenties owing to the lack of adequate coal and iron resources. Nonetheless, aware of military discontent, 
Alvear resolutely supported the Army technocrats and appointed General Mosconi to head Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), the state oil company established in 1922.107
In the context of the thesis, the significance of the creation of YPF is threefold. First, it indicates 
that State intervention in the economy, which is usually associated with Peronismo in the late Forties, began 
in the Twenties. However, there are two distinctive features about such intervention in the latter decade. 
It was not limited to essential industries, as exemplified by greater bureaucratisation, the growing importance 
of State railways and the attempt to regulate the beef trade. Moreover, it was an experience common to 
other Latin American economies before 1930, as illustrated by the example of Brazil. On the eve of the 
Wall Street crash, the Brazilian State owned 67% of the country’s railways, major ports, its largest shipping 
line and leading banks, and also controlled the marketing and international price of coffee (the key export 
commodity).108 Second, the founding of YPF signalled the beginning of military involvement in the 
development of basic industries, which peaked with the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares and 
the conception of the Plan Siderurgico Argentino (PSA) in the Forties. Finally, State control of the oil 
industry reveals the failure of the Armed Forces to overcome politicians’ opposition to ownership of critical 
sectors by public-private sociedades mixtas, a situation which recurred with the PSA. Although Mosconi
105 Benjamin A. Most, Changing Authoritarian Rule and Public Policy in Argentina, 1930-1970 
(Boulder, 1991), p.84; Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1990), p.93.
106 Carl E. Solberg, Oil and Nationalism in Argentina (Stanford, 1979), pp.76,82,83.
107 Alain Rouquie, Pouvoir militaire et societepolitique en Republique Argentine (Paris, 1978), p. 153.
108 Steven Topik, The Political Economy o f the Brazilian State, 1889-1930 (Austin, 1987), p.l.
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initially advocated a State oil monopoly, he decided that the best solution was a monopolistic mixed 
corporation. The latter would be moulded on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as regards shareholding 
structure and on the Mexican sociedad mixta Petromex in terms of the origin of private sector investment. 
Like Anglo-Persian, the proposed enterprise would be owned 51% by the State and 49% by private 
investors. As was the case with the PSA proposal (see Chapter 3), government representatives on the board 
of directors would have a veto over major policy decisions while private investors, which had the necessary 
commercial skills, would administer the company.109 However, the Mosconi proposal differed in one 
critical respect from the PSA project: no foreign interests could participate in the mixed enterprise. Mosconi 
based this requirement on Petromex. Established in 1923, this firm restricted private investment to 
individuals of Mexican nationality.110 Mosconi was unable to see the issue of control of the oil industry 
resolved in the Twenties owing to bitter wrangling within the UCR and in Congress, the conflict between 
federal and provincial authorities over property rights on mineral deposits, and Yrigoyen’s intransigence 
during his doomed second presidency.
The growth of the oil industry illustrates that certain conditions for the rise of manufacturing were 
present before 1930. Industry had been stimulated by the expansion of agro-exports, rapid urbanisation, the 
shift in the nature of foreign investment, and military interest in defence related industries. Nevertheless, 
there had been no opportunity for genuine industrialisation and the development of an iron and steel sector. 
The production and export of rural commodities remained predominant in the national economy, 
notwithstanding the weaknesses of the export-led growth model. Industrialisation was limited, and the UCR 
administrations did little to encourage economic reform as its single priority had been the accomodation of 
its supporting constituencies within the existing framework. The Great Depression, as the First World War 
had done, again exposed the weaknesses of dependence on agro-exports. However, the intensity of the world 
crisis provided little scope for maneouvre in economic policy-making in the Thirties.
109 Carl E. Solberg, ’YPF: The Formative Years of Latin America’s Pioneer State Oil Company, 1922- 
39’, in John D. Wirth (ed.), Latin American Oil Companies and the Politics o f Energy (Lincoln, 1985), p.72.
110 Juan Carlos Vedoya, ’Mosconi, el petroleo y los trusts’, in Juan Carlos Vedoya and Luis C. Alen 
Lascano, El petroleo nacional (Buenos Aires, 1976), pp.54,55.
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The economy during the decada infame
The decada infame of Argentine politics (1930-1943) comprises two periods of major economic 
upheaval: the Depression during the early Thirties, and the Second World War in the early Forties. The 
most severe was the former, with its effects being more prolonged than those of the downturn during the 
First World War. Extremely adverse conditions reduced the scope for maneouvre in policy-making. The 
second Yrigoyen administration took no steps to overcome the crisis, which contrasts sharply with the 
performance of the Concordancia regime that came to power in the aftermath of the 1930 coup. The 
Concordancia dealt effectively with economic difficulties by implementing short-term policies that increased 
government involvement in economic management. However, this section also shows the Concordancia’s 
inability to introduce long-term reforms during the Second World War, when it became clear that the 
existing framework was no longer functioning. Increasing opposition to the regime prevented the 
introduction of an economic programme which was influenced by the conflict but had major long-term 
considerations, and the lack of political legitimacy ultimately destroyed the Concordancia.
As other countries, the Republic drifted into the Depression before October 1929. A sharp 
reduction in export volumes was coupled with a sudden capital outflow caused by speculation in Wall Street. 
This was combined with the deterioration in the terms of trade. Owing to the subsequent inability to pay 
for imports and service the foreign debt, net exports of gold increased until prohibited in December 
1929.111 Apart from suspending convertibility, which aimed to prevent further drainage of gold reserves, 
no concrete steps were taken by the government to tackle the economic crisis. The problem was that the 
crisis coincided with the disastrous second presidency of Yrigoyen, who was returned to power in 1928 at 
the age of 76, and brought about the downfall of democracy as the machinery of State virtually ground to 
a halt for two years. Yrigoyen’s overthrow in September 1930 resulted from simultaneous factors: the 
President’s senility and the overall incompetence of his government, combined with the wish of the 
oligarchy and his own supporters to displace him, growing restiveness within the Armed Forces, popular
111 Arturo O’Connell, ’La Argentina en la Depresion: los problemas de una economia abierta’, DE 23 
(1983-1984) No.92, p.487.
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discontent associated with the onset of the Depression, and an oil nationalisation policy that contributed to 
a serious legitimacy crisis by challenging the federal system and constitutional rights of the provinces.112
Although the Yrigoyenista oil nationalisation policy was a factor in the 1930 coup by paving the 
way for a political breakdown, there is little evidence to sustain the traditional argument that it was an ’oil 
coup’. There was no direct relation between oil nationalisation and the revolution’s chronology, and no 
conspiracy between Standard Oil (the firm most threatened by nationalisation) and the corporatist ideas of 
the group led by General Jose Felix Uriburu.113 Uriburu’s gobiemo provisional only lasted until 1931, 
for four reasons, (a) Its fascist project to replace Congress with an Italian-style Chamber of Corporations 
was unpopular, (b) The heavy-handed response to opposition provoked hostility towards the authorities, 
(c) The President’s health was deteriorating, (d) The economic crisis continued to deepen, and the 
Conservatives and their allies within the revolutionary camp outflanked Uriburu.114 The 1931 presidential 
election, which was marred by fraud and boycotted by personalista Radicals, brought to power a coalition 
known as the Concordancia. The latter, due to the controversial Roca-Runciman Pact of 1933, has been 
called el gobiemo de las vacas, but that description conceals its true composition. It was a coalition of 
Yrigoyen’s opponents, namely the Partido Democratico Nacional (old-time Conservatives), the 
antipersonalistas and the Independent Socialists (moderate former members of the Socialist Party), who 
provided Federico Pinedo, the very capable Minister of Finance.115
The policies undertaken by the Concordancia under Presidents General Agustin P. Justo and his 
successor Roberto M. Ortiz are the subject of considerable controversy and were largely designed to 
overcome the severe economic difficulties caused first by the world crisis in the early Thirties and 
subsequently by the Second World War in the early Forties. The most significant characteristic of these
112 Particular details on the causes of the 1930 coup can be found in Smith, Politics, p. 137; Falcoff and 
Dolkart, ’Developments’, pp.45,46; Rock, Argentina, p.212; Solberg, Oil, pp.l 13,151.
113 Fernando Garcia Molina and Carlos A. Mayo, El general Uriburu y  el petroleo (Buenos Aires, 1985), 
pp.36,37.
114 Falcoff and Dolkart, ’Developments’, p.34.
115 Smith, Politics, p. 138.
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policies was that they were supported by increased government involvement in economic management, which 
included the establishment of the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) in 1935. To counter 
the effects of the Great Depression, the Concordancia applied sound fiscal practices and promoted economic 
recovery in the rural sector. Although this strategy achieved its short-term objective after 1933, the regime 
had not aimed at long-term economic reform. This was explained by its nature, and the fact that ’reformist’ 
government officials could not openly advocate the need for industrialisation owing to the continued 
prevalence of the international division of labour theory and the weight of public opinion.116 The 
Concordancia’s only permanent achievement was the ’fiscal revolution’ that made government reliant for 
the first time on direct rather than indirect taxation for its revenue. Although the rural sector retained a 
fundamental function in economic policy and the country remained dependent on Britain for exports of key 
commodities, the share of manufacturing in the GDP was increasingly greater than that of agriculture (see 
Table 2.2) and industrial development had been encouraged by the contraction in foreign trade.
The Concordancia’s intervention in the management of national finances was the result of the 
disarray inherited by the gobiemo provisional in 1930, as the total receipts collected by the State could not 
cover administrative expenses, and the effects of the world economic crisis on the collection of import 
duties, the leading source of public revenue. With the country forced to depend less on duties to raise public 
funds and more on the domestic economy to pay for the services and expansion of the State, the government 
established the appropriate machinery to raise receipts domestically from new taxes on income, business 
transactions and petrol.117 The introduction of these levies and other charges, which resulted in a 
significant decline in the gap between national revenue and expenditure, were the first step towards severing 
government finances from the hazards of foreign trade.
The other cornerstone of Concordancia policy was promoting the recovery of the rural sector, and
116 Raul Prebisch, ’Argentine Economic Policies since the 1930s: Recollections’, in Guido Di Telia and 
D.C.M. Platt (eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1880-1946 (Basingstoke, 1986), p. 134.
117 Peter Alhadeff, ’Public Finance and the Economy in Argentina, Australia and Canada during the 
Depression of the 1930s’, in D.C.M. Platt and Guido Di Telia (eds.), Argentina, Australia and Canada 
(London, 1985), pp. 162,163.
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its success was largely owed to the financial provisions in the controversial Roca-Runciman Treaty of May 
1933. The Roca Funding Loan aimed to release blocked remittances of obligations representing import costs 
and profits of foreign-owned enterprises. The remittances had to be released, to alleviate the exchange 
position and restrain the pressure on the peso consequent from the steep drop in commodity prices, the 
deteriorated terms of trade and the burden of foreign obligations. Owing to the heavy strain on the peso, 
the exchange system had been placed under State control."8 Its reform was crucial for the success of the 
Plan de Accion Economica, which would actively support rural producers by purchasing major crops at 
minimum guaranteed prices. These purchases would be financed from the profits derived from the 
difference between the cheap rate at which the State bought exchange from exporters and the high rate at 
which it sold it to importers.119 The reform of the exchange system was critical for this, and depended 
on the managed devaluation of the peso. The Roca Loan had major implications for domestic policy. It 
made the regime confident that the devaluation could be controlled when the blocked funds were released, 
and that the minimum crop price guarantees could be implemented without major disturbances.120 The 
peso was devalued by 20% in November 1933 to favour rural production and exports. In a move which 
reflected the continuing growth of State intervention in the economy and which was designed to ensure that 
the leading multinational grain traders did not reap all the benefits, the Junta Reguladora de Granos was 
created and awarded control over all export sales. Basic prices were fixed for wheat, maize and linseed, 
and the Banco de la Nacion paid an immediate advance of 80% of the estimated crop value. The remainder 
was paid to farmers once crops were resold at market prices to the export houses.121
The agricultural sector was responsible for overall recovery. The reform of the exchange control 
system and the introduction of minimum price guarantees for grain purchases coincided with recovery in
118 Peter Alhadeff, ’Dependency, historiography and objections to the Roca Pact’, in Abel and Lewis 
(eds.), Imperialism, p.370; Javier Villanueva, ’Economic Development’, in Falcoff and Dolkart (eds.), 
Prologue, pp.62,63.
119 Alhadeff, ’Finance’, p. 168.
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DE 10 (1970-1971) Nos.39-40, p.408.
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the terms of trade and the stimulation of exports by the severe droughts in North America, which enabled 
the country to become the largest maize exporter in the world for several years during the mid-Thirties.122 
Although the Concordancia made no attempt at economic diversification, the crisis had provided scope for 
industrial expansion. Import constraints arising from the depreciation of the peso and increases in duties 
and tariffs resulted in ’forced’ import-substitution in manufacturing and enabled local producers to obtain 
a larger share of the domestic market.123 Some sectors as textiles and food processing continued to 
develop on the foundations established before 1914. Textiles were a major industry in the Thirties, and food 
processing expanded into new product lines - particularly minor agricultural goods.124 An unforeseen 
consequence of high tariffs, bilateralism and exchange controls was the manufacture of ’new’ products by 
the subsidiaries of foreign firms. Investment in these subsidiaries increased substantially as American firms 
needing to circumvent the discriminatory use of exchange controls established local branches. The main US 
investments in subsidiaries were in sectors whose output had the highest rates of expansion between 1925- 
1929 and 1937-1939, namely machinery, electrical goods and rubber products. The curtailment of trade in 
the Thirties enabled the subsidiaries to expand from assembly into local manufacturing of components, which 
partially substituted imports.125 Iron and steel production was not among the manufacturing activities that 
expanded, and the nascent metallurgical industry relied on local scrap resources and imports of basic inputs. 
Although these imports contracted at the trough of the Depression, their pre-Depression level was regained 
after 1933 owing to the rapidity of economic recovery and the policies of the ISC. As seen earlier, the 
cartel aimed to control worldwide production and distribution of iron and steel and sustain a declining trade 
by obstructing growth of the industry in the few remaining ’open’ markets such as the Republic. With the 
domestic market for iron and steel goods being limited and well served by foreign suppliers, there was little 
incentive to develop steelmaking. However, this situation would be altered by the Second World War.
122 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, ’An Interpretation of Argentine Economic Growth since 1930: Part I ’, The 
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Recovery under Justo was followed by renewed difficulties during the Ortiz presidency. The 
outbreak of war in 1939 added further strains. Rural production was highly affected by shortages of 
shipping capacity, which restricted the export level of output residues, and surplus production of maize and 
wheat was used as fuel.126 Economic hardship combined with the decline in government fortunes. The 
problem was that, even without the difficulties it faced, the government again did not satisfy the political 
requirements for sustained economic growth. The Concordancia not only personified specific interest 
groups, but also lacked a true level of political representativeness as it was sustained in power by the mighty 
Justista faction of the Army and the fraudepatriotico embodied in restricted and extremely corrupt elections. 
When Ortiz became President, it was not clear if growing discontent would undermine the regime. Aware 
of this, Ortiz attempted to silence critics through redemocratisation. The personalistas, who had previously 
abstained from participating in elections, re-entered the political arena. The UCR was successful in 
Congressional elections held in 1940 and, when combined with other opposition parties, had a majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies. For the first time since 1932, the regime faced a hostile Lower House. 
Nonetheless, fate and Vicepresident Ramon S. Castillo dashed any hope of full redemocratisation. The 
President had to take an extended leave owing to poor health and was replaced by Castillo, an 
unreconstructed Conservative who undid what Ortiz had achieved. He appointed a new cabinet and 
intervened in province after province to secure Conservative victories. The Concordancia was never to be 
the same again.127
The first casualty of the new political climate was the Plan Pinedo, the regime’s response in late 
1940 to the renewed economic crisis and the outbreak of the Second World War. Intended as a 
countercyclical measure, it reflects the increasing government involvement in economic management that 
characterised Concordancia mle. First, the plan aimed to help agriculture by extending the crop-financing 
schemes created in 1933. Second, it hoped to promote faster industrial growth and the export of 
manufactures. Finally, it supported the construction industry through a programme of cheap housing, which 
Pinedo hoped would create some 200,000 jobs. Nevertheless, the plan only partly attempted to tackle
126 Di Telia and Zymelman, Etapas, p.95.
127 Falcoff and Dolkart, ’Developments’, pp.38-40.
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structural economic imbalances. Pinedo, serving a second term as Minister of Finance and under the 
influence of the international conjuncture, laid emphasis on the recovery of the rural sector in much the same 
way he had done in 1933. Largely devoted to agricultural relief, the plan only attempted to promote 
’natural’ industries transforming nationally available resources. Pinedo regarded industry as a supplementary 
economic sector: farm exports were to be the ’master wheel’, and industries were to be promoted as ’lesser 
wheels’ at its side.128 However, the strategy went beyond the conjuncture. Because of the shortage of 
convertible currencies to cover import costs and the need to broaden markets, it proposed the diversification 
and industrialisation of exports.129 The shortage of convertible currencies was due to the fact that Britain 
would not use scarce dollar or gold holdings on Argentine purchases. Under an accord between the Bank 
of England and the BCRA, Britain made its payments into a special account at the Bank of England, where 
sterling balances remained blocked and would be gradually freed after the war.130 Hence, Pinedo proposed 
the diversification of markets, with a preference for Latin America and the USA. The reference to relations 
with the latter in the plan went beyond short-term considerations. The traditional Anglo-Argentine link was 
no longer functioning and Pinedo understood that his strategy would be unfeasible without improved trade 
relations with the Americans.131
Submitted to Congress in November 1940, the Plan Pinedo fell victim to the political crisis, most 
notably growing opposition by the UCR, and failed to gain approval in early 1941. The opposition would 
only support the Plan if there was political reform and demanded clean elections, but failed to obtain this. 
Rigged elections in the provinces of Santa Fe and Mendoza resulted in the rejection of the Plan Pinedo and 
the resignation of Pinedo as Minister of Finance.132 Castillo succeeded ailing Ortiz as President in January 
1942, and it was during his tenure that the economy bore the brunt of the impact of the war. Grain earnings
128 Rock, Argentina, pp.239,240.
129 Juan Jose Llach, ’El Plan Pinedo de 1940, su significado historico y los origenes de la economia 
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dropped steeply as the threat of German submarine warfare halved shipping to and from Argentine ports. 
In addition, the British naval blockade closed access to all Continental grain markets except Spain and 
Portugal.133 Industrial development was under severe import constraints, as exemplified by the case of 
iron and steel production. The latter, which was insignificant on the eve of the war and provided by two 
ephemeral domestic producers before 1939, was undertaken by metallurgical enterprises as a result of the 
demise of the ISC and wartime import shortages (see Chapter 3). Based on the use of increasingly depleted 
domestic scrap resources and of equipment produced domestically by ingenious Argentine engineers, steel 
output increased substantially. As indicated in Chapter 1, local production rose sharply between 1941 and 
1944 and covered a substantial share of national consumption of steel during the Second World War owing 
to the forced contraction of demand created by import curtailments.
Table 2.4
EXPORTS OF NON-TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL GOODS, 1934-1947
(as a percentage)












Source: Juan Jose Llach, ’El Plan Pinedo de 1940, su significado historico y los origenes de la 
economia politica del peronismo’, DE 23 (1983-1984) No.92, p.532.
However, despite severe difficulties, the country took some advantage of wartime conditions. 
Because the belligerent powers geared their economies to the war effort and could not supply Latin
133 Rock, Argentina, p.238.
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American markets, Argentine trade with adjacent nations grew rapidly.134 The most significant feature 
of the increased wartime regional trade is the share of manufactures in the structure of Argentine exports 
and imports. The contribution of industrial goods to exports during the conflict peaked in 1943 at levels 
seldom repeated subsequently in this period (see Table 2.4), and exports of manufactured goods were largely 
dominated by goods from the textile industry. The type of non-traditional industrial exports reflect an 
Argentine industrial structure based largely on light consumer industries. Since the country required imports 
of industrial goods, dependence on regional trade for the latter was heightened with wartime conditions and 
the American economic embargo. Brazil supplied industrial and semi-industrial products, and these included 
iron goods.135 Brazilian supplies of pig iron were particularly important for Argentine metallurgical firms 
as it enabled them to circumvent wartime import shortages and obtain the minimum essential quantities 
necessary for their steelmaking activities. In fact, Brazil was the leading source of pig iron during the 
Second World War (see Chapter 5).
Industrial exports, which represented 13.7% of total exports in the period 1941-1945, were a 
wartime windfall which evaporated once the war was over.136 Hence, during the conflict, the country had 
continued to depend on agricultural exports which were severely affected by wartime conditions. The 
economic difficulties created by the Second World War combined fatally with the total decline of the 
Concordancia and the rise of pro-fascist elements within the Army to produce the coup of June 1943. The 
regime’s coalition structure was shattered by Castillo, who broke publicly with ailing President Ortiz over 
both domestic and foreign policy in February 1941 and curbed most political activities by placing the 
country on long periods of state of siege with the pretext of ’wartime conditions’.137 Additionally, Castillo 
alienated the Justista faction within the Armed Forces, which had provided the first Concordancia president
134 For data on Argentine trade with other American countries see Llach, ’Plan’, p.533, and Porcile, 
’Challenge’, p. 132.
135 Porcile, ’Challenge’, pp.153,154.
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and given critical support to the regime, and there inevitably came the break between Castillo and Justo.138 
With the Armed Forces restless over the deteriorating political and economic situation and the government 
lacking any legitimacy or support, Castillo triggered the coup when he picked Robustiano Patron Costas, 
an arch-Conservative sugar baron from northwest Argentina, as his successor and Concordancia candidate 
for the presidential election due in late 1943.
The Concordancia was confronted with severe problems when it took power in 1932, and its 
policies were not bold but dictated by short-term exigencies. When national economic structural weaknesses 
were again exposed by the Second World War and caused renewed problems, the government paid a heavy 
price for its undemocratic nature. It was prevented by its political opponents from introducing an innovative 
economic plan that, although emphasising agricultural relief, went beyond the wartime conjuncture. The 
politically doomed Plan Pinedo sought an incomplete alteration of the existing economic strategy and the 
promotion of trade relations with the USA and Latin America. Nevertheless, doubts remain over the 
sustainability of the Plan. The competitive nature of the Argentine and American economies, particularly 
in the field of agricultural production and exports, and US protectionist policies cast a shadow over 
improvements in US-Argentine trade relations.139 The strategy of promoting industrial exports was 
affectedby the fact that the domestic industrial capability was embryonic. Capital goods were the industrial 
product most in demand in Latin American trading partners like Brazil, and industries producing these goods 
were poorly represented in the Argentine industrial structure.140 The Plan Pinedo was an aborted, partial 
attempt at economic change, whose most remarkable characteristic was a tacit acknowledgement that the 
existing framework was no longer functioning. The Army overthrew the government in June 1943 as a 
result of increasing economic and political problems. The Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU) that came to 
power had very different convictions than its Conservative predecessors, and from its ranks emerged the 
most famous Argentine leader of the century.
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The rise and fa ll o f  Peronista economics
The post-1943 decade perhaps provided the best opportunity to implement socio-economic reforms. 
The dictatorship of 1943-1945 and the elected Peronista government which followed it benefited from 
favourable conditions which were most apparent at the end of the war. When Juan Domingo Peron came 
to power in 1946, he had the economic means to create la Nueva Argentina (see Chapter 1). Yet the post- 
1943 decade ended in economic failure as both the military and Peronista regimes floundered. As is shown 
below, the problem as always was that these administrations represented specific interest groups and their 
policies were conditioned by political goals. The military governments headed by General Pedro Pablo 
Ramirez and General Edelmiro Farrell championed an industrialisation policy guided largely by wartime 
considerations, providing impetus for the development of projects like the PSA. Peron himself as Minister 
of War during the dictatorship of 1943-1945 had supported this type of industrialisation. Nonetheless, once 
the conflict ended, military policy had little urgency. Peron used his government position to create his own 
political base and develop his own justicialista agenda for his election to office. Given his labour base, his 
hatred for the Conservatives and his xenophobic leanings, Per6n subordinated economic policy to political 
ideology. This brought short-term benefits to his supporters but did not lead to diversification. The rural 
sector was squeezed as it was the key source of cash, industrial policy was inappropriate due to 
overemphasis on light industries, and Peron wasted valuable exchange resources in nationalisations rather 
than productive investments. What this section will make clear is that the regime squandered a unique 
opportunity to introduce structural reforms which was favoured by the existence of the singular advantages 
described in Chapter 1.
Between 1943 and 1945, the military regime promoted the growth of defence-related industries. 
Influenced by the war, the Armed Forces envisaged self-sufficiency and preparedness for war. Changes in 
technology had made existing armament stockpiles and forms of mobilisation obsolete, and the Army 
responded to the challenge with two programmes. The first proposed the expansion of military factories 
by the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares. The second was a systematic elaboration of planes
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de movilizacion industrial with reference to basic industries, fuels and weapons.141 These circumstances 
resulted in the elaboration of schemes like the PSA. Furthermore, they led to the military redefinition of 
the term ’natural industries ’, which had been linked with industrialisation limited to manufacturing associated 
to rural production. The Army also related the expression with the processing of minerals and to the notion 
of ’national raw materials’ - ie, minerals vital for heavy industry.142 With these criteria in mind, the 
military embarked on a desperate search for domestic resources and on the creation of a national heavy 
industry, since iron and steel were crucial to manufacture weaponry for modem warfare.143
Following his victory in the 1946 elections, Peron promoted a policy of mass consumption which 
conflicted with the need to deepen the industrialisation process and make long-term investments in areas 
such as steel production. The expansion of light industries increased demand for capital goods, which in 
turn could only be imported if agricultural exports paid for them. Unfavourable government policy towards 
the rural sector, which is discussed below, made this impossible. With lower exports and less foreign 
exchange available, there was little opportunity for further industrialisation.144
The policy of mass consumption was typified by: (a) an increase in the income of the lower classes, 
which would enhance purchasing power and provide a mass market for domestic industry, and (b) the 
expansion of light industries producing for that market. Peron invariably backed wage demands from the 
trade unions (the popular base of his regime) to increase the earnings of the lower classes, and thereby 
gained political credit for the swift improvement in workers’ living standards.145 Real wages in industry 
rose by around 33% from 1946 to 1950, or by 70% when fringe benefits are added. In the short-run, this
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income redistribution stimulated mass consumption as against investment.146 Manufacturing grew by 
around 29% between 1945 and 1948. The prime agent in this rapid expansion was the Banco de Credito 
Industrial founded in 1944, which starting in mid-1946 provided upto 80% of total credits for manufacturers. 
The consumer goods and service industries received most of the loans, and expanded fastest.147 Especially 
favoured were housing construction, regional meat-packing plants, the production of 16 milimetre films, 
regional electricity cooperatives, regional ’industrial nuclei’ (usually consisting of several small factories 
clustered around electric power stations), experimental nuclear power plants, frozen-food factories, storage 
facilities for cheese and wine, the purchase of diesel vehicles, any factory that would locate in Tierra del 
Fuego, and a broad range of artisan-type industries.148 These sectors suffered from overinvestment and 
did not generate sufficient exchange savings to cover the increase in capital goods imports resultant from 
the growth in light industries. Therefore these imports were only possible if rural exports could pay for 
them, and government policy towards a declining agricultural sector made this very hard indeed.
The decline of agriculture was reflected in the decrease in the land area devoted to grains.149 The 
war had severely hit output, exports and prices owing to the closure of traditional markets and the shortage 
of shipping capacity. Landowners shifted to pastoral activities, which were highly profitable as world 
demand for beef had been rising and increased further during the war.150 The shift in production required 
less labour and resulted in high rural unemployment. Tenants, whose incomes had already dropped due to 
market conditions, were expelled from the land and forced to migrate to the cities.151 Tensions rose 
between tenants and landowners, and also between the latter and the government. The post-1943 regimes 
were no friends of the Conservatives, and this resulted in a confrontation compounded in the harsh
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agricultural policies of the Casa Rosada.
The seeds of conflict between landowners and the government were sown by the revolutionary GOU 
regime, whose policies conflicted with the interests of landowners and export houses.152 Of particular 
importance was the decision to increase State control in grain commercialisation. The government elected 
in 1946 implemented this policy to the extreme, which was to the detriment of the rural sector and only 
intensified the rift between landowners and government. Farmers suffered due to the pricing policies of the 
Instituto Argentino para la Promocion del Intercambio (IAPI), higher costs caused by the extension of 
minimum-wage legislation to rural labourers, and the forced channeling of investment into manufacturing. 
The IAPI was a State agency set up in May 1946, which was to direct the buying and selling of exportables, 
though export houses dealing with commodities were not nationalised.153 It became the leading State 
instrument to control foreign trade, with a monopoly over practically all exports except wool. These 
included grain and meat exports through the various boards established by the Concordancia, and also linseed 
and leather exports.154 The IAPI became the sole buyer of most rural goods from local producers. Its tasks 
was to ensure the highest possible export earnings and favourable terms for purchases of imports, and also 
cheap sales in the home market.155 The IAPI was crucial for the income redistribution necessary to 
increase mass consumption, and a primary source of new funds for industrial investment. Designed to reap 
and reinvest the profits from agriculture, it squeezed rural interests by buying commodities cheaply from 
farmers and selling them dear abroad.156 The IAPI made enormous profits for a time by paying farmers 
far less than prevailing international prices and pushing down rural incomes.157 The differential it obtained 
was retained for allocation by the government, which used it to purchase foreign-owned utilities, subsidise
152 For the use of the state agencies created by the Concordancia to impose strict controls on output and 
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imports, finance acquisitions of capital goods, fuel and supplies for public companies and the Armed Forces, 
and for the obras de bien comun of Peronista urban and welfare programmes.158
The regime’s industrial and rural policies contributed to the economic difficulties which surfaced 
by 1949. Before turning to these, two further aspects associated to resource allocation must be examined: 
investment, and the use of blocked foreign exchange balances. Though his first presidency is considered 
the best by its supporters, Peron’s improvidence is reflected in the public accounts. The share of the gross 
national product paid out to public employees rose steadily, from 7.9% in 1945-1949 to 9.1% in 1950-1954. 
There was also the matter of the vast amount of resources directed for political purposes. Politicians have 
to pay off their supporters in some way or another, either in the shape of policies producing visible benefits 
or in the form of booty. The problem was that most of Peron’s pay-off was booty (ie, the direct transfer 
of assets from one person to another) on too large a scale. The classic example is the Fundacion Eva Peron, 
whose real budget increased tenfold in 1949-1952 and whose bounties were distributed among thousands 
of beneficiaries.159 Investment was even more critical in the expenditure pattern. The proportion of public 
funds used in direct investments jumped to 8.7% while that in indirect investments rose from nil to 4.2% 
with the purchase of foreign-owned enterprises, and the share of the gross national product invested by State 
agencies increased impressively to 12.9% in the years 1945-1949. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem 
lay in the nature of the investments. Only 66.6% of these were direct, and were not predominantly used 
to build up productive capacity. Hence, 50.8% of direct investment was non-economic and mostly on 
conspicuous waste: 12.4% was spent on public buildings, 29.3% on the Armed Forces, and only 12.4% on 
items of some possible economic use (eg, sanitary works).160 The remaining 33.3% was indirect 
investment, and consisted of asset transfers to foreign capitalists and the wastage of most of the US$
1,500,000,000 held in foreign exchange reserves.
Government policy contained serious flaws and achieved little in terms of economic diversification
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or the development of heavy industry. Diversification could only be achieved through thorough 
industrialisation, a process that would absorb the manpower no longer required in primary production and 
had to supply all those industrial goods which could not be imported owing to the relatively slow growth 
of exports.161 Import substitution industrialisation consisted of two stages. The first was the establishment 
of light industries, which resulted in an expansion of capital goods imports. Since such imports were 
vulnerable to shortfalls in export earnings, industrialisation had to be deepened. The second stage was the 
development of heavy and capital goods industries, in which iron and steel had a vital role. The iron and 
steel industry not only would satisfy rising demand for its products in sectors as industrial construction 
building and transportation, but also constitute the basis for other industries as machinery manufacturing.162
Peronista policies were far from achieving diversification. The light industries that received most 
of the regime’s attention had been developing rapidly before 1943, and were probably nearing maturity by 
the Forties. Therefore these industries probably required an increasingly competitive climate to ensure their 
efficiency, but instead were surrounded by extremely protective policies.163 The policy to promote mass 
consumption led to investment being channelled primarily into industries producing ’wage commodities’ and 
activities producing ’wage services’ such as popular housing. Furthermore, rural policy was aimed at 
ensuring cheap foodstuffs for urban workers. Export volumes declined steeply and domestic consumption 
of foodstuffs increased.164 Hence, Peron’s policies sacrificed exports and opportunities to earn foreign 
exchange that could be utilised on capital goods imports. In addition, emphasis on light industry reflected 
the regime’s populist tone and excessive stress on the first stage of import substitution industrialisation. The 
government failed to deepen industrialisation, to generate sustained growth and to devote more attention to
161 United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Problems o f the steel 
making and transforming industries in Latin America, Volume 1: Report of the Sao Paulo meeting (New 
York, 1958), p.35.
162 Ibid., p.36.
163 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, ’An Interpretation of Argentine Economic Growth since 1930: Part II’, 
The Journal o f Development Studies 3 (1966-1967) No.2, p. 164.
164 Ibid., p. 166; Rock, Argentina, pp.296,297.
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sectors struggling to emerge and the necessary social overhead capital.165 Furthermore, public expenditure 
was mismanaged and public funds were siphoned off by corruption in the government.166 Finally, there 
was the waste of foreign exchange balances on nationalising run-down utilities. The most celebrated 
nationalisation was that of the British-owned railways. Although the use of sterling balances in such a 
purchase was questionable, it arose from Argentine dilemmas. As the United Kingdom suffered from 
currency instability and export difficulties, the build-up of non-convertible sterling reserves was deemed 
dangerous.167 There was no possibility of financing the dollar deficit with a sterling surplus as in the past, 
and the prospects of importing the necessary products from Britain were low.168 Despite these 
circumstances, the purchase of the railways was unwise for two reasons. First, the economy was strained 
by the reorganisation and renovation of the enlarged State network. Second and more crucial, the acquisition 
contributed to shortages of sterling reserves at a time of increasing exchange shortages. Of the £
150,000,000 spent, only £ 40,000,000 corresponded to the balances. The remainder was covered with an 
advance from the British Ministry of Food on account of commodity purchases in 1948, and a contribution 
made by HM Government towards increased Argentine production costs. Hence, the country spent exchange 
which could have been added to its dwindling reserves and did not retain adequate reserves to cover 
unforeseen future problems in the balance of payments.169
The failure of government policy became apparent by late 1948, when the economy showed signs 
of incapacity to support the Peronista strategy. Foreign exchange and gold holdings were exhausted, and 
the balance of payments turned unfavourable as export prices fell relative to purchases of fuel, machinery 
and industrial raw materials. The deficits were met by borrowing and increasing the money supply, and the
165 Diaz Alejandro, ’Interpretation II’, pp. 164,166.
166 For the notorious corruption in the Fundacion Eva Peron, see Lewis, Crisis, p.202.
167 Noel Fursman, The declineof the Anglo/Argentine economic connection in the years immediately after 
the Second World War: a British perspective (DPhil thesis, Oxford, 1988), p. 187.
168 Jorge Fodor, ’Peron’s Policies for Agricultural Exports 1946-1948: Dogmatism or Commonsense?’, 
in David Rock (ed.), Argentina in the Twentieth Century (London, 1975), p. 147.
169 Fursman, Decline, pp. 185,186.
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differential between the prices paid for commodities and export prices was extended by the LAPI.170 The 
bottleneck in the balance of payments became critical. Export earnings decreased as import levels increased 
and, by early 1949, Argentina had exhausted its dollar reserves and could no longer acquire imports from 
the USA.171 As the economy plunged, the troubled rural sector continued its steady decline. There was 
no scope to revive rural exports, owing to severe droughts in the late Forties and early Fifties and the fact 
that their placement abroad became increasingly difficult in the face of American competition in the grain 
trade.172 However, the difficulty in placing exports of rural commodities overseas was also due to the last 
remnants of US economic pressure on the country, which were manifest in discrimination towards purchases 
of Argentine goods with Marshall Plan dollars. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the 
administrator of Marshall Plan funds, deliberately denied the country the chance to acquire much needed 
exchange in 1948 by discriminating against Argentine goods which were in surplus and in high demand. 
Ever since the Marshall Plan was launched in 1947 and Argentine-American relations had improved, the 
country was promised access to ECA dollars by the Truman administration. While the Republic was 
discriminated against by the ECA, rural commodity exporters like Canada, which suffered from exchange 
shortages and required cash payment for its exports, were awarded substantial orders for agricultural 
products.173 Matters were worsened by the impossibility of turning towards the United Kingdom for 
reviving the export trade, as the degree of dependence was not mutual.174
The severe economic crisis initiated in the late Forties spread from agriculture and commerce to 
industry. In addition, employment and income contracted, and inflation compunded the crisis. Peron reacted 
to the deepening crisis by sacking the head of both the IAPI and the Banco Central and introducing a 
patchwork of measures in 1949, which included new import restrictions, the tightening of credit for the
170 Fems, Argentina, p. 193; Lewis, Crisis, p. 190.
171 Rock, Argentina, p.298.
172 Ibid., p.293.
173 Carlos Escude, ’Las restriccionesintemacionalesde la economiaargentina, 1945-1949’, DE 20 (1980- 
1981) No.77, pp.33,38.
174 For specific details on the problems in Anglo-Argentine trade see Colin Lewis, ’Anglo-Argentine 
Trade, 1945-1965’, in Rock (ed.), Argentina, pp.121,122, and Rock, Argentina, p.294.
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private sector, the curtailment of public works projects, and a demand for employers to cover the rising 
wages from profits.175 Nevertheless, the measures were insufficient or even failed as any serious 
commitment was lacking.
The difficulties experienced by industry in the late Forties are critical from the perspective of the 
thesis, as the steepest drop in production occurred in the metallurgical sector. As seen above, metallurgical 
enterprises and importers of finished goods had undertaken steel production during the Second World War 
to compensate for shortages of overseas supplies. However, domestic steel output was based on increasingly 
depleted sources of scrap (see Chapter 5) and in the postwar period could only be sustained with imports 
of essential inputs. The curtailment of imports resulting from the economic crisis led to severe raw material 
shortages.176 Unable to obtain import permits, many large firms cut back production. The difficulties 
became so extreme and vital imports of pig iron so scarce that steel production for construction, 
transportation and public works was threatened with paralysis.177
Given the economic difficulties described above, it is clear that the attempt to create la Nueva 
Argentina had failed by the early Fifties. The policy to encourage mass consumption had been too costly. 
The squeeze on the rural sector sacrificed exports and opportunities to earn the foreign exchange necessary 
to acquire capital goods, and overemphasis on promoting light industries did not generate enough exchange 
savings to cover the required imports. In addition, the regime spent the considerable foreign exchange 
reserves it held after the war on purchasing foreign-owned, run-down utilities. These policies adversely 
affected the development of heavy industry, which had been enacted into legislation in 1947 but made no 
headway. The exchange shortage made resources scarce for this project and for equipment imports, and 
overinvestment in light industries retarded the growth of sectors which required iron and steel products.
175 Gary W. Wynia, Argentina in the Postwar Era (Albuquerque, 1978), p.69.
176 La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 48° Ejercicio cerrado 
el 30 de Junio de 1950’, Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, 4 December 1950, p. 1151; La Cantabrica, 
’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 50° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio de 1952’, Boletin, 1 
December 1952, p.499.
177 Metalurgia, November 1951, p. 14, and December 1951, p.7.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has assessed the international and domestic constraints on the efforts to develop 
steelmaking in Argentina. The external restrictions manifested themselves in the attempts of leading steel 
producer-exporters to prevent the growth of production overseas as export markets shrank. As seen above, 
the Continental European exporters predominant before 1939 achieved this the International Steel Cartel they 
established. These practices included a comprehensive general marketing agreement, the establishment of 
subordinate international sales comptoirs for specific products, domination of the distribution process in 
export markets, and dealing with competition from producer-exporters outside the cartel through market 
segmentation. Although the Second World War provided an opening to develop local steelmaking capacity 
in ’small’ economies as the Argentine, there was renewed obstruction to the development of heavy industry 
in traditional markets importing iron and steel products. The USA replaced Continental Europe as leading 
producer-exporter and, notwithstanding that it had encouraged industrial development in Latin America out 
of wartime strategic considerations, did not want to foster industrial activities south of the Rio Grande which 
could compete with North American industry. However, Washington did not have to resort to the cartel’s 
methods to achieve its goals. It refused to supply technology and capital, of which it was the principal 
international source, and in the case of Argentina had a further incentive not to collaborate. The US- 
Argentine relationship had deteriorated during the Second World War and reached an all-time low.
In terms of domestic constraints on the development of steelmaking, the key factor was the 
configuration of the national economy. As shown in this chapter, some kind of structural transformation 
was taking place, which was reflected in the increasing share of manufacturing in the GDP (see Table 2.2). 
The growth of industrial activities had initially arisen from the demand effects of rising income and was 
subsequently fostered by ’forced’ import substitution resultant from the Great Depression and the Second 
World War. However, the process of change did not go far enough and thereby rural production and exports 
retained a key economic function. The critical reason why this was the case was institutional failure. As 
seen above, the political groupings that governed in this period represented particular sectorial interests, 
which was reflected in their policies. The Union Civica Radical merely strove for accomodation within the
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existing framework, the Concordancia restricted itself to economic policies influenced by short-term 
economic difficulties and would not have genuinely sought reform given the nature of the regime and the 
weight of public opinion, and the Peronistas wasted the best opportunity to implement socio-economic 
reforms by mismanaging the economy and embarking on grandiose follies. Although the inability or 
unwillingness of particular regimes to introduce structural reforms had an adverse effect on attempts to 
develop domestic steelmaking, there were other problems associated with iron and steel production to which 
this thesis now turns.
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Chapter 3
THE ROLE OF THE STATE, PRIVATE FIRMS AND FOREIGN INTERESTS IN  HEAVY INDUSTRY
Domestic steel production emerged by and large during the Second World War as a result of three 
factors. First was the demise of the International Steel Cartel, which had attempted to control worldwide 
steel production and distribution and obstructed growth of the industry in the extra-European world. Second 
were wartime shortages of imported iron and steel products, and third were military concerns over national 
defence. Given increased State intervention in the economy, it is little wonder that government action was 
central to the emergent industry. However, this was not how its future had been envisaged by General 
Savio, key promoter of a national heavy industry during the Forties.
This chapter presents three arguments, (a) That government involvement in the sector did not begin 
until the crises of the Thirties, despite clamours for the creation of a State-owned industry in the Twenties, 
(b) That although projects in the Forties were not devised to be wholly State-owned, this is what eventually 
happened, (c) That participation of foreign interests in proposals of the Forties was not incompatible with 
the objectives of the State, as foreign firms could provide much needed influxes of capital and technology. 
The first section of the chapter surveys the emergence of the private sector producers. It examines the 
origins of the firms concerned (some of them were well established metallurgical enterprises) and problems 
confronting them during the Peronato. The career of Fritz Mandl, an Austrian arms dealer closely involved 
in a scheme to establish a domestic iron and steel industry in the early Forties, is also considered in this 
section. The second section focuses upon initial State efforts to establish heavy industry. It outlines the 
government’s assessment of requirements vital to a successful iron and steel industry and the ideas 
underlying military involvement in this sector. It examines the attempt by the Armed Forces to develop iron 
and steel production in the Thirties, and the subsequent development and functions of a military-controlled 
industrial empire known as the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares. The final section will assess 
the development of the Plan Siderurgico Argentino and its political and economic tenets. Particular attention 
is paid to the establishment of Altos Homos Zapla, a blast furnace in the province of Jujuy, and difficult 
negotiations for the establishment of the mixed enterprises Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina and Hoj alata
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Argentina, the integrated steeklworks in which participation by private and even foreign interests was 
regarded as vital for success. The section concludes with an explanation of the factors that led to the non­
implementation of the Plan Sidenirgico.
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVA TE SECTOR IRON AND STEEL PRODUCERS
The private sector companies that undertook steel production to overcome import shortages during 
the Second World War may be grouped into two categories. The first were metallurgical firms, founded 
mainly by immigrant entrepreneurs in the late nineteenth century to manufacture items such as construction 
materials, rural implements, and tools. By the war most of these companies were well established and had 
diversified into raw iron and steel production. The second group were composed mainly of importers of 
finished items. Cut-off from imports during the war, they were compelled to manufacture substitutes. The 
difficulty for these firms was that they possessed neither modem technology nor sufficient capital to 
undertake the construction of a large-scale steelworks. However, several of their achievements can not be 
underestimated, (i) The modest production capacity which existed before 1939 was expanded and plant was 
integrated. The metallurgical firms developed backward linked operations, and largely produced steel for 
’in house’ consumption. Of the three integrated stages of iron and steel production, only pig iron production 
was omitted. As inputs other than imported pig iron could be used in open-hearth furnaces (see Chapter 
1), the key raw material was scrap obtained from obsolete machinery and rural implements, and war materiel 
and demolitions.1 (ii) Equipment was available owing to the ingenuity of local engineers, in spite of 
wartime scarcities and hostile US policy, (iii) There is evidence that companies were able to overcome the 
insufficiency of capital and develop their steelmaking operations with financing from local banks.
Origins o f  the leading private iron and steel producing firms
Of the established firms, only one had produced steel before the Twenties. However, all had been
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founded towards the end of the nineteenth century and, before diversifying into steelmaking during the 
Second World War, most had a tendency towards administrative reorganisation most visible in changes of 
company names. This, however, did not necessarily result in the restructuring and integration of production. 
The first of these companies, the Compania Argentina de Hierros y Aceros Limitada de Pedro Vasena e 
Hijos, dated back to 1870 but did not produce raw iron and steel per se. It provided frames, manufactured 
from foreign inputs, for the main buildings of the city of Buenos Aires between 1890 and 1914.2 Another 
establishment, the El Carmen workshops, followed in 1889. Founded by Aureliano and Eliseo Baldor, they 
prospered in the metal bashing trade. El Carmen was transferred to a group of industrialists composed of 
Antonio Arostegui, Ciriaco and Antonio Morea, Antonio Mulet, and Julian Ruiz in 1894. Following 
recapitalisation, the company was renamed La Cantabrica on 12 June 1902.3 Little else is known about the 
firm before 1939, except that it specialised in the supply of rural implements.
The pioneer steel producer was established in the Constitucion district of Buenos Aires (see Map 
3.1) by Juan Pinoges in 1896. It began operations with a small 3-ton capacity furnace, and successively 
incorporated 6 Siemens-Martin furnaces of 8 tons each.4 Initially, Pinoges produced pieces of moulded steel 
for machinery spare parts and years later set up a rolling mill with all accessories necessary for the 
production of steel building materials.5 This diversification was fostered by the protection awarded to 
certain rolled goods used in construction.6 Little else is known about the enterprise, except that it became 
the Talleres Metalurgicos Vulcano S.R.L. and that at the end of the Second World War it was still owned 
by the Pinoges family.7 One more firm emerged in the early twentieth century, which eventually became
2 Luis Enrique Vergne, ’El acero argentino: una batalla nacional’, Todo es Historia, July 1980, p.20.
3 Garcia Vizcaino, Tratado, Volume II, p.254.
4 Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), 31° Aniversario, 9 de Octubre 1941-1972 
(Buenos Aires, October 1972), p.61.
5 Raul Larra, Savio: el argentino que forjo el acero (Buenos Aires, 1980), p. 139.
6 Secretariade Industria y Comercio, Hierro Laminado sin trabajar (Buenos Aires, August 1947), p. 13.
7 Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), Informe sobre elmercado local e industria nacional 
en laminados de hierro y  acero (Buenos Aires, May 1945), p.22.
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the Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET and national leader in the market for 
metallurgy products. Its origins also date back to the late nineteenth century, to the bolt factory of Jose 
Ottonello and Luis A. Huergo and the machinery workshops of Antonio Rezzonico. In 1902, on the 
initiative of the Emesto Tomquist & Co. group, Rezzonico, Ottonello and Huergo founded a company to 
acquire the stocks, equipment and land of the General Bosch plant of El Ancla S.A. The purpose of the 
venture, known as Rezzonico, Ottonello y Cia. until 1909 and thereafter as the Sociedad Anonima Talleres 
Metalurgicos, was to assemble and modify the implements and agricultural machinery imported by a 
Tomquist subsidiary.8
Excluding Pinoges, only Vasena attempted to diversify into raw iron and steel production and 
develop backward linkages before the Twenties. As a number of Argentine companies, Vasena was listed 
overseas in order to gain access to new capital. It was registered in Britain in 1912 as the Argentine Iron 
and Steel Company, and its capital was denominated in sterling.9 Encouraged by import shortages during 
the First World War and by the fact that it already possessed technically advanced installations in its 
Riachuelo workshops (see Map 3.1 for their location), the firm expanded its activities into steelmaking. It 
set up 2 open-hearth furnaces and inaugurated a modem plant for the manufacture of bars in June 1920.10 
Once a flourishing business, the Argentine Iron and Steel Company subsequently dwindled away and went 
into liquidation in 1924. Vasena products could not compete against the dumping of cheaper imported iron 
and steel goods.11 In addition, the company had been mismanaged, and its expansion plans handled 
carelessly and financed through speculation.12
8 Revista de la Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin, July 1930, p.3; Donna J. Guy, ’La 
industria argentina, 1870-1940: Legislation comercial, mercado de acciones y capitalization extranjera’, 
Desarrollo Economico 22 (1982-1983) No.87, p.364.
9 Guy, ’Industria’, p.368; The Times, 2 October 1924, p.23.
10 Secretaria de Industria, Hierro, p. 13; H. Foster Bain, Lasposibilidades de la manufactura de hierro 
y acero en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1925), p. 104.
11 Foster Bain, Posibilidades, p. 104.
12 The Times, 2 October 1924, p.23.
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Following the Vasena liquidation, there were no further private sector attempts to produce iron and 
steel. They were discouraged by the emergent oligopoly in the iron and steel trade, until war broke out in 
September 1939. As seen in Chapter 2, Continental steel producer-exporters attempted to retain their 
decreasing shares of overseas trade initially through dumping and subsequently through oligopolistic 
practices. One of the means of deterring the growth of iron and steel production in ’small’ economies 
employed by West European steelmakers was the purchase of stakes in companies with the potential to 
produce steel locally in traditional export markets. The latter method was to be formalised by the 
International Steel Cartel (ISC) and pioneered by one of its founding members, the ARBED-Terres Rouges 
group of Luxembourg. ARBED, a colossal international mining and metallurgical consortium and the 
second largest European steel producer, had acquired important shareholdings in over 50 enterprises 
throughout Western Europe, Africa and South America, in order to secure raw materials for its 
manufacturing and markets for its products.13 The overseas operations of ARBED-Terres Rouges are 
important within the context of the thesis for two reasons, (i) They were the direct consequence of the 
problems faced by the Luxembourgeois steel industry after the First World War, namely the need to dispose 
of large production surpluses and gain footholds in the few remaining ’open’ markets (see Chapter 2). (ii) 
By different means, ARBED methods affected the development of domestic steel production in both Brazil 
and Argentina, the two major South American economies.
In Brazil, ARBED acquired the Companhia Sidenirgica Mineira in 1921. This purchase, which 
resulted in the creation of the Companhia Sidenirgica Belgo-Mineira, suited both the requirements of the 
Brazilian Government and the Luxembourg group. Brazil was prepared to grant mining concessions in the 
rich iron ore deposits in the state of Minas Gerais, providing ARBED with the opportunity to obtain a share 
of Brazilian supplies of ore - which were largely controlled by British and American interests. In exchange 
for such favours, Brazil expected the firm which was awarded the mining concession to develop 
steelmaking in Minas Gerais, where charcoal-based pig iron production had been undertaken at the end of 
the nineteenth century.14 For ARBED, this was a chance to control the Brazilian market for iron and steel.
13 Revista, July 1930, pp.7,8.
14 Carlos Manuel Pelaez, Historia da Industrializagao Brasileira, (Rio de Janeiro, 1972), p. 147.
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Belgo-Mineira established itself as both the leading domestic steel producer and a major supplier of ISC 
products as local output did not keep pace with demand. In line with the objectives of its parent company 
and the steel cartel, Belgo-Mineira maintained its prominent market position by organising and dom inating 
an association with other local producers. This trust regulated output through quotas, set prices and even 
paid some blast furnaces not to operate.15
ARBED’s approach in Brazil contrasted sharply with that in Argentina, where the Luxembourgeois 
group acquired a significant participation in the Talleres Metalurgicos in 1922. In Argentina, where 
domestic steel production and raw materials (excluding scrap) were virtually absent, it preempted the 
development of the industry by ’controlling’ a firm in a traditional importing country with potential to 
expand into steelmaking. By taking a stock in the Talleres Metalurgicos, a dynamic and rapidly growing 
concern, ARBED seemed outlets in the leading Latin American market and allowed a ’controlled’ expansion 
of its licensed distributor which would complement the corporate objectives of the group. The Talleres 
Metalurgicos acquired the Talleres San Martin in 1925 and the former Vasena works in 1926.16 These 
purchases did not result in the integration of plant. In line with its goals, ARBED prevented the undertaking 
of steel production in the former Vasena works despite the availability of modem facilities. Vital inputs 
required in metallurgical goods were imported from countries participating in the ISC, while the steelmaking 
facilities acquired from Vasena remained idle until the collapse of the cartel and the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The rolling mill was then purchased by La Cantabrica, and the open-hearth furnaces were 
subsequently brought into use by the Talleres Metalurgicos when this firm was forced to compensate import 
shortages with its own steel production.17 As a result of ARBED policies, the acquisition of the Talleres 
San Martin and Vasena in the short-term merely led to an amalgamation into a large holding company, the 
Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin, which was to manage and coordinate activities.18
15 John D. Wirth, The Politics o f Brazilian Development 1930-1954 (Stanford, 1970), p.88.
16 Revista, July 1930, p.3.
17 Revista, September 1930, p.3; BCRA, Informe, p.48; TAMET, September-October 1943, p.3.
18 Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin S.A., Reseha grafica (Buenos Aires, 1928), unpaginated.
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The acronym TAMET was added to the firm’s name in 1935.19
The oligopolistic trade practices of the ISC and the ’control’ by one of its founder members of a 
leading Argentine metallurgical firm had deterred any attempts to develop domestic steel production. With 
the collapse of the cartel, the opportunity arose for diversification by the established metallurgical firms into 
steelmaking. However, before assessing this particular development, the chapter describes the origins of the 
two major private steel producers arising from companies that imported finished items before 1939 and were 
compelled to manufacture substitutes to overcome wartime shortages. The first was Industria Argentina de 
Aceros S.A. (ACINDAR), founded in 1942 by the construction firms Acevedo y Shaw and Compania de 
Construcciones Civiles de Aguirre y Aragon. Set up to produce steel for construction, the sector with the 
largest share of the domestic iron and steel market, ACINDAR was no administrative amalgamation. 
Acevedo y Shaw and Aguirre y Aragon together held 50% of the capital and the Chilean industrial group 
Industria de Aceros Chilenos (INDAC) the remainder. Acevedo y Shaw had contracted work in Chile and 
a chance meeting between engineer Arturo Acevedo and Francisco Agurto Montesinos, the president and 
founder of INDAC, led to this Chilean company becoming a partner in the nascent company. The 
shareholding structure of ACINDAR underwent a major change when INDAC withdrew in 1946.20 The 
reasons for this were connected to events in Chile. The Compania de Acero del Pacifico steelworks project 
in Huachipato, developed with substantial financing from the Chilean State through the Corporacion de 
Fomento de la Produccion, was to start construction in mid-1947.21 This project represented a major threat 
to the survival of INDAC. The latter was a fairly small company based in Santiago, which would have 
difficulty in competing against large-scale production at Huachipato and thereby be marginalised in the 
Chilean market. The alternative for INDAC was to attempt to expand its facilities and production, which 
required substantial investments.22 In order to raise funds quickly, INDAC sold its stake in ACINDAR.
19 Revista, January 1935, p.5.
20 ACINDAR, Historia de una Voluntad de Acero (Buenos Aires, 1986), pp.77,78,86.
21 David G. Greene, Steel and Economic Development: Capital-Output Ratios in Three Latin American 
Steel Plants (East Lansing, 1967), pp. 18,19.
22 Carlos Sanchez Hurtado, Evolucion Historica de la Industria Sidenirgica Chilena e Ibero-Americana 
(Santiago de Chile, 1952), pp.239,240.
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The other major producer set up by an importer of finished items are the Establecimientos 
Metalurgicos Santa Rosa S.A., founded in 1943. In sharp contrast to ACINDAR, this firm was not set up 
by a consumer of iron and steel goods but by a licensed distributor of imported rolled products. Its founder 
was Hierromat S.A., a company established in 1933 by the French group Longovica (a subsidiary of the 
Acieries de Longwy and Marine Homecourt).23 Hierromat was a direct reflection of ISC policies. It was 
set up as a result of the need of the above mentioned French enterprises (which participated in the cartel) 
to secure markets at a time when trade contracted, and it acted as their licensed distributor in Argentina. 
Owing to wartime shortages and on the initiative of the South American director of Longovica, the 
Establecimientos Metalurgicos Santa Rosa were created to manufacture substitutes for formerly imported 
products. Some other small companies emerged during the war, of which only the names are known.24
The growth o f  private sector iron and steel production: equipment, finance and post-1945 problems
By diversifying into steelmaking, the private sector firms described above contributed substantially 
to surmount wartime shortages of imported iron and steel. More crucially, owing to the ability of local 
engineers, they demonstrated their capacity to circumvent the lack of imported capital goods and the 
American economic embargo. Nevertheless, growth in local iron and steel production had been shielded 
from overseas competition by the Second World War. In the aftermath of the conflict, it was assumed that 
the companies would confront the possibility of the restoration of iron and steel imports and would have 
to modernise their plants in order to survive but, as will be seen below, the threat of cheap imports proved 
temporary given domestic constraints on imports.
Compelled by the outbreak of war and subsequent import shortages, the companies mentioned above 
established steelmaking facilities in fairly rapid succession. Local engineers overcame the scarcity of foreign
23 ACINDAR, Historia, p. 104.
24 These include Rosati y Cristofaro and Torres y Citati, which are mentioned in the data in Table N°1 
in the Appendix of Eduardo A. Garimaldi, Industria sidenirgica argentina (Buenos Aires, December 1947). 
Lack of information on these firms suggests that they do not appear to have survived long after the war.
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capital goods by copying old foreign designs and adapting second-hand equipment. The plants they designed 
were fairly integrated, comprising steelmaking and rolling installations. La Cantabrica was the first to 
diversify into raw iron and steel production. In 1941 it inaugurated a plant, designed by Argentine engineer 
Emilio Pujals, in the Buenos Aires suburb of Haedo (see Map 3.1).25 It comprised 2 open-hearth furnaces 
with a capacity of 20 tons each, built locally on the basis of French designs, and rolling equipment from 
the Vasena works, which had been reconstructed and modernised. The plant produced shapes, slabs and iron 
for construction.26 The following year, ACINDAR erected its plant in Rosario, the leading city in Santa 
Fe. It comprised a rolling mill supplied by INDAC and 1 Siemens-Martin furnace built according to a copy 
of plans of an American designed 15-ton furnace. The latter were provided by the Fabricaciones Militares 
(DGFM) and came with the furnace purchased during the mid-Thirties for the Fabrica Militar de Aceros 
project (see below). In addition, the DGFM provided ACINDAR an allocation of fuel-oil, as the latter was 
rationed and was needed to fuel the furnace. However, this assistance had a price. ACINDAR’s location 
in Rosario was not solely based on the adequacy of communications and labour supply (see Map 3.2) and 
the availability of an ample scrap supply in the nearby railroad workshops at Perez. It also met the 
condition laid by the DGFM for its support, which was that the plant should be within easy reach from San 
Nicolas - the site of the proposed SOMISA steelworks. This fit in with the military project for an integrated 
heavy industry, and ACINDAR was a potential SOMISA customer.27
The ACINDAR plant is the best example of the domestic ability to build and commission 
steelmaking facilities. In order to attain high productivity, ACINDAR modified the military furnace design 
and increased capacity first to 25 tons and subsequently to 30 tons. The Rosario plant was completed by 
late 1942, the furnace having been built in 8 months. Production started in April 1943.28 Also in 1943, 
TAMET inaugurated a steel plant in the former Vasena works. Although the firm previously had the
25 Horacio N. Bruzone, Contribution de La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y  C. al progreso del pais (Buenos Aires, 
1941), unpaginated.




potential to diversify into steelmaking, the ARBED shareholding had imposed constraints on expansion from 
which it was only freed by the collapse of the steel cartel in 1939 and the German invasion of Luxembourg 
in 1940. The TAMET plant comprised 2 locally built open-hearth furnaces of 15 tons each and a rolling 
section, part of which was acquired in Brazil.29 By the Fifties, the plant comprised 3 open-hearth 
furnaces.30 Finally, one more mill was inaugurated by the Establecimientos Metalurgicos Santa Rosa. This 
firm aimed to install a plant for the complete production process and obtain steel ingots, billets and rolled 
products in successive stages, and for this purpose acquired a large property in the Buenos Aires suburb of 
La Tablada (see Map 3.1).31 Steel production began in 1944 with locally-produced equipment, namely one 
open-hearth furnace of 17 tons and a rolling mill.32
Although there is little evidence as to how this rapid growth in productive capacity was financed, 
major clues are provided by TAMET and Santa Rosa. Both these companies resorted to local financing to 
offset capital shortcomings. TAMET was able to obtain the necessary funds to rehabilitate the Vasena works 
through the Tomquist banking house - its key shareholder (the other being ARBED-Terres Rouges).33 
Arrangements between emergent manufacturers and the financial sector, such as that of TAMET and 
Tomquist, were not new and indicate that interests more commonly associated with agroexports did at times 
invest in non-agricultural projects. The Tomquist group, which was largely identified with involvement in 
farming, foreign trade and sugar mills, financed other industrial operations besides metallurgy.34 In contrast 
to TAMET, no banks held shares in Santa Rosa - at least initially. The major shareholders were Hierromat, 
Marine Homecourt and the French company Actuma, which provided funds from blocked accounts that 
could not be remitted to German-occupied France. As the capital contributions of these three companies
29 TAMET, September-October 1943, p.3; BCRA, Informe, p.48.
30 ’Evolucion de la Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET’, La Res, 5 January 
1958, p.27.
31 Instituto Latinoamericanodel Fierro y el Acero (ILAFA), Argentina (Santiago de Chile, 1963), p. 113.
32 Table N°1 in the Appendix of Garimaldi, Industria.
33 ’TAMET S.A.’, La Metropole, Antwerp, 12-13 July 1947.
34 Guy, ’Industria’, pp.362,363.
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were insufficient to meet the substantial investment required for steelmaking and rolling installations, Santa 
Rosa placed shares in the Buenos Aires stock exchange.35 Again, the search for new shareholders by 
would-be manufacturers was not unprecedented. There are other examples of this practice, with two dating 
back to the late nineteenth century: these are the Noel and Bagley companies in the foodstuffs sector.36 
After Santa Rosa searched for new partners, 40% of its shares came under the control of the public and local 
banks, with the remainder staying in French hands.37
The achievements of private business in the development of iron and steel production were 
considerable. The scarcity of imported capital goods was circumvented by Argentine engineers, who 
designed plants that utilised copied old foreign designs and/or adapted second-hand equipment. The 
insufficiency of capital of individual companies to satisfy investment requirements in steelmaking facilities 
was offset with a resort to local financing, at least by some of the firms. However, the growth in productive 
capacity had been shielded from overseas competition by the Second World War. With the return of 
peacetime conditions in 1945, private iron and steel producers faced three difficulties, (i) Firms confronted 
price problems. Because formed stocks were purchased at wartime prices, losses would be incurred when 
prices dropped with the restoration of overseas supplies, (ii) It was assumed that sales of domestic producers 
were bound to contract if foreign products of greater variety and quality became available, (iii) There were 
plant-related problems. These producers would have to consolidate through modernisation to survive, but 
did not expect that technology would be readily available as the Americans would give priority to transfers 
to the countries devastated by the war.38
In the event, the availability of imported iron and steel products had little effect on local production. 
Domestic factors, especially those originating in the faulty Peronista economic strategy, resulted in limited
35 ACINDAR, Historia, p. 104.
36 Guy, ’Industria’, pp.367,368.
37 ACINDAR, Historia, p. 104.
38 La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondientes al 43° Ejercicio cerrado 
el 30 de Junio de 1945’, Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, 15 October 1945, p.299.
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output and restricted the growth and modernisation of capacity. Costs of production were affected by the 
high prices and shortage of raw materials, rises in labour costs, high fuel prices and electricity shortages 
which prevented a better mechanisation of production.39 Furthermore, the rapid exhaustion of supplies of 
key raw materials such as scrap, creeping inflation resultant from government policies, and the run-down 
state of basic infrastructure adversely affected output. Increasing costs of production and input shortages 
led to lower turnovers by steel producers, forcing companies such as La Cantabrica to scale down the 
implementation of their expansion and modernisation programmes.40 That particular firm made slow 
progress with its postwar plans to renovate and expand equipment through overseas purchases of machinery, 
to diversify production, to improve processes, and to lower costs and acquire land and build new 
facilities.41 The plight of private steel companies was further aggravated by the crisis of the late Forties. 
Severe exchange shortages arising from economic mismanagement (see Chapter 2) resulted in a sharp drop 
in imports and purchases being limited to cash transactions. The subsequent decline in stocks of imported 
raw materials (pig iron), machinery and spare parts resulted in drastic curbs of output.42 Since the 
government would not issue permits to purchase foreign exchange and import licences for machinery or 
spare parts, steelmakers continued to implement their projects to expand facilities when possible.43 The 
firm hindered most by the inability to achieve its modernisation ambitions was ACINDAR, which had been 
rapidly consolidating its market position.44 It had compensated the loss of the INDAC shareholding with 
local financing it obtained by becoming listed in the Buenos Aires stock exchange, and its wartime success 
resulted in the decision to erect a second plant outside Rosario, on a greenfield site with good 
communications and where a port could be built. ACINDAR acquired land in Villa Constitucion, a spot
39 Metalurgia, August 1949, p.5.
40 Monthly Journal o f the British Chamber o f Commerce in the Argentine Republic, April 1950, p.40; 
La Cantabrica, ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 47° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio de 1949’, 
Boletin, 16 January 1950, p.405.
41 La Cantabrica, ’Memoria’, Boletin, 15 October 1945, p.300, and ’Memoria’, Boletin, 16 January 1950, 
p.405.
42 Journal, April 1950, p.40.
43 La Cantabrica, ’Memoria’, Boletin, 16 January 1950, p.405.
44 Roberto Bisang, Maduracion tecnologica, acumulacion economica y  generacion de ventajas 
comparativas (mimeo, Sussex, 1989), p.47.
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that met these criteria and was situated near the proposed location of SOMISA (see Map 3.2). Unlike other 
private steel producers, and despite severe problems in US-Argentine relations and ’official’ American 
reluctance to promote industry south of the Rio Grande after the Second World War, ACINDAR benefited 
from the willingness of US big business to take advantage of opportunities in Latin America. It awarded 
the Republic Steel Corporation a 3-year contract for technical assistance, under which it was to direct the 
Villa Constitucion project, supervising the erection and commissioning of the plant, and training the future 
operating personnel. Nevertheless, the execution of the project was seriously delayed by the severe crisis 
of the late Forties, and the Ingeniero Acevedo plant only came into operation during the Fifties.45
Private sector producers had developed steel production to overcome wartime shortages and sustain 
their output of finished goods. However, notwithstanding the existence of backward linkages, their 
production process was neither fully integrated nor large-scale. The use of Siemens-Martin furnaces allowed 
producers to both circumvent wartime shortages of imported pig iron and employ considerable amounts of 
scrap as a raw material. The difficulty was that excessive dependence on scrap as an input was unwise (see 
Chapter 5). Although domestic steel production had risen and contributed significantly to satisfy demand 
in wartime, output levels were insufficient to substitute imports as the main source of iron and steel in 
peacetime conditions. The capital base of these producers were insufficient for the development of an 
integrated large-scale steelworks, as huge capital outlays and modem technology were required. One 
ambitious but unsuccessful initiative to build a large steelworks launched by the notorious arms tycoon Fritz 
Mandl between 1939 and 1941 attempted to overcome that problem by overtly seeking foreign assistance.
Mandl escaped to the Republic in 1938 following the German annexation of Austria. As a 
supporter of the Heimat party, he had opposed this and his Austrian properties were confiscated after the 
Anschluss.46 Involved in the international trade of arms, whose manufacture depended on iron and steel, 
Mandl already had the idea of building a steelworks in Argentina when he settled there. His motives for
45 ACINDAR, Historia, pp.86,87.
46 Statement by Juan Atilio Bramuglia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Fritz Mandl during the debate 
on extraordinary and supplementary credits for ministries and government departments, 24 and 25 June 1948, 
Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Ano 1948, Tomo II, p. 1358.
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such an undertaking became the subject of debate due to his dealings with the Third Reich. It was alleged 
that major producers, particularly German companies, which had participated in the ISC wanted to expand 
their industrial park overseas as the inevitable outbreak of war threatened serious damage to their exports. 
It was claimed that, in order to achieve this, the German military establishment allied itself with international 
arms magnates and financiers.47 Although Mandl’s scheme was far from being Nazi-inspired, it fit the bill 
by involving Germany (see below) and was thereby conflated with Nazi plots in South America.
Mandl’s initial effort to obtain machinery within Argentina floundered. In the course of a European 
tour in early 1939 he met Barbanson of ARBED, a leading shareholder in TAMET, and failed to acquire 
the old Vasena equipment because it had already been sold to La Cantabrica.48 Therefore, Mandl had to 
acquire both capital and technology, and he sought to obtain the simultaneous collaboration of American 
and German interests. This contrasted sharply with the case of the Volta Redonda project being undertaken 
in Brazil, where the United States of America and Germany competed to provide the Vargas regime with 
assistance. Mandl turned to the Americans for capital and advice on his project, and to Germany for the 
technology. The key financial backing was to come from the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation of 
New York, through its banking subsidiary Argentaria in Buenos Aires. During a visit to the USA in 1940, 
Mandl set up a syndicate to study the project, comprising the J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation and 
the financial house Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.49
Germany, which would provide the technology, was involved in the project from its inception. 
Mandl returned from his European visit in 1939 with Joseph Hatting, a metallurgical engineer once 
employed by the German weapons manufacturer Rheinmetall and SS officer, who worked with Mandl until
47 Statement by Arturo Frondizi, Radical deputy for the Federal Capital, during the debate on the Draft 
Bill considering several unrelated issues, including the increase of capital for SOMISA, 28 September 1950, 
Diputados, Ano 1950, Tomo IV, p.3463.
48 Ronald C. Newton, The ’Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford, 1992), p.325.
49 Despatch from C.A.E. Shuckburgh, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to the 
South American Department, FO, London, 28 June 1944, containing copies of documents regarding the 
activities of Fritz Mandl that were sent by the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare in London, 27 June 1944. FO 371 37719 AS 3708/101/2.
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the scheme petered out.50 Although Mandl later claimed that his syndicate officially contracted Brassert 
& Company of Chicago to study the undertaking only in 1940, there is evidence that this engineering firm 
was already involved. Hermann Brassert, another German, was involved in the technical organisation of 
Mandl’s proposed technology supplier, the Hermann Goring Reichswerke in Nazi Germany.51 Brassert & 
Co. was engaged to prepare an assessment for approximately US$ 10,000, and it appears that Brassert 
himself visited the Republic in 1939. The report was rendered in early 1940.52 Soon after its completion 
by Hatting and Brassert, the latter fell out with Mandl for unknown reasons. Brassert then attempted to sell 
a copy of the report to the Argentine Government for US$ 150,000, claiming that his project would meet 
both military and commercial requirements and that it had financial backing from the US Export-Import 
Bank. In the summer of 1940, Brassert held conversations with the State Department, which expressed 
interest owing to the concern of US steelmakers as ARMCO with such a project. However, the State 
Department urged caution and the overtures were rejected.53 Nevertheless, this was a temporary setback 
as ARMCO would become involved in the SOMISA project in the mid-Forties.
Although Mandl later asserted that his attempted collaboration with German interests was the work 
of the Schroder Banking Corporation, there is no evidence that the American firms involved colluded in the 
dealings with the Goring Reichswerke.54 In fact, Mandl himself had sought German collaboration and this 
’unholy alliance’ suited both interested parties. For Germany, it was an opportunity to strengthen its 
position in the Argentine market for iron and steel products. The Reichswerke already had Latin American 
business interests of its own since, in the aftermath of the Anschluss, the acquisition of the Austrian 
Steirische Gusstahlwerke (a member of the Central European Group of the ISC) had given it control over
50 Ibid.; Newton, Menace, p.325.
51 Kurt Lachmann, ’The Hermann Goring Works’, Social Research VIII (1941) No.l, p.29.
52 Despatch from Shuckburgh to the FO. FO 371 37719 AS 3708/101/2.
53 Newton, Menace, pp.325,326.
54 Despatch from Shuckburgh. FO 371 37719 AS 3708/101/2.
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three marketing companies in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.55 Given the German failure to influence the 
Volta Redonda steelworks project, participation by the Reichswerke in the Mandl scheme would give Berlin 
leverage over the development of another South American steel plant. On the other hand, Mandl had two 
motives to seek German collaboration. These were technological and political. Regarding the former, the 
Reichswerke were working on a formula by which steel was extracted under high temperature from iron ore 
bearing sands, like those available in the southern coast of the province of Buenos Aires and which Mandl 
hoped to industrialise. However, the technology was not fully developed.56 As for political speculation, 
the course of the war dictated how Mandl dealt with Germany. He was convinced of a Nazi victory in 1940 
and, by involving the Reichswerke in his Argentine project, hoped to gain some favour regarding his 
confiscated Austrian properties.57 After all, following the Anschluss, the Reichswerke had acquired the 
control of most Austrian heavy industry (raw material production, sales and distribution, armaments 
manufacture), including the Hirtenbergwerke owned by the Mandl family.58 Mandl conducted his 
negotiations through Johann Wehrli in Switzerland, an intermediary who had previously dealt with the 
expropriation of the Austrian properties and assets of the arms tycoon. By the time the Reichswerke replied 
in April 1941 that they were willing to collaborate, Mandl had changed his opinion on the war. He rightly 
concluded that Germany would lose eventually, owing to three factors: Britain had survived the Nazi 
onslaught, Roosevelt was re-elected as US President, and the Americans were rapidly sliding towards war 
with Japan. Accordingly, Mandl declined the German offer and his project faded away.59
The Mandl scheme had two major weaknesses. First, it aimed to obtain simultaneously capital and 
technology supplies from two competing powers in wartime, which was not realistic. And second, it would 
be based on an untried technology. More critically, the project had two major implications, (i) It became 
linked to the US embargo imposed on Argentina in 1942. Mandl’s activities, which extended beyond the
55 Richard J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1994), p. 150, fn.23.
56 Despatch from Shuckburgh. FO 371 37719 AS 3708/101/2.
57 Newton, Menace, p.327.
58 Overy, War, p. 150; Newton, Menace, p.324.
59 Despatch from Shuckburgh. FO 371 37719 AS 3708/101/2.
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steelworks project and went unchecked, were of the type that fuelled American suspicions about the 
Argentine failure to break relations with the Axis. They therefore had an effect on the shape of 
Washington’s antagonistic policy towards Buenos Aires, which remained in force until the late Forties and 
adversely affected progress with the Plan Siderurgico Argentino (see Chapter 6). (ii) Mandl’s scheme again 
exposed the problem of insufficiency of domestic private capital to develop large-scale iron and steel 
production. As indicated earlier, some private sector producers had obtained financial resources from banks 
to undertake steelmaking, but their level was inadequate to cover the huge outlays necessary to invest in a 
modem steelworks. However, by the time Mandl had abandoned his efforts, international instability fostered 
demands to develop heavy industry from an entirely different quarter: the Armed Forces. As is seen below, 
they clamoured for the promotion of steel production since the Twenties and, with strong influence on the 
government after 1930 (see Chapter 2), increased the pressure to achieve this objective.
THE BEGINNING OF STATE INTERVENTION IN  HEAVY INDUSTRY
State intervention in the development of heavy industry can be traced back to the Twenties. The 
government expressed interest in the subject, but never got beyond compiling reports. However, real 
pressure came from nationalist elements within the Army - particularly the Engineering Corps. From the 
military perspective, the lack of industrial development restricted the technical capacity of the Armed Forces 
to guarantee adequately national defence requirements.60 Sections of the Armed Forces firmly believed 
that the capability to wage war was dependent on the presence of an efficient industrial capacity, and 
asserted that the State should intervene in financing and operating vital installations through the Army.61 
These views were promoted at government level by General Justo, the powerful Minister of War, and gained 
the support of President Alvear. As seen in the previous chapter, the State-owned oil company Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) was placed under General Mosconi. Under his direction, YPF enjoyed a period 
of growth which was reflected in the increase of both production and refining capacity. Besides oil, the
60 Maria del Carmen Angueira and Alicia del Carmen Tonini, Capitalismo de Estado (1927-1956) 
(Buenos Aires, 1986), p.55.
61 Carl E. Solberg, Oil and Nationalism in Argentina (Stanford, 1979), pp.82,83.
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Army planned to establish a whole range of defence-related industries. Most of them were to be located 
in Cordoba, as the military believed that this province could be better defended in the event of an attack 
owing to its location in the centre of the country. The first of these industrial plants, the Fabrica Militar 
de Aviones, opened in 1927.62 With the onset of the world economic crisis, the projects for armaments 
factories were shelved. As seen in Chapter 2, the Uriburu regime was rightly more concerned with restoring 
order to national finances and thereby defence spending was reduced.63 The Army’s aspirations of self- 
sufficiency in military hardware were boosted when General Justo became President in 1932. Military 
expenditure was increased and a number of defence-related industrial projects were launched, the most 
important being the Fabrica Militar de Aceros.
Mining, metallurgy and iron and steel production had not been supported by the State during the 
Twenties. This decision was criticised by several influential officers. Colonel Luis Vicat, a metallurgical 
engineer, emphasised that the State should promote a national heavy industry in order to escape dependence 
on foreign trade and a strategically dangerous situation. The Italian example was frequently evoked to 
support the contention that the apparent lack of high-grade iron ore need not prevent the development of 
a steel industry.64 In the absence of adequate raw materials and to overcome import shortages, scrap-based 
steel production had mushroomed in Italy during the First World War.65 During the Second World War, 
this example could have well inspired Argentine private metallurgical firms which undertook steel production 
in similar circumstances. However, contrary to expectations, the intensive use of scrap as a raw material 
was far from a secure foundation for heavy industry (see Chapter 5).
The arguments of the Twenties were strengthened in the early Thirties by the onset of the 
Depression, the severity of the economic crisis and the coming to power of the Army. Given the 
deteriorating international situation and rivalry with Brazil, the Armed Forces concluded that the
62 Jorge Schvarzer, La industria que supimos conseguir (Buenos Aires, 1996), pp. 136,137.
63 Ibid., p. 178.
64 Solberg, Oil, p.84.
65 British Iron and Steel Federation, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 27 (1952) No.4, p.l.
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development of military industrial capacity required steelmaking for the production of tools, munitions and 
weapons. Thus, the erection of a military steel plant was decided in 1933.66 Construction of the Fabrica 
Militar de Aceros, which was located in the Buenos Aires suburb of Valentin Alsina (see Map 3.1), began 
in 1934. This initiative was ill-planned, lacked support outside the Army, and was financed from credits 
which had been originally earmarked for other military expenditure. Nonetheless, work progressed.67 The 
Fabrica Militar de Aceros was established on 31 December 1935, and became a dependency of the newly 
created Direccion de Fabricas Militares on 24 December 1936. The plant was set up in the abandoned 
Polvorin del Riachuelo, which required renovation, and opened in July 1937.68 It was one of two steel 
producers, the only other one at this time being the Talleres Vulcano. These two plants were the only 
producers of rolled goods until 1940, and of ingots until 1942. The Fabrica Militar surpassed its civilian 
counterpart and by 1946 became the fourth largest national producer of metallurgical goods, with just over 
10% of total output. Production began with an American designed Siemens-Martin furnace in 1937; another 
of national manufacture, based on the original and which enabled the military to circumvent the US 
embargo, was added in 1942.69 Such domestic technical ingenuity resulted in the doubling of capacity and 
an increase and diversification of output. The Fabrica Militar rolled iron, billets and slabs for artillery 
munition, and sheets. The latter were mostly thin sheets, which were then unique in South America.70
Although the Fabrica Militar was a modest achievement, it laid the foundations for future 
developments. Military pressure for the development of heavy industry intensified in the late Thirties, owing 
to two factors. First was the deterioration of the economy after 1938, which renewed military concerns over
66 Alberto S.J.de Paula, ’Reestructuracion operativa de la industria belica argentina’, in Maria Haydee 
Martin, Alberto S.J. de Paula and Ramon Gutierrez (eds.), Los ingenieros militares y  sus precursores en el 
desarrollo argentino (1930-1980) (Buenos Aires, 1980), p.81.
67 Garimaldi, Industria, pp.20-22.
68 De Paula, ’Reestructuracion’, p.81.
69 Ricardo Lesser and Marta Panaia, ’Las estrategias militares frente al proceso de industrialization 
(1943-1947)’, in M. Panaia, R. Lesser and P. Skupch (eds.), Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo, 
Volume 2 (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 104.
70 Ministerio de Guerra, Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, 1941 - 9 de Octubre - 1945 
(Buenos Aires, 1945), unpaginated.
129
the vulnerability of the Argentine economy to international conditions. Poor harvests in 1938 resulted in 
lower production and export volumes, and coincided with a reduction in international grain prices consequent 
from the recovery in North American agricultural exports.71 Problems were further aggravated by the 
outbreak of the Second World War, which resulted in reduced shipping capacity for exports and shortages 
of vital imports (see Chapter 2). The second factor that encouraged the Army to press for basic industrial 
development was the perception that the national security situation was worsening. Brazil appeared to 
threaten increasingly Argentine dominance of the Southern Cone of South America. Its defence spending 
seemed considerably greater than that of Argentina.72 Brazil was also an iron and steel producer. While 
Argentine iron and steel output on the eve of the Second World War was minimal, Brazilian production had 
been initiated in the Twenties and by 1939 was sufficiently high to reduce dependence on imported iron and 
steel. In 1939, Brazil produced 160,016 tons of pig iron, 114,095 tons of steel ingots and 100,996 tons of 
rolled goods.73 This total would later be expanded with the establishment of the Volta Redonda integrated 
steelworks, a project which involved American assistance.
With renewed economic problems and increased security anxieties, the creation of heavy industry 
was considered an essential step for development and critical to national defence. Military pressure resulted 
in the foundation of the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares in June 1940 by the government of 
ailing President Ortiz. As this project only became law in October 1941, the credit went to Acting President 
Castillo.74 Law 12,709 established the functions of the DGFM, and those specifically related to iron and 
steel were to carry out explorations for minerals and obtain iron, build the necessary works for its extraction, 
promote related industries, and to elaborate war materiel.75
71 Benjamin A. Most, Changing Authoritarian Rule and Public Policy in Argentina, 1930-1970 (Boulder, 
1991), pp.83,84.
72 Ibid., p.85.
73 Werner Baer, The Development o f the Brazilian Steel Industry (Nashville, 1969), p.61.
74 Robert A. Potash, El ejercitoy lapolitica en la Argentina, 1928-1945 (Buenos Aires, 10th ed., 1982), 
p .181, fn.58.
75 Lesser and Panaia, ’Estrategias’, p. 105.
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The key promoter of heavy industry was General Manuel N. Savio, who headed the DGFM until 
his premature death in 1948. He intended to establish a whole range of basic industries, but faced many 
obstacles (not least with the Plan Siderurgico Argentino, as is seen below) and his tenure at Fabricaciones 
Militares was too brief for him to achieve his goals.76 The most remarkable feature of these industrial 
projects regarded their ownership. Savio introduced new perceptions on State involvement in industries 
processing ’strategic’ minerals. Rather than advocate outright intervention, he believed that the vehicle to 
achieve military industrial objectives were sociedades mixtas. Incorporated into Law 12,709, this concept 
would enable the State to share large expenditures of installation and maintenance with private sector capital. 
Since no industrial mixed companies existed, this measure was guided by Law 12,161, which awarded the 
faculty of veto to the State.77 Savio recognised that the DGFM budget could not provide all the capital 
required for the enterprises, and stressed that they had to be formed as mixed corporations with private 
interests.78 These included foreign interests, whose cooperation in major projects was not opposed in 
principle by the Army.79 Although mixed corporations would allow the State to sustain an industry and 
provide technical assistance, the State had no evident commercial purpose in these industries and its 
participation could only be transitory. Hence, private interests could eventually be left in charge of the 
sociedades mixtas. There were, nevertheless, some factories where the private sector could not be involved: 
those producing arms, munitions and explosives.80
Savio’s conceptions implied that the State was to have an initiating role through the Fabricaciones 
Militares, a dependency of the Ministry of War. However, the requirements of iron and steel production 
were more complex. The DGFM was determined to ’have’ heavy industry for military purposes at any cost,
76 Schvarzer, Industria, p. 180.
77 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Ley de FabricacionesMilitares: conceptosque fundamentaronsu proyecto’, 
Buenos Aires, 25 September 1943, in SOMISA, Obras del General Manuel N. Savio (Buenos Aires, 1973), 
pp.406,407.
78 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Politica de la produccion metalurgica argentina’, 1942, in Bias Alberti 
(ed.), Fuerzas Armadas y  Nacionalismo Economico (Buenos Aires, 1982), p.54.
79 Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962 (London, 1980), p.64.
80 Savio, ’Ley’, pp.407,408.
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but could not provide all the capital and lacked the commercial and technical experience to establish a 
modem steelworks. Private producers had some experience, as the technical ingenuity of local engineers 
enabled them to commission equipment and plants, but lacked the capital necessary to develop integrated 
production. The alternative was to set up mixed corporations to develop heavy industry, which the military 
believed would result in the achievement of the political objectives of the Army and the growth of existing 
capacity.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN SIDERURGICO ARGENTINO (PSA)
The Plan Sidenirgico devised by Savio stated the four purposes of having an iron and steel industry. 
The first purpose of the PSA was domestic steel production, using the most economically advantageous 
combination of local and foreign raw materials. The second was to supply the domestic processing and 
finishing industries with high quality steel at prices comparable to those prevailing internationally. The third 
purpose was to promote the installation of modem steel processing and finishing plants. Finally, the Plan 
was to ensure the development and ultimate stability of the steel industry.81 Although these tenets appeared 
economically sound, there was no indication as to how or when they would be achieved. Moreover, even 
though it was based on three industrial units, the Plan laid its entire emphasis on a single component: the 
Sociedad Mixta Sidemrgia Argentina project. This suggests that the PSA was not exactly a plan but merely 
a vehicle for the DGFM to achieve its objectives.
The DGFM proposal foresaw the constitution of three industrial units, which were interdependent 
and to be established as separate companies. The first of these was the blast furnace at Palpala, which 
would produce pig iron utilising ores from the nearby Zapla deposit. The decision to make it a separate 
enterprise was based on its location, and the unlikelyhood of attracting the participation of the private sector. 
The second unit foreseen by the PSA would produce steel in Siemens-Martin furnaces and obtain 
semifinished materials in a blooming mill. The third comprised the plants carrying out rolling and finishing 
operations. Two distinct mixed corporations would be established for steel production and rolling, as there
81 Translation of the Draft Bill of the PSA, The Review o f the River Plate (RRP), 18 April 1947, p. 11.
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would be private sector interest and to prevent the creation of a monopoly controlling these two activities.82 
However, the attempts to set up the enterprises for each stage of production proved far more difficult than 
foreseen by Savio.
The first unit o f the PSA: the Altos Homos Zapla (AHZ)
The DGFM envisaged a first unit for pig iron production, a resource-oriented project comprising 
sources of raw materials and nearby blast furnaces to process them.83 This was the wartime development 
of the iron ore deposits at Zapla in the remote province of Jujuy. Given its location and being the first 
undertaking of this kind, the venture failed to attract private interests. The private sector considered 
exploitation uneconomic in view of the large capital investment required and lack of adequate machinery 
for mining and processing the ore, and had many doubts about the ores.84 There were no clues as to how 
much Zapla iron would cost in Buenos Aires compared with imports, if it could be used economically to 
manufacture special steels comparable in quality and price with imports, what impact the 1,600 kilometre 
haul by rail from Zapla to Buenos Aires would have on costs, or how difficult it was to obtain charcoal to 
fuel the blast furnace.85 The latter issue also deterred private investors, as charcoal-based production was 
the only option available for Zapla but not the most modem nor economic method (see Chapter 5).
Notwithstanding the lack of private investors, the DGFM went ahead with the development of Zapla 
as this project was a comparatively modest undertaking. Nevertheless, as its budget had to finance other 
projects, the Fabricaciones Militares still hoped to restrict its role in Zapla to being either a shareholder or 
independent supplier.86 It obtained funds from the local provincial government, which was interested in
82 Bases for the Mixed Company contest for the constitution of the Second Iron and Steel Unit of the 
plan of the DGFM, in DGFM, Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 143.
83 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Bases para la industria del acero en la Republica Argentina’, Cordoba, 
1942, in SOMISA, Obras, p.391.
84 Monthly Journal, April 1950, p.38.
85 RRP, 19 October 1945, pp. 13,14.
86 Savio, ’Bases’, p.391.
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the scheme. The DGFM and the Jujuy authorities signed a contract in August 1942 establishing the 
conditions for working the mine on a profit-sharing basis and the construction of the blast furnaces and 
processing plants.87 Once the wealth and size of the deposits was confirmed in 1942, the area was declared 
a national reserve.88 Decree No. 141,462 of 23 January 1943 stipulated that Establecimiento Altos Homos 
Zapla or AHZ was the name for the industrial unit consisting of the iron ore deposit in the Zapla hills and 
the installations at Palpala. In August 1943, the DGFM undertook the exploitation of the ’9 de Octubre’ 
mine. However, despite some experience in small-scale iron and steel production at the Fabrica Militar de 
Aceros and the successful expansion of this plant in the Forties (see above), the Army lacked the necessary 
technical know-how and expertise on blast furnaces. Therefore, international tenders were invited for the 
Adjudication of the Project, Construction and the Making Operational of a charcoal-fuelled blast furnace, 
and the Swedish firm Svenska Entreprenad AB successfully submitted a proposal.89 This firm was chosen 
on two accounts, (i) It could satisfy the technical requirements of the AHZ project as Sweden, which lacked 
coal, had expertise in charcoal-based iron and steel production and had made some technological advances 
in this field (see Chapter 6). (ii) Sweden was neutral in the Second World War. There was no possibility 
of Britain or Germany contributing industrial equipment, as capital goods necessary to sustain production 
related to the war effort would not be exported. The USA would not contribute equipment either, as export 
licenses were limited and Washington was attempting to enforce an economic embargo on the Republic over 
Argentine wartime neutrality.
The AHZ blast furnace was built according to Swedish plans at a construction cost of SKr 180,000, 
which was equivalent to approximately m$n 163,000 on 31 December 1943.90 Construction was begun 
by the DGFM in May 1944. Financed from the budgets of the DGFM and the Jujuy government, the project
87 Monthly Journal, April 1950, p.38.
88 DGFM, Fabricaciones Militares. Vision de una gran empresa (Buenos Aires, 1973), p.62.
89 Ricardo Fernando Marcos, Altos Homos Zapla (Jujuy, 1980), unpaginated.
90 Ibid.; the conversion from SKr to m$n is based on data in Business Conditions in Argentina, No.242, 
April 1944, p.53.
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also involved the firm Thyssen Lametal, which built the cable car to transport iron from the mine to 
Palpala.91 The blast furnace started production of pig iron on 11 October 1945, an event which passed 
unnoticed owing to political turmoil at the time.92 The AHZ initially comprised one blast furnace with a 
capacity of 60 tons and was considered an experiment, in order to verify its efficiency and the aptitude of 
the raw materials.93 With the performance deemed satisfactory from a strictly technical viewpoint, 
construction of a second furnace began in August 1950 and was completed on 10 April 1951.94
The second unit o f the PSA: the Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA)
The DGFM project envisaged a second unit which would produce steel in open-hearth furnaces and 
semifinished materials in a blooming mill. The effort to attract private sector participation proved far more 
successful than with Zapla since output from the second unit would increase steel supplies for the private 
producers and thereby allow them to increase production. Nevertheless, major setbacks occurred. Tenders, 
to be submitted by 15 September 1944, had to meet three requirements, (a) The plant was to comprise a 
foundry with the capacity to manufacture 150,000 tons of pig iron and semifinished materials annually, and 
a rolling mill with the capacity to produce 350,000 tons annually, (b) Both components of the unit were 
to be located in the immediate vicinity of one of the riverside ports on the Parana, and designed to handle 
scrap and nationally produced iron ore. (c) The project was to achieve the minimum steel production 
necessary for the domestic industry and especially defence-related sectors to avoid shortages in times of
• • 95crisis.
The DGFM held the tender contest on 3 November 1944. The only detailed, feasible proposal
91 Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated.
92 Larra, Savio, p. 147.
93 DGFM, Fabricaciones, p.64.
94 DGFM, El hierro de Zapla (Buenos Aires, 1954), p.4.
95 Despatch no. 191 ’E’ from Sir D.V. Kelly, British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, to the Rt.Hon. 
Anthony Eden, FO, 2 July 1944. FO 371 37676 AS 3928/4/2.
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submitted was that of a consortium comprising the local firms TAMET, La Cantabrica, and SIAM Di Telia 
and the US steel group ARMCO.96 Other foreign interests were also indirectly involved: ARBED had a 
substantial participation in TAMET and Westinghouse partly financed SIAM Di Telia. The proposal 
recommended that the sociedad mixta should have an initial capital of m$n 100,000,000, to which the 
private sector shareholders would subscribe m$n 10,000,000, and that the technical management should be 
in the hands of ARMCO Argentina.97 In addition, the proposition set the tone for PSA guidelines on the 
use of a mix of national and foreign minerals. Although the proposal affirmed that the project had to be 
based on the use of national resources, its signatories foresaw that it would be more advantageous to import 
minerals in peacetime and preserve national raw materials for emergencies.98 This responded to the 
inadequacy of national mineral supplies (see Chapter 5) and the high costs of transportation. The other 
domestic iron and steel producers not involved in the proposal supported the scheme as they stood to benefit 
from it. Hence, Savio suggested negotiations with all local steelmakers and companies re-rolling imported 
billets and slabs, aiming to shape their development within the PSA and their eventual involvement in the 
mixed enterprise. The recommendation was accepted by the private investors and Savio prepared the 
project, which was discussed in detail by its participants.99 Although the proposed sociedad mixta 
represented the modernisation of existing capacity, the framing of all private steelmakers within the PSA 
and their participation in the mixed company signalled a tendency towards creating a local monopoly.
An agreement between the DGFM, the signatories of the tender, the adhering industrialists and 
ARMCO Argentina was signed on 19 January 1946. It detailed the role of the ARMCO subsidiary in the 
project, which was critical to its success. ARMCO Argentina was not only a shareholder but also contractor 
and operator. It was awarded the contract for the production of feasibility studies, the installation and 
commissioning of the plant, and the management of the works when SOMISA became fully operational.
96 Proposal presented by TAMET S.A., La Cantabrica S.A., SIAM Di Telia Ltda., and ARMCO 
Argentina S.A. at the contest held on 3 November 1944, in DGFM, Plan, p. 154.
97 Despatchno.il ’E’ from Shuckburgh to Eden, 10 January 1945. FO 371 44751 AS 729/729/2.
98 Lesser and Panaia, ’Estrategias’, p. 149.
99 Larra, Savio, pp. 143,144.
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The agreement also specified three preparatory work undertakings for constituting SOMISA. (i) A whole 
series of specifications and plans was to be prepared for a plant with an annual production capacity of 
around 315,000 tons of billets, blooms and slabs, but which had to allow for an increase in capacity upto 
500,000 tons and perhaps later to 800,000 or even 1,000,000 tons. The preparation of the plans and 
specifications was to be implemented by ARMCO Argentina within 1 year of the agreement being approved 
by the Executive Power, (ii) The cost of the remaining work involved in the complete technical 
management was to be calculated, and presented within 90 days of the agreement being approved by the 
Executive Power, (iii) The materials necessary for the installation of the plant which were unrelated to 
technical management (eg, land, machinery, vehicles) were to be purchased.100 The estimated cost of these 
undertakings was m$n 4,000,000, to which the State would contribute m$n 3,700,000 and the private 
shareholders m$n 300,000. These amounts would be entered in the books and considered as part of the 
paid-up capital subscriptions of the shareholders.101
The private shareholders and shareholding partners confirmed their intention to contribute m$n 
10,000,000 to the authorised capital of SOMISA on 19 January 1946. The largest contributions would be 
furnished by La Cantabrica, TAMET and ARMCO Argentina, which each agreed to subscribe shares 
amounting to m$n 2,000,000. The other major share subscriptions would be those of ACINDAR’s founders 
with m$n 1,500,000, Santa Rosa with m$n 1,100,000, and SIAM Di Telia with m$n 500,OOO.102 Given 
the levels of private and State contributions to the project, the sociedad mixta was hardly ’mixed’. 
Nevertheless, as was indicated earlier, State predominance was intended to be transitional as the DGFM 
merely aimed to have an initiating role in industrial projects. Therefore, an article in the corporation’s 
statutes allowed private shareholders to expand their holdings of integrated capital in the sociedad mixta upto 
49% after 1 year of SOMISA becoming operational and, if the State agreed, enabled them to acquire up to
100 Translation of the agreement on the preparatory work for the constitution of SOMISA, Buenos Aires, 
19 January 1946, RRP, 30 May 1947, p. 15.
101 Ibid., p. 14.
102 Undertaking of subscription of shares, Buenos Aires, 19 January 1946, in DGFM, Plan, pp. 128,129.
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90% of the integrated capital. The remaining 10% could not be purchased.103
The PSA was submitted to President Farrell on 24 January 1946, but received little attention as a 
general election approached. It got a new lease of life following the Peronista victory. Savio presented his 
project at a cabinet meeting with the backing of General Sosa Molina, the Minister of War, and obtained 
full support from Peron. Not only did the latter accept the Plan in its original form, but also allowed Savio 
to prepare both the text of the Draft Bill and the Message from the President presenting the Bill to Congress. 
By signing the proposed legislation, Peron expressed identification with the PSA.104 At least at the start 
of his presidency, Peron was not opposed in principle to enlist private or foreign capital for major 
development projects.105 It must be noted that the PSA is not the only example of this approach. A 
comparable mixed enterprise proposal had been prepared for the British-owned railways under the Miranda- 
Eady treaty of September 1946, which resulted from the Anglo-Argentine renegotiation of the waning 
’special relationship’. In the case of the railways, a corporation was to be formed for the acquisition and 
exploitation of their goods, with its capital fixed at m$n 2,000,000,000. The old British companies were 
to participate at the value of their existing investments, and the State was to contribute m$n 500,000,000 
for the modernisation of lines projected in its Five-Year Railway Plan. In addition, the new company would 
have significant advantages including tax exemptions, the extension of the duty exemptions provided under 
the Mitre Law (due to expire in 1947), and a guaranteed operating revenue; the State would cover the 
disparity when net income dropped below the guaranteed minimum level.106 As with SOMISA, the 
railways mixed corporation was intended to be an ’intermediate’ stage. Upon reasonable notice, the 
Government could buy shares until it gained full control, but was not obliged to take control.107 The most
103 Estatutos de Siderurgia Argentina, Sociedad Anonima Mixta, in Obras, p.295.
104 Larra, Savio, pp. 145,154 and fn.p.153.
105 Potash, Army, p.64.
106 Pedro R. Skupch, ’Nationalization, libras bloqueadas y sustitucion de importaciones’, Desarrollo 
Economico 12 (1972-1973) No.47, p.489; Winthrop R. Wright, British-Owned Railways in Argentina 
(Austin, 1974), p.251; Jorge Fodor, ’Argentina’s Nationalism: Myth or Reality?’, in Guido Di Telia and 
Rudiger Dombusch (eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1946-1983 (Basingstoke, 1989), p.38.
107 Wright, Railways, p.251.
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significant similarity between the two sociedad mixta proposals was that both suffered the same fate. They 
came under heavy fire and the enterprises ended up wholly State-owned. The main opponents were Radical 
and ’extremist’ Peronista members of Congress, who displayed immoderate anti-foreign views towards the 
proposals for the railways and, as is seen below, the steelworks. In addition, the railways scheme was 
opposed by the railroad unions, at the very moment Peron was waging battle for greater control over trade 
unions. While the railway nationalisation was also a means to strengthen Peron’s political position, 
SOMISA was left under greater State control than originally planned as the only alternative to salvage the 
project from opposition in Congress.
The Draft Bill of the PSA and Statutes of SOMISA was submitted to Congress on 26 July 1946, 
and approved by the Senate with media sancion in November that year. Because Congress went into recess, 
La Cantabrica, SIAM Di Telia, TAMET, and ARMCO Argentina issued a complementary document 
extending their proposal’s term of validity until 30 April 1947. The extension, which was not the first, was 
necessary to allow Congress to approve the Bill and authorise the constitution of the mixed enterprise.108
Following approval by the Senate, the Draft Bill was referred to the relevant Congressional 
Committees.109 It was at this stage that the concept of mixed corporations as applied to SOMISA came 
under fire. The PSA suffered two major setbacks concerning the participation of the private sector and the 
size of its shareholdings. Foremost was the objection against the article in the SOMISA statutes enabling 
the private investors to acquire upto 90% of the integrated capital (see above). The Minister of War argued 
that there was no obligation for this to be implemented, since national interests were affected, and that 90% 
of the DGFM capital could not be easily absorbed by private shareholders.110 This did not convince the 
opposition. However, the Committees acknowledged that, though it should retain substantial control of 
heavy industry, the DGFM could not provide from its budget all the capital for the enterprises it was
108 Translation of the complementary minutes of the future private shareholders of SOMISA drawn up 
at a meeting with the DGFM, Buenos Aires, 31 December 1946, RRP, 30 May 1947, p.18.
109 Communication from the Senate, 29 November 1946, Diputados, Ano 1946, Tomo VII, p.693.
110 Summation speech by Minister of War General Jose Humberto Sosa Molina during the debate on the 
PSA, 8-9 May 1947, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.343.
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required to promote. Therefore, they made two recommendations, (a) A change in the composition of the 
capital, with m$n 80,000,000 being subscribed by the State and the remainder by the private sector, (b) The 
limit of shares to be offered by the State for public subscription was to be 49% and that the remaining 51% 
could not be transferred.111 The other setback concerned the size of private shareholdings in SOMISA. 
Argentine companies were required by law to have 80% of capital and directors of national origin, and 
thereby could have no shareholdings held by subsidiaries of foreign firms or companies involving foreign 
interests. The Congressional Committees had to make exceptions for the private shareholders (TAMET, 
SIAM Di Telia and ARMCO Argentina involved substantial foreign participation), but restricted their 
holdings to 2% each.112
The Draft Bill of the PSA reached the Chamber of Deputies on the night of 8-9 May 1947. On 
the eve of the Congressional debate, the proposal’s terms of validity were again extended until 6 August 
1947.113 During the debate, the cmcial issue was that of private sector participation. The most ardent 
opponent to sociedades mixtas was Arturo Frondizi, spokesman for the Radical block. He argued that the 
State should control ’strategic’ industries, and that private sector participation should be limited and 
restricted to those firms which could provide technical knowledge or commercial experience. Though this 
argument was based on the fact that the State had to acquire the necessary technology and had no evident 
commercial purpose in the activity considered, it contradicted the facts. One of the private shareholders 
would supply the technology, and the other three were commercially experienced. Furthermore, the limit 
to be imposed on private sector involvement was not defined, and Frondizi pointed out that the State should 
have the right to confiscate private shares without indemnity.114 However, the dominant Peronista block 
defended the suggestion of the Committees, which was a variant on Savio’s proposal. It argued that the
111 Recommendations of the Comisiones de Defensa Nacional, de Legislacion General, and de 
Presupuesto y Hacienda reviewing the Draft Bill of the PSA, 26 March 1947, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo 
I, p.258.
112 Ibid.
113 Message from the Executive Power on the extension of the term of validity of the undertakings 
related to the constitution of SOMISA, Buenos Aires, 8 May 1947, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p. 185.
114 Debate on the PSA, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.321.
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military-controlled industrial empire was awarded ample control over SOMISA, for two reasons, (i) An 
increase in private capital could not exceed49%. (ii) Under a provision in the Bill, the DGFM was awarded 
overall control of the PSA and over the handling of the advice received during the first 5 years."5
The military and the private shareholders reluctantly accepted the changes.116 In his summation 
speech, the Minister of War conceded that private sector participation could be of upto 49% - thereby 
accepting defeat over the initial proposal that it could be allowed to increase to 90%. Nonetheless, he also 
noted that private sector participation was not entreguismo and in the interest of industrial development, as 
the creation of heavy industry was related to national defence but not exclusively for that purpose.117 
Following a heated debate, the recommendations of the Committees were accepted and the Bill was passed. 
However, the debate is best remembered for the onslaught over the participation of ARMCO Argentina, in 
which the government was attacked in sensationalist terms over the position granted in the Plan to this 
subsidiary of the US firm ARMCO (see Chapter 6 for an account). No objections were raised to the 
involvement of ARBED-Terres Rouges in TAMET and of Westinghouse of the United States of America 
in SIAM Di Telia.118 Approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the revised Bill returned to the Senate, 
where it was accepted.119 The Bill was approved, becoming Law 12,987 on 13 June 1947, and was 
followed by two decrees aimed at the constitution of the mixed corporation. Decree No.22,018 of 28 July 
1947 designated the authorities representing the State for a period of 3 years, and Savio became the president 
of SOMISA. Decree No.22,315 of 3 August 1947 allowed these authorities to constitute the sociedad mixta. 
SOMISA was awarded the status of a juridical person, and 20% of the authorised capital had to be
115 Ibid., p.329.
116 Larra, Savio, p. 156.
117 Summation speech by General Sosa Molina during the debate on the PSA, Diputados, Ano 1947, 
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subscribed and 10% integrated.120
The private sector industrialists adhered to the statutes of SOMISA as approved by Congress and 
ratified their undertaking to subscribe shares on 20 August 1947. However, ARMCO Argentina resigned 
its undertaking to subscribe m$n 2,000,000.121 It was the price ARMCO was compelled to pay for 
political disapproval of its dual role in the steelworks project as shareholder and contractor. The Ministry 
of War, responding to Congressional objections, had already restricted the shareholding of ARMCO 
Argentina. A communique stressed that ARMCO could not hold more than m$n 800,000 in shares out of 
the total capital of m$n 100,000,000, nor its holding exceed 4% of the latter even if it did fulfill the 
qualifications of an Argentine juridical person. Despite this setback, ARMCO agreed to remain as contractor 
and would provide the technical information and personnel necessary for the success of the PSA.122
Further steps were taken towards the conclusive organisation of SOMISA. The DGFM studied the 
two ARMCO proposals for a steelworks (with capacities of 315,000 and 500,000 tons respectively) in the 
PSA and, given the high levels of national iron and steel consumption, determined that the capacity of the 
steelworks should be 500,000 tons. The contract covering the technical direction and design of the 
steelworks was drawn up, under which SOMISA would comprise blast furnaces and a rolling mill with an 
annual output capacity of 500,000 tons, and a mill for the production of plates, sheets and tinplate with an 
annual capacity of 250,000 tons.123 The contract was subscribed on 13 March 1948, and the Definitive 
Plan presented by ARMCO on 29 March 1948 was approved on 23 June 1948.124 Despite progress on 
these technicalities, the PSA made little headway owing to political and economic constraints associated with 
the Peronista regime. The political constraints were embodied in the opposition from powerful people who
120 Pedro F. Castineiras, Esto lo hicieron los argentinos (Buenos Aires, 1972), pp.30,31.
121 Ibid., p.32.
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had gained Peron’s favour. The most important of these was Miguel Miranda, the ’czar of the economy’. 
He had been called upon by Peron to direct the Consejo Economico Nacional, which promoted the 
commercialisation of rural products through the Instituto Argentino para la Promocion del Intercambio, and 
as president of the Banco Central controlled foreign exchange. According to nationalist author Raul Larra, 
opposition by Miranda to the steelworks project arose from his personal business interests. A manufacturer 
of tinned fish and importer of tinplate, he had defined himself in favour of the promotion of mass 
consumption policies and of light industries similar to his own. Furthermore, Miranda opposed the 
development of heavy industry because its projected product range included tinplate - which would be 
inauspicious for his tinplate import trade.125 The economic constraints were reflected in the effects of the 
policies fostered by Miranda. The country faced serious problems by 1948 owing to economic 
mismanagement, and the government could not afford large expenditures or heavy exchange outlays (see 
Chapter 2). State contributions to SOMISA came in ’droplets’, and under prevailing regulations exchange 
could not be obtained nor foreign loans negotiated.126
The lack of government funding proved critical, as one year after the approval of the PSA it 
became clear that the authorised capital of SOMISA would have to be increased. The decision to increase 
the capacity of the plant to 500,000 tons meant that there would be more installations than had been 
originally envisaged.127 Furthermore, owing to rising costs, projected expenditure on the plant bore no 
relation to the authorised capital. Because prices had increased since ARMCO had prepared its estimates 
in 1944, it became apparent that the budget presented by ARMCO was greater than the authorised capital 
of the mixed corporation.128 Although the economic crisis prevented any realistic possibility of the State 
being able to provide funds, the Executive Power submitted draft legislation laying the foundations for an 
increase in the capital of SOMISA. Though the Bill made no specific committments, it urged an increase 
from the initial m$n 100,000,000 to m$n 500,000,000 if costs were higher than planned or if it was essential
125 Larra, Savio, pp.161,162.
126 Castineiras, Esto, p.42.
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to expand facilities, and that the State could contribute upto m$n 400,000,000. Congress shelved the Bill 
on account of mounting economic difficulties and political objections by the Radicals. The Govemmentpaid 
a heavy price as the Bill also attempted a drastic revision of the extent of DGFM involvement in SOMISA 
agreed by Congress in 1947. After the first 5 years, the DGFM would have to reduce its stake from 51% 
to a minimum of 10%, which was considered sufficient to retain supervision and control.129 This was in 
line with the concept that State participation in sociedades mixtas should be transitory, but increased private 
sector participation was as before fiercely opposed by the UCR.
Peron again attempted to increase the capital of SOMISA in June 1949. Since the PSA had been 
foreseen at a lower cost level than that being incurred, the presidential Message to Congress stated that the 
capital should be increased to m$n 500,000,000.13° With the deepening economic crisis, the proposal was 
shelved. Nevertheless, an increase in capital was finally obtained in 1950. A Bill typical of the end of the 
Congressional session, which dealt with several unrelated matters, was presented on 26 September. Article 
4 authorised an increase in capital upto the amount required to fulfill the aims of the PSA, and empowered 
the Executive Power to modify the statutes of SOMISA accordingly as well as to guarantee the necessary 
financing schemes. The proposal was ambiguous, as it made no specific financial committments, and did 
not contain controversial provisions modifying the shareholding structure of the company. Therefore, it was 
accepted by the Congressional Committees studying the Bill on 27 September, and Article 4 was passed on 
the following day.131 The economic crisis prevented the government from making any contribution to the 
increase in capital throughout 1951. Only the works that could be implemented within existing constraints 
were executed. No equipment purchases had been possible, and a considerable rise in internal prices made 
available funds totally insufficient to face local works. Housing was built for the workers, and terrain was 
levelled.132
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Although SOMISA had initially attracted private investment, it failed to get off the ground by the 
early Fifties. Congress manifested antagonism towards private business, with particular resentment at 
participation of private shareholders and the size of its holdings in a ’strategic’ industry. However, other 
political and economic factors associated with the Peronato also prevented the implementation of the PSA. 
Although Peron had supported this type of industrial project as Minister of War during the military regime 
of 1943-1945, he developed his own agenda once elected President in 1946. The realisation of the PSA was 
frustrated by government policy, for reasons explained in Chapter 2. The promotion of heavy industry was 
not a priority. Furthermore, Peronista policies resulted in a severe crisis and shortage of foreign exchange 
by the late Forties, which led the regime to curb drastically expenditure and restrict the issue of import 
licenses vital for equipment purchases. However, even without these adverse domestic political factors, the 
PSA could not have been successfully implemented by the Fifties. As will be seen in forthcoming chapters, 
shortages of vital foreign inputs such as coal, poor US-Argentine relations, and the sheer cost of the 
steelworks also conspired against the execution of the project. Nevertheless, the bases for the development 
of SOMISA had been laid. These were far more secure than the ground work being carried out for a 
sociedad mixta in the third unit of the PSA.
The third unit o f  the PSA: the production o f finished goods
The DGFM project envisaged a third unit comprising the existing establishments that carried out 
rolling and finishing operations, and those to be installed in future. The existing plants, which were the 
Fabrica Militar de Aceros and the private manufacturers, were regarded as insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the PSA. Savio himself had indicated that State intervention in this unit was necessary, and 
a mixed company would be established. In line with the concept for mixed corporations that had originally 
guided the SOMISA proposal, the State would participate at a level which was sufficient to attain effective 
control as shareholder. Once productive capacity was increased and restructured, the State would withdraw 
as it was believed that the success of the third unit of the PSA lay in the participation of the private 
producers.133
133 Savio, ’Bases’, pp.396,397.
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Accordingly, a sociedad mixta for the manufacture of steel sheets and flats was projected, in which 
ARMCO Argentina would be the nucleus.134 However, because of overt US interference in Argentine 
domestic political affairs (see Chapter 6 for an account), ARMCO Argentina faced increasing difficulties 
over its involvement in the PSA and thereby expressed reservations. It assumed no obligation to participate 
in the constitution of the mixed company for the third unit, and everything agreed regarding that enterprise 
was declared null and void.135 Consequently, some circles suggested that finishing operations should be 
included in SOMISA, thereby making the latter a monopoly. This was rejected on the grounds that private 
sector initiatives would be damaged, and that the purpose of State intervention was to stimulate private 
initiatives.136
Despite the decision by ARMCO not to form the sociedad mixta with the DGFM for the production 
of sheets and plates, General Savio was determined that ARMCO Argentina remained involved in the third 
unit of the PSA. He succeeded once US-Argentine relations were ’normalised’ in mid-1947 and the storm 
over the role of ARMCO in SOMISA had receded. Savio was authorised by Decree No. 2,786 of 30 
January 1948 to organise a mixed corporation for the production of sheets, plates, and tinplate. The DGFM 
was empowered to carry out the preparatory work for this purpose and contract the direction of ARMCO 
Argentina for the installation and operation, on the basis of the proposal originally presented by ARMCO 
on 15 February 1947. Furthermore, all expenditure would be temporarily debited to the DGFM budget.137
The mixed enterprise Hojalata Argentina was officially created on 20 March 1948, and US$
5.000.000 (m$n 21,150,000 at the official exchange rate) were to be invested in it. In addition, another US$
10.000.000 (m$n 42,300,000 at the official exchange rate) were to be destined to the purchase of machinery
134 Comments on the supplementary documents of the PSA, RRP, 30 May 1947, p. 12.
135 Translation of the complementary minutes signed by La Cantabrica, ARMCO Argentina, TAMET 
and SIAM Di Telia, Buenos Aires, 22 February 1946, RRP, 30 May 1947, p.18.
136 Speech by Manuel Alvarez Pereyra, Peronista deputy for Buenos Aires, during the debate on the 
PSA, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.290.
137 Castineiras, Esto, p.51.
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and installations in the United States of America, and the necessary contract was negotiated.138 The 
contract signed by the DGFM and ARMCO, which was similar to that between SOMISA and ARMCO, 
established that the DGFM would set up a North American commission, with the power to subscribe 
contracts of purchase, decide technical questions of lesser importance, and contract legal advice. This 
commission would be empowered to approve plans and specifications, and carry out inspections of 
manufacture or of materials and equipment.139 Pedro F. Castineiras was appointed its head, and he left 
for the USA on 25 May 1949. However, the contract between the DGFM and ARMCO had not been 
formalised owing to domestic economic uncertainties, a shortage of funds which prevented any investment 
in Hojalata Argentina, and the scarcity of exchange for equipment purchases. The US commission of the 
DGFM was not established, as this would mean unnecessary expenditure, and Castineiras was put in charge 
of the commission already set up by SOMISA in Chicago. As the Argentine economic crisis deepened and 
resulted in total paralysis in the implementation of the Hojalata Argentina and SOMISA projects, Castineiras 
was recalled on 1 August 1951.140 Consequently, the ground work aimed at laying the foundations for 
a sociedad mixta for the production of rolled and finished goods ended in virtual failure. No funds were 
available for Hojalata Argentina owing to economic difficulties, and the technical management contract 
between the DGFM and ARMCO was never formalised.
CONCLUSION
Although nationalist elements within the Army had advocated the development of heavy industry 
before 1939, domestic iron and steel production emerged as a result of import shortages during the Second 
World War. Private metallurgical companies and also firms that previously drew on iron and steel imports 
were interested in steelmaking owing to the use of steel in the production of finished goods, and State 
interest responded to its importance in national defence. However, the private sector plants built during the
138 Nora Siegrist de Gentile, ’Desarrollo siderurgico’, in Martin, De Paula and Gutierrez (eds.), 
Ingenieros, p. 195; the conversion from US$ to m$n is based on data in Vicente Vazquez Presedo (ed.), 
Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas: Compendio 1873-1973 (Buenos Aires, 1988), p.244.
139 Castineiras, Esto, p.52.
140 Ibid., pp.52,53.
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war were not fully integrated, as they substituted the need for pig iron as an input by drawing heavily on 
local scrap sources. Furthermore, neither private industrialists nor the DGFM, the military-controlled 
industrial empire commissioned by the Army to develop iron and steel production, could afford the heavy 
capital outlays required in the development of a modem, large-scale steelworks.
Determined to develop heavy industry, the DGFM was willing to work with the private sector 
through sociedades mixtas to achieve its goals. Private firms collaborating with the military in mixed 
companies could include foreign interests, as the latter could provide much needed influxes of capital and 
technology. The most interesting characteristic of the mixed enterprises was that once the foundations were 
laid and the private sector could be left to its own devices, Fabricaciones Militares intended reducing its 
involvement to an essential minimum as its participation had no evident commercial purpose. The existing 
literature has largely ignored these facts and their implication - namely that, despite their nationalist 
rationale, the military required assistance from technically and commercially experienced private firms to 
develop defence-related industries such as steel.
Private interests were not attracted to participate in the AHZ. Large capital investments were 
required to develop the remote iron ore deposit at Zapla, adequate machinery was lacking, and there were 
doubts regarding the iron. With the project being comparatively modest, the DGFM pressed ahead on its 
own in order to attain national pig iron production, which began in October 1945. Participation of private 
interests was attracted more successfully for the SOMISA proposal. Both major industrialists and the 
subsidiary of the US firm ARMCO were involved. However, there were major setbacks. SOMISA was 
regarded as a ’strategic’ project, and Congress challenged the extent of private sector participation in the 
project and the role of ARMCO Argentina as shareholder and operator of the steelworks. Although Peron 
has been usually associated with nationalism and Statism, he had not opposed the PSA project in its initial 
form. It was Congress, largely owing to the Radical block, which restricted the role of the private sector 
in SOMISA. Political factors were not alone in hindering the implementation of the PSA. The scheme also 
fell victim to Peronista economic policy. It was not an economic priority, it was opposed by powerful 
people, and by the late Forties the necessary funds were unavailable as a result of the severe economic crisis.
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These problems also affected the third unit of the PSA, which ran into trouble from the beginning. After 
several false starts, the prevailing conditions were extremely unfavourable when the DGFM finally was able 
to undertake the project.
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Chapter 4
THE MARKET FOR IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS
Within Latin America, the Republic had both the most advanced economy and the highest iron and 
steel consumption. Table 4.1 shows apparent consumption, which is the sum of total imports and national 
output, and per capita consumption in the region’s three major economies. The table also shows how 
Argentina’s position relative to that of the other countries deteriorated. In 1925-1929, Argentine aggregate
Table 4.1




Aggregate Per capita 
(’000 t) (kg)
BRAZIL 
Aggregate Per capita 
(’000 1) (kg)
MEXICO 
Aggregate Per capita 
(’000 1) (kg)
1925-29 891.8 81.0 447.5 13.3 174.0 11.1
1930-34 510.9 41.5 239.5 6.7 151.0 8.8
1935-39 668.8 47.9 406.3 10.5 253.6 13.5
1940-44 312.5 21.0 386.5 9.0 256.7 12.3
1945-49 732.8 45.0 662.0 13.6 501.6 21.4
Source: Calculated from the statistics in United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), A study o f the iron and steel industry in Latin America, Volume I (New York, 1954), 
pp.84-86.
levels were double those of Brazil and eight times over those of Mexico. The pace of recovery in Argentine 
consumption after the Depression was below that of Brazil and even Mexico, where consumption outstripped 
pre-1929 levels. Following further fluctuations, total Argentine demand had in 1945-1949 actually fallen 
in relation to that of 1925-1929. In contrast, aggregate consumption in Brazil and especially Mexico had 
increased - not least because of substantial growth in domestic steel output capacity. The data also shows 
that the drop is even more dramatic in Argentine consumption per capita, which in 1945-1949 was almost 
'A that of 1925-1929. In Brazil the level remained virtually unchanged, and in Mexico it had doubled.
The shifts in total and per capita Argentine consumption levels are representative of broader
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economic conditions. Notwithstanding the progress attained by the Republic, this chapter shows that the 
market for iron and steel products was limited. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides 
a general view of the market. It considers issues such as population, income and economic structure, and 
argues that Argentina was already in a position where the degree of industrialisation should, apparently, have 
been deeper. However, although manufacturing had expanded before the Depression and the Second World 
War, industrial growth was most rapid in branches unlikely to foster an increase in steel consumption. The 
first section also assesses the composition of demand, actual conditions regarding imports and domestic 
output, and the extents and limits for local production - including what might have been possible by using 
the example of other countries at some similar stage of development as counterfactuals. The three remaining 
sections gauge whether or not the market was sufficient to sustain an efficient national industry. Each 
appraises a key area of iron and steel consumers, namely, transportation, construction and the infant 
metallurgical industry. The focus on these areas of consumption will be justified in the appropriate parts 
of the text. The section on transportation explains the decline of this sector as a consumer of iron and steel. 
This resulted from the altered economic circumstances after 1914 and financial difficulties of the railway 
companies. The product case-study chosen to support the argument is that of rails. The section on 
construction, which was by far the largest source of demand, argues that requirements for iron and steel 
changed over time. Although building remained the principal user in the absence of major steel- 
transforming industries, the metal content in construction gradually decreased owing to a shift to low-cost 
housing projects and the substitution of cement for steel. Changes in demand for iron and steel by the 
construction industry are captured by two product case-studies - iron girders and cast-iron pipes. The final 
section considers metallurgical goods (other than construction materials) produced locally. Their product 
range was relatively diverse and, notwithstanding the technological restrictions and the comparatively small 
output volume, were able to cover part of demand in times of import scarcities - especially during the 
Second World War. The chosen product case-studies are windmills and ploughs.
GENERAL MARKET TRENDS
Iron and steel consumption is construed as an indicator of economic development. The higher the
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level of consumption, the deeper the degree of industrialisation. This is of particular importance from the 
perspective of the thesis. Although the country boasted the highest consumption levels in Latin America, 
the market for iron and steel was limited. This section argues that this resulted from two factors. First, that 
Argentina was far less industrialised than it should have been. Second, that large-scale domestic iron and 
steel production could have been undertaken in a different manner from that envisaged by military planners.
Argentina had already attained various basic traits of economic progress often declared as 
’prerequisites’ of modem industrialisation - eg, a large unified territory, and a legal system assuring the 
rights of the individual and satisfactory protection of property.1 In this period, it can be described as a 
semi-industrial country - that is, an economy which had diversified its production structure and exceeded 
some threshold level of per capita income (see below).2 It was in a position to undergo a Tate 
industrialisation’ process, which meant industrialising by acquiring and improving the technology already 
created by experienced leading firms in the most advanced economies.3 Yet the Republic took what many 
portray as a wrong turn: it squandered opportunities and set off on a perverse downhill course which in the 
long-run resulted in a belated, weak, incomplete and truncated industrialisation process.4 The problem was 
that, although the country was prosperous, the simple availability of wealth had not helped industrialisation. 
Capital was accumulated in the hands of people (ie, landowners and merchants) who were mostly unwilling 
either to invest it in industrial ventures themselves or to pass it on in one form or another to those who are 
immediately engaged in industrialisation.5 This had occurred notwithstanding that Argentina had already 
attained various benchmarks identified by Chenery and which differentiated semi-industrial countries from 
exclusively primary-oriented exporters. The most important of these were a minimum per capita income
1 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1962), pp.32,33.
2 Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin, ’The Semi-Industrial Countries’, in Hollis Chenery, Sherman 
Robinson and Moshe Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth (Washington, 1986), p.84.
3 Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, ’La industrializaciontardia en perspectiva historica’, Desarrollo 
Economico (DE) 35 (1995-1996) No. 137, p.3.
4 Juan Carlos Korol and Hilda Sabato, ’Incomplete Industrialization: An Argentine Obsession’, Latin 
American Research Review XXV (1990) No.l, p.3.
5 Gerschenkron, Backwardness, p.39.
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(as a proxy for domestic demand for manufactures), shifts in production from the primary sector to 
manufacturing, and the contribution of industry to growth.6
The size o f  the population and its purchasing power
Argentina was one of the most populous Latin American countries. The population doubled 
between the Third National Census in 1914 and the Fourth National Census in 1947: it rose from 7,885,237 
to 15,897,127 inhabitants. Most people clustered in urban areas, whose share of the total population 
increased from 53% in 1914 to 62% in 1947.7 This reflects a rapid urbanisation process, which was 
concentrated in the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area and fundamentally relied on migration - first 
from overseas and subsequently from the interior of the country. Foreign immigrants, facing increasing 
difficulties of access to the land (see Chapter 2), descended in droves upon the national capital and until the 
Thirties were the major component of its growth.8 The population of Buenos Aires in 1914 was 50% of 
European immigrant origin, 40% city-born (and, therefore, also largely of foreign origin) and only 10% 
originated from the interior.9 The immigrant population contributed in a fundamental manner to expanding 
the market for manufactures, not only because its origin implied a taste for ’European’ products. Enjoying 
relatively high wages, the disposable incomes of European immigrants widened the market for 
manufactures.10
Because of rapid urbanisation, the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area had already exceeded 
the 1,000,000 inhabitants mark by 1914, and remained the only city to have done so for decades.11 In fact,
6 Chenery and Syrquin, ’Countries’, p.85.
7 Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (Berkeley, 1967), p.227.
8 Zulma Recchini de Lattes, ’El proceso de urbanizacion en la Argentina: distribution, crecimiento y 
algunas caracteristicas de la poblacion urbana’, DE 12 (1972-1973) No.48, pp.879,880.
9 Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1990), p. 118.
10 Celso Furtado, Economic Development o f Latin America (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1976), p.58.
11 Recchini de Lattes, ’Urbanizacion’, p.870.
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its population doubled from 2,067,000 inhabitants in 1914 to 4,274,000 inhabitants in 1947.12 This increase 
in the urban population, although not associated with industrialisation, drove demand for iron and steel 
products. Urbanisation concentrated not only the market for manufactures but also for factory, office and 
house building. Therefore iron and steel products associated with construction were those most in demand 
(see below). Despite the absence of a genuine industrialisation process which should have translated into 
greater demand for other iron and steel goods, urban growth was a form of macroeconomic structural change 
which was reflected in changes in the employment structure and the insertion of new groups into the 
economic process. Manufacturing and tertiary activities increasingly absorbed a greater share of the labour 
force and had expanded as Buenos Aires enjoyed major advantages favouring their growth. The capital was 
a concentrated market, it had an abundant labour supply with above-average training and adequate 
infrastructure and services, and was the hub of the transport system with easy access to national resources 
through the rail network and to foreign inputs through the port on the River Plate.13
Table 4.2
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION AMONG ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
(as a percentage)
SECTOR 1900-1904 1925-1929 1940-1944 1955
Rural 39.2 35.9 33.3 26.1
Manufacturing 19.8 20.8 23.8 22.5
Mining and construction 4.7 4.9 3.9 5.6
Transport 4.6 5.1 4.5 5.9
Electricity and communications 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.9
Commerce and finance 12.8 13.9 13.5 14.8
Personal services 14.4 13.1 12.8 12.7
State 3.6 5.2 6.7 10.3
Source: Compiled from UN, ECLA, Serie Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo economico, V: El 
desarrollo economico de la Argentina, Primera parte - Los problemas y perspectivas del crecimiento 
economico argentino (Mexico, 1959), pp.37,39.
Alterations to the occupational structure are revealed in Table 4.2 above. The rural sector steadily
12 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic (New Haven, 
1970), p.422.
13 Eduardo F. Jorge, Industriay concentracion economica (Buenos Aires, 1971), p.139.
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declined as a source of employment, while higher income tertiary activities (ie, commerce, services and the 
State administrative apparatus) and manufacturing expanded. The data shows that tertiary activities 
employed a larger share of the active population than manufacturing. This reflects the fact that urbanisation 
in Argentina did not result in industrialisation owing to the lack of capital, which was essential for industry. 
Therefore most people migrating to the cities got absorbed into tertiary activities, which required little or 
no capital.14 The expansion of commerce, services and the State apparatus led to the growth of the middle 
class, which already in 1914 comprised 33% of the total active population.15 As a result, the different 
social strata enjoyed good income levels and a relatively more even income distribution - unlike in Brazil 
or Mexico.16 Income and its distribution are important to the argument that Argentina should have been 
further industrialised than it actually was. Rises in per capita income led to changes in demand: the 
proportion of food consumption decreased while that of non-food demand (ie, that for manufactures) 
increased.17 Per capita income in the Republic was rising and income distribution underwent significant 
changes. Since the level of per capita income was virtually that of a semi-industrial country, demand for 
manufactures had expanded and the country should have pursued a different industrial strategy than that 
implemented.
Changes in gross per capita income for the period 1920-1949 are shown in Table 4.3 below. The 
figures are based on the only existing reliable data, which is that calculated in 1950 pesos by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. For the purposes of international comparisons, the 
figures include the US currency equivalent for 1950. Since more than one exchange rate was in operation, 
two key rates are shown. First the official rate, which is defined as the amount of pesos per dollar quoted
14 Ezequiel Gallo and Roberto Cortes Conde, La republica conservadora (Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 175.
15 Roberto Cortes Conde and Ezequiel Gallo, La formation de la Argentina modema (Buenos Aires, 
1967), p.83.
16 Jorge, Industria, p. 137.
17 Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin, ’Typical Patterns of Transformation’, in Chenery, Robinson and 
Syrquin, Industrialization, p.57.
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in the Mercado de Cambios in Buenos Aires; second the parallel market rate.18 However, caution should 
be exercised when using the dollar equivalents shown in Table 4.3 - particularly those arising from the 
parallel market rate. Normally, the ’gap’ between the official and parallel market rates was very low. 
Towards the end of the period, it was considerable owing to the severe domestic crisis and the shortage of 
foreign exchange. As a result, per capita income in the dollar equivalent for 1950 at the parallel market rate 
appears substantially distorted. Regarding the official rate, it is not entirely satisfactory due to the existence 
of multiple rates but it is widely used.
Table 4.3
GROSS PER CAPITA INCOME, 1920-1949*






1920-1924 9,416,300 2,670 406.4 167.0
1925-1929 10,969,900 3,207 488.1 200.6
1930-1934 12,384,600 2,626 399.7 164.2
1935-1939 13,493,200 2,991 455.2 187.0
1940-1944 14,643,000 3,065 466.5 191.7
1945-1949 16,005,800 3,639 553.9 227.6
* The data for the period 1945-1949 was calculated from the individual figures for the years 
concerned.
Sources: The statistics for population and income were compiled from UN, ECLA, Analisis y 
proyecciones, V: Argentina, Primera parte, p.15 and the US$ equivalent was calculated from the data 
for exchange rates (m$n 6.57 per US$ at the official rate and m$n 15.99 per US$ at the parallel 
market rate) in Vicente Vazquez-Presedo (ed.), Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas: Compendio 1873- 
1973 (Buenos Aires, 1988), p.244.
Table 4.3 shows that, excluding the contraction in 1930-1934 during the world crisis, per capita 
income experienced growth. Chenery identifies US$ 500 as the threshold level of per capita income 
distinguishing semi-industrial countries from primary-oriented exporters.19 Measured in dollars at the 
official exchange rate, per capita income was close to the benchmark on several occasions and even exceeded 
it in the late Forties. As per capita income is used as a proxy for domestic demand for manufactures, the
18 Vicente Vazquez-Presedo (ed.), Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas: Compendio 1873-1973 (Buenos 
Aires, 1988), p.241.
19 Chenery and Syrquin, ’Countries’, p.86.
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evidence suggests that in Argentina it was high enough to have expanded non-food demand and that thereby 
the country was already in a position to industrialise. There was a market for manufactures as the 
population had considerable purchasing power and, as is seen below, benefited from a relatively more even 
income distribution than elsewhere in Latin America.
Table 4.4
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATIONAL INCOME IN 1950 
(at factor cost)
ITEM m$n AT CONSTANT PRICES
Remuneration of employees* 32,128,000*
Income from unincorporated enterprises 21,913,000
Income from property 6,250,000
Savings of corporations 1,014,000
Direct taxes on corporations 720,000
General government income from property and
entrepreneurship 237,000
Minus interest on public debt (443,000)
NATIONAL INCOME 61,819,000
* Comprises m$n 29,745,000 in wages and salaries and m$n 2,383,000 in employers’ contributions to
social security.
Source: UN, ECLA, Statistical Bulletin for Latin America I (1964) No.2, p.107.
Data on income distribution is scarce, particularly for the earlier part of the period, and the most 
precise statistics only date back to 1950. Nevertheless, there is some information for the Thirties and early 
Forties. The most critical feature of the period was that distribution underwent a significant change in terms 
of the share of wages. Remuneration of labour - wages and salaries, including business and personal 
contributions to social security - accounted for around 46% of net domestic income in the years 1935-1939. 
The remaining 54% corresponded to the remuneration of capital and enterprise - net business income, 
property owners, independent professions, interest, and so on. These relative shares remained more or less 
unchanged until 1946, after when the share of labour rose steadily and peaked at 56.9% in 1952.20 This 
rise is reflected in the data in Table 4.4, which shows the first detailed statistics of the distribution of
20 Ferrer, Economy, p. 173.
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national income. Remuneration of employees through wages and salaries and employers’ contributions to 
social security came to account for just over 50% of national income by 1950. This was the result of: (i) 
the changes in the employment structure indicated earlier, and (ii) the strengthening of the unions - not least 
during the Peronato. Alterations to the occupational structure affected income distribution, as the share of 
labour in total income varied considerably per sector. The share of labour in the net income generated by 
rural production was around 25%, while that in manufacturing and tertiary activities amounted to 
approximately 55%. Therefore, when the labour force shifted from rural production to industry and services, 
the share of wages in the net national income increased.21 The strengthening of labour unions also tended 
to raise the share of wages. Urbanisation and increased employment in manufacturing and services 
reinforced the labour unions and enabled workers to defend their share of total income more effectively. 
This is particularly true during the late Forties, when the labour-based Peronista regime was highly receptive 
to union demands for higher wages, ceiling prices on primary necessities, rent control and so forth.22 The 
rise in labour costs acted as a disincentive, not least for the expansion of iron and steel production. 
Although higher labour costs could have stimulated attempts to substitute capital for labour, they also 
squeezed profits of firms already enduring hardship - which prevented them from purchasing equipment 
essential for modernisation (see Chapter 3).
In terms of size of the population and its purchasing power, Argentina was already a semi-industrial 
country in a position to industrialise further. Rapid urbanisation had three results: (a) concentration of 
demand; (b) changes in the occupational structure, with the decline of the rural sector as a source of 
employment in favour of manufacturing and tertiary activities; and (c) the insertion of new groups into the 
economic process. Good income levels were not only enjoyed by the wealthy upper class but also by the 
expanding middle class, and higher disposable income gradually became available for the labour force. As 
income per capita rose, demand for bare essentials such as food declined in favour of that for non-food items 
- which expanded the market for manufactures. The rising demand for these goods is only one of the 
indicators signalling that the country could have undergone industrialisation. A further two equally
21 Ibid., p. 170.
22 Ibid., pp. 170,171.
158
important indicators are discussed below: the shift in production from the primary sector to manufacturing, 
and the contribution of industry to growth.
Manufacturing and the national economy
One of the benchmarks differentiating semi-industrial countries from primary producers is the share 
of manufacturing as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). According to Chenery, the threshold 
is 14%.23 Table 4.5 below, which displays the structure of Argentine GDP for the period 1920-1949, 
shows that the share of manufacturing exceeded this level and had already done so by the early Twenties. 
Nevertheless, two observations should be made: (i) how does this share compare with that of the rural sector
Table 4.5
STRUCTURE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1920-1949* 
(share of economic sectors as a percentage)
SECTORS 1920-24 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39 1940-44 1945-49
Farming 15.5 14.9 14.6 13.8 13.7 9.3
Livestock 12.6 10.6 10.3 10.4 10.8 9.2
Fishing 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Mining 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.0
Manufacturing 16.4 17.7 18.4 20.4 21.0 23.5
Other public services 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Construction 5.3 6.5 5.3 5.7 5.3 6.1
Trade 20.5 21.3 19.1 18.2 16.7 17.3
Transport 6.3 7.2 7.5 7.1 7.4 8.2
Communications 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
Finance 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.3
Housing
Government and personal
5.3 4.8 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.6
services 14.2 13.0 14.7 14.5 15.0 16.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
concerned.
Source: Compiled from the data in Banco de Analisis y Computation S.R.L. (ed.), Relevamiento 
Estadistico de la Economia Argentina 1900-1980 (Buenos Aires, 1982), pp.40,60,78,218.
23 Chenery and Syrquin, ’Countries’, p.86.
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(the key source of cash for the country), and (ii) what is actually meant by the term manufacturing. 
Regarding the former, the data in Table 4.5 shows that the share of manufacturing surpassed the individual 
shares of farming and livestock production. However, it does not exceed the combined share of these rural 
activities, except in 1945-1949. The share of mral production in the GDP amounted to almost 30% in 1920- 
1924, approximately 25% between 1925 and 1944, and slumped to 18.5% in 1945-1949 as a result of 
Peronista policy towards farmers (see Chapter 2). This is partly explained by the fact that, although 
industries developed, the composition of manufacturing was not that of a truly industrialised country. 
Therefore, it is necessary to observe changes in the structure of industry and to qualify the term 
manufacturing, particularly for the pre-1930 period.
Although on paper the share of manufacturing in the GDP before the Wall Street crash was 
sufficient for Argentina to be regarded a semi-industrial country, the established activities did not genuinely 
represent what is normally regarded as manufacturing. Industry had been stimulated by the expansion of 
exports (ie, some local transformation of primary products was necessary), urbanisation and the rise in 
income derived from export growth. The predominant activities were traditional industries: foodstuffs and 
beverages, tobacco, textiles and clothing.24 Supplementary activities, which included the production of 
construction materials and mral implements and railway repair workshops, had also developed.25 Until the 
Thirties, production of non-durables accounted for over 50% of industrial output.26 Only when trade 
contracted during the world crisis and imports had to be substituted was a relative expansion of the industrial 
base facilitated. Changes in the composition of manufacturing are reflected in the data in Table 4.6, which 
shows the value of industrial output per branch for the period 1930-1949. The most dramatic growth 
occurred in the share of textiles. Other existing sectors, playing a modest part during the Twenties, 
increased their share within manufacturing with difficulty.
24 United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), El proceso de 
industrializacion en America Latina (New York, 1965), pp.14,15,27.
25 Jorge, Industria, p.48.
26 Monica Peralta-Ramos, The Political Economy o f Argentina (Boulder, 1992), p. 11.
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Table 4.6
VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION PER SECTOR, 1930-1949
(as a percentage)
INDUSTRY 1930-1934 1935-1939 1940-1944 1945-1949
Food and beverages 33.2 36.1 35.2 30.3
Tobacco - 1.8 1.7 1.7
Textiles 6.2 9.6 11.6 13.6
Clothing - 9.2 8.1 9.0
Wood - 4.3 4.8 5.0
Paper - 5.1 4.7 4.4
Chemicals 6.9 4.9 6.7 6.1
Petroleum derivatives 3.3 4.2 3.8 3.6
Rubber 0.4 1.4 0.6 1.0
Leather - 3.2 4.4 4.0
Glass and ceramics 5.9 3.6 4.0 4.0
Metallurgy, excluding machinery 7.6 8.7 6.7 7.6
Vehicles and machinery 7.6 5.3 5.2 6.9
Equipment and electric machinery 7.6 1.6 1.3 1.9
Miscellaneous - 1.0 1.2 1.4
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo economico argentino (Buenos 
Aires, 2nd ed., 1973), p.100.
Government policy was responsible for the ad hoc nature of industrial development after 1930. 
During the early Thirties, the Concordancia faced severe conditions and responded with measures to 
reactivate the rural sector (see Chapter 2). Nonetheless, some ’new’ industries such as rubber emerged. 
This was not because of the existence of an official industrial policy but in response to the drastic reduction 
in the capacity to import. In order to continue or expand their business, foreign companies that traditionally 
supplied manufactured imports had to skirt exchange and import controls and tariff surcharges imposed in 
1931.27 These firms, facing idle capacity in their countries of origin as a result of the Depression, were 
in condition to export capital, equipment and technicians and therefore set up local subsidiaries in 
Argentina.28 However, major basic industries did not emerge. The development of steel production was
27 Jorge Schvarzer, La industria que supimos conseguir (Buenos Aires, 1996), p. 168; Roger Gravil and 
Timothy Rooth, ’A Time of Acute Dependence: Argentina in the 1930s’, The Journal o f European Economic 
History 7 (1978) Nos.2-3, p.375.
28 Adolfo Dorfman, Cincuenta ahos de industrializacion en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1983), pp.45,46.
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obstructed throughout the Twenties and Thirties. Before 1930, two factors were at the root of the problem,
(i) There were no exploitable domestic iron ore and coal sources at the time.29 (ii) In its infancy, the 
industry would be uncompetitive owing to high costs of production and the absence of economies of scale 
and thereby require tariff protection which the government would not provide. The ruling political class, 
the agro-exports sector and local merchants of imported basic inputs were powerful vested interests which 
resisted this type of industry.30 Although the Depression created the conditions for import substitution, two 
further factors hindered the development of local steel making, (a) Improvements in the economy by the 
mid-Thirties led to recovery in import levels, (b) The strong presence of the steel cartel in the market 
frustrated any attempt to develop domestic production - at least by private firms (see Chapters 3 and 6).
Renewed import shortages in the early Forties again encouraged the growth of manufacturing - 
including steelmaking (see Chapters 2 and 3). With the industrial sector already accounting for over 20% 
of GDP (see Table 4.5) and light sectors firmly established, Argentina was in a position to industrialise 
further by the late Forties. Moreover, a deep industrialisation process seemed achievable with the election 
of Peron, who favoured industry and relied on the labour movement for political support. Nevertheless, the 
Peronista regime did not foster genuine industrialisation (see Chapter 2). The encouragement of mass 
consumption resulted in over-emphasis on light industries and therefore a continued predominance of these 
sectors within the structure of manufacturing (see Table 4.6). The drawback was that industrial growth 
essentially based on light industries could not be sustained in the long-term, for two reasons. First, demand 
for wage goods had low elasticity and expanded very slowly. Second, the operation of these sectors was 
constrained by the need to import machinery and intermediate goods, which could only be covered by 
expanding exports.31 During the Peronato, this was not feasible. Export volumes declined as a result of 
adverse government policies towards the rural sector, while simultaneously the terms of trade deteriorated.32
29 Diaz Alejandro, Essays, p.213.
30 Jorge, Industria, pp.44,45.
31 UN, ECLA, Industrializacion, p.27.
32 UN, ECLA, The economic development o f Latin America in the post-war period (New York, 1964), 
p.84.
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The import-purchasing power of exports could not be substituted with gold or liquid foreign currency. 
Exchange reserves accumulated during the Second World War were exhausted, not least because of their 
use to finance the nationalisation of foreign-owned utilities.33 Imports of machinery and intermediate goods 
were therefore unobtainable, and the only alternative was to develop basic sectors such as iron and steel and 
related transforming industries.34
During the period under study, the Republic had shifted away from primary production to 
manufacturing. However, there was a crucial difficulty: the nature of the predominant industries. These 
were well established light sectors, which by 1949 had virtualy exhausted their import-substitution 
possibilities.35 Given the share attained by manufacturing within GDP, Argentina could have deepened 
industrialisation. Yet the country failed to undertake this task. As seen in Chapter 2, the various 
governments of the day can be held partly responsible for this failure. Industry had initially arisen as a 
consequence of the expansion of exports, urbanisation and the rise in income derived from export-led 
growth. Its subsequent development was induced by the need for ’forced’ import-substitution resultant from 
the contraction in trade during the world economic crisis and the Second World War. However, this had 
been insufficient to genuinely transform the country into an industrial economy. This is even more apparent 
when assessing the iron and steel sector. As is shown below, though steelmaking had been undertaken in 
the early Forties, the market was limited and the Plan Siderurgico Argentino (PSA) project for large-scale 
production fell far short of realising its potential.
Iron and steel: the composition o f  demand and sources o f  supply
The increases in urban population and income described earlier should have expanded demand for 
industrial commodities such as iron and steel. Nevertheless, even though Argentina had the highest
33 UN, ECLA / Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) / Food and Agriculture Organisation, A study 
o f trade between Latin America and Europe (Geneva, January 1953), p.33; Lewis, Crisis, p. 193.
34UN, ECLA, Industrializacion, pp.27,28.
35 Diaz Alejandro, Essays, p.228.
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aggregate demand for iron and steel in Latin America, consumption per capita had not kept pace with 
changes in the standard of living.36 In fact, it decreased from 81 kilograms in 1925-1929 to 45 kilograms 
in 1945-1949 (see Table 4.1). In the absence of an authentic industrialisation process, the market for iron 
and steel remained restricted. The tragedy was that things could have been different. In order to assess 
what might have been possible, this section considers three critical factors: (i) the composition of demand,
(ii) actual supply conditions regarding imports and domestic output, and (iii) the extents, limits and 
opportunities for local production.
Table 4.7
ANNUAL AVERAGE ESTIMATED STEEL CONSUMPTION BY GROUPS OF PRODUCTS
(as a percentage of total steel consumption)
GROUPS OF PRODUCTS 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39 1940-44 1945-49
TOTAL (in thousands of tons) 891.8 510.9 668.8 312.5 732.8
Bars, strip, shapes and structural steel 37.2 39.7 45.4 48.9 45.9
Sheet 18.7 18.4 18.3 11.7 16.4
Rails and accessories 15.0 7.7 5.2 0.8 4.8
Wire and wire products 14.4 14.3 12.4 10.1 15.1
Tubes 9.2 10.1 8.7 7.0 9.1
Tinplate 4.5 9.5 9.7 20.4 7.9
Other products 0.9 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.7
Source: Calculated from the Argentine consumption data in UN, ECLA, Study, Volume I, p.87.
To evaluate the composition of demand for iron and steel, the evolution of consumption of the 
major groups of products is observed. Changes in the share of specific categories within aggregate demand 
for the years 1925-1949 are shown in Table 4.7 above. The figures indicate that the commodities with the 
highest proportion of consumption were all types of steel associated with construction, which as late as 1939 
was rated as the second largest local industry after meat-packing despite its relatively low share within GDP 
(see Table 4.5).37 The largest share of demand corresponded to bars, strip, shapes and structures, which
36 UN, ECLA, A study o f the iron and steel industry in Latin America, Volume I (New York, 1954), 
p.72.
37 Laura Randall, An Economic History o f Argentina in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1978), p. 129.
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reflected the absence of major steel-transforming industries and resulted from fluctuations in the share of 
demand for other products. However, the data in Table 4.7 conceals important facts relating to the actual 
volume of consumption of bars, strip, shapes and structures. Excluding drops in demand during the trough 
of the Depression and the Second World War, the tonnage consumed remained largely stable: it averaged 
333,400 tons in 1925-1929, 304,700 tons in 1935-1939 and 314,500 tons in 1945-1949.38 However, the 
amount of steel employed in construction effectively decreased in favour of locally produced cement as a 
consequence of tendencies towards product substitution, technological changes in building and the growth
Table 4.8
CONSUMPTION OF STEEL BARS AND SHAPES AND OF CEMENT, 1925-1949
(1935-1939 = 100)






Source: Calculated from the data in UN, ECLA, Study, Volume I, p.90.
in public works programmes. Table 4.8 charts the substitution effect, confirming the steady increase of 
cement use in construction while the absolute volume of construction steel stood at much the same level in 
the late Forties as in the late Twenties. During the same period, cement consumption more than doubled. 
As a result of this shift, there was increased utilisation of products such as asbesto-cement tubes in sewerage 
systems and galvanised sheets for roofing were replaced by asbesto-cement sheets.39
Three other groups of products associated with construction had a significant share of consumption: 
(a) sheets, which were employed in galvanised roofing; (b) wire and wire products, in the form of items
38 The figures were calculated from the Argentine consumption data in UN, ECLA, Study, Volume I, 
p.87.
39 UN, ECLA, Study, Volume I, p.60.
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such as wire rods; and (c) tubes and pipes, which were employed in public works and services. However, 
these categories of commodities were not used exclusively by the building industry. The emergent 
metallurgical sector utilised sheets in the production of consumer durables such as kitchen stoves and 
refrigerators and of capital goods such as machinery and rural implements. Agriculture required wire and 
wire products such as fencing wire and wire netting. The petroleum industry made increasing use of tubes 
and pipes.40
Finally, the data in Table 4.7 above shows the trends in the share of demand for products associated 
with the agro-exports sector. The most significant feature is the steep drop in the consumption of rails and 
accessories, which had been the iron and steel product in greatest demand before 1914. The construction 
of railways, although associated with factors such as national consolidation, had also been determined by 
the requirements of export production.41 Changed economic conditions after the First World War and the 
financial difficulties of the railway companies (see below) were the principal causes for the fall in demand 
for rails. However, two further factors were also to blame: (i) contractions in trade during the Depression 
and the Second World War, and (ii) steel shortages in the late Forties. As regards tinplate, a commodity 
associated with food processing industries (especially meat-packing), consumption was remarkably stable 
save for a huge growth during the period 1940-1944. The significantly high levels of tinplate consumption 
during the Second World War responded to Allied (and more particularly British) needs. The meat-packing 
industry was controlled by British and US interests, and its beef supplies were vital. Shortages of tinplate 
imports from Britain were compensated with a substantial US quota.42 This can only have discouraged the 
development of local tinplate manufacturing. Moreover, during the late Forties, tinplate was progressively 
substituted by other packaging materials. Imported tinplate supplies were preserved for goods which could 
not employ other materials (eg, canned fish, shellfish and condensed milk), and replaced where possible by
40 Ibid., pp.79,80.
41 Colin M. Lewis, ’Railways and industrialisation: Argentina and Brazil, 1870-1929’, in Christopher 
Abel and Colin M. Lewis (eds.), Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State (London, 1985),
pp.201,202.
42 UN, ECLA, Study, p.79.
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materials such as cardboard, wood and glass.43
Table 4.9









(% share of 
consumption)
OUTPUT 
(% share of 
consumption)
1925-1929 891,800 891,800 - 100.0
1930-1934 510,900 510,900 - 100.0 -
1935-1939 668,800 664,200 4,600 99.3 0.7
1940-1944 312,500 243,700 68,800 78.0 22.0
1945-1949 732,800 560,800 172,000 76.5 23.5
Source: Calculated from the statistics in UN, ECLA, Study, p.84.
Having assessed the structure of demand for iron and steel, this section focuses on actual supply 
conditions. Table 4.9 shows the volumes and shares of demand covered by imports and domestic 
production. It is clear from the data that imports were the key source of supply. Before 1939, local output 
was too modest to satisfy a significant share of consumption. Domestic iron and steel production grew 
during the Second World War but, as the figures indicate, domestic production satisfied only approximately 
20% of requirements during the Forties.
The predominant source of iron and steel was imports. Two features characterised imports at this 
stage: first, volumes fluctuated strongly, subject to the length of economic cycles; and second, consistency 
in sources of supply - at least until September 1939. Fluctuations reflected the fact that ’normal’ conditions 
were not prevalent. Severe difficulties arose from the contraction in trade during the world economic crisis 
and especially the Second World War, which are reflected in the drops in the annual averages of imports 
shown in Table 4.9. Furthermore, since economic cycles had shortened, annual import levels swayed even 
in periods of relative stability - as occurred between 1920 and 1927. With the onset of the world crisis in 
1928, imports fell sharply. Although the domestic economy and trade recovered between 1934 and 1937,
43 Ibid.
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these years were again typified by sharp variations. Imports were most seriously disrupted between 1938 
and 1945, owing first to recession and subsequently the Second World War.44 Finally, notwithstanding 
the boom in the early postwar period, fluctuations in import levels remained the norm. Traditional trade 
currents were not immediately restored, and Peronista economic policy adversely affected the balance of 
payments.
The dominant sources of imports until 1939 were Continental European steel producer-exporters, 
notwithstanding the significance of Anglo-Argentine relations and that 23% of total Argentine imports 
originated in Britain and British India. Purchases of British iron and steel goods which in 1930 had declined 
in favour of Continental goods in relation to 1913 included galvanised sheets, and various types of wires 
and pipes.45 As seen in Chapter 2, this shift towards Continental producers resulted from: (i) changes in 
output capacity arising directly from the First World War; (ii) currency conditions prevailing in the early 
and mid Twenties; and (iii) the oligopolistic International Steel Cartel (ISC) they created to sustain a 
declining overseas trade. As also seen in Chapter 2, the ISC flourished during the Thirties and was able to 
effectively control (and prevent the development of local production in) the few remaining ’open’ overseas 
markets like Argentina through a range of elaborate distribution practices.
The outbreak of the Second World War precipitated change in supply conditions. The ISC 
collapsed and the Republic was deprived of imports from its leading sources, thereby encouraging the growth 
of a national steel industry to compensate for import shortfalls. Crude steel producers consumed their entire 
output ’in house’ since they also manufactured finished goods. Although the domestic industry contributed 
to alleviate import shortages by satisfying a significant share of consumption, it was still in its infancy. 
Notwithstanding that production in nationally manufactured or second-hand Siemens-Martin furnaces with 
modest capacity and simple rolling mills methods overcame the limited availability of modem technology 
(see Chapter 6), methods were antiquated and restricted both output and the range of goods produced.
44 Boletin Informativo Techint, October-November 1964, pp. 11,27.




DOMESTIC OUTPUT OF IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS FOR SELECTED YEARS
(share of total output value)
CATEGORIES 1935 1941 1948
Cast and elaborated iron and steel shapes and 
various articles 13.4% 15.8% 25.1%
Undetermined range of iron articles with or without 
content of other metals 9.7% 14.1% 18.1%
Tinplate, iron and zinc goods - including production 
of food containers 26.0% 29.5% 15.5%
Various iron shapes produced by blacksmiths 3.2% - -
Galvanised iron 9.4% 3.8% 1.9%
Drawn and galvanised wire 1.6% 2.6% 2.2%
Rivets, screws and nails 10.5% 5.4% 5.4%
Iron and steel pipes 3.2% 5.5% 5.5%
Rural implements 6.0% 2.2% 1.4%
Weighing apparatus and scales 0.6% 0.7% 0.8%
Doors, windows and other building goods 8.0% 8.4% 5.0%
Iron fittings and edgings for doors, windows, 
furniture and related goods 1.0% 2.5% 3.4%
Kitchen stoves and analogue goods 2.9% 4.4% 9.0%
Safes, metal furniture and related goods 2.0% 3.1% 4.2%
Iron beds and springs 2.3% 2.0% 2.5%
Sources: Calculated from the data in Ministerio de Hacienda, Censo Industrial de 1935 (Buenos Aires, 
1938), pp.612-632; Ministerio de Hacienda, Estadistica Industrial de 1941 (Buenos Aires, 1944), pp.307- 
311; Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Argentina, Tomo HI: 
Estadistica Industrial, Aiios 1949-1950, pp.447,450-456,459.
There are few years for which national output statistics for the different product categories are 
available. With the exception of some selected items, the data is in monetary values rather than volume. 
Furthermore, there are inconsistencies in the range of items included in each category, particularly in the 
figures for 1948. To make the data comparable comparable throughout the period (not least because of 
changes over time in the value of the peso), Table 4.10 shows the share of each category in total output 
value. The types of goods shown were simple to manufacture (ie, the necessary equipment was not 
complex) and reflect the absence of a genuine industrialisation process. Products associated with the 
building sector, the leading iron and steel consumer, were predominant overall. The categories under which 
they were classified accounted for between 35% and 40% of output value during the years displayed in 
Table 4.10. There was also considerable growth in the manufacture of consumer durables, notwithstanding 
their comparatively modest share of total output value, with the most notable example being provided by
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kitchen stoves and analogue goods. High customs duties and the depreciation of the peso gave a sharp 
impetus to their national production during the Thirties. Domestic products, which were copies or licensed 
manufactures of imported brands, matched their foreign counterparts in all respects except quality. They 
were offered at very cheap prices, and thereby the import market became increasingly unsustainable.46 
With the subsequent over-emphasis on industries manufacturing consumer durables during the Peronato, 
production of goods as kitchen stoves soared and was sufficient to satisfy demand.47
Notwithstanding the growth in output, domestic iron and steel production was neither modem or 
large-scale and its scope was limited. This worried military planners, who were concerned over supplies 
for seguridad nacional purposes and self-sufficiency in ’strategic’ commodities. As seen in the previous 
chapter, their response was the PSA and its centrepiece, the SOMISA project. Unfortunately, the underlying 
assumption of the military - ie, that once the steelworks were operational a whole range of related 
transforming industries would develop automatically - was a serious misconception. Although the PSA was 
not implemented on schedule, it failed to go far enough and the flaws showed when it eventually was 
realised. This need not have been the case, as is demonstrated by two counterfactual examples: the steel 
industries in South Korea and Australia.
The South Korean counterfactual refers to a later period than that being studied, namely the late 
Sixties and early Seventies. Nonetheless, it is useful on three accounts, (a) South Korea also had a 
concentrated market, (b) South Korea, like Argentina in the interwar period, was at a stage where some of 
Chenery’s benchmarks defining a semi-industrial economy were rapidly being attained, (c) Unlike the case 
of the PSA, government plans for iron and steel production included expanding the limited domestic market 
by incorporating related transforming industries. Regarding the thresholds differentiating primary-oriented 
economies from semi-industrial ones, South Korea made spectacular progress within a decade. Per capita 
national income expanded at a faster rate than the population. While population increased from 26,987,000
46 DOT, Economic Conditions in the Argentine Republic, No.608, March 1935, p.72.
47 Board of Trade, Export Promotion Department, Overseas Economic Surveys, Argentina, October 1947, 
p.87.
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inhabitants in 1963 to 32,905,000 inhabitants in 1973, per capita income rose steeply over the same period 
from US$ 87 to US$ 313.48 The role of manufacturing within the economy was also considerably 
enhanced. Its contribution to GDP increased from 15.6% to 20.5% between 1964 and 1970 - at a much 
faster pace than had been the case in Argentina (see Table 4.5).49 These changes enabled South Korea to 
deepen industrialisation, as growth in per capita income shifted demand towards manufactures and 
manufacturing continued to increase its share of GDP.
Prior to government planning for expansion, South Korean iron and steel production was modest. 
As in Argentina during the Forties, local producers relied heavily on increasingly depleted scrap resources. 
Pig iron production, which began in 1958, was almost entirely exported to Japan. Crude steel output 
amounted to a mere 47,000 tons in 1961, and the finished goods produced were typical of a sector in its 
infancy.50 Production was low technology, its market was limited and costs of production were high. 
When the Seoul government pursued the modernisation of the sector, though national defence played a part, 
the key consideration was the limitation of growth led by light industries. In addition, it acknowledged the 
insufficient stimulation of related sectors through state incentives and market mechanisms. The Heavy and 
Chemical Industries Promotion Plan launched by the South Korean regime in 1973 provided for the 
establishment of industries that consumed iron and steel, thus securing a minimum domestic market for its 
integrated steelworks project.51 If the PSA would have followed the South Korean example of 
incorporating related transforming industries, industrialisation would have been deepened and the market for 
iron and steel expanded with the growth of other heavy sectors. The PSA merely envisaged concentrated 
production of a broad range of semifinished and finished goods, many of which could not be manufactured 
efficiently (see Chapter 7). Hence, the PSA was severely flawed and would remain so when implemented. 
Argentina could have avoided or corrected the most serious defficiencies, as other countries had done with
48 Korea Development Institute, Korea’s Economy: Past and Present (Seoul, May 1975), p.342.
49 UN, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Economic Bulletin for Asia and the 
Far East XXIII (1972) No.l, p.53.
50 UN, ECAFE, Economic Survey o f Asia and the Far East 1963 (New York, 1964), pp.61,62.
51 Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (eds.), Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea 
(Honolulu, 1991), pp.436, 437,438.
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their industries.
During the second quarter of the century, Australia provides another useful counterfactual. Both 
Argentina and Australia were traditional exporters of primary commodities, with the difference that before 
1929 the range was more diverse in the Argentine case. Wool and wheat accounted respectively for 43% 
and 21% of total Australian exports in the Twenties.52 However, there were three significant distinctions 
between the two countries, (i) The Australian population, which increased from 5,435,734 inhabitants in 
1921 to 7,579,358 inhabitants in 1947, was significantly less than that of Argentina.53 (ii) Australia was 
’bom rich’. Sparsely populated and endowed with vast minerals resources, Australia enjoyed a higher GDP 
per capita than Argentina. Diaz Alejandro has estimated that, measured in 1970 US dollars, Australian GDP 
per capita was already US$ 1,690 in 1913 while that of Argentina was US$ 1,030 that same year.54 (iii) 
The composition of manufacturing in Australia at the start of the Twenties was ’advanced’ in relation to that 
of Argentina, notwithstanding that the contribution of manufacturing to GDP in Australia at that time was 
below that of its South American counterpart. The contribution of manufacturing to Australian GDP was 
12.5% in the years 1920-1921, and it rose to 18% by 1929-1930.55 Yet when it was just below the 
threshold differentiating exclusively primary-oriented exporters from semi-industrial countries, Australia had 
initiated import-substituting industrialisation as a result of import shortages during the First World War. 
Among the sectors that emerged was the iron and steel industry.
The Australian iron and steel sector had two significant similarities with the Plan Siderurgico 
Argentino. (a) Production was concentrated in the hands of a single firm - the Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company (BHP) in Australia and SOMISA in Argentina, (b) The location of plant was dictated by access
52 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, ’Argentina, Australia and Brazil Before 1929’, in D.C.M. Platt and Guido 
Di Telia (eds.), Argentina, Australia and Canada (London, 1985), p.99.
53 Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census o f the 
Commonwealth o f Australia, 30 June 1947, Statistician’s Report (Canberra, 1952), p.34.
54 Diaz Alejandro, ’Argentina’, pp.97,98.
55 N.G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938/1939 
(Cambridge, 1962), p. 13.
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to both the market and basic inputs. The Argentine industrial heartland and main steel consumer market 
stretched along the River Plate and the right bank of the Parana, between the cities of La Plata and Santa 
Fe, and was linked to the rest of the country by road and rail. The projected SOMISA steelworks were to 
be located at San Nicolas on the Parana river, somewhere at the centre of this belt, with easy access to the 
market as well as its mainly imported raw material supplies.56 In Australia, the rapidly growing market 
was concentrated in two states, New South Wales and Victoria, which each held Va of the national population 
and were located contiguously. BHP initially concentrated production in the Newcastle steelworks in New 
South Wales. This implied easy access to the market and nearby coal sources, and the availability of a 
seaport to receive iron ore from South Australia.57 Similar criteria applied to the subsequent development 
of steelmaking facilities at Port Kembla, as is seen below.
The Australian industry was heavily protected by tariffs, and its initial structure was far from 
efficient. Basic steel output was monopolised by BHP at its Newcastle plant, which had opened in 1915, 
and a number of small enterprises dependent on its production set up close by.58 While requirements of 
pig iron and crude and semifinished steel were satisfied exclusively by local mills, those of finished 
commodities (excluding rails and wire) were not at least until the Depression. Although its output of 
finished products included galvanised sheets and wire, BHP was encouraged by guaranteed government 
purchases to concentrate on the manufacture of rails and structural steels for the public authorities. 
Production was costly and uncompetitive, as goods had to be made for use in the maintenance of 
infrastructure and services to government and municipal specifications. Furthermore, demand for these 
products was dependent on public expenditure. Before the onset of the Depression, heavy borrowing by the 
federal and state governments for works such as bridge building, electrification of the railways and 
improvements in the harbours sustained purchases of BHP products.59
56 Pedro J. Maristany, El problema siderurgico argentino (Buenos Aires, 1950), p.36.
57 E.A. Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia (Camberwell, 1971), pp.126,141.
58 For details on the small producers see Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Trade, Steel 
Industry o f Australia (Melbourne, November 1958), pp.6,7.
59 Nancy Windett, Australia as Producer and Trader, 1920-1932 (London, 1933), pp.181-184.
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However, abrupt change came with the world crisis. The disappearance of both government orders 
and of imports transformed the industry. BHP acquired many of the small firms producing finished goods 
in the Newcastle area and developed an integrated operation based on an extensive network of subsidiaries 
and associated companies. The most significant acquisition was that of Australian Iron and Steel Limited 
in the early Thirties. This firm was severely affected by the Depression and had recently completed its 
steelworks at Port Kembla - a site which became the focus for the expansion of Australian steel 
production.60 Port Kembla was a greenfield location outside Wollongong, the third largest city in New 
South Wales after Sydney and Newcastle, and had rail links with the coal deposits and a deep water harbour 
to receive iron ore shipments. BHP expanded operations in Port Kembla, and production levels in that area 
were further boosted with the opening of another steelworks in 1939 by Commonwealth Rolling Mills 
Proprietary (a joint venture of the British firm John Lysaght Limited and ARMCO).61
The development of Port Kembla into the prime Australian steelmaking area can be compared and 
contrasted with the structure proposed for SOMISA. In both cases, there was a high degree of integration 
and concentration. The Argentine steelworks project envisaged steel production in Siemens-Martin furnaces 
and a blooming mill. The steel ingots produced by SOMISA would then be reduced to adequate sizes and 
supplied to the private finished good producers for processing. As ’in house’ production of steel at these 
firms was inefficient and outdated, their requirements would be provided by SOMISA - whose output would 
be efficiently manufactured by modem, large-scale production methods.62 Like the BHP plants at both Port 
Kembla and Newcastle, SOMISA would concentrate and virtually monopolise raw steel production, and a 
whole range of private sector firms manufacturing finished goods in the main consumption area would 
depend on its output.
The involvement of ARMCO with one of the Port Kembla plants was also in similar circumstances
60 Department of Trade, Australia, pp.5,6.
61 Ibid., p.7.
62 Proposal presented by TAMET S.A., La Cantabrica S.A., SIAM Di Telia Ltda., and ARMCO 
Argentina S.A. at the contest held on 3 November 1944, in Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares 
(DGFM), Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 151.
174
to the Argentine case. The American company had experience in the design, construction and operation of 
steelworks.63 Participation of the US firm in both Commonwealth Rolling Mills Proprietary and SOMISA 
allowed domestic manufacturing of specialised ARMCO product lines such as sheets for automobiles and 
consumer durables such as refrigerators and enamelware.64 However, the involvement of ARMCO in the 
PSA also responded to Argentine self-sufficiency aspirations. It not only manufactured a specialised line 
of sheets but also had diversified into the production of finished goods such as oil storage tanks and 
pipelines from its sheet output.65 As part of its services to SOMISA, ARMCO would make its major 
registered processes available through licensing.66
Concentration of production and the involvement of ARMCO are the only similarities between the 
Port Kembla area and SOMISA. There are three sharp and important differences: (i) the location of the 
greenfield sites, (ii) the range of goods produced, and (iii) the development of related industries. Regarding 
the upriver site proposed for SOMISA, it was unsuitable. The water was not deep enough for large ore 
carriers and thereby transport costs of raw materials increased (see Chapter 7). As concerns the variety of 
products manufactured, the initial concentration by BHP on expensive rails and structural steels had given 
way to a broader range of products (eg, plates and special steels) which could be manufactured efficiently 
as a result of favourable labour and fuel costs and of growth in the scale of production.67 In contrast, 
SOMISA was designed to satisfy military self-sufficiency aspirations and produced all conceivable finished 
steel goods at enormous costs (see Chapter 7). Finally, there was the matter of the formation of related 
industries. BHP established one which increased consumption of its steel output. On the eve of the Second 
World War, it had developed the port of Whyalla in South Australia (the outlet for iron ore) and established 
its own shipyard there. The Whyalla shipyard designed and built ships to transport raw materials and
63 Antecedentes de la capacidad tecnica de ARMCO Argentina S.A., in DGFM, Plan, p.66.
64 Department of Trade, Australia, p.7.
65 William T. Hogan, Economic History o f the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States (Lexington, 
1971), Volume 3, pp.981,982, and Volume 4, p. 1797.
66 Antecedentes, in DGFM, Plan, p.66.
67 Peter Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence (St. Lucia, 1980), p.95.
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finished goods for BHP, and to satisfy defence requirements of the Royal Australian Navy and commercial 
requisites of the Australian Shipbuilding Board.68 In the case of the Argentine steelworks project, the only 
related transforming activity had no bearing on the market for iron and steel. Coke to be employed in 
steelmaking was to be produced in special ovens that made use of byproducts (eg, distilled gas, benzol for 
engines, coke tar) which would be sold by SOMISA - to a rather limited market - in order to reduce the cost 
of metallurgical coke.69
As the South Korean and Australian examples have shown, the PSA had serious flaws which could 
have been avoided if DGFM planners had based it on economic rather than military considerations. The 
deficiencies showed when the project was finally realised in the early Sixties. Until then, domestic 
production had a market limited by the absence of a genuine industrialisation process and output constrained 
by technological restrictions. At least on paper, things should have been different. Argentina had a 
concentrated market. Its population was one of the largest in Latin America and enjoyed both good income 
and a relatively even income distribution - which could only increase demand for manufactures. 
Furthermore, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP was rising. Therefore, the country should have been 
in a position to genuinely industrialise. The Argentine failure to take advantage of these conditions are 
reflected in the market for iron and steel, where shifts in consumption did not introduce real changes or 
expansion, and in the limitations on what iron and steel goods could be produced locally.
THE TRANSPORT SECTOR: A DECLINING LEADING CONSUMER (Product case-study: steel rails)
Transportation, a major traditional sector associated with agro-exports, had been the leading steel 
user before 1914 as a result of the growth of the national railway network. As indicated earlier, the drop 
in its iron and steel consumption was one significant feature of the market. The position of transportation 
as a consumer was undermined by: (i) changed economic conditions after the First World War, and (ii) the
68 Department of Trade, Australia, pp.5,9.
69 Estudio tecnico-economico de la produccion de acero semiterminado en la Republica Argentina 
presentado por ARMCO Argentina S.A., in DGFM, Plan, pp.73,77.
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financial difficulties of the railway companies - particularly British-owned ones, which controlled most of 
the system until 1948. These arguments will be supported by a product case-study: that of steel rails, whose 
selection is justified on two accounts, (a) Rails were an essential input in railway development and the key 
component in steel consumption by the transport sector, (b) Rails were one product which the Republic 
aspired to produce in its bid for self-sufficiency in ’strategic’ goods and for which demand was pent-up as 
renewals had not been undertaken for some time. However, notwithstanding Argentine aspirations, this 
section demonstrates that domestic rail production was not economically viable. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America has calculated that the minimum annual level necessary for rails 
to be produced economically was 100,000 tons. Domestic demand by the early Fifties remained well below 
this threshold, as the combined consumption for rails in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay was calculated at 160,000 tons.70
The critical factor preventing efficient domestic rail production was that shapes, lengths and weights 
varied widely as a consequence of consumer requirements and a lack of standardisation among users.71 
The ’segmentation’ of the railways between a multiplicity of private companies (mostly British-owned, but 
also comprising some minor French and Argentine ones) and the State Railways had two important 
consequences on demand: (i) there was no big buyer, and (ii) a proliferation of gauges which resulted in 
divergent requirements of different types of permanent way materials. Broad-gauge lines, representing 58% 
of track, required heavy rails of 40-50 kilograms per metre. Metre-gauge and standard-gauge lines, 
representing 34% and 7.5% of track respectively, required semi-light rails of 25-35 kilograms per metre. 
Narrow-gauge lines, which were insignificant in the system, needed light rails of less than 25 kilograms per 
metre.72 Given these conditions, the undertaking of local manufacturing was not viable as large numbers 
of shapes would have to be produced in relatively small volumes in rolling equipment also employed to
70 UN, ECLA, Study o f the prospects o f inter-Latin American trade (Southern zone o f the region) (New 
York, 1954), p. 104.
71 UN, ECE, Railways and steel (Geneva, 1957), p.3.
72 UN, ECLA, Serie Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo economico, V: El desarrollo economico de 
la Argentina, Segunda parte - Los sectores de la produccion: energia y transporte (Mexico, 1959), pp.81,86.
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manufacture other goods.73
Besides varying requirements for different types, circumstances particular to the railways affected 
demand. Purchases of rails depended on the age of existing tracks, traffic density, the amount of empty 
running, the extent to which additional tracks were being laid, and the financial position of railway 
companies.74 On account of the age of existing tracks, there appeared to be considerable demand for 
permanent way materials. The normal useful life of rails, if these had been adequately maintained, was 20- 
25 years on main lines (except those with intense traffic or unfavourable layout characteristics such as steep 
gradients and curves) and upto 40-50 years in secondary and trunk lines. In the Republic, a large proportion 
of rails had completed their useful life: it was estimated that 54% of rails were over 40 years old in 1954.75 
However, track dilapidation was unevenly distributed among the different gauges, and varied with levels of 
traffic density. In many of the State-operated lines, especially those built out of political considerations in 
the north and northwest of the country, traffic density was low and the slow decay of permanent way 
materials was due to the passage of time. In Greater Buenos Aires and the agricultural region of the 
Pampas, owing respectively to the heavy volumes of traffic in suburban passengers and rural production, 
densities were really high. However, even density changed over time in areas with the greatest traffic. This 
was most apparent in the Pampas, and resulted from the success of automotive transport. There was an 
excess of parallel lines to the ports which ran close to each other, which were initially laid as a result of 
intense competition between private operators, and many declined as most pre-dated the age of roads. 
Consequently, the slow running down of many tracks owed little to traffic density.76 Given the uneven 
distribution of track dilapidation, domestic production of replacement materials would have been inefficient 
as demand was irregular.
73 UN, ECLA, Problems o f the steel making and transforming industries in Latin America, Volume 1: 
Report of the Sao Paulo meeting (New York, 1958), p.13.
74 UN, ECE, Railways, p.22.
75 UN, ECLA, Analisis y proyecciones, V: Argentina, Segunda parte - Los sectores de la produccion: 




THE ARGENTINE RAILWAYS, 1900-1950 
(length in kilometres)
YEAR TOTAL NETWORK PRIVATE LINES STATE LINES
1900 16,400 14,400 2,000
1907 22,000 19,400 2,600
1914 33,500 28,800 4,700
1920 35,291 29,141 6,150
1925 36,436 29,455 6,981
1929 38,378 30,296 8,082
1935 41,753 31,643 10,110
1939 42,846 30,223 12,623
1946 42,852 29,389 13,463
1950 42,984 - 42,984
Sources: Ricardo M. Ortiz, HistoriaEcondmicade la Argentina, Volume H (Buenos Aires, 1955), p.232 
for the years 1900-1914; Business Conditions in Argentina, Reports No.150, 31 January 1921, p.16; 
No.169, January 1926, p.24; No.188, October 1930, p.114; No.209, January 1936, pp.20-21; No.225, 
January 1940, p.20 and No.253, January-February 1947, p.15 for the years 1920-1946; UN, Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE), Railways and steel (Geneva, 1957), p.53 for the year 1950.
On account of the extent to which additional tracks were being laid and of the financial position 
of the railway companies, demand for rails steadily dropped - particularly after 1930. Table 4.11 shows the 
increase in the length of the national railway system between 1900 and 1950, breaking it down into private 
and State lines. The rapid expansion of the network before 1914 reflects a railway building boom. 
Economic growth was founded on a land-extensive pattern of agro-exports, and increased commodity output 
and exports required new railway construction across the Pampas. Steel rail imports rose from 28,740 tons 
in 1900 to 156,592 tons in 1913.77 However, changed conditions after the First World War limited further 
expansion of the network. Table 4.11 shows a sluggish increase in the length as from 1920, indicating that 
the the building rate had slowed down considerably. Two factors account for the deceleration in the 
Twenties, (i) The exhaustion of the ’easy’ phase of export-led growth, which resulted in the ’closing’ of 
the frontier and a shift in the nature of foreign investment from infrastructure and public services to industry 
(see Chapter 2). (ii) Instability in world commodity and money markets reduced export profits and made 
it difficult for (especially British) companies to raise new capital to invest in social overhead projects.
77 Ministerio de Hacienda, El Comercio Exterior Argentino, Ano 1900, Boletinnumero 108, p.83, and 
Ano 1913, Boletin numero 160, p. 197.
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The rail market was ’fragmented’ between private and State railways, between imports from Britain 
and the Continent, and between demand for replacements and new construction. Purchases by British 
companies were made in Britain; the State Railways bought mainly in the Continent. The market began to 
undergo a substantial structural change. There was a slow shift from private to State construction, which 
peaked under President Justo in the Thirties. During the confrontation with foreign-owned railways 
(particularly over rates), Yrigoyen annulled various existing concessions awarded to British companies to 
build extensions and new lines on the grounds that they represented speculative aims.78 Simultaneously, 
the State Railways undertook a construction programme whose feature was that it complemented rather than 
competed with private lines. It aimed to link up those national territories which the private sector could not 
exploit profitably, connect part of the State system with Buenos Aires - the terminus of the British lines - 
and improve Transandine links.79
Table 4.12












1921-1925 85.0 38.3 17.1 3.4 28.2
1926-1930 137.5 69.1 6.5 10.5 10.0
1931-1935 21.4 11.7 13.4 9.0 23.3
1936-1940 24.7 4.3 3.6 39.5 17.1
1941-1945 0.5 - - - -
1946-1950 40.2 14.1 0.3 1.5 12.3
Sources: Calculated from the data in Ministerio de Hacienda, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la 
Republica Argentina, volumes for 1921-1942; Direction Nacional de Investigaciones, Estadistica y 
Censos, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Argentina: Comercio Exterior, volumes for 1944-1947; 
Anuario Estadistico, Tomo H: Comercio, Anos 1948 y 1949-1950.
The gradual move from private to State building is reflected in Table 4.12, which shows the origin
78 DOT, Report on the Financial and Economic Conditions o f the Argentine Republic, September 1921, 
p.44.
79 DOT, Economic Conditions in the Argentine Republic, November 1929, p.77, and Report, September 
1922, p.31.
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of rail imports. The British share declined in the early Twenties, as British-owned companies limited 
procurements, while the share of Continental sources increased with purchases by the State Railways. By 
the middle of the decade, the British companies benefited from improvements in their financial position and 
thereby restarted their comprehensive work on extensions, improvements and repairs.80 The result, as seen 
in Table 4.12, was a sharp rise in import levels during the second half of the Twenties, especially from 
Britain, which reflected postponed demand and increased the total annual imports to levels unparalleled since 
1913. Although demand in the late Twenties exceeded the efficiency level required for domestic rail 
manufacturing, it could not have justified the undertaking of local production if this would have been 
possible. The onset of the world crisis led to the decline of transport as a source of demand for steel. The 
high import levels of the late Twenties were maintained in 1930, as the bulk represented orders placed in 
1929 and 1930 by the British companies.81 Demand for rails and accessories decreased subsequently as 
both the British and State railways were forced to limit purchases. Furthermore, the State Railways were 
forced by the military regime of 1930 to suspend many extension projects authorised by its Radical 
predecessors, though work on new branches and extensions undertaken before the coup was allowed to 
continue and be completed.82
Rail imports in the Thirties did not attain the high levels of the late Twenties (see Table 4.12). The 
British companies, the leading buyers, never recovered from the crisis and were unable to replace 
increasingly dilapidated materials as a result of the failure to maintain provision for depreciation and 
mounting financial difficulties. Receipts were drastically reduced with the fall in traffic and increased 
competition from road transport, and thereby purchases were restricted to materials essential for the 
maintenance of the network.83 This trend was sustained throughout the Thirties, and rail imports from 
Britain dropped from over 100,000 tons per annum on the eve of the Depression to a few hundred tons by
80 DOT, Report on the Financial, Commercial and Economic Conditions o f the Argentine Republic, 
September 1925, p.59.
81 DOT, Conditions, Report No.505, 31 October 1931, p.39.
82 DOT, Conditions, 31 October 1930, p.81.
83 DOT, Conditions, Report No.608, March 1935, p.66.
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the end of the decade.84 Therefore most rail purchases corresponded to the State Railways, which acquired 
materials from the Continent as members of the International Steel Cartel offered advantageous prices. The 
State Railways were in a stronger position than British-owned companies. Having resolved their chronic 
financial difficulties and been reorganised under engineer Pablo Nogues, they launched an ambitious 
extension programme.85 This programme, a part of the government strategy of public works and approved 
by the Concordancia-dominated Congress in October 1933, resulted in substantial rail orders being placed 
in the Continent for its implementation. Work was proceeding on over 15 different lines by 1937, and a 
total of 1,732 kilometres of new lines were opened in 1938.86 The achievements of the State Railways 
construction programme were considerable.
The Second World War and its aftermath only aggravated problems. There were steel import 
shortages and the future of the private railways was precarious, not least because operating concessions 
would expire in 1947. The war severely affected imports as traditional sources of supply, which were 
involved in the conflict or occupied by Germany, vanished and imports dropped sharply (see Table 4.12). 
This contrasted clearly with events in the aftermath of the Depression, when import levels improved once 
Argentine economic recovery gathered momentum. At a time when extensive renovations were critical, 
British companies remained crippled. The continued absence of renewals threatened to reduce efficiency and 
increase difficulties in the marketing of mral production, as 66% of the cereal and linseed crops were still 
transported along the 28,714 kilometres of British-owned lines.87 However, British companies failed in 
their attempt to obtain government assistance. The State Railways, on the other hand, fared better at least 
until 1942. They temporarily, and partially, replaced Continental supplies with imports from the United 
States of America, until the Americans entered the war in December 1941 and US-Argentine antagonism 
intensified. The Concordancia regime attempted to overcome shortages of imported materials for the State
84 DOT, Report, No.683, p.73.
85 Carlos Aguinaga and Roberto Azzareto, Ni decada ni infame, del ’30 al ’43 (Buenos Aires, 1991),
p.266.
86 DOT, Conditions, No.608, p.67, and Report, No.683, p.73, and No.733, June 1939, p.121.
87 Communication from the British-owned railways to Salvador Oria, Minister of Public Works, Buenos 
Aires, 3 February 1942, The Review o f the River Plate (RRP), 20 February 1942, p.22.
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Railways, and presented Congress with a proposal to manufacture rails in the Fabrica Militar de Aceros. 
Local production was to supply the requirements of the State network, which were 10,000 tons per annum 
for maintenance and 10,000-15,000 tons per annum for the planned expansion of the network. However, 
the most significant feature of the proposed legislation was the acknowledgement that domestic rail 
manufacturing was not viable. It specified that local production would only be undertaken for the duration 
of the Second World War, as high costs and low output levels would make production in peacetime 
uncompetitive.88 This proposed legislation was not approved before the military closed Congress in 1943.
Supply difficulties persisted after the war. Although import levels improved (see Table 4.12), these 
were insufficient to meet requirements as the railways were in desperate need of extensive renewals.89 On 
the surface, shortages of imported materials could have fostered local production - not least because of State 
plans for the railways. The Peronista government initially confined itself to completing State lines under 
construction and providing new ones, allowing the State Railways to import materials through the Instituto 
Argentino para la Promotion del Intercambio.90 Nevertheless the regime, having acquired the French 
railways in late 1946 and with the purchase of the British ones in sight, incorporated the needs of the private 
companies in an ambitious programme launched in 1947. The Five-Year Railway Plan needed 250,000 tons 
of rails over 5 years (or 50,000 tons per annum).91 Unfortunately, in terms of volume and technology, this 
did not warrant the undertaking of domestic rail manufacturing. The annual requirements of the Five-Year 
Railway Plan were 50% lower than the minimum level necessary to sustain efficient domestic production. 
Furthermore, although it was not made explicit, this programme needed rails with varying lengths, shapes 
and weights as a result of the proliferation of gauges. Hence, different rail types would have to be produced 
in fairly small volumes in equipment used to manufacture a range of other goods in relatively small
88 Message from the Executive Power containing information on the cost of expanding the Fabrica 
Militar de Aceros for the production of rails, Buenos Aires, 24 November 1941, presented at the session of 
29 May 1942, Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Ano 1942, Tomo I, p.76.
89 RRP, 21 June 1946, p .ll.
90 RRP, 29 November 1946, p.18; Business Conditions in Argentina, No.255, July-August 1947, p.67.
91 Drive Telegram no.769 from Sir Reginald A. Leeper, British Ambassador to Argentina, to the FO, 
4 December 1947. FO 371 AS 6617/16/2.
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tonnages, thereby making production inefficient. Existing facilities were also unsuitable. Private sector 
suppliers of rolled goods utilised semi-continuous mills. These comprised a reversing roughing train of one 
or two stands, and a continuous finishing train of four or more stands placed in tandem through which steel 
travelled without reversing at any stage.92 Such equipment was not used to make rails, which were usually 
produced in two-high mills.93 The latter were either reversing or non-reversing and had two driven rolls 
of equal diametre.94
Lacking the possibility of obtaining supplies domestically in the immediate postwar period, the 
country could only procure materials abroad. According to an estimate by the Banco Central, these 
purchases would cost upto m$n 400,000,000 annually.95 However, three factors hindered their obtention: 
supplies from traditional sources were limited, the country faced a crisis in the late Forties, and the railways 
were crippled by problems. As part of Anglo-Argentine negotiations, Britain was expected to provide the 
necessary materials for the Five-Year Railway Plan. The authorities wanted these delivered in roughly equal 
annual installments.96 The United Kingdom could not deliver. Imported rails were not only scarce, but 
their purchases became increasingly restricted by the depletion of foreign exchange reserves in the late 
Forties. Moreover, the difficulties faced by the railways in the Thirties subsisted subsequently. There was 
no growth in traffic, operations ran at a loss, and continued financial difficulties prevented any acquisitions 
of new materials. However, there were two differences with the Thirties, (a) The State covered the deficit 
of the entire network as the British companies had been nationalised in 1948. (b) Whatever funds the 
railways might have had available for renewals were used by the Peronista regime for featherbedding and 
shielding its supporters from economic hardship in the late Forties.
Although it was clear that economically viable domestic rail production was unfeasible as a result
92 UN, ECE, The European steel industry and the wide-strip mill (Geneva, 1953), p.98.
93 UN, ECE, Railways, p.3.
94 UN, ECE, Wide-strip mill, p.98.
95 RRP, 18 July 1947, p. 13.
96 Drive Telegram No.769 from Leeperto the FO. FO 371 AS 6617/16/2.
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of specific market conditions and the nature of the product itself, the DGFM showed no concern with 
economic considerations. When the PSA was finally realised in the early Sixties, rail production was 
undertaken at great cost. The final acknowledgement that steel rails could not be produced locally only 
came three decades later with the privatisation of SOMISA. The recommendations for the latter specified 
that unprofitable lines such as rails would have to be abandoned as their production resulted in cash losses 
and high cash operating costs and that, as a result of inefficient use, the blooming mill producing such goods 
should have to be closed down.97 The failure of domestic rail production is a clear indicator that if military 
planners had given priority to economics rather than national defence, the PSA might have been better 
designed and more economically viable.
CONSTRUCTION: THE LEADING CONSUMER (Product case-studies: iron girders an cast-iron pipes)
While the share of transportation in total consumption declined, building constantly represented the 
largest slice of the market. Construction was rated as the second largest industry in 1939.98 It is estimated 
that in 1955 almost 50% of iron and steel consumed went to construction and associated industries, and that 
this proportion was even higher in earlier years.99 A complete picture of the requirements for iron and 
steel by the sector is unobtainable due to the inadequate information available on material consumption. 
Nevertheless, the only detailed construction statistics, which are furnished in the Censo Industrial de 1935, 
provide useful indications. As Table 4.13 shows, the leading activity was building construction. As a result, 
demand for iron and steel goods was principally for bars, strip, shapes and structural materials. Reflecting 
this, the product case studies selected to illustrate the market trends for building products are those of iron 
girders and cast-iron pipes. The choice of these products is justified on three accounts: (i) they were 
specifically used in buildings and complementary works; (ii) they could be produced locally, and domestic 
output displaced imports as the leading source of supply after 1930; and (iii) their consumption reflects shifts
97 Ministerio de Defensa, Developing a Strategy for the Turnaround, Restructuring and Privatization o f  
Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA) (Buenos Aires, 16 January 1992), pp. 13,14,27.
98 Randall, History, p. 129.
99 UN, ECLA, Analisis y proyecciones, V: Argentina, Segunda parte - Los sectores de la production: 
agricultura e industria (Mexico, 1959), p. 172.
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Table 4.13
OUTPUT VALUE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 1 JULY 1934 - 30 JUNE 1935





Buildings and complementary works and repairs 73.5 46.9 62.7
Roads, bridges, pavements and work excluding buildings 29.0 5.3 18.3
Companies that carry out all kinds of construction 24.1 10.2 42.3
Source: Calculated from the statistics in Censo Industrial, pp.701,702,704,706.
in demand by the construction sector. However, an observation is necessary as regards data. First, import 
statistics were not disaggregated before 1928. Up to that point, cast-iron pipes were encompassed in a broad 
category that included a wide range of types of pipes and tubes. Second, there are substantial gaps in 
national industrial production figures. Therefore, the relation between changes in import levels and in 
domestic output levels are not easily determined.
Table 4.14
BUILDING ACTIVITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND IMPORTS OF GIRDERS AND PIPES, 1921-1950
(annual averages)
PERIOD COVERED AREA 
’000 m2 %  change
GIRDER IMPORTS 
’000 t % change
PIPE IMPORTS 
’000 t %  change
1921-1925 1,913.3 54.3 n/a
1926-1930 2,240.5 17.1 69.9 28.7 37.5*
1931-1935 1,577.7 -29.6 17.5 -75.0 9.5
1936-1940 1,577.2 -0.02 11.1 -36.6 11.4 20.0
1941-1945 2,110.7 33.8 0.3 -97.3 4.4 -61.4
1946-1950 2,290.1 8.49 24.5 8066.7 10.3 134.1
* Annual average for the period 1928-1930 only.
Sources: Calculated from the Buenos Aires building statistics in Business, No.165, January 1925, p.25; 
No.201, January 1934, p.17, No.241, January 1944, p.20; and No.271, July 1951, p.44; and the data 
in Anuario del Comercio, volumes for 1921-1942; Comercio Exterior, volumes for 1944-1947; Anuario 
Estadistico, Tomo H, Anos 1948 y 1949-1950.
Overall trends in construction can be depicted by employing one measure used in reports on local
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economic conditions in this period: the covered area in square metres built annually in the Federal Capital. 
Table 4.14 measures these trends against those visible in imports of our case studies, thereby allowing an 
accurate assessment of market behaviour with the exception of cast-iron pipe imports in the Twenties. 
Building, which had slumped during the First World War and its immediate aftermath, recovered in the early 
Twenties. New building activity in the Federal Capital rose rapidly, and peaked in 1923 with 2,366,800 m2 
per annum.100 Growth in manufacturing and tertiary activities had encouraged the construction of 
processing plants (eg, the meatpacking plants of Armour, Swift and La Plata Cold Storage) and commercial 
property (eg, the bank headquarters of Emesto Tomquist & Co., the Nuevo Banco Italiano, the Banco de 
Galicia and the National City Bank of New York).101 Urbanisation had also fostered residential building 
in the outlying districts.102 High prices for land and rents in the central area had encouraged the 
population to spread towards more spacious neighbourhoods made accessible by the rapid expansion of 
public transport.103 Although most of this building was undertaken by the private sector, the State had 
some initiatives of its own. As Buenos Aires faced increasing traffic congestion and numerous areas had 
to be modernised if the city was to retain its cosmopolitan image, the authorities embarked on a programme 
of urban beautification. Projects included the widening of key streets such as Santa Fe and the opening of 
new avenues such as the diagonales Julio A. Roca and Roque Saenz Pena.104
Widespread building activities boosted the market for structural materials such as iron girders. 
They did the same for consumption of products used in complementary works such as cast-iron pipes for 
water mains, for which Obras Sanitarias de la Nacion (OSN) was the leading customer.105 Imports, which
100 Banco de la Nacion Argentina (Banco Nacion), Revista Economica 2 (1929) No.l, p.7; Business 
Conditions in Argentina, No. 165, January 1925, p.25.
101 ’Las industrias nacionales: Compania Argentina de Hierros y Aceros de Pedro Vasena e Hijos, 
Limitada’, La Epoca, Buenos Aires, 10 September 1918; Revista de la Sociedad Anonima Talleres 
Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET, May 1933, p.9.
102 Richard J. Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Buenos Aires: 1910-1942 (Cambridge, 1993), p.84.
103 Raul Garcia Heras, Transportes, negocios y  politico: la Compania Anglo-Argentina de Tranvias, 
1876-1981 (Buenos Aires, 1994), pp.13,14.
104 Ibid., pp.51,52.
105 DOT, Report, September 1925, p.30.
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were provided by Continental exporters controlling the market through dumping (see Chapter 1), were the 
key source of supply and expanded to unprecedented levels as construction activities resumed in the late 
Twenties (see Table 4.14).106 Demand for materials such as girders and cast-iron pipes subsequently 
declined during the Thirties and early Forties. The onset of the Depression hit construction severely. The 
covered area built in the Federal Capital dropped sharply in the early Thirties (see Table 4.14), with the 
larger projects being those most affected.107 The building of office and residential premises, factories, 
warehouses and other major facilities was curtailed. Furthermore, the OSN postponed most undertaken and 
planned work, and was out of the market due to financial difficulties. Therefore, requirements for girders 
and cast-iron pipes were reduced and imports fell (see Table 4.14),108 Nevertheless, the share of 
construction goods in total national iron and steel consumption rose during those years (see Table 4.7 
above). This arose from the contraction in trade and in imports of items such as rails.
Urban construction recovered in the mid-Thirties with a revival of private construction and the large 
government public works programmes. With strong public support and intent on a splendid celebration of 
the fourth centenary of the national capital, the Justo regime continued the urban modernisation and 
beautification process begun in the Twenties.109 Grandiose government buildings (the Ministry of Public 
Works, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of War) were commissioned.110 The widening of major 
arteries such as Corrientes and sections of new avenues - eg, 9 de Julio and Juan B. Justo - were completed, 
monuments such as the massive Obelisco were erected, and numerous residential barrios were 
developed.111 However, consumption of iron and steel commodities in the late Thirties was affected by
106 DOT, Commercial, Economic and Financial Conditions in the Argentine Republic, October 1928, 
p.29.
107 Banco Nacion, Revista 3 (1930) No.9, p.160; 4 (1931) No. 10, p.193; and 5 (1932) No.5, pp.85,86.
108 DOT, Conditions, Report No.551, 31 January 1933, pp. 48,54.
109 Garcia Heras, Transportes, p. 126.
110 Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Tarea que realizo el gobiemo nacional en el periodo 1932-1938 (Buenos 
Aires, 1938), Volume 3, unpaginated.
111 Ibid., Volume 5, unpaginated.
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various difficulties. The building industry was brought to a virtual standstill by the bricklayers’ strike in 
late 1935 and early 1936.112 This was followed by the recession of 1938 and the outbreak of the Second 
World War, which renewed the problems as costs of materials increased and imported products became once 
again unobtainable.113
Table 4.15
PRODUCTION OF STRUCTURAL MATERIALS AND CAST-IRON PIPES
(in tons)







Sources: Censo Industrial, pp.612,622; Ministerio de Hacienda, Estadistica Industrial de la Republica 
Argentina, 1938 (Buenos Aires, 1940), p.74; Estadistica Industrial de 1941, pp.307,309; Anuario 
Estadistico, Anos 1949-1950, Tomo HI, p.453.
The most crucial long-term effect of the Depression on construction was a shift in the nature of 
materials used. As a consequence of import shortages at the trough of the crisis and with support of high 
tariffs, import substitution was promoted through national production of building materials. Favoured by 
rising domestic cement production and technological changes in construction, the most preferred material 
was reinforced concrete. Increased cement consumption led to lower demand for structural steel, whose use 
was limited to the building of sheds, gantries and some factories.114 Even more crucial, imports - which 
were still supplied by Continental sources now assembled into the ISC - never attained pre-1929 levels (see 
Table 4.14). The main sources of structural steel products and cast-iron pipes were now domestic. Based 
on the available data, Table 4.15 shows national output of these goods. Output levels were considerable. 
Imports of structural commodities remained low as national producers strengthened their position to meet
112 Business, No.209, January 1936, p.19; No.213, January 1937, p.22.
1,3 Business, No.217, January 1938, p.22; No.221, January 1939, p. 19; No.225, January 1940, p. 19.
114 DOT, Conditions, Report No.608, p.65.
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local needs, and imports of cast-iron pipes depended on OSN requirements since the merchant trade was 
supplied by domestic manufacturers.115
National production of construction materials had a key role in maintaining supplies in the Forties. 
The Second World War and the immediate postwar dismpted imports far more severely than the Depression. 
While imports of structural commodities and cast-iron pipes plunged to record lows, local production 
enabled the growth of building during the harshest years of the war. This was reflected in the increase in 
the newly built covered area in square metres in the Federal Capital (see Table 4.14). Although domestic 
manufacturing of construction goods continued to expand after the Second World War (see Table 4.10) and 
import levels increased as a result of postponed wartime demand (see Table 4.14), these facts do not reveal 
much about overall trends in the building industry. During the Forties, there were two major shifts affecting 
the sector: (i) the rise of the State to the position of leading investor, and (ii) the increased use of substitutes 
for iron and steel products.
The rise of the State to the position of leading investor resulted in a shift away from private to State 
building in urban construction, which required a lower iron and steel content, and the undertaking of large 
numbers of public works during the Peronato. Private building had dominated urban construction before 
the Second World War, developing residential property, commercial facilities and industrial installations. 
The necessary materials had been furnished by construction firms, which imported the inputs required, and 
by the leading metallurgical firm Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET, which both imported and 
manufactured essential building items. TAMET had supplied goods to a wide range of industries, including 
storage tanks with a 6,500 ton capacity for the oil industry, structural steel for the Compania Argentina de 
Cemento Portland and the Sociedad Anonima Tubos Mannesmann, and a chimney for YPF installations.116 
With the advent of the Peronista regime, the State expanded into the construction industry through a low- 
cost housing programme designed to overcome housing shortages aggravated by the drift to the cities, and
115 DOT, Report, No.683, p.67, and No.733, p.47.
116 Revista de la Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET, December 1932, p. 14; 
April 1933, pp. 12-13; May 1933, p.9.
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the promotion of public works. The government set aside vast sums for its large-scale low-cost housing 
programme and progress had been made by the late Forties in various housing projects undertaken by the 
Buenos Aires municipality.117 Established major private firms did not contribute to low-cost housing as 
thit type of construction did not require a large iron and steel content. However, they were able to continue 
doing so for industrial projects and some government non-housing projects. For instance, TAMET provided 
materials for private and State industrial installations (eg, the General Motors car plant and the CADE power 
station), for State-owned infrastructure (eg, grain elevators and the Correo Central building), and for 
conspicuous government waste such as the renewal of lamp posts in Plaza Colon in Buenos Aires.118
Besides low-cost housing construction, State involvement in building also included a large number 
of public works projects. This required iron and steel finished goods, for whose provision the government 
relied on the military steel plant. During the war, the Fabrica Militar de Aceros met the requirements of 
various DGFM undertakings, supplying structures for the Altos Homos Zapla, docks for the Rio Santiago 
naval base, and storage tanks for the Fabrica Militar de Polvoras y Explosivos. With the return of 
peacetime, the Fabrica Militar de Aceros diversified from exclusively military public works into non-military 
public construction. It furnished materials for the extension of the General Paz ring road in Buenos Aires 
and the Banco de la Nacion headquarters; for dams, irrigation works and bridges comissioned by the 
Ministry of Public Works; and for a pipeline supplying Buenos Aires with gas from the refinery in La 
Plata.119 In October 1945 the DGFM inaugurated the Altos Homos Zapla, which also contributed to meet 
steel demand by the State investment programme. Steel produced from Zapla iron was used in bars for the 
building of dams, bridges and housing; in tubes for water supplies; and in shapes required by the national 
railways and oil production.120
117 Business, No.253, January-Febmary 1947, p.14; No.257, January-February 1948, p. 16; No.261, 
January-Febmary 1949, p. 107.
118 ’TAMET S.A.’, La Metropole, Antwerp, 12-13 July 1947.
119 Ministerio de Guerra, Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, 1941 - 9 de Octubre - 1945 
(Buenos Aires, 1945), unpaginated.
120 General Humberto Sosa Molina, Inauguracion del segundo alto homo Zapla (Argentine Republic, 
April 1951), unpaginated.
191
By the end of the Forties, construction was affected by the severe economic crisis resultant from 
Peronista mismanagement. Private building faced high costs, and uncertainty over working conditions as 
well as supplies (ie, domestic producers were cutting back output and imports were increasingly unavailable 
owing to foreign exchange shortages).121 The government, confronted with financial difficulties, curtailed 
the public works programme and the DGFM was forced to diversify both its output and customers in order 
to maintain its industrial capacity active. Although 50% of goods manufactured by the DGFM were still 
destined to defence in 1950, 34% went to the private sector and only 16% to the non-military public 
sector.122 Building only remained the leading single source of iron and steel demand because the Republic 
was not fully industrialised and had not developed industries consuming substantial volumes of iron and 
steel. The construction industry per se could not serve as a base for domestic iron and steel production. 
Despite sustained demand in some areas, other developments (eg, the shift to cement and the growth in low- 
cost housing) limited the effectiveness of construction as a source of strong and continuous demand for iron 
and steel.
NON-CONSTRUCTION METALLURGICAL GOODS (Product case-studies: windmills and ploughs)
Besides transportation and the building industry, the other large consumer of iron and steel was the 
emergent metallurgical industry. Production of finished goods by this sector had been initially based on 
imported inputs. However, as seen above, import shortages during the Second World War had forced firms 
to integrate their operations and produce crude steel for ’in house’ consumption. Notwithstanding the low 
levels of output, the locally produced range of metallurgical goods was varied and included rural 
implements. An assessment of the market for the latter is useful as an indicator of what extent the domestic 
production of finished iron and steel goods (other than construction materials) was substituting imports. The 
chosen product case-studies are windmills and ploughs, which are justified on three accounts, (i) These 
items were originally mostly imported but increasingly produced nationally, (ii) Windmills and ploughs 
were of particular importance to the national economy given their vital role in the rural sector, the key
121 Business, No.257, p. 16.
122 Sosa Molina, Inauguracion, unpaginated.
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source of cash for the country. Windmills were very serviceable for the water supply required by cattle 
stocks at a relatively low cost, and ploughs were key tools in agriculture.123 (iii) Demand for these goods 
varied with shifts in rural production and general domestic economic conditions.
From the supply perspective, the most distinctive feature of windmill and plough imports is that 
trade was dominated by the Americans. In the early part of the century, Argentina was one of the largest 
markets for rural equipment in the world. Implements had become the largest import from the USA on the 
eve of the First World War, and the country had become the principal market for US machinery exporters 
by the Twenties.124 Since farming conditions in the USA and the Republic were somewhat similar, rural 
implements supplied by the Americans were cheaper and more suited to Argentine conditions than those 
produced in countries like Britain, which would have had to produce equipment especially for the Argentine 
market.125 From the demand viewpoint, implement requirements depended on the situation of the rural 
sector, and the balance between arable and pastoral activities within the latter.
The leading market for windmills were agricultural districts, where they were required to raise 
water from semi-artesian wells to supply cattle and other farming needs, with demand mostly for 6, 8, 10 
and 12 foot types with an 8-inch stroke.126 Most of the 150,000 plus windmills installed in the country 
dotted the rural landscape of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba and Mendoza. The larger 
ranches had often 10 to 15 windmills, whilst a few of the most important ranches had as many as 200. The 
high windmill demand was generated by some ’modernisation’ in grazing practices and a shift in rural 
production from grains to pasture. Over time, ranchers tended to divide their large fields and install more 
windmills to avoid having to take animals over long distances to seek water.127 Regarding the shift in
123 RRP, 18 March 1932, p.27.
124 Jeremy Adelman, Frontier Development: Land, labour and capital on the wheatlands o f Argentina 
and Canada, 1890-1914 (Oxford, 1994), p.236.
125 DOT, Report, September 1924, p.22, and September 1927, p.27.
126 DOT, Conditions, 31 October 1930, p.38, andNo.608, p.81.
127 DOT, Conditions, November 1929, p.41.
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production, the difficulties faced by the rural sector after 1930 led to a decline in the overall area planted 
with cereals and an increase in cattle production. This required a rise in the number of watering holes and 
hence windmills.
Table 4.16
IMPORTS OF WINDMILLS AND PLOUGHS, 1921-1950 
(annual averages)
PERIOD WINDMILLS PLOUGHS
tons %change units %  change
1921-1925 n/a 54,294
1926-1930 4,782 64,652 19.1
1931-1935 605 -87.3 7,454 -88.5
1936-1940 1,781 194.4 12,828 72.1
1941-1945 232 -87.0 228 -98.2
1946-1950 583 151.3 7,788 3315.8
Sources: Calculated from the data in Anuario del Comercio, volumes for 1921-1942; Comercio Exterior, 
volumes for 1944-1947; Anuario Estadistico, Tomo H, Aiios 1948 y 1949-1950.
Table 4.17
PRODUCTION OF WINDMILLS AND PLOUGHS 
(value in pesos)
YEAR WINDMILLS PLOUGHS




Sources: Censo Industrial, p.624; Estadistica Industrial, 1938, pp.74,75, and 1941, pp.309,313; Anuario 
Estadistico, Anos 1949-1950, Tomo HI, pp.451,461.
Demand for windmills was largely satisfied through imports, whose tonnage is shown in Table 4.16. 
Having been the first supplier of metal windmills, the Americans controlled the market from early on.128 
Although unable to dislodge US dominance, local producers entered the market with the Depression. Before
128 DOT, Conditions, No.551, p.66.
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1929, local production had been undertaken by La Cantabrica and output, amounting to 100 units per month, 
had a negligible effect on the market.129 Growth in production was fostered by a contraction in imports, 
dollar shortages, and tariff protection. Output levels cannot be determined from available statistics, as there 
are significant gaps in the data and production is measured by its value in pesos (see Table 4.17). However, 
it is known that several types of windmill were made nationally and competed with imports.130 Although 
domestically produced units were cheaper and enjoyed a ready sale, preference was given to imported types 
on quality grounds. However, national manufacturing contributed to sharply reduce imports of one 
component: windmill towers.131
Demand for ploughs depended on plantings and the prices and profit margins obtained by farmers. 
The growth in plantings of cereals during the Twenties resulted in an increase in plough imports, particularly 
towards the end of the decade (see Table 4.16). The onset of the Depression, combined with the large carry­
over of equipment purchased in 1929, the unfavourable credit situation for farmers and a rather poor harvest, 
resulted in a sharp fall in imports in 1930.132 Imports dropped further despite the excellent harvest in 
1931, as farmers obtained low prices which left them with inadequate profit margins to provide capital for 
investment in rural equipment.133 Demand was largely supplied from stocks which had been imported at 
unusually high levels in 1929 and remained unsold at the trough of the crisis.134
Business in rural equipment improved substantially from the mid-Thirties. The government had 
actively supported rural producers by purchasing major crops at minimum guaranteed prices. Basic prices 
had been fixed for wheat, maize and linseed, and the Banco de la Nacion paid an immediate advance of 80%
129 DOT, Conditions, November 1929, p.41.
130 DOT, Conditions, No.551, p.66, andNo.608, p.81.
131 DOT, Report, No.683, p.83.
132 DOT, Conditions, 31 October 1930, p.36.
133 DOT, Conditions, 31 October 1931, p.43.
134 DOT, Conditions, No.608, p.73.
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of the estimated crop value.135 Within the area devoted to cereals, plantings of wheat had declined in 
favour of maize as prolonged droughts in North America enabled Argentine maize exports to increase their 
trade share in the mid-Thirties (see Chapter 2). In addition, maize prices improved relative to wheat. 
Furthermore, the credit standing of farmers improved as firms in the agricultural machinery trade accepted 
greater facilities of payment.136 These circumstances enabled farmers to devote more land to grain 
cultivation and to carry out long overdue renewals. Their spare capital was invested in the renovation of 
equipment, which was available from two sources: local producers and imports. It is unclear to what extent 
nationally produced ploughs satisfied requirements in the mid and late Thirties, as available output statistics 
are in monetary terms rather than volume (see Table 4.17). Imports of ploughs revived (see Table 4.16), 
but not for long as they fell sharply starting in 1939. Crop prices were depressed by bumper harvests in 
North America, which limited cereal export opportunities in Europe, and therefore farmers had less money 
available for new purchases.137 Matters worsened with the outbreak of the Second World War, which 
deprived the country of its already restricted European markets and seriously disrupted the import trade.
The war hit the rural sector severely. Large volumes of grain output could not be exported due 
to shipping space scarcity, and crop prices fell. Plantings decreased, especially of maize. Maize was 
practically unsaleable.138 As it does not keep well, storage was problematic and over 3,300,000 tons of 
the 1939-1940 harvest had to be destroyed.139 Throughout the war, maize surpluses were burned for fuel 
and market conditions provided little incentive to plant.140 Production shifted from wheat and maize to 
other crops, and the market for ploughs still subsisted even though imports declined. Local production of 
ploughs, which was available before the Second World War, was able to satisfy demand. In 1941, 12,408
135 Roger Gravil, ’La intervencion estatal en el comercio de exportacion argentino entre las dos guerras’, 
DE 10 (1970-1971) Nos.39-40, p.408.
136 DOT, Report, No.683, p.74.
137 DOT, Report, No.733, p.50.
138 Business, No.234, April 1942, p.53.
139 Business, No.231, July 1941, p.70.
140 Business, No.233, January 1942, p.29.
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units were produced.141 This figure, being close to annual import levels in the mid and late Thirties (see 
Table 4.18), indicates that local output must have gone a considerable way towards meeting wartime demand 
for ploughs. The latter was sustained by the growth in plantings of crops such as sunflower, which rose 
from 333,000 hectares in 1939 to 1,573,000 hectares in 1944.142
As with ploughs, windmill imports dropped. However, they were continued owing to two factors. 
First, rural production shifted away from cereals towards cattle, sheep and pigs, which required a greater 
number of watering holes and hence windmills. Second, British requirements of Argentine meat supplies. 
Though the USA was attempting an economic blockade to coerce the Republic into breaking with the Axis, 
it could not hamper British purchases of Argentine meat as the USA could not cover any shortfall.143 
Guided by self-interest, the Americans decided to avoid problems for their British allies. As windmill 
demand increased with the growth in output of meat sources for Britain at a time of import shortages, US 
suppliers met Argentine requirements of windmills.
The end of the conflict brought no relief to the rural sector. Government policy killed the market 
for iron and steel implements. The pricing policy of the LAPI squeezed farmers by purchasing crops at fixed 
prices below those prevailing internationally and accumulated enormous profits avowedly used to finance 
Peronista development programmes. For wheat and maize, the leading crops, producers operated either at 
a loss or a very narrow profit margin.144 Little incentive was given to farmers, who reacted by planting 
less. Furthermore, farmers were deprived of spare capital to invest in rural implements and thereby 
requirements for renewals and additions of agricultural equipment only increased. This pent-up demand was
141 Ministerio de Hacienda, Estadistica Industrial de 1941, p.313.
142 Diaz Alejandro, Essays, pp.440,441.
143 E. Louise Peffer, ’Cordell Hull’s Argentine Policy and Britain’s Meat Supply’, Inter-American 
Economic Affairs X (1956-1957) No.2, p.16.
144 Edward J. Chambers, ’Some Factors in the Deterioration of Argentina’s External Position, 1946- 
1951’, Inter-American Economic Affairs VIII (1954-1955) No.3, p.44.
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not met by either imports or domestic production.145 Both plough and windmill imports remained at low 
levels after the war (see Table 4.16) owing to: (a) the mounting problems faced by the rural sector, and (b) 
balance of payments difficulties in the late Forties. Domestic suppliers of rural implements were also 
affected by government policy priorities. Economic conditions in the immediate postwar provided a critical 
opportunity to import industrial equipment required to modernise and expand local output of iron and steel 
commodities, which the regime did not use. The consequences of this failure are illustrated by La 
Cantabrica - a major supplier of rural equipment produced from the firm’s own steel output.146 The 
company urgently required capital goods imports to replace and modernise machinery, but like other 
businesses endured restrictions on vital imports in the late Forties due to foreign exchange shortages and 
exchange controls.147
Import restrictions aided the growth of domestic manufacturing of implements, which could be 
efficient as the market was large enough to sustain production - not least because of an ever accumulating 
pent-up demand. Production had already been undertaken before the war. It involved the assembly of 
foreign components to some extent, complemented by sales of imported implements in the case of La 
Cantabrica.148 Despite the hardship endured by metallurgical firms, output was expanded and thereby 
unnecessary foreign exchange outlays averted. Among the methods employed to this end was the obtention 
of production licences from foreign companies which had supplied rural articles in the past. La Cantabrica 
itself reached an agreement with The Oliver Corporation, enabling it to manufacture ploughs under licence,
145 Board of Trade, Export Promotion Department, Overseas Economic Surveys, Argentina, October 
1947, p.33.
146 La Cantabrica S.A.M.I.y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 44° Ejercicio cerrado 
el 30 de Junio de 1946’, Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, 16 September 1946, p.1301.
147 La Cantabrica, ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 46° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio 
de 1948’, Boletin, 29 November 1948, p. 1072; La Cantabrica, ’Memoria y balance correspondiente al 47° 
Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio de 1949’, Boletin, 16 January 1950, p.405; La Cantabrica, ’Memoria y 
balance correspondiente al 48° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio de 1950’, Boletin, 4 December 1950, p. 1151.
148 La Cantabrica, ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 50° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio 
de 1952’, Boletin, 1 December 1952, p.499.
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and also expanded production of its Huracan brand of windmills.149 As a result of such initiatives, output 
of rural implements rose substantially. Although production data for ploughs and windmills contains major 
gaps and is usually measured by their value in pesos, some figures in terms of volume are available. 
Windmill production attained 3,789 units in 1948 and increased to 14,619 units in 1953; and that of 
windmill towers rose from 1,949 units in 1948 to 7,336 units in 1953. Plough output attained 14,102 units 
in 1948, and increased to 18,557 units in 1953.150 However, notwithstanding its growth, local production 
remained inadequate for domestic requirements.151 This suggests that, although production of rural 
implements could not be the base of iron and steel manufacturing, output of such goods needed to be 
expanded considerably - even at the expense of other metallurgical goods of no great significance to the 
national economy which were produced in relatively small volumes.
CONCLUSION
Although the Republic had the highest iron and steel consumption in Latin America, the market 
remained limited. This should not have been the case. The country was populous and given the high degree 
of urbanisation (particularly in the national capital), the market was concentrated. Moreover, the population 
enjoyed both a relatively even income distribution and good income levels. Combined with the expansion 
of agro-exports, these conditions had generated demand for manufactures and the growth of manufacturing 
activities. Manufacturing made a substantial contribution to GDP and thereby industrialisation should have 
been deepened. However, there was a major difficulty. Industrial growth occurred in sectors unlikely to 
foster demand for iron and steel. Activities established before 1930 were not genuinely representative of 
what is normally regarded as manufacturing and the industrial base remained circumscribed despite the 
’forced’ import substitution undertaken during the Depression and the Second World War. In the absence
149 La Cantabrica, ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 49° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio 
de 1951’, Boletin, 10 March 1952, p.202.
150 Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos, Anuario Estadistico, Anos 1949-1950, Tomo III, pp.451,461; 
Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Censo Industrial 1954, pp.294,336.
151 Board of Trade, Commercial Relations and Exports Department, Overseas Economic Surveys, 
Argentina, May 1956, p.59.
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of a genuine industrialisation process, which was reflected in a lack of major steel-transforming industries, 
demand for iron and steel products arose principally from the construction industry. The emergence of 
domestic steel production did not bring about changes in the market. The industry was neither modem or 
large-scale, which restricted the scope of production. Although the range of goods produced was relatively 
broad, output volumes were low. The Plan Siderurgico Argentino sanctioned in 1947, which was not 
implemented on schedule, might have resolved these problems if it had been better prepared. Military 
planners were merely concerned with self-sufficiency goals rather than economic requirements. The 
underlying assumption that the coming on stream of an integrated steelworks would automatically lead to 
the flowering of a whole string of related transforming industries - thereby expanding the market - was 
misconceived, and the wide range of products to be manufactured by SOMISA included many goods which 
were hindered on two accounts: (a) they could not be produced efficiently, and (b) their market was limited 
as no incentives had been given to guarantee minimum consumption levels. As seen above, failures 
associated with the size of the market could have been avoided if the PSA would have been moulded along 
the lines followed by the South Korean heavy industry project two decades later.
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Chapter 5
THE SUPPLY OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN RAW MATERIALS:
INPUT CONSTRAINTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRA TED INDUSTRY
This chapter examines the availability of raw materials, a factor critical to the success of attempts 
at establishing heavy industry, and demonstrates the existence of two key difficulties. Foremost was the 
deficiency of domestic raw materials. Supplies of scrap, which were regarded as an essential resource in 
countries poorly endowed with minerals (like Argentina), were inadequate and sources of iron ore and coal, 
which were developed in the Forties to satisfy the self-sufficiency goals of the Direction General de 
Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), were constrained by location, poor quality and volume. The second 
problem identified in this chapter is that the ’window of opportunity’ to develop steel production provided 
by the outbreak of the Second World War was limited by the restricted availability of foreign inputs and 
the domestic economic crisis at the end of the Forties, which reduced the capacity to import.
The raw materials used in steel production are closely linked with the technology employed. Iron 
ore and coal are necessary to manufacture pig iron, and scrap and pig iron are required in steelmaking. 
Since the emergent domestic industry was semi-integrated and steel production in Siemens-Martin furnaces 
was undertaken before pig iron production and the preparation of the military integrated steelworks project, 
supplies of resources will be assessed on the basis of the order in which the stages of production developed. 
The chapter comprises five sections. The first section considers the issue of the supply of scrap, and the 
second examines pig iron production. These two products were the main raw material inputs used by the 
industry in the period. It will be argued that scrap was an inadequate resource, despite the fact that it was 
viewed as the major raw material for nations consuming large volumes of iron and steel and lacking the 
necessary minerals, and that demand for pig iron remained satisfied by imports notwithstanding import 
shortages during the Second World War and the start of national production in 1945. The third section 
discusses the leading resources for a modem industry, which became available in the Forties albeit on a 
modest scale, and demonstrates that iron ore and coal sources were characterised by inadequate reserves, 
poor quality and remote location. The following part of the chapter assesses charcoal, the fuel employed 
at the Zapla blast furnace, whose production was inefficient and at considerable distance from the plant.
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As domestically available raw materials presented major constraints, the final section will discuss the 
alternative enshrined in the Plan Siderurgico Argentino (PSA) for the projected SOMISA steelworks: the 
use of both foreign and national resources. Though this was the most feasible proposal, the section will 
show that it would not have been practicable, since the launch of the PSA coincided with both the 
inadequacy of local resources and the unavailability of imported raw materials.
THE SUPPLY OF SCRAP IRON AND STEEL
Scrap is a part of the cycle in which iron is reduced from the mineral, transformed into steel, 
presented for consumption, and after some time returns to the steel plants as scrap and is given a new lease 
of life. The volume of scrap available was higher if the timespan during which iron and steel products were 
in use was short. Although scrap was a relatively cheap input (see Chapter 7), the belief that it was an 
essential raw material in countries poorly endowed with minerals was ill-founded. In the short-run, the use 
of scrap in steel production circumvented the absence of local sources of raw materials. However, the 
critical long-term problem was sources of supply - particularly in countries with limited industrialisation. 
While advanced economies had abundant sources of scrap (ie, it was generated by diverse sectors such 
manufacturing, transport and shipbuilding), countries with limited industrialisation had circumscribed 
sources. Insufficient volumes of scrap were generated, and thereby lower stocks of scrap were available in 
underdeveloped than in industrialised countries.1
The inadequacy of sources ultimately exposed the long-term unsustainability of scrap-based steel 
production, as demonstrated by the emergent Argentine private steel producers in the Forties and the 
comparable case of the pre-Second World War Japanese iron and steel industry. The latter was the prime 
example of scrap-based steel production in the Thirties, and could have well served as a model for the 
ambitious Argentine military heavy industry project. Its growth was driven by military nationalism and 
strategic requirements and, as with both the early version of the DGFM plan and the emergent Argentine
1 United Nations (UN), Department of Economic Affairs, World Iron Ore Resources and Their 
Utilization (Lake Success, 1950), p.25.
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private producers, it depended on large volumes of scrap.2 Compared to the Argentine producers, who 
employed local scrap supplies, the Japanese industry faced a more extreme predicament. Although Japan 
imported some minerals and pig iron from various Far East countries, it depended almost entirely on scrap 
imports from the United States of America. In 1939, the Americans provided 85% of total Japanese scrap 
stocks.3 Dependence proved fatal. Japan was deprived of vital supplies by the escalating confrontation 
between Tokyo and Washington in 1940-1941. This led to a full-scale and rigorously enforced American 
embargo, unlike that applied on Argentina after September 1942, and ultimately war. Japanese steel 
producers struggled to maintain output, and partially overcame scrap shortages by employing raw materials 
from conquered territory in Manchuria, China, Korea, the Philippines and Malaya.4 Dependence on scrap 
conclusively failed in Japan, as it did in Argentina. However, as is seen below, Argentine difficulties with 
supplies of scrap arose from different circumstances to those of Japan. The rise of import-substituting 
domestic steel production during the Second World War rapidly exhausted national scrap stocks which had 
limited demand before 1939, and import sources in the early postwar years were severely restricted.
Argentine scrap consumption before 1939 was narrow. In the Twenties, around 60,000 tons of 
scrap became available annually in the Republic, of which only 14,000 tons were required by the Talleres 
Metalurgicos Vulcano plant. The latter employed 10,000 tons in its open-hearth furnaces and 4,000 tons 
in rolling. Unused scrap was thereby exported. Scrap exports had amounted to 30,000 tons at the outset 
of the First World War. Banned for ’strategic’ reasons during the global conflict, they resumed in 1923.5 
Table 5.1 below, which displays data on Argentine trade in scrap and pig iron imports, shows exports 
between 1924 and 1941 - when the export ban was reintroduced under Law 12,709. Two interesting features 
emerge from the data. First, there were substantial scrap exports in the middle and late Twenties, which 
suggests the existence of large stocks not used domestically. Second, the export ban introduced in 1941
2 Kenneth Warren, World Steel (Newton Abbot, 1975), pp.100,110.
3 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p. 19; Warren, Steel, p. 100.
4 Jean Bienfait, La Siderurgie Japonaise (Lausanne, 1965), p.28.
5 Sven Wassman, Sobre las posibilidades de una industria siderurgica en la Republica Argentina 
(Buenos Aires, 1927), p.6.
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Table 5.1
ARGENTINE TRADE IN SCRAP AND PIG IRON IMPORTS, 1921-1952
(in tons)
YEAR SCRAP EXPORTS SCRAP IMPORTS PIG IRON IMPORTS
1921 _ _ 5,507.4
1922 - - 9,991.2
1923 - - 7,411.4
1924 52,548 - 10,959.7
1925 65,448 - 13,622.9
1926 8,897 - 14,060.4
1927 41,693 - 17,305.1
1928 41,290 - 25,852.9
1929 96,991 - 26,946.8
1930 48,683 655 33,402.2
1931 - 25 17,484.9
1932 6,000 - 13,150.4
1933 - - 15,568.3
1934 - 50 20,569.7
1935 - 35 24,969.1
1936 - 50 26,720.9
1937 - 236 52,106.1
1938 - 66 28,235.4
1939 - 245 55,784.4
1940 - 75 28,180.0
1941 - 288 28,121.1
1942 - 1,301 8,051.3
1943 - 898 22,988.4
1944 - 1,063 17,865.7
1945 - 713 21,652.4
1946 - 1,492 34,358.7
1947 - 26,605 65,114.8
1948 - 44,061 113,650.9
1949 - 89,565 82,259.8
1950 - 62,747 93,297.6
1951 - 18,075 77,264.3
1952 - 13,964 56,341.5
represents nought.
Sources: Compiled from Ministerio de Hacienda, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Repiiblica 
Argentina,v olumes for 1921-1942; DireccionNacional de Investigaciones,Estadistica y Censos, Anuario 
Estadistico de la Repiiblica Argentina: Comercio Exterior, Aiios 1944 y 1945-1946; Ministerio de 
Asuntos Tecnicos, Anuario Estadistico de la Repiiblica Argentina, Tomo U, Afios 1948 y 1949-1950; 
Secretariade Estado de Hacienda, Comercio Exterior, Ahos 1951-1954.
merely formalised an existing situation as, with the exception of 1932, there had been no exports since 1930. 
The sudden drop in exports was not due to the contraction in trade but to a decline in scrap supplies initiated 
in the Thirties. This was the result of: (i) decreases in the replacement of railway materials, the leading
204
source of scrap, and (ii) changed demand conditions in the Forties, as import shortfalls of finished steel led 
to the rise of domestic scrap-based steel production. The decreasing renewals of railway materials were the 
result of the severe problems faced by the railway starting in the Twenties. Investments in railways 
contracted as the horizontal expansion process ceased.6 More crucially, during the Thirties, both the British- 
owned and State railways confronted financial difficulties that impaired their ability to refurbish materials. 
The problem was particularly acute in the case of the British-owned companies, which controlled most of 
the national network. The companies could not replace materials that dated back to the period 1904-1913 
and which required renovation.7 They were hindered by foreign exchange provisions, which affected 
remittances to be used for purchases of materials, and suffered from competition by road transport and a 
prolonged depression, which sharply reduced receipts.8
The decline in scrap supplies, noted in the Thirties, accelerated with the growth of scrap-based local 
output of finished iron and steel products in the Forties. Consumption of scrap, which was parallel to rolled 
goods production, rocketed from 10,000 tons in 1938 to 175,000 tons annually by the end of the Second 
World War.9 Scrap reserves, which stood at 400,000 tons in October 1939, were drained by an annual 
wartime demand of 130,000 tons and could not be easily replenished.10 Annual scrap output at the height 
of the war was estimated at 25,000 tons, which was less than 20% of annual wartime consumption, and this 
level was not expected to change for some time.11 Stocks were badly depleted by 1945, and it had become 
clear that they were far from adequate to sustain domestic steel production. The scrap requirements of steel 
producers for the period 1946-1950, working with existing methods and without increasing production, had
6 Guido Di Telia and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo economico argentino (Buenos Aires, 
revised 2nd ed., 1973), p.88.
7 Wassman, Posibilidades, p.6.
8 ’Republic of Argentina: Special Review’. Supplement to The Economist, 8 February 1936, p. 13.
9 Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), Informe sobre el mercado local e industria nacional 
en laminados de hierro y  acero (Buenos Aires, May 1945), p.40.
10 Coronel Julio Sanguinetti, La industria metalurgica nacional (Cordoba, 1950), p. 17.
11 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Bases para la industria del acero en la Republica Argentina’, in SOMISA, 
Obras del General Manuel N. Savio (Buenos Aires, 1973), pp.385,387.
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been calculated (with no evidence as to how) at 1,000,000 tons for the five-year stretch or 200,000 tons per 
annum.12 Therefore, annual demand equalled 50% of the reserves available in 1939 and exceeded fourfold 
the stock existent in July 1946, which merely totalled between 50,000 and 55,000 tons.13
The rapid exhaustion of domestic scrap stocks during the Second World War and, as seen below, 
the subsequent difficulties in obtaining imported supplies clearly demonstrate the serious weaknesses of 
scrap-based steel production. In the absence of national iron ore deposits, scrap had been the only raw 
material available.14 The supply crisis arose as the rapid fall in reserves was coupled with a sharp increase 
in demand. In 1942, the Fabrica Militar de Aceros alone consumed 20,000 tons obtained from obsolete 
materials and scrap provided by the Direccion General de Puertos and the State Railways.15 Mounting 
problems in acquiring scrap prompted individual attempts to acquire every available ton of material, such 
as lifting abandoned tram lines between the Buenos Aires suburbs of Olivos and San Isidro, which provided 
803 tons of rails.16 Nonetheless, such efforts were inadequate. The consequence was growing dependence 
on imports of scrap to sustain steel production.
Table 5.1 above clearly shows that Argentina shifted from being an exporter to importer. Imports, 
which were non-existent in the Twenties and relatively modest during the Thirties, increased subsequently 
as demand for scrap outstripped available supplies. Two interesting features of the trade during the Forties 
emerge from Table 5.1. First, the Republic was able to import scrap in wartime. Second, the sharpest 
increase in imports occurred in the postwar period, which reflects the inability to meet demand for scrap 
from national sources. Concerning wartime, Argentine neutrality enabled the acquisition of some imports
12 BCRA, Informe, p.40.
13 Secretariade Industriay Comercio, Hierro Laminado sin trabajar (Buenos Aires, August 1947), p.44.
14 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Ley deFabricacionesMilitares: conceptosquefundamentaronsuproyecto’, 
in SOMISA, Obras, pp.410,411; Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Ano 
1939, Tomo IV, p. 107.
15 Alberto S.J. de Paula, ’Reestructuracion operativa de la industria belica argentina’, in Maria Haydee 
Martin, Alberto S.J. de Paula and Ramon Gutierrez (eds.), Los ingenieros militares y  sus precursores en el 
desarrollo argentino (1930-1980) (Buenos Aires, 1980), p.82.
16 Review o f the River Plate, 21 May 1943, p.20.
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from both Latin American and overseas sources. Imports from neighbouring Latin American countries 
resulted from increased regional trade, which compensated for the loss of traditional trading partners during 
the war (see Chapter 2). Imports from overseas included supplies from the United Kingdom which, despite 
the strain of the war effort and American pressure on Britain to participate in the anti-Argentine embargo 
(see below), responded to two wartime British trade requirements. First, they contributed to reduce the 
balances of blocked sterling, and second, they were used as a sweetener for countries supplying Britain with 
vital commodities.17 Imported supplies contributed modestly to alleviate Argentine scrap shortages. 
However, as domestic reserves continued to be depleted, import levels rose dramatically in the aftermath 
of the war (see Table 5.1). Given the projected postwar growth in consumption indicated earlier, the 
increase in imports was insufficient to offset shortfalls in national stocks. Consequently, the flaws of 
depending on scrap for steelmaking were again exposed. Imports were increasingly necessary at a time 
when sources of supply were restricted. The Peronista regime was willing but unable to resolve the crisis, 
handicapped by a worldwide scrap shortage and subsequently by the failure of its own economic policy.
Facing major limitations on sources of imports, the government resorted to the Anglo-Argentine 
negotiations as a springboard to resolve the mounting crisis. It turned to the United Kingdom for the much 
needed renovation of railway materials, which would release scrap for steelmaking, and for imports of scrap. 
The Five-Year Railway Plan was a leading capital project and required 250,000 tons of steel for rails over 
5 years, which the Argentine authorities requested should be delivered over roughly equal annual 
installments.18 In addition, when the British mission headed by Sir Clive Baillieu was presented with 
Argentine requirements in December 1947, the list included 250,000 tons of scrap.19 Since annual 
consumption of scrap had been estimated at 200,000 tons (see above), the release of 50,000 tons of discarded 
rails per annum and a single procurement of 250,000 tons of scrap were insufficient to offset the fall in
17 Remarks on the cover of the folder containing various documents relating to wartime controls on 
exports from the United Kingdom and neutral European countries to Latin America, 28 July - 13 August
1942. FO 371 32466 W 12313/37/49.
18 Drive Telegram No.769 from Sir Reginald Leeper, British Ambassador to Argentina, to the FO, 4 
December 1947. FO 371 61130 AS 6617/16/2.
19 Telegram no.796 from Leeper to the FO, 12 December 1947. Bank of England Archive, OV 102/123.
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domestic scrap supplies. In the event, this mattered little as Britain was unable to meet the request even 
though it had much at stake in these negotiations. Given the harsh economic conditions faced by the United 
Kingdom in the postwar period, it could only supply 75,000 tons of steel.20 This offer was far too low, 
and there were difficulties in meeting that commitment. Rails were not the only steel goods requested by 
the Republic, and exports were already restricted due to steel shortages.21 Regarding scrap imports from 
Britain, Argentina fared even worse. Given the worldwide scrap shortage, Britain could not provide scrap. 
Furthermore, Britain and the USA were exploring all possible overseas sources to meet their own needs.22 
The Baillieu Mission was aware that the success of the negotiations and Argentine willingness to back the 
British programme of rural commodity purchases for 1948 depended on the country obtaining the goods 
requested, but there was little it could do.23 The supply predicament, manifested in shortages of imported 
scrap, was further aggravatedby domestic difficulties. The severe economic crisis, which as seen in Chapter 
2 was caused by Peronista policy, resulted in the curtailment of imports owing to foreign exchange 
shortages. In the early Fifties, with lower imports of vital inputs (see Table 5.1), private sector steel 
producers such as La Cantabrica suffered from shortages of raw materials and steel production dropped.24
Dependence on scrap as the major resource was a failed strategy. Although scrap was relatively 
cheap and believed to be the ideal raw material for steel production in countries with high steel consumption 
and inadequate domestic sources of minerals, reliance on this raw material was dangerous. The problem 
was that insufficient volumes of scrap were generated domestically in the absence of industrialisation (ie,
20 Drive No.745 from the FO to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 6 December 1947. FO 371 
61130 AS 6617/16/2.
21 Telegram No.797 from the FO to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 18 December 1947. Bank 
of England Archive, OV 102/123.
22 Telegram No.796 from the FO to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 18 December 1947. Bank 
of England Archive, OV 102/123.
23 Telegram No.795 from Leeper to the FO, 12 December 1947. Bank of England Archive, OV 
102/123.
24 La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 48° Ejercicio cerrado 
el 30 de Junio de 1950’, Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, 4 December 1950, p.l 151; La Cantabrica, 
’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 50° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de Junio de 1952’, Boletin, 1 
December 1952, p.499.
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the main Argentine source were railway materials) and were available through foreign trade. Consequently, 
supplies increasingly failed to satisfy consumption - particularly if the latter expanded. In the case of Japan, 
the problem was aggravated by the fact that its scrap requirements were almost wholly imported from a 
country with which relations were highly conflictive. However, scrap was not the only raw material 
employed in steelmaking. Steel production in open-hearth furnaces required a mix of scrap with pig iron 
(see Chapter 1). Demand for the latter was covered by imports, which increased sharply starting in 1946 
to overcome scrap shortages (see Table 5.1).
THE SUPPLY OF IMPORTED AND NATIONAL PIG IRON
Unlike the case of scrap, domestically produced pig iron did not become available until October 
1945. Even then, as will be shown below, it was only obtainable in relatively modest volumes. Therefore, 
pig iron consumption was satisfied through imports. As seen in Table 5.1, the period was characterised by 
sharp fluctuations in import volumes. Furthermore, there was instability in terms of sources of supply. 
Unsurprisingly, the greatest difficulties were experienced during the Second World War (see Table 5.2 
below). This section assesses the Argentine pig iron trade: three features become apparent, (a) Continental 
producers participating in the steel cartel, which obstructed the development of steel production in the 
Republic (see Chapters 3 and 6), successfully jockeyed to dominate the pig iron trade before 1939. (b) 
Increased dominance of the market by the cartel largely affected Britain, which struggled to maintain its 
presence in the market as close Anglo-Argentine political and economic ties were steadily waning, (c) 
Wartime disruption led to the replacement of Continental suppliers by non-traditional sources, despite US 
attempts to dismpt deliveries owing to the anti-Argentine policy pursued by Washington.
Trade before the Second World War
The pig iron trade was characterised in the Twenties and Thirties by the increased predominance 
of Continental producer-exporters. This was achieved largely to the detriment of the United Kingdom, 
which had been the traditional pre-1914 supplier of iron and steel goods, and arose from: (i) the European
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Table 5.2
PIG IRON IMPORTS: SHARE OF LEADING SOURCES, 1921-1952*
(as a percentage)
YEAR UK BELGIUM FRANCE GERMANY BRAZIL INDIA
1921 35.7 9.4 15.6 6.6 _ _
1922 32.1 35.8 9.8 16.4 - -
1923 28.9 29.7 20.2 11.5 - -
1924 39.0 29.4 13.0 2.3 - -
1925 34.5 22.2 30.3 4.3 - -
1926 26.0 41.3 18.8 5.0 - -
1927 31.5 25.2 27.5 6.8 - -
1928 20.3 29.8 13.7 7.5 - -
1929 44.4 23.2 8.1 18.7 - -
1930 40.4 16.8 1.7 32.2 - -
1931 16.5 17.5 1.9 9.4 35.7 -
1932 16.4 19.4 15.4 1.0 26.2 19.5
1933 17.3 12.9 41.5 0.8 - 19.0
1934 19.7 15.8 22.1 3.1 - 13.9
1935 25.9 14.6 21.5 1.1 - -
1936 15.8 15.5 4.2 1.8 - -
1937 17.5 4.0 69.1 0.3 - 0.1
1938 13.6 12.7 60.5 - 7.7 -
1939 4.2 8.6 50.5 0.4 29.2 -
1940 9.2 1.4 9.8 - 70.7 -
1941 - - - - 94.4 -
1942 - - - - 74.8 20.2
1943 - - - - 75.5 9.5
1944 - - - - 37.1 8.8
1945 - - - - 75.6 -
1946 7.2 1.0 - - 54.5 0.6
1947 16.7 1.1 0.6 - 42.5 0.9
1948 - 19.1 9.5 - 49.6 0.9
1949 0.1 6.0 43.2 - 21.2 -
1950 - - 6.5 - - -
1951 - 3.7 20.9 4.9 13.1 -
1952 - 0.9 2.5 3.7 7.6 -
* Since the data only corresponds to the main foreign sources of pig iron, their share of the import
trade does not total 100% for all years. When this is the case, it reflects the presence of a diversity 
of minor suppliers whose share of the market is far too low to be of any significance.
Source: Calculated from the data in Anuario del Comercio, volumes for 1921-1942; Comercio Exterior, 
Aiios 1944 y 1945-1946; Anuario Estadistico, Tomo H, Anos 1948 y 1949-1950; Comercio Exterior, Anos 
1951-1954.
currency situation in the Twenties, and (ii) the oligopolistic practices of the International Steel Cartel or ISC 
in the Thirties. Currency depreciation in the Twenties enabled Belgium and France to strengthen their
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presence in the market.25 To a lesser extent, Germany temporarily regained a large share of the trade 
during both the early and late Twenties (see Table 5.2). In the early part of the decade, this was achieved 
exclusively through low prices caused by currency devaluation. Nevertheless, Germany was unable to 
sustain this trade for long with an inflated and unstable currency.26 In the late Twenties, the increased 
share of imports reflected conditions in the German iron and steel industry. As seen in Chapter 1, Germany 
had reconstructed and expanded its steel output capacity after the First World War. The result was that by 
the end of the Twenties, supply outstripped domestic demand and the only means of disposing of 
overproduction was dumping in export markets.
The strong position of France and Belgium (and Germany to a much lesser extent) in the market 
for pig iron reflects a broader issue within the thesis: the efforts of these founder members of the steel cartel 
to frustrate domestic manufacturing and dominate the market for iron and steel products. Concerning efforts 
to thwart the development of local steel production, the supply of products at short-term, artificially low 
prices discouraged the establishment of local manufacturing in the long-run. Regarding control of the 
market, the pig iron trade in Argentina demonstrates how predominance by Continental producer-exporters 
forced outside competitors to intensify their efforts to sustain their market position. In the Argentine case, 
it was Britain which struggled. In the Twenties, the British competed with Belgium and occasionally France 
to maintain the largest market share (see Table 5.2). However, the trade figures conceal the tactics to which 
the British resorted to maintain their position. During the early Twenties, they did so through re-exports. 
Most pig iron coming through from Britain was supplied from France or Belgium, as low quotations for 
Belgian and French iron made its delivery to the Midlands possible at a lower cost than that produced in 
the British region.27 In the Thirties, although it was among the three leading pig iron suppliers, the United 
Kingdom again struggled hard to fend off French and Belgian competition. Although the data in Table 5.2 
points to success against Belgium, this was not the case with France. In fact, the latter was the main
25 Board o f Trade Journal, new ser. CXII (1924) No.1415, pp. 36,37, and new ser. CXIX (1927) 
No.1619, p.616.
26 The Board o f Trade Journal, new ser. CIX (1922) No. 1361, p.730.
27 Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the Market for Iron and Steel in the 
Argentine Republic (London, 1922), p. 16.
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supplier in 1933-1934 and again in 1937-1939. This French success resulted from the dumping policies of 
the ISC, of which Britain was not a member. Having been the top supplier in the Twenties and managed 
to retain the second place in 1934-1938, the United Kingdom again went to great length to maintain supplies 
when its ability to sustain its position in the market faltered. It made supplies available from the Empire. 
At the trough of the Depression, it made available supplies from India. The latter temporarily acquired a 
major share of the market (see Table 5.2) and in fact became the second leading supplier in 1932-1933. 
Supplies from India were again made accessible during the Second World War, which contributed to 
alleviate import shortages despite the attempts to disrupt supplies which were part of the antagonistic 
American policy towards Argentina (see below).
Trade during the Forties
The disarray in the pig iron trade caused by the Second World War was far more severe than that 
during the Depression. Supplies ceased from both the Continent and Britain, and the loss of traditional 
sources was compensated by closer ties with Brazil. The latter, which had previously only been a supplier 
at the trough of the Depression (see Table 5.2), was able to provide substantial quantities of pig iron as it 
had initiated steel production before the Republic and had authorised pig iron exports. Brazilian supplies 
averaged 17,494 tons between 1940 and 1942, which represented 82% of the Argentine market for pig 
iron.28 Brazil dominated the market during the war, and retained a marked presence in the early postwar 
years (see Table 5.2). However, its market position declined sharply in the early Fifties as Argentina 
curtailed imports and Brazilian consumption of pig iron rose with the coming on stream of Volta Redonda.
Brazil was not the only wartime source of imported pig iron. The United Kingdom was 
increasingly dependent on Argentine commodities and, having to offer something in exchange for bargaining 
purposes, made available stocks of Indian pig iron during the decisive years of the war.29 These substantial
28 Gabriel Porcile, ’The Challenge of Cooperation: Argentina and Brazil, 1939-1955’, Journal o f Latin 
American Studies 27 (1995) No.l, p. 152.
29 Letter from E.A. Mather-Jackson, FO, to K. Anderson, India Office, 17 March 1943. FO 371 33573 
A 2502/2177/2.
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provisions, which transformed India into a major Argentine supplier in 1942-1944 (see Table 5.2), caused 
controversy between London and Washington over the implementation of the US Policy Directive towards 
Argentina. Washington had devised the Directive to press the Republic into line with other American 
republics over relations with the Axis through an economic blockade, and expected its British and Canadian 
allies to adhere to the embargo.30
The difficulty was that Washington, in its attempt to coerce Argentina, was prepared to go to any 
length to sustain the embargo. It wanted to extend adherence to the Directive to other parts of the British 
Empire such as India. In early 1943, the United States of America attempted to force the British into 
preventing Indian exports to the Republic. It nonsensically claimed that pig iron was being shipped 
notwithstanding that cast iron mill rolls had been supplied to India under Lend-Lease. The ’evidence’ was 
that 1,800 tons were being provided by Tata Iron and Steel Company, of which 800 were for the British- 
owned railways.31 It soon became obvious that the American assertion was ludicrous. The shipments did 
not contravene the terms of the White Paper on the US Policy Directive.32 Moreover, India was a regular 
pig iron exporter and cast iron rolls could not be produced in that country.33
The United Kingdom had two reservations over the Directive. First, the attempt to control steel 
shipments affected the maintenance of British-owned railways in Argentina. Second, if the Americans were 
concerned over shipments of iron and steel to Argentina, they themselves would have to scrutinise 
consignments.34 Scrutinising in India was carried out by the colonial authorities, with export license
30 US Directive on policy towards Argentina, 24 September 1942. Bank of England Archive, OV 
102/17.
31 Telegram from Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador to Washington, to the Board of Trade, No. 134 
Askew, 15 February 1943. FO 371 33573 A 2502/2177/2.
32 Copy of the letter from A.C.B. Symon, India Supply Mission to Washington, to R.K. Jopson, 
Commercial Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington, 15 March 1943, sent to Anderson by the Board 
of Trade, 30 March 1943. FO 371 33573 A 2502/2177/2.
33 Letter from A. Dibdin, India Office, to Mather-Jackson, 16 April 1943. FO 371 33573 A
3660/2177/2.
34 Letter from Mather-Jackson to Anderson, 17 March 1943. FO 371 33573 A 2502/2177/2.
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applications being checked against the War Trade Lists and all shipments being accompanied by documents 
disclosing the ultimate consignee.35 If the latter was unknown, the Consular Offices in Buenos Aires could 
obtain their name through British intermediaries in the trade.36 Therefore, if Washington wished to restrict 
Indian exports it had to approach the Indian Government, for it was the latter which had the authority to 
control these exports.37
Despite resistance to American pressure, the British strategy to sustain pig iron exports to Argentina 
by drawing on supplies from third parties ran into trouble. Indian exports were lower than anticipated owing 
to transport bottlenecks in India and the impact of the war on British pig iron supplies. The transportation 
difficulties had to be eased by temporarily suspending all shipments, including that of a consignment of 
2,238 tons purchased from the Bengal Ingot Company in 1943 by the South American Mining Company 
of Buenos Aires.38 The situation improved with repairs to breaches in the East Indian Railway and a drop 
in coal raisings, which made wagons available for transport and permitted the resumption of shipments. 
However, only 1,111 tons of the Argentine order were licensed, with the remainder pending authorisation.39 
Any further export licensing was affected by conditions in Britain. Indian exports to Argentina deflected 
potential supplies for Britain, whose pig iron stocks had sharply deteriorated during the war. Therefore, 
when the British Iron and Steel Control indicated that its monthly requirements were 20,000 tons for the 
first quarter of 1944, it requested assurances that this tonnage would have priority over other export 
orders.40 Substantial pig iron stocks had accumulated following clearance of transport bottlenecks and a
35 Letter from J.M. Troutbeck, Ministry of Economic Warfare, London, to Dibdin, 7 May 1943. FO 
371 33573 A 3660/2177/2.
36 Letter from W.W. Nind, India Office, to Troutbeck, 13 May 1943. FO 371 33573 A 3660/2177/2.
37 Letter from Mrs. Margaret McArthur Campbell, Board of Trade, to R.A. Gallop, FO, 22 November
1943. FO 371 33573 A 10701/2177/2.
38 Telegram No.880 Askew from the Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, to the Board of 
Trade, 27 October 1943. FO 371 33573 A 10000/2177/2. Letter from the Ministry of War Transport 
to Gallop, 17 November 1943. FO 371 33573 A 10435/2177/2.
39 Inward Telegram No. 14211 CS from the Supply (MP) Department, Government of India, Calcutta, 
to the Secretary of State for India, 11 December 1943. FO 371 33573 A 10701/2177/2.
40 Cypher Telegram 28927 from the Secretary of State for India to the Supply (MP) Department, 
Government of India, 18 December 1943. FO 371 33573 A 10701/2177/2.
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large Indian output surplus was available, even after supplying British needs.41 Nevertheless, as shipping 
space was limited, deliveries to Argentina at British expense were not contemplated.42 When a shipment 
of 1,400 tons was requested for the Argentine railways, no ships were available.43 Consequently, the Iron 
and Steel Controller in Calcutta did not sanction the export.44
This hitherto unknown information on Indian pig iron exports to the Republic is of particular value 
for three reasons. First, it provides background detail relevant to the inclusion of India as a supplier in some 
of the Argentine data for wartime pig iron imports. Second, it is directly connected to US policy towards 
Buenos Aires and demonstrates the extent to which Washington was prepared to go in order to sustain the 
anti-Argentine economic boycott and of Britain to resist this pressure. By attempting to interfere in Indian 
trade with Argentina, the Americans aimed beyond the countries required to comply with the US Directive 
and thereby broaden the embargo. The effects of the latter went beyond interference in trade since it also 
had an adverse effect on the DGFM integrated steelworks project (see Chapter 6). Finally, the Indian pig 
iron exports episode illustrates the problems of compensating lost trade with non-traditional sources which 
had other major committments.
Difficulties in obtaining imported pig iron persisted in the aftermath of the Second World War as 
a result of worldwide iron and steel shortages. The traditional pre-1939 suppliers struggled slowly to regain 
their share of the market, and imports from non-traditional wartime suppliers declined. Although Brazil 
remained the leading source of pig iron from 1939 to 1948 and a significant source in 1949 (see Table 5.2), 
its exports decreased as domestic requirements took priority. Imports of Indian pig iron were reduced to 
insignificant levels and ceased altogether in 1949 (see Table 5.2). The result was that by 1950, supplies still
41 Telegram No. 1328 from the FO to Washington, 15 February 1944. FO 371 37692 AS 221/43/2.
42 Inward Telegram from the Department of Supply, Government of India, to the Secretary of State for 
India, 24 December 1943. FO 371 37692 AS 44/43/2.
43 Copy of a Telegram from the British Merchant Shipping Mission, Washington, to the Shipminder, 
London, Telegram Amast 10532, 20 August 1944. FO 371 37692 AS 4651/43/2.
44 Telegram Amast 10149 from the Ministry of War Transport to the British Merchant Shipping Mission, 
Washington, 18 September 1944. FO 371 37693 AS 4651/43/2.
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remained vulnerable to external factors. The problem was further aggravated by the fact that the Republic 
could not afford imports owing to the exchange crisis. During the Second World War, pig iron shortages 
and military ambitions of self-sufficiency in ’strategic’ commodities were at the root of the decision to 
develop domestic pig iron production based on local iron ore and charcoal sources (see below).
National production o f  pig iron
Domestic pig iron production was inaugurated at Palpala in the province of Jujuy in October 1945, 
with the claim that national pig iron supplies were secure and that output from Palpala could replace imports 
in times of emergency.45 However, this was far from the truth, at least at this time. Consumption of pig 
iron continued to be satisfied largely by imports (see Table 5.3). The military initially considered the Altos
Table 5.3
PIG IRON CONSUMPTION, 1945-1952 






Volume Share of total
1945 28,403.1 25,190.1 88.7% 3,213 11.3%
1946 50,366.5 38,049.5 75.5% 12,317 24.5%
1947 84,595.5 68,860.5 81.4% 15,735 18.6%
1948 135,373.8 118,025.8 87.2% 17,348 12.8%
1949 103,743.0 85,184.0 82.1% 18,559 17.9%
1950 114,543.1 96,709.1 84.4% 17,834 15.6%
1951 101,102.5 82,081.5 81.2% 19,021 18.8%
1952 90,951.4 59,187.4 65.1% 31,764 34.9%
Source: Boletin Informativo Techint, October-December 1965, p .l l .
Homos Zapla (AHZ) an experiment, in order to verify their efficiency and the aptitude of the raw 
materials.46 With the performance of the works deemed satisfactory from a strictly technical viewpoint,
45 Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Senadores, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.225.
46 Direction General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), Fabricaciones Militares: Vision de una gran 
empresa (Buenos Aires, 1973), p.64.
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the DGFM decided to increase capacity and a second blast furnace was inaugurated in 1951.47 Output from 
the AHZ, however modest when compared to that of major producers, was not insignificant (see Table 5.3). 
It initially satisfied over 10% of requirements and, once the second blast furnace was added, over 30% in 
1952. However, it must be noted that the market share of 1952 production in total consumption is distorted. 
As shown in Table 5.3, growth in pig iron output coincided with a curtailment in imports, which resulted 
from the post-1949 crisis. With shortages of scrap, private sector steel producers could only offset supply 
deficiencies by increasing the volume of pig iron used for steelmaking in Siemens-Martin furnaces. Foreign 
supplies were increasingly unavailable since permits for imports were not being issued as exchange reserves 
were depleted. Domestic output could not compensate for import shortfalls. Zapla pig iron processed at 
the Fabrica Militar de Aceros furnished the steel requirements of the DGFM and State investment 
programmes.48 This resulted in severe scarcities of pig iron that threatened to paralyse private sector firms, 
whose steel production was utilised for construction, transportation and public works by Obras Sanitarias 
de la Nacion and Gas del Estado. Dependent on imports, large enterprises such as TAMET had little choice 
but to cut back output.49
Consequently, domestic pig iron production was insufficient to reduce dependence on foreign 
supplies. Nonetheless, the AHZ remained a considerable technical achievement by Argentine standards. 
As will be shown in Chapter 6, the DGFM were not prevented by the US embargo from obtaining the 
necessary foreign technological assistance, and domestic engineering capabilities enabled the successful 
completion of the project - the first undertaking of its kind. Yet it remained part of a broader military 
strategy guided by national defence considerations. The aim of self-sufficiency in ’strategic’ goods had 
already been formalised through Law 12,709 in 1941, which established the DGFM and its functions. These 
included exploration for mineral resources, the construction of the facilities necessary for their extraction,
47 DGFM, El hierro de Zapla (Buenos Aires, 1954), p.4.
48 General Humberto Sosa Molina, Inauguracion del segundo alto homo Zapla (Argentine Republic, 
April 1951), unpaginated.
49 Metalurgia, November 1951, p.14, and December 1951, p.7.
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and the promotion of related industries.50 The Armed Forces wielded considerable power in government 
at the time, and their aspirations ultimately resulted in substantial finds of iron ore and coal.
NATIONAL IRON ORE AND COAL RESOURCES
The period was largely characterisedby a lack of exploitable domestic resources. As late as 1914, 
no search for iron ore had been undertaken.51 To some extent, this applied also to coal. The Rio Turbio 
basin, which was to become the largest domestic coal source, had been pinpointed in the late nineteenth 
century but no action was taken.52 Therefore, prior to the discovery of substantive iron and coal deposits 
in the Forties, erratic efforts were made with little success to tap the wealth of what some nationalists 
erroneously believed were vast mineral reserves.53 As was indicated in Chapter 3, nationalists within the 
Armed Forces pressed for the exploitation and processing of minerals throughout the Twenties. General 
Isidro Arroyo, appointed inspector de siderurgia in 1922, was the most prominent officer involved in this 
campaign. He was convinced that the country was rich in minerals, and that there were no excuses for not 
exploiting them.54 These views led to sporadic efforts to develop mining in the Andean region, but the 
problems were enormous: finds were small, the quality of minerals poor, and transportation costs high.55
The outbreak of war in 1939 gave new impetus to exploration for mineral resources, which was 
driven by the military and their quest for strategic self-sufficiency. The result was the discovery of iron ore
50 Ricardo Lesser and Marta Panaia, ’Las estrategias militares frente al proceso de industrializacion 
(1943-1947)’, in M. Panaia, R. Lesser and P. Skupch (eds.), Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo, 
Volume 2 (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 105.
51 Jose Garcia Vizcaino, Tratado de politico economica argentina, Volume II (Buenos Aires, 1975), 
p.257.
52 Luis Calliari, Elyacimiento ’Presidente Peron ’ en la cuenca carbonifera de Rio Turbio (Buenos Aires, 
1952), p.13.
53 Ministerio de Hacienda, Iron (Buenos Aires, 1971), p.7.
54 ’El gobiemo posee informes que aseguran la vasta existencia de hierro, carbon y otros minerales, y 
el exito de la explotacion’. Reprint of an interview to General Arroyo by the newspaper La Nacidn in 
Revista de Economia Argentina XVI (1926) No.93, pp.219,225.
55 Wassman, Posibilidades, p.3.
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at Zapla in Jujuy and near Sierra Grande in Rio Negro, and coal at Rio Turbio in Santa Cruz. While the 
actual discoveries of iron ore were accidental, that of coal was the result of a concerted effort. In the case 
of iron ore, it was five local individuals who stumbled across the Cerro Zapla deposit in 1940, and a local 
person who found the Sierra Grande deposits in 1945.56 In the case of coal, due to import shortages, 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) was entrusted in 1941 with carrying out studies and prospecting. 
The Division Carbon Mineral of YPF was created and explorations were carried out from Jujuy to Tierra 
del Fuego, which led to the development of Rio Turbio.57 Substantial reserves by Argentine standards, 
though not on the scale the nationalists had hoped for, were discovered as a result.
The ’9 de Octubre’ mine, the iron deposit at Zapla which become operational in 1944, had verified 
reserves of 20,000,000 tons of hematite and, according to studies carried out in 1943, possible reserves of
36.000.000 tons.58 With the addition of the ’Puesto Viejo’ mine in the late Fifties, Zapla iron ore reserves 
increased to 80,000,000 tons.59 The verified iron stocks at Sierra Grande were calculated in 1946 at
19,950,000 tons, and possible reserves at 65,000,000 tons.60 When compared to iron ore reserves in major 
producing areas, these quantities were modest. In the Fifties, the measured, indicated and inferred reserves 
of the four countries that shared the Western European coal and iron basin (ie, West Germany, France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg) totalled 8,360,000,000 tons, and those of the United Kingdom amounted to
3.760.000.000 tons.61 As for coal, proven reserves of the 4 seams comprising the Rio Turbio deposit 
amounted to 180,000,000 tons, and possible reserves to 350,000,000 tons.62 When compared with the 
stocks of leading coal producers, these volumes were again modest. In 1950, the United States of America
56 Ricardo Fernando Marcos, Altos Homos Zapla (Jujuy, 1980), unpaginated; Raul Larra, Savio: el 
argentino que forjo el acero (Buenos Aires, 1980), fn.pp.166-167.
57 Presidencia de la Nacion, Carbon (Buenos Aires, 1969), p.6.
58 DGFM, Fabricaciones, p.64; Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated.
59 Ministerio de Hacienda, Iron, p.9.
60 Instituto Latinoamericano del Fierro y el Acero (ILAFA), Argentina (Santiago de Chile, 1963), p. 199.
61 Calculated from the data in UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Survey o f World Iron 
Ore Resources (New York, 1955), p.27.
62 Calliari, Yacimiento, p.27.
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had proven reserves of 200,000,000,000 tons and possible reserves of 2,028,000,000,000 tons. In that same 
year, West Germany had proven reserves of 80,455,000,000 tons and possible reserves of 260,000,000,000 
tons.63 Argentine iron and coal deposits, already hindered by inadequate reserves, suffered from two 
further critical problems: location and transportation, and poor quality of the minerals.
Location o f  the deposits and transportation
All the newly located deposits of iron ore and coal were distant from Buenos Aires. Zapla was 
located 1,300 kilometres from the national capital, and Sierra Grande and Rio Turbio were 1,265 and 3,000 
kilometres away respectively. The disadvantage of remoteness was more serious for the Patagonian 
discoveries, as effective transportation was mostly lacking. Compared with the deposits near Sierra Grande 
and the coal basin at Rio Turbio, the iron mine at Zapla and its related development the Altos Homos Zapla 
enjoyed significant advantages. The ’9 de Octubre’ mine was situated 16 kilometres away from the AHZ 
at Palpala.64 Palpala itself was located on a direct railway line to Buenos Aires and connected to three 
branch lines that reached the Parana river (see Map 5.1). This enabled the AHZ to receive charcoal supplies 
(see section below) and provide locally produced ore for the SOMISA project, which would utilise both 
foreign and national inputs. In addition, the AHZ was near the city of Jujuy, which could provide human 
and other sources and also had the necessary services and facilities.65
In sharp contrast, deposits near Sierra Grande did not enjoy such beneficial conditions 
notwithstanding that two of the deposits, ’Banco de Credito Industrial Argentino’ and ’General Peron’, were 
located 8 kilometres to the north of the town, and the other two, ’Pecheca’ and ’General Belgrano’, were 
10 kilometres to the south. Sierra Grande lacked the facilities and resources which made the Zapla 
development possible. The Ruta Nacional 3 required modification in order to improve communications, and
63 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p. 11.
64 DGFM, Fabricaciones, p.64.
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Map 5.1 DOMESTIC SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
major investments in infrastructure were needed for the ores to be employed by SOMISA. Rail links would 
have to be established with San Antonio Oeste, a coastal town where a port would have to be built so that 
the mineral could be shipped (see Map 5.1 for location). Proposals for local processing of the ore (as was 
done at Palpala) were not feasible as the only available fuel was coal from remote Rio Turbio, which was 
unsuitable for coking and could not be used elsewhere as large-scale facilities to ship it were non-existent.66
Given the lack of effective transportation and the investment levels required to develop the deposit, 
the discovery of Sierra Grande did not generate enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that other 
factors also had a bearing. The Second World War was over, Fabricaciones Militares was processing Zapla 
ores at the AHZ, and the Peronista regime had other economic priorities. Although the Banco de Credito 
Industrial granted the first loan for preparatory work in 1947, the DGFM took no immediate action. In fact, 
it only sent its chief geologist to the area in 1949.67 The Rio Turbio coal basin also suffered from 
inadequacies in terms of location and transportation. However, unlike Sierra Grande, it was the largest 
known domestic coal source and its development was regarded as essential to offset import shortages. 
Imported coal was not used in the early efforts to produce iron and steel, and instead largely consumed by 
power stations, the railways, the gas company, the emergent merchant fleet, and the Navy.68
The development of Rio Turbio was encouraged by two factors. First, the country depended on 
thermal power, with coal-fired power stations having generated 80% of national energy requirements in 
1939.69 Second, the military envisaged the use of national raw materials in iron and steel production. 
Given the remote location of the deposit in relation to the leading markets, the problem requiring foremost 
attention was again the lack of effective transportation. The basin was situated in Santa Cruz at around
3,000 kilometres from Buenos Aires and 260 kilometres from the Atlantic coast, in the extreme southwest
66 Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, May 1950, pp.336,338.
67 Ministerio de Hacienda, Iron, p. 11; Larra, Savio, fn. pp. 166-167.
68 Julio Sanguinetti, Nuestro potencial economico industrial y  la defensa nacional (Buenos Aires, April 
1946), p. 134.
69 Calculated from the data in Vicente Vazquez-Presedo,Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas: Compendio 
1873-1973 (Buenos Aires, 1988), p.211.
222
of Patagonia near the border with Chile (see Map 5.1).70 The construction and improvement of roads was 
necessary, and tenders were called for the improvement of highway 293. The latter covered the 260 
kilometres separating the deposit from Rio Gallegos, the potential site for port facilities to ship the coal. 
There was also the idea of building a railway link, which was considered as early as 1943.71
Initially two proposals for a rail link were prepared, but subsequently abandoned because of poor 
planning. The first option, an outlet through Puerto Natales in Chile, was immediately discarded as its 
dependence on Chilean goodwill was politically and economically unacceptable. The second option, that 
of transporting coal to an Argentine port on the Atlantic and then shipping it to the consumption centres, 
was considered more viable. However, the project was dropped owing to significant flaws. The proposed 
railway spanned 390 kilometres to Santa Cruz rather than the 260 kilometres to Rio Gallegos (see Map 5.1 
for location), its estimated cost of m$n 350,000,000 was considered high as the government had other public 
expenditure priorities, and the construction period would be lengthy given the problems in obtaining vital 
materials such as imported rails due to the worldwide iron and steel shortage.72 Despite these failures, the 
urgency of the transportation problem resulted in a third project. This was an economic industrial railway 
from Rio Turbio to Rio Gallegos, which covered the shortest distance to the Atlantic coast (thereby reducing 
construction costs) and allowed the use of the stocks of discarded rails and railroad materials abandoned at 
the Patagonian coastal town of Puerto Madryn.73 The Direccion General de Combustibles Solidos 
Minerales (DGCSM) was authorised by Decree No.9,754 of 13 May 1950 to agree with the Ministries of 
Public Works and Transport all the measures necessary for the preparatory work, construction and 
completion of the project.74 Opened in May 1951, the line was named Ramal Industrial Eva Peron.75
70 Presidencia, Carbon, p.6.
71 Speech by Captain Arturo Kunz, adviser to the Direccion General de Combustibles Solidos Minerales 
(DGCSM), on LRA 1 Radio del Estado, 1 October 1948, DGCSM, Primer cargamento de carbon mineral 
de Rio Turbio, 1° de Octubre de 1948 (Buenos Aires, 1949), unpaginated.
72 Revista de la Facultad, July 1950, p.635.
73 Calliari, Yacimiento, p.50.
74 Revista de la Facultad, July 1950, p.636.
75 Calliari, Yacimiento, p.50.
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Hasty construction led to severe deficiences: it was a narrow-gauge railway with steep gradients on Va of 
the line, no ballast on most of the track, and light rails that restricted the maximum load per axel to 6 
tons.76 This created serious transportation bottlenecks, reflected in the volumes of coal transported - which 
were relatively low when compared with actual output (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6 below). Problems were only 
aggravated by the lack of progress made in developing the port at Rio Gallegos.
Table 5.4
COAL TRANSPORTED FROM RIO TURBIO TO BUENOS AIRES, 1951-1958
(in tons)
YEAR BY RAIL FROM RIO TURBIO 
TO RIO GALLEGOS










Source: Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Programa de desarrollo de la cuenca de Rio Turbio, Tomo I 
(Buenos Aires, 1963), Primera parte, p.62.
Rio Gallegos required new port facilities to accomodate the growth in coal traffic. A dock was 
under construction by 1948, and conveyor belts with an hourly capacity of 200 tons were being fitted for 
loading coal from a storage bay.77 However, planners considered these facilities incomplete and inadequate 
as the projected (but subsequently unachieved) daily capacity of the industrial railway was 12,000 tons. 
Therefore, Decree No.9,754 also authorised the DGCSM to agree with the relevant Ministries all the 
measures necessary for the construction and completion of a terminus, port facilities, and accessory
76 UN, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Serie Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo 
economico, V: El desarrollo economico de la Argentina, Segunda parte - Los sectores de la production: 
energia y transporte (Mexico, 1959), p. 158.
77 Despatch from the Subsecretaria de Informaciones, Direction General de Prensa, Presidencia de la 
Nation, 29 September 1948, DGCSM, Cargamento, unpaginated.
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installations at Rio Gallegos.78 This required vast capital outlays which could not be afforded due to 
economic difficulties, and thereby the project was scaled down. The start of the construction of mechanised 
loading facilities at Rio Gallegos was authorised by Decree No. 13,163 of 4 July 1951. This undertaking, 
for which international tenders were invited, was budgeted at m$n 123,900,000.79 Completed in the late 
Fifties, it enabled the loading of 300 tons per hour directly from the train wagon to the ship hold.80 No 
other installations were built, as the Administracion General de Puertos concentrated on planning new major 
capital investments to modernise infrastructure in the leading national ports (which served the Pampas and 
were located on the River Plate, the Parana river and the Atlantic coast of the province of Buenos Aires).81 
In the absence of adequate facilities at Rio Gallegos, ships could not operate in secure conditions and those 
of only 3,000 to 4,000 tons could be handled - even at times of high tide.82 As a result, even lower 
volumes of coal were shipped in relation to actual output and consignments on the Ramal Industrial Eva 
Peron (see Tables 5.4 above and 5.6 below).
Notwithstanding such difficulties, production had already begun at Rio Turbio and the DGCSM was 
determined to prove that domestically produced coal could reach the main market. Its resolve was 
epitomised by the way the first shipment reached Buenos Aires in October 1948. As facilities were lacking 
at Rio Gallegos, 1,600 tons were shipped on an LST-type military transport. This craft, which was built 
in the USA in 1943-1945 and acquired after the ’normalisation’ of Argentine-American relations in 1947, 
could land on the beach itself and open its bow doors for easy loading and unloading.83 This was an 
attractive temporary solution, but no real substitute for the necessary improvement of the port at Rio 
Gallegos. However, it proved more than temporary. There was little progress with the development of new
78 Revista de la Facultad, July 1950, pp.635,636.
79 Calliari, Yacimiento, p.50.
80 UN, ECLA, Analisis y proyecciones, V: Argentina, Segunda parte - Energia y transporte, p. 170.
81 Ministerio de Obras y Servicios Publicos, A long range Transportation Plan for Argentina, Main 
Report (Buenos Aires, 1962), p.72.
82 UN, ECLA, Analisis y proyecciones, V: Argentina, Segunda parte - Energia y transporte, p. 158.
83 Despatch from the Subsecretaria de Informaciones, DGCSM, Cargamento, unpaginated; Revista de 
la Facultad, October 1948, p. 1048, fn.l.
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and modem facilities as a result of the high investment levels required, and thereby LST-type craft continued 
to serve the many primitive Patagonian ports as late as the Sixties.84
The quality o f  iron ore and coal resources
Combined with adverse location and transportation factors was the poor quality of domestic 
minerals. Regarding the quality of iron ore in general terms, iron-bearing minerals (which included 
hematite, the type found in Argentina) were normally expected to have a content of 60 to 72%.85 At the 
Argentine deposits, the iron content was below these levels and therefore larger volumes of mineral had to 
be extracted. The content of the Zapla ores from the ’9 de Octubre’ mine averaged 48%.86 The quality 
of Zapla minerals did not improve with the coming on stream of the ’Puesto Viejo’ mine in the late Fifties. 
Situated at about 60 kilometres from Palpala, ’Puesto Viejo’ was an open cast mine consisting of a seam 
which was 3 to 5 metres thick with an iron content of merely 40%. The ore had to then be transported by 
rail to the AHZ after processing and classification, thereby increasing its cost.87 Quality was higher at 
Sierra Grande, where the iron content was 55 to 56%.88
As regards coal, it was unsuitable for steel production. The mineral extracted from two seams at 
Rio Turbio which came into exploitation before the Fifties was of poor quality. Tests in the Manto 
Superior, the first seam to be mined, showed that 650 kilograms of coal for commercial purposes were 
available for every ton extracted. However, fixed coal amounted to 46%, the ash content was 13%, and 
the tenor of volatile substances was 34%.89 Quality was similar in the Manto Dorotea. Its coal was again
84 UN, ECLA, Analisis y proyecciones, V: Argentina, Segunda parte - Energia y transporte, p. 157.
85 UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Survey, pp.7,8.
86 DGFM, Fabricaciones, p.64.
87 DGFM, Pasado, presentey futuro de los Altos Homos Zapla (Argentine Republic, 1975), p.3; DGFM, 
31° Aniversario, 9 de Octubre 1941-1972 (Buenos Aires, October 1972), p.81.
88 ILAFA, Argentina, p. 199.
89 Revista de la Facultad, June 1948, p.472.
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poor, with an ash content of 12% and a high tenor of volatile substances.90 Notwithstanding such 
disadvantages, efforts persisted to supply Rio Turbio coal for steelmaking and to achieve self-sufficiency 
in ’strategic’ commodities. To overcome the problem of high content of ash and volatile substances, 
treatment became essential. Although depuration was initially done by hand, a plant with a daily capacity 
of 200 tons was under construction by 1948 and completed in May 1951.91 With growth in coal output, 
this plant was expanded in various successive phases and attained a daily capacity of 1,500 tons by the early 
Sixties.92 It had been originally intended to complement the depuration plant with a coking plant, which 
would have enabled the supply of industrial coke for steel production.93 By the early Sixties, the coking 
plant had not been built. By then the SOMISA steelworks, which would rely on imported coal (see below), 
had finally come on stream and had its own coking facilities.
Development o f  iron ore and coal production
Despite the major disadvantages in terms of localtion and quality, the drive for self-sufficiency in 
’strategic’ commodities led to the rapidly-paced development of the ’9 de Octubre’ iron mine at Zapla and 
the ’Presidente Peron’ coal deposit at Rio Turbio. Since both efforts were guided by wartime considerations 
and occurred at a time not only of increased State intervention in the economy but of military participation 
in government (see Chapter 2), it was the State companies associated with the Armed Forces which 
undertook the exploitation of domestic raw material resources.
Following the discovery of iron at the Cerro Zapla in 1940, samples of ore were sent to
90 Diputados, Ano 1951, Tomo I, p.244.
91 Calliari, Yacimiento, p.46; Despatch from the Subsecretariade Informaciones, DGCSM, Cargamento, 
unpaginated.
92 Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Programa de desarrollo de la cuenca de Rio Turbio, Tomo I (Buenos 
Aires, 1963), Primera parte, p.58.
93 Speech by Rear-admiral Bautista Frola, director of the DGCSM, during the ceremony marking the 
unloading of the first shipment of Rio Turbio coal at Buenos Aires, 1 October 1948, DGCSM, Cargamento, 
unpaginated.
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Fabricaciones Militares and successfully tested at the Fabrica Militar de Aceros.94 Given military interest 
in ’strategic’ reserves, the acceptance of private sector applications for exploration and mining at Zapla and 
a large surrounding area were suspended by the provincial authorities in September 1941. With the 
announcement in February 1942 that the few individuals that registered applications in the provincial 
Direccion de Minas had donated the exploitation rights to the Nation, Zapla became a reserve and 
applications expired by decree on 9 April 1942.95 In September 1942 the DGFM confirmed that the 
deposit was extensive. The extension of the deposit into the Puesto Viejo district was confirmed later.96 
A definitive profit-sharing agreement on the exploitation of the ore - no details are available - was reached 
on 21 August 1942 between the DGFM and the provincial finance minister.97 The ’9 de Octubre’ mine 
became operational in 1944, and
Table 5.5
IRON ORE PRODUCTION, 1944-1955 
(in tons)
YEAR TOTAL OUTPUT ZAPLA OUTPUT SHARE (%)
1944 1,921 3 0.2
1945 43,375 40,947 94.4
1946 50,477 48,729 96.5
1947 39,495 38,500 97.5
1948 36,439 31,686 87.0
1949 37,601 34,556 91.9
1950 39,873 37,519 94.1
1951 55,063 52,271 94.9
1952 66,671 63,598 95.4
1953 76,621 74,090 96.7
1954 77,145 71,280 92.4
1955 76,270 73,802 96.8
Sources: Ministerio de Industria y Comercio de la Nation, Estadistica Minera de la Republica 
Argentina, Anos 1945-1949, pp.61,63; Ministerio de Comercio e Industria de la Nacidn, Estadistica 
Minera, Anos 1950-1952, p.15, and Anos 1953-1956, p.94.
94 Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated.
95 Altos Homos Zapla (AHZ), Revista de adhesion al 25° aniversario de la primera colada del arrabio 
argentino (Argentine Republic, 1970), p. 12.
96 Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated.
97 AHZ, Revista, p. 12.
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daily output amounted to 330 tons.98 Between 1944 and 1949, 200,000 tons of ore were extracted.99 In 
the absence of iron ore imports, Zapla became the leading source of iron and had the largest share of 
national output (see Table 5.5).
In the case of Rio Turbio, rapid development was facilitated by the fact that the basin had been 
pinpointed in the nineteenth century and studies carried out in 1922. Systematic exploration began in 
February 1943, combined with small-scale extraction to satisfy local demand. With the confirmation that 
exploitation was viable, the DGCSM (later renamed Yacimientos Carboniferos Fiscales) was created in 
January 1946.100 The length of the Rio Turbio deposit from north to south was estimated at 40 kilometres, 
the width in its middle portion at 5 kilometres, and it consisted of 4 seams (Manto Superior, Manto Dorotea, 
Manto ’A’, and Manto Inferior) each with a thickness of 1 to 2 metres.101 Development began in 1943 
in the Manto Superior, the only known layer at the time. Two pits were opened, the Mina No.l and the 
Mina No.2. The former produced coal from the start, and 60,000 tons had been extracted by 1951. 
However, it was to be abandoned as only 35,000 tons remained available, its 1,023 metre-long main gallery 
was limited by the Chilean frontier, and the lower parts of the seam were under exploitation through the 
Mina No.2. The latter opened in mid-1947, the length of its main gallery being 720 metres and extendable 
to a maximum 5,000 metres, and whose total production was calculated at 300,000 tons. Following the 
assessment of the Manto Dorotea, exploitation of the latter was begun. Preparatory work began in 
November 1946 for the Mina No. 3, which was to be the main one of the deposit. The projected length for 
its main galleries was 6,300 metres, and its output was estimated at 11,000,000 tons of coal. Further 
development of the Manto Dorotea would be undertaken in 1952 with the Mina No.4, which was expected 
to supply another 4,500,000 tons.102
98 DGFM, El hierro de Zapla (Buenos Aires, 1954), p.7.
99 Ricardo Piccirilli, Francisco L. Romay and Leoncio Gianello (eds.), Diccionario Historico Argentino, 
Volume VI (Buenos Aires, 1954), p.470.
100 Calliari, Yacimiento, p.22.
101 Diputados, Afio 1951, Tomo I, p.244.
102 Calliari, Yacimiento, pp.34,36,38.
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Locational factors made high mechanisation essential at the coal basin. Unlike Zapla, Rio Turbio 
was virtually isolated and no local labour supply was available. To offset labour shortages, machinery was 
purchased in Britain for £ 500,000 and in the USA for US$ 200,000 in 1948. These acquisitions were 
possible as the country had not yet completely exhausted its exchange reserves and relations with the USA 
had been ’normalised’ in 1947. To satisfy the power requirements of the imported equipment, the 
installation of a 30,000 kw plant was planned.103 However, the deterioration of public finances at the end 
of the Forties prevented the construction of this plant, since large expenditure outlays were not affordable. 
Moreover, national power supplies were deficitary and, if urgent improvements would have been carried out, 
priority would have presumably gone to the main consumption areas. In the event, mechanisation of work 
was achieved in the Fifties with the installation of a 12,000 kw thermal power plant.104
Table 5.6








1944 625,864 616,818 98.5% 9,046 4,443
1945 772,493 767,872 99.4% 4,621 58
1946 1,146,447 1,144,368 99.8% 2,079 1,647
1947 1,228,950 1,214,610 98.8% 14,340 13,247
1948 2,194,693 2,177,200 99.2% 17,493 16,838
1949 1,358,046 1,340,837 98.7% 17,209 15,885
1950 1,473,576 1,447,087 98.2% 26,489 25,192
1951 2,207,541 2,167,638 98.2% 39,903 37,587
1952 1,852,518 1,740,228 93.9% 112,290 109,100
1953 1,267,096 1,183,920 93.4% 83,176 80,516
1954 1,599,444 1,506,161 94.2% 93,283 92,523
1955 1,313,221 1,177,241 89.6% 135,980 132,617
1956 1,504,854 1,351,465 89.8% 153,389 149,024
1957 1,364,216 1,155,496 84.7% 208,720 203,238
1958 1,614,299 1,353,315 83.8% 260,984 259,367
Sources: Compiled from Comercio Exterior, Anos 1944 y 1945-1946; Anuario Estadistico, Tomo II, 
Anos 1948 y 1949-1950; Comercio Exterior, Anos 1951-1954 y 1955-1957; Secretaria de Estado de 
Hacienda, Comercio Exterior, Ano 1958; Estadistica Minera, Anos 1945-1949,1950-1952 y 1953-1956; 
Ministerio de Economia de la Nacion, Estadistica Minera, Anos 1957-1961.
103 Ibid., p.41.
104 UN, ECLA, Analisis y proyecciones, V: Argentina, Segunda parte - Energia y transporte, p.51.
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The Rio Turbio basin represents 99% of proven national coal reserves and became the main 
domestic source of coal supply.105 However, notwithstanding that coal imports did not attain pre-1939 
levels for reasons described below and that petroleum was replacing coal as the leading fuel, Rio Turbio 
output was insufficient to offset the predominance of imports in consumption (see Table 5.6). Despite 
growth in iron and coal production, dependence on national resources was impractical and uneconomic. The 
remoteness of deposits and severe transport bottlenecks resulted in high costs and the poor quality of the 
minerals, manifested in an iron and coal content below levels normally accepted, affected the efficiency and 
profitability of the mines. These considerations were taken into account in the planning of the SOMISA 
project and led to the recommendation that a combination of both domestic and imported inputs should be 
used. However, before this issue is addressed in the final section, one other domestic raw material must be 
assessed.
THE SUPPLY OF CHARCOAL, THE FUEL FOR THE ALTOS HORNOS ZAPLA
The use of charcoal for fuel at the wartime development of Zapla responded to three factors. First, 
as seen in Chapter 1, charcoal had been the ’original’ fuel employed to smelt iron ore.106 Second, the 
Republic was exploiting iron ore but lacked coal and, as in other countries facing similar problems (eg, 
Brazil and Sweden), the use of charcoal enabled iron and steel production based on exclusively national raw 
materials. Finally, owing to the superior properties of charcoal, pig iron produced in charcoal-based blast 
furnaces was of higher quality than that produced with coke.107 However, charcoal-based iron and steel 
production was not viable in the long-term. In order to understand why this was the case, a comparison 
between Zapla and Brazilian charcoal-based steel producers is very useful. Unlike the AHZ, Brazilian firms 
had the necessary initial advantages to employ charcoal. Forests and the labour required for cutting and 
converting the wood into charcoal were concentrated in the proximity of the mills. Nonetheless, the initial
105 Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas, Siderurgia (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 17.
106 Douglas A. Fisher, Steel Serves the Nation (New York, 1951), p. 119.
107 UN, ECLA, A study o f the iron and steel industry in Latin America, Volume II (New York, 1954), 
p.157.
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cost advantages of charcoal-based production decreased in the long-term. Few of the Brazilian steelmakers 
had established tree plantations to meet their charcoal requirements. Natural wood supplies close to the 
plants dwindled, and thereby costs rose for many firms as timber had to be transported over longer 
distances.108
In contrast, the AHZ did not enjoy even the initial advantages enjoyed by Brazilian producers as 
a result of two major difficulties. The first was the availability of natural wood supplies to meet the 
charcoal requirements of the AHZ. The forests which once had the best economic value (ie, those of easy 
access from major cities) were already depleted.109 Remaining stocks of timber were also being depleted 
owing to rapid wartime growth in charcoal demand, which resulted from imported coal shortages, and the 
absence of a national reforestation policy. Consumption of charcoal, which before 1939 was used 
exclusively as fuel in northern Argentina, totalled 644,000 tons in the period 1922-1938. It then rose steeply 
during the Second World War, to annual volumes exceeding the total consumption for 1922-1938. 
Consumption rose to 762,000 tons in 1941 and 815,000 tons in 1942. Therefore, 45,000,000 tons of 
firewood were extracted between 1922 and 1942.110 The second difficulty were the primitive techniques 
employed to process firewood and produce charcoal. Production and transport of firewood was 
unmechanised and labour-intensive, which prevented economies in the costs of both firewood and charcoal. 
Charcoal production in the forests of northern Argentina was undertaken by a large number of small 
producers scattered all over the region.111 Charcoal was produced in ovens which required more than 6 
to 10 tons of firewood to obtain 1 ton of charcoal, and wastage caused by the lack of modem procedures 
prevented industrialisation of byproducts which would have reduced total production costs.112 Once 
elaborated, charcoal could not compete as an industrial fuel with coal. Notwithstanding the advantages 
relating specifically to pig iron production, the problems with charcoal were that its volume was 3 times that
108 Wemer Baer, The Development o f the Brazilian Steel Industry (Nashville, 1969), p.10.
109 Wassman, Posibilidades, p.4.
110 Sanguinetti, Potencial, pp. 142,143.
111 AHZ, Revista, pp.58,60.
112 Sanguinetti, Potencial, p. 143.
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of coal and only had V% to 1/a of its thermal value per ton.113
In an attempt to overcome the problems of firewood availability and reliance on scattered suppliers, 
the DGFM devised a reforestation programme in 1947.114 Comprising a Plan de Carbonizacion and a Plan 
Forestal, its goals were plant self-sufficiency in charcoal supplies and to increase annually the availability 
of firewood until it matched the future requirements of the AHZ.115 Military planners envisaged a Centro 
Forestal, which for economic reasons could not be located more than 100 kilometres from the AHZ. The 
selected site was only 4 kilometres from the plant and covered an area of 17,250 hectares. Following the 
expropriation of land, the Programa de Forestacion began in 1948.116 Its centrepiece was the planting of 
35,000,000 eucalyptus between 1948 and 1954.117 The first 660 hectares were forested with 1,625,000 
eucalyptus trees. Work proceeded rapidly and a plant for charcoal production was built, which comprised 
131 furnaces of the kind used in Brazil and had a capacity of 1,400 to 1,800 kilograms per fumacing.118 
The DGFM reforestation plan was the largest national project of its kind.119 Eucalyptus trees, which were 
fast-growing, had been chosen to restrict the phosphorus content in charcoal. The charcoal fines were 
obtained from the bark of trees, where the phosphoms content was highest, and tests in Brazil had shown 
that some eucalyptus varieties were virtually phosphorus-free.120 Charcoal production at Zapla began in 
1950, using firewood obtained in the land clearing preceding the reforestation, and 10,000,000 eucalyptus 
were protected in greenhouses and another 7,000,000 had been placed in their final location by 1951.121
113 H. Foster Bain, Lasposibilidades de la manufactura de hierroyacero en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 
1925), p.31.
114 General Humberto Sosa Molina, Inauguracion del segundo alto homo Zapla (Argentine Republic, 
April 1951), unpaginated.
115 Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated.
116 Ibid.
117 Sosa Molina, Inauguracion, unpaginated.
118 Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated.
119 Sosa Molina, Inauguracion, unpaginated.
120 UN, ECLA, Study, Volume II, p. 165.
121 Sosa Molina, Inauguracion, unpaginated.
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However, the Centro Forestal did not meet military expectations. Because production of firewood was 
unmechanised and labour-intensive, it remained as inefficient as the scattered suppliers which the 
reforestation programme had aimed to replace. The Centro Forestal only provided 10 to 15% of charcoal 
requirements of the AHZ by 1970, while third parties remained the predominant suppliers of charcoal - as 
in the past.122 The use of charcoal, like that of national iron ore and coal resources, had major 
disadvantages. Nevertheless, as is seen below, there yet remained one way in which domestic raw materials 
could be employed in iron and steel production.
THE SOMISA PROJECT: A COMBINATION OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN INPUTS
The underlying assumption behind the Plan Siderurgico Argentino and the SOMISA project was 
that limited steel production based on foreign inputs could not continue and therefore national sources of 
minerals had to be exploited, despite their strategic and cost disadvantages.123 Hence, the objective was 
self-sufficiency in iron and steel production and in raw material supplies. However, during the preparation 
of the PSA it became clear that pursuing an autarkic policy for raw material supplies was a mistake owing 
to transportation bottlenecks, the inadequate location of deposits, and high costs of production.124 As a 
result, private sector industrialists participating in SOMISA recommended that the projected plant should 
operate mainly with imported inputs - although this did not entirely exclude the use of national inputs. 
Their proposal recommended that, for economic reasons, the use of imported minerals was more 
advantageous in peacetime and that national inputs should be preserved for emergencies.125
The specific details of the mix of foreign and national inputs to be utilised by SOMISA were
122 AHZ, Revista, p.58.
123 Savio, ’Bases’, p.389.
124 Debate on the PSA, 8-9 May 1947, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.288.
125 Proposal presented by TAMET S.A., La Cantabrica S.A., SIAM Di Telia Ltda., and ARMCO 
Argentina S.A. at the contest held by the DGFM, 3 November 1944, in DGFM, Plan Siderurgico Argentino 
(Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 150; Consideration of the report of the Comision de Defensa Nacional on the Draft 
Bill of the PSA under revision, 13 June 1947, Senadores, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.225.
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stipulated in the PSA. Although the proportion of domestic raw materials to be used was 30% (this was 
the percentage of requirements that could be met by national pig iron output), the minimum obligatory 
consumption of domestic inputs was 10%. The remaining 20% was to become part of a raw material 
reserve enshrined in the PSA in the event of a cut-off in overseas supplies.126 Under Article 60, SOMISA 
undertook to form and maintain a permanent strategic reserve of foreign and national inputs sufficient to 
maintain production. Furthermore, the PSA established that stocks of imported minerals to cover 6 months 
production were to be accumulated along with national raw materials for at least 2 months production.127 
The volume of foreign raw material stocks to be held by SOMISA was also related to national defence 
requirements. Though the plant was required a 6 month stock for its normal operation, the DGFM believed 
that an additional foreign raw material reserve of an undetermined volume should be stockpiled for 
seguridad nacional purposes. As a result, a progressive investment of m$n 20,000,000 in this extra stock 
would be made over 8 years. The extra stock was to be stored at the steelworks and under the custody of 
SOMISA, as it would be DGFM property and thereby under State jurisdiction. SOMISA could make use 
of it with authorisation from the DGFM and then replace it or reimburse its cash value to the Ministry of 
Finance.128
Planning for the PSA coincided with severe limitations imposed by the Second World War on 
potential foreign sources of minerals. The two nearest possible sources of iron were Chile and Brazil. 
Chilean deposits offered the best prospects, as the ores had a high iron content, required low investment for 
mining and loading facilities, and were reasonably located in relation to ports.129 However, the possibility 
of importing them was low as Chilean minerals would be required in domestic steel production at the
126 Debate on the PSA, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, pp. 312,342.
127 Estatutos de Siderurgia Argentina, Sociedad Anonima Mixta, in DGFM, Plan, pp.126,127.
128 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Conceptosfundamentalesde ordeneconomico-financiero’,Buenos Aires, 
17 August 1945. In the Analisis de los aspectos tecnicos, economicos y financieros de la propuesta 
SOMISA, in DGFM, Plan, p.50.
129 Estudio tecnico-economico de la production de acero semiterminado en la Republica Argentina 
presentado por ARMCO Argentina S.A., in DGFM, Plan, p.81.
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Huachipato works.130 Brazilian ores presented serious problems. Notwithstanding the advantages of 
quality, prices were high owing to the poor transport infrastructure. The railway network was inadequate, 
freight rates high, and port facilities lacking.131 The difficulty in obtaining imported coal proved far 
greater, as wartime shortages were not resolved with the end of the war. Britain, traditionally the leading 
coal supplier, was unable to meet Argentine needs and struggled to maintain its prominence in a market 
which had provided very favourable treatment. The launch of the PSA coincided with a major crisis in the 
world coal supply. Although the preparatory studies recommended the use of a specific mix of domestic 
and foreign inputs, they also acknowledged the crisis. The principal European producers could not produce 
coal in quantity, as war had led to a shortage of labour and transport facilities and, far more critical, there 
was no knowledge of when prewar output levels would be restored.132
Table 5.7
ESTIMATED ANNUAL RAW MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS OF SOMISA
(in tons)
RAW MATERIALS FOR 315,000 TONS FOR 500,000 TONS
Ore (Fe 62% content) 394,000 600,000
Coal 264,500 400,000
Scrap iron 35,000 70,000
Other metallic elements 2,200 3,500
Source: Estudio tecnico-economico de la production de acero semiterminado en la Republica 
Argentina presentado por ARMCO Argentina S.A., in Direction General de Fabricaciones Militares, 
Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1946), p.80.
Nevertheless, the calculations of the annual raw material requirements of SOMISA - for when the 
plant was fully operational - were elaborated by ARMCO Argentina (see Table 5.7). They were prepared 
for two different capacities: 315,000 tons, the capacity requested by the DGFM when inviting tenders for 
the project, and 500,000 tons, the capacity recommended by ARMCO Argentina to allow for an increase
130 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.30.
131 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, p.81.
132 Ibid., p.82.
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from the initial capacity without incurring extra costs. The quality of imported ore to be employed was 
specified, and the iron content was within the normally expected levels (see above) and higher than that of 
domestic sources. On the basis of initial capacity estimates, coal imports for SOMISA, were calculated at
264,000 tons. Based on total prewar requirements, PSA supporters claimed that this would merely represent 
a rise of under 10% in imports since pre-1939 coal imports attained 3,000,000 tons.133 It was perhaps 
fortunate that the government took no further action on the steelworks once the project was approved by 
Congress (see Chapters 2 and 3), because had they come on stream within schedule they could have not 
become operational given the continuing coal shortages. Established suppliers such as Britain faced serious 
difficulties, and traditional trade currents had not normalised.134 It would have been impossible to obtain 
the tonnage required by SOMISA. Furthermore, the decision in 1948 to increase the capacity of the 
projected plant from 315,000 to 500,000 tons raised coal import requirements for the steelworks to 400,000 
tons (see Table 5.7). This target could not have been attained had SOMISA been completed on schedule, 
due to mounting problems in Anglo-Argentine trade and the national economic crisis.
Since the volume of British coal that could be imported was sufficient to meet pressing demands 
from the major consumers (ie, power stations and the railways), the issue of British coal supplies became 
critical to Anglo-Argentine negotiations. At 1,000,000 tons, the total volume of British coal that could be 
made available to the Republic in 1948 was well below prewar levels.135 Fearful of the wane in its 
relations with Buenos Aires, London agreed to supply this volume under the trade agreement initialled on 
12 February 1948.136 Nonetheless, coal shortages prevented the British from fully meeting their 
commitment. Only 880,000 tons were provided, from which the power stations received 440,000 tons, the
133 Consideration of the report from the Comision de Defensa Nacional on the Draft Bill of the PSA 
under revision, Senadores, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.225.
134 Ibid.
135 Telegram No.237 from the FO to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 10 February 1948. Bank of 
England Archive, OV 102/125.
136 Agreement on Trade and Payments between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Buenos Aires, 12 February 1948. 
Title and text despatched in Telegram No.255 from Leeper, 12 February 1948. Bank of England Archive, 
OV 102/125.
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railways 345,000 tons, and Gas del Estado 25,000 tons.137 Aware that the volume supplied was far below 
real requirements and of the importance of the negotiations, Britain unsuccessfully considered providing coal 
out of the additional 77,000 tons available per week for export to all destinations in 1948.138 However, 
the proposal to supply another 500,000 tons would have not been feasible given the scarcity of coal.139
Although the level of supplies was subsequently renegotiated, problems mounted. The difficulties 
in obtaining imported coal as a result of shortages combined with a balance of payments crisis, which 
crippled the country’s ability to pay for imports. The British agreed to supply 1,500,000 tons of coal under 
the agreement of June 1949, an amount which was to be maintained for each year until the accord expired 
in June 1954 or was terminated by either contracting party.140 No sooner had this happened, the Bank of 
England voiced its concern to the Treasury over backlogs in Argentine payments.141 Such an anxiety 
appeared justified as the country continued to fall behind in its obligations despite measures to remedy 
exchange shortages. The British Government considered suspending coal supplies, but this was not possible. 
The Republic had not formally broken the agreement, and Britain would be in breach by withholding 
supplies. This was tantamount to declaring an economic war at a time when contracts existed for almost 
full obligation until June 1950.142 London was anxious to avoid serious economic dislocation in the 
country, which depended on a transport system that until the Second World War had been powered by 
British railway and bunker coal.143 It was believed that alternative sources could not fully substitute
137 TelegramNo.286 from Leeperto theFO, 18 February 1948. Bank of England Archive, OV 102/125.
138 Telegram No.364 from the FO to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 27 February 1948. Bank of 
England Archive, OV 102/125.
139 TelegramNo.334 from Leeperto the FO, 28 February 1948. Bank of England Archive, OV 102/125.
140 Agreement on Trade and Payments between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Argentine Government, with Schedules, Annex and Exchange of Notes, Buenos 
Aires, 27 June 1949. Bank of England Archive, OV 102/133.
141 Letter from G.M.Watson, Bank of England, to L. Petch, HM Treasury, 8 July 1949. Bank of 
England Archive, OV 102/133.
142 Draft of an Argentine Working Party Report on Coal and Oil Supplies from HM Treasury to the FO, 
30 December 1949. FO 371 AA 1531/1.
143 Ibid.
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British supplies. American coal would be unavailable owing to Argentine shortages of foreign exchange 
and to continuing instability in relations between Buenos Aires and Washington, and South Africa and 
Poland could only replace British provisions very partially. The British Government did not want economic 
warfare, and thereby engaged in the discussion of all aspects of the agreement that required adjustment.144
It was during the negotiations of 1950 that SOMISA should have been completed. Had this been 
the case, it would have had little opportunity of obtaining its coal requirements owing to the balance of 
payments crisis. The issue of coal supplies became part of the row over Argentine meat shipments. Buenos 
Aires limited the issue of import licenses, thereby frustrating the British undertaking to supply 1,500,000 
tons of coal. In February 1950 the Argentine Government purchased 45,000 tons of Polish coal for shore 
depots, which was ranked against the Argentine-Polish barter agreement.145 In July 1950, while licenses 
were not issued for large volumes of British coal, permits were granted for 150,000 tons of Polish coal and
3,000 tons of South African coke, for which prices were not quoted. Each would be paid in dollars, and 
delivered before September that year.146 In these circumstances, the British National Coal Board decided 
it could not allow arrears for past deliveries to accumulate further and suspended shipments to the Argentine 
State Railways, which owed £ 250,000.147 However, the suspension of British coal shipments over the 
backlog of Argentine payments made little difference, given that the National Coal Board could not fulfill 
contracts with Argentine buyers for coal deliveries.148 This happened at a particularly awkward moment 
in the negotiations over Argentine meat. Although the problem arose from the failure to maintain coal 
output levels, it was difficult for HM Government to convince the Argentine authorities that the inability
144 Report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the proposed suspension of coal and oil supplies to 
Argentina, 7 January 1950. FO 371 AA 1531/6.
145 Telegram No.54 from the FO to Buenos Aires, 8 February 1950. FO 371 AA 1531/8.
146 Despatch SA No.l 12 from the Commercial Department of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to 
the American Department of the FO, 14 July 1950. FO 371 AA 1531/12.
147 Telegram No. 134 from the FO to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 29 March 1950. FO 371 
AA 1531/9.
148 Telegram No.348 from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to the FO, 16 August 1950. FO 371 
AA 1531/13.
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to meet commitments was not some reprisal for their suspension of meat shipments.149 In the event, a 
compromise was reached over coal supplies, by which the Britain would attempt to make 500,000 tons of 
coal available in 1951.150 Given the priority awarded to the largest consumers, this would have been an 
inadequate volume for SOMISA to have obtained its requirements. As a result, the proposal that the 
SOMISA project should employ a mix of both foreign and national minerals was not practicable - even 
though it was the most feasible proposal. The launch of the PSA had coincided with both the inadequacy 
of local resources and the unavailability of imported raw materials.
CONCLUSION
In a period fraught with problems created by adverse external conditions, the difficulties in 
obtaining raw materials for iron and steel production remained unsolved. Domestic resources were 
inadequate. Although scrap stocks were considerable, they depended on decreasing renewals of rails and 
were exhausted owing to the rapid growth of scrap-based steel production during the Second World War. 
National sources of iron ore and coal were discovered during the Forties as a result of military concerns of 
’strategic’ commodities, but were hindered by location and quality problems. Deposits were located in 
remote regions, with little transportation infrastructure to cover the distance to the markets, and the poor 
quality of the minerals made these resources unsuitable for use in heavy industry. Finally, there was the 
matter of charcoal being employed as fuel. Though it was the only alternative for the AHZ, production was 
costly and unmechanised, and transport of large volumes from outlying areas was also problematic.
Foreign inputs were also difficult to obtain, particularly during the Forties. With the sharp decline 
in iron and steel imports, military concerns over supplies of ’strategic’ materials increased and therefore the
149 Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer from E. Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 16 November 1950. FO 
371 AA 1531/15.
150 Letter No.4 from John Edwards, the Economy Secretary to HM Treasury, to Roberto A. Ares, 
Argentine Minister of the Economy, Buenos Aires, 23 April 1951. Protocol supplementing the Agreement 
on Trade and Payments between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic of 27 June 1949 [with Schedule and Letters], Buenos 
Aires, 23 April 1951. Bank of England Archive, OV 102/148.
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Army embarked on two heavy industry projects. The first of these was pig iron production, based entirely 
on domestic resources. Given the quality of the raw materials, and that the latter had the greatest bearing 
on costs, Zapla bears true testimony to military determination to attain self-sufficiency in iron and steel 
supplies at any price. The second project, the SOMISA steelworks, was to be based on a combination of 
foreign and domestic minerals, since the use of the former would be economically advantageous. 
Nonetheless, the availability of foreign sources was constrained by the Second World War and its aftermath, 
as exemplified by the crisis in coal supplies. The real difficulty was that development of heavy industry 
simply because the Armed Forces had to ’have’ it was an insufficient condition. A lack of adequate raw 
materials, combined with the international crises, made the success of such attempts impossible.
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Chapter 6
THE AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Access to imported modem technology was critical for the development of domestic steel 
production. Foreign technology transfers were limited by international factors and, at the end of the period, 
by domestic considerations. Two external constraints can be clearly identified. First were the deliberate 
efforts of the leading steel producer-exporters in the Twenties and Thirties to frustrate growth in national 
production. This led to a refusal to provide strategic Tumps’ of technology and the acquisition of local 
firms (or the establishment of branch firms) in order to limit domestic production to certain finishing lines. 
Second was US antagonism towards Argentina following the 1943 coup and the rise of Peron. The 
American economic boycott in the Forties initially aimed to penalise the Republic for its refusal to join the 
Inter-American system, and was subsequently a function of the determination to prevent the development 
of heavy industries in ’small’ economies. Towards the late Forties, domestic economic difficulties also 
restricted technology transfers. Diminished foreign exchange earnings and the exhaustion of gold and 
foreign exchange reserves, which were vital to cover import costs, prevented any equipment purchases.
This chapter argues that, despite these adverse constraints, technology scarcity was on occasions 
circumvented by competent and ingenious local engineers - particularly during the Second World War. 
Plants were built, equipment was adapted, existing (previously imported) machinery copied, foreign designs 
modified, and vital capital generally manufactured. Arguably, this pointed to a domestic capacity to foster 
iron and steel production. Yet, even though other ’small’ economies faced identical difficulties and resolved 
them in a similar fashion, it will be seen that Argentina was unable to emulate other countries by 
successfully upgrading equipment following the end of the Second World War owing to continued problems 
in relations between Buenos Aires and Washington and national economic factors.
This chapter comprises two sections. The first considers the capital goods shortage, and argues that 
the successful emergence of local steel production was largely frustrated by deliberate pressure from foreign 
firms. Intentional foreign coercion is reflected in the attempt to control world steel production and
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distribution by the International Steel Cartel, which finally collapsed with the outbreak of the Second World 
War. The section also argues that, notwithstanding the curbs on foreign supplies of technology, Argentine 
engineers at times were able to bypass restrictions on technology transfers. The second section assesses the 
impact of the Argentine-American relations on the implementation of the Plan Siderurgico Argentino, the 
greatest attempt of the period to create a modem, large-scale steel industry, and will argue that fluctuations 
in the continuously strained relations had a direct bearing on the Argentine reaction to the involvement of 
the US company ARMCO in the project.
RESTRICTIONS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND THEIR CIRCUMVENTION, c.1920-1945
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the leading European iron and steel producer- 
exporters attempted to frustrate efforts by ’small’ economies to develop heavy industry through the 
International Steel Cartel (ISC). As seen in Chapter 2, this consortium implemented oligopolistic policies 
whose goal was controlling world steel production and distribution. In Argentina, ISC practices involved 
a degree of control over one of the few large metallurgical producers and a calculated denial of technical 
assistance for any serious independent attempt to develop steel production. However, this section shows that 
the cartel ultimately failed to achieve its objectives owing to two factors, (i) Already in the Thirties, the 
Armed Forces built a steel plant with equipment imported from outside the ISC sphere, (ii) The outbreak 
of war in September 1939 destroyed the cartel and resulted in severe shortages of imported iron and steel. 
This provided the opportunity to develop domestic steel production by private sector metallurgical firms, 
whose engineers copied old foreign designs or reconditioned second-hand equipment to overcome restrictions 
on foreign technology transfers.
The oligopolistic practices of the main Continental steel producer-exporters in the Twenties and 
Thirties aimed to protect their shrinking export markets by obstructing the growth of steel production 
overseas. In Argentina, one of the few remaining major ’open’ markets, the only existing steel producer 
at the end of the First World War was an ephemeral firm that posed no threat to foreign suppliers. The 
Talleres Metalurgicos Vulcano was a modest plant located in Buenos Aires, the leading market and source
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of access to scrap and fuel, which had turned out low-grade crude and rolled steel as well as steel rods since 
1896. Vulcano utilised inefficient, low capacity equipment. Its six Siemens-Martin furnaces each produced 
7-8 tons of steel every 12-20 hours while consuming large quantities of fuel oil. The daily foundry capacity 
was only 60 tons.1
However, while Vulcano caused no concern for Continental producer-exporters, any possibility of 
further local initiatives to develop steel production was unwelcome. In the Twenties, such a prospect arose. 
The firm which eventually became the Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET was 
rapidly growing through the acquisition of various workshops and small firms (see Chapter 3). From the 
perspective of European steel producer-exporters, this expansion represented a threat. It could enable 
TAMET to integrate plant and even consider developing steel production at an efficient scale. Attempts to 
’control’ TAMET were pioneered by the colossal metallurgical and mining consortium ARBED-Terres 
Rouges of Luxembourg, which soon acquired a substantial shareholding in the firm. This move was 
particularly significant on two accounts, (a) It involved a major Continental producer-exporter, whose 
oligopolistic practices would shape the methods of the steel cartel it helped found in 1926. (b) It offers the 
possibility to contrast the actions of ARBED in Argentina with those of its Brazilian subsidiary company, 
the Companhia Siderurgica Belgo-Mineira.
Reflecting the economic union between Luxembourg and Belgium, in which the former was the 
junior partner, ARBED brokered its deals in both Brazil and Argentina through interests associated with 
Belgium. The Brazilian arrangement arose from the willingness of the Minas Gerais government to grant 
iron ore concessions to groups other than the predominant British and American interests, in exchange for 
further development of the embryonic local iron and steel industry. The proposal was presented to the 
Belgian monarch during his visit to Brazil in 1920, and elicited a positive response from the 
Luxembourgeois group. ARBED purchased the deposits of the Companhia Siderurgica Mineira in return 
for acquiring and expanding the industrial plant of this company. This firm, which was chosen because one
1 H. Foster Bain, Las posibilidades de la manufactura de hierroy acero en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 
1925), p.103.
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of its founders was the Belgian consul in Belo Horizonte, became the ARBED subsidiary Companhia 
Siderurgica Belgo-Mineira in 1921.2 The Argentine arrangement was almost certainly negotiated by the 
Tomquist group (the key shareholder in TAMET) through the Sociedad General Belga Argentina. The latter 
was registered in Antwerp and devised to obtain European investment in the various industries controlled 
by Tomquist - such as the ARBED stake in TAMET.3
Participation in both Belgo-Mineira and TAMET was part of the ARBED strategy to sustain its 
position in the few remaining ’open’ markets. In the aftermath of the First World War, ARBED-Terres 
Rouges faced severe difficulties in placing output surpluses on the market. With limited outlets in 
Luxembourg owing to insignificant domestic demand, the only alternative was to increase exports (see 
Chapter 2). To attain this goal, ARBED created a worldwide sales network covering 50 countries which 
was based upon its sales organisation Columeta and specific national licensed distributors such as TAMET.4 
In Brazil, steel production had already emerged and therefore the Luxembourg group successfully strove for 
outright control of the market. Belgo-Mineira established itself as both the leading domestic steel producer 
and a major supplier of ISC products as local output did not keep pace with demand. In line with the 
objectives of its parent company and the steel cartel, Belgo-Mineira maintained its prominent market position 
by organising and dominating an association with other local producers. This trust regulated output through 
quotas, set prices and even paid some blast furnaces not to operate.5 In Argentina, the leading Latin 
American market and a traditional iron and steel importer, the stock in TAMET enabled the Luxembourgeois 
enterprise to secure outlets for its products. The Argentine firm, which became a licensed distributing 
company for ARBED, was allowed a ’controlled’ expansion which would complement the corporate 
objectives of the group.
2 Carlos Manuel Pelaez, Historia da Industrializagao Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1972), p. 147.
3 Donna J. Guy, ’La industria argentina, 1870-1940: Legislacion comercial, mercado de acciones y 
capitalizacion extranjera’, Desarrollo Economico 22 (1982-1983) No.87, p.362.
4 Carlo Hemmer, L ’Economie du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, Volume 2 (Luxembourg, 1953), p. 157.
5 John D. Wirth, The Politics o f Brazilian Development 1930-1954 (Stanford, 1970), p.88.
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Amongst the acquisitions made by TAMET was that of the former workshops and equipment of 
the defunct Compania Argentina de Hierros y Aceros de Pedro Vasena e Hijos in 1926. These facilities 
were located on the banks of the Riachuelo in Buenos Aires and highly modem by local standards. They 
comprised a small foundry and machinery for the production of screws and bolts, wire drawing and 
galvanising equipment, and an up to date internal transportation system for machinery and finished goods.6 
TAMET expanded these metallurgical workshops, but was prevented by its ARBED shareholders from 
utilising the equipment set up for steel production by Vasena. These installations comprised 2 Siemens- 
Martin furnaces with a capacity of 15 tons and rolling sections. With an output capacity of 60-80 tons of 
steel per day, the Riachuelo workshops had the potential for an annual production of 20,000 tons.7 TAMET 
imported vital iron and steel inputs required for metallurgical goods production from countries participating 
in the International Steel Cartel, while the steelmaking equipment acquired from Vasena remained idle until 
the collapse of the cartel and the outbreak of the Second World War. The rolling mill was then purchased 
by the firm La Cantabrica when it expanded into steel production, and the Siemens-Martin furnaces were 
brought into use by TAMET when imports were no longer available and domestic production was substituted 
instead.8
Efforts such as those of ARBED and its ISC partners to ’control’ production and distribution of 
steel in the extra-European world were based on an internationally regulated supply of goods sold at prices 
just below those likely to be charged by small would-be independent producers in markets such as 
Argentina. This practice, along with restrictions on technology made it virtually impossible for new firms 
to enter into production. However, such practices in the Argentine market only succeeded in the private 
sector. The case of the Fabrica Militar de Aceros, established in the Thirties as a result of increasing 
military concerns over the deteriorating international situation and seguridad nacional, demonstrates that
6 ’Las industrias nacionales: Compania Argentina de Hierros y Aceros de Pedro Vasena e Hijos, 
Limitada’, La Epoca, Buenos Aires, 10 September 1918.
7 Foster Bain, Posibilidades, p. 104; Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin S.A., Reseda grafica (Buenos 
Aires, 1928), unpaginated.
8 Revista de la Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin, September 1930, p.3; Banco 
Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), Informe sobre el mercado local e industria nacional en 
laminados de hierro y  acero (Buenos Aires, May 1945), p.48; TAMET, September-October 1943, p.3.
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some initiatives could successfully circumvent restrictions on technology transfers and foreign assistance.
The Fabrica Militar de Aceros was completed despite the disadvantages of its location in suburban 
Buenos Aires. Located in marshland in the upper reaches of the Riachuelo, the site could only be reached 
through a restricted Ministry of Public Works railway and lacked power supplies until electricity was 
generated in the plant.9 The Direccion General de Arsenales, which was responsible for the project, 
overcame both the constraint on technology transfers, and the shortage of experts and skilled labour. It 
circumvented the ISC by purchasing a Siemens-Martin furnace with a capacity of 12 tons and 
complementary facilities in the USA, a country then outside the cartel. Although purchase contracts for 
equipment normally included the provision of technical assistance, the military factory had no such 
arrangement. The Armed Forces, aware that the Fabrica Militar de Aceros had little support outside military 
nationalist circles, were determined to prove that they could execute the enterprise on their own and awarded 
the supervision of the project to an undisclosed Army engineer.10 The latter was trained at the Escuela 
Superior de Guerra, which had been founded by General Savio in November 1930 to address military 
concerns with industrial development and capability.11 The engineer successfully completed the 
undertaking, notwithstanding the lack of experience in the industry. The mass of workers which built the 
plant were provided by the Armed Forces and assisted by three civilian technicians. It comprised foremen 
from the Arsenal Esteban de Luca, supplemented by junior officers and conscripts. When the factory 
became operational, skilled labour shortages were overcome by employing most of the workers engaged in 
its construction. Initial production problems were successfully mastered by modifying the furnace 
substantially, a task completed by 22 November 1937.12
Although little else is known about the construction and commissioning of the plant, the fact that
9 Eduardo A. Garimaldi, Industria siderurgica argentina (Buenos Aires, December 1947), pp.23,24.
10 Ibid., p.30.
11 Emilio J. Corbiere, ’Manuel N. Savio, pionero de la industrialization argentina’, Todo es Historia, 
No. 158, July 1980, p.39.
12 Garimaldi, Industria, pp.24,30,31,32.
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the Fabrica Militar de Aceros was successfully completed demonstrates that restrictions on transfers of 
foreign technology could be skirted. Competent and ingenious local engineers such as those employed at 
the military plant became essential with the collapse of the ISC and the outbreak of the Second World War. 
They enabled private metallurgical firms to develop domestic steel production in order to overcome import 
shortages of key inputs. The severe restrictions on technology transfers and lack of technical assistance were 
surmounted by copying old designs of open-hearth furnaces and acquiring second-hand rolling equipment. 
The best known example of a firm that copied old furnace designs for steelmaking is ACINDAR, which was 
established in 1942 (see Chapter 3). General Savio, head of the FabricacionesMilitares (DGFM), favoured 
the location of ACINDAR in Rosario as this company was a potential customer of the relatively nearby 
SOMISA project. As an incentive, he provided the plans of an American designed 15 ton capacity Siemens- 
Martin furnace.13 These plans in turn corresponded to the second furnace installed at the Fabrica Militar 
de Aceros, which was built by the military in 1942 and itself based on the originally imported first furnace 
of the plant. The ACINDAR engineers regarded the furnace capacity of 15 tons as low and inefficient, and 
displayed skill by successfully modifying the design. They built a 25 ton capacity furnace.14
Efforts of Argentine engineers such as those of ACINDAR resulted in rapid growth in steel output 
capacity. The number of Siemens-Martin furnaces, having augmented from 7 in 1937 to 22 by 1947, trebled 
within a decade and total furnace capacity, having expanded from 58 tons in 1937 to 327 tons by 1947, 
increased almost sixfold within the same timespan.15 The furnaces were complemented with rolling mills, 
which enabled the metallurgical sector to satisfy its requirements for both crude steel and finished goods. 
Rolling equipment was acquired second-hand, and the best known examples of firms that did so are La 
Cantabrica and ACINDAR. As indicated earlier, La Cantabrica purchased and reconditioned the abandoned 
Vasena mill. ACINDAR acquired an idle rolling mill from INDAC of Chile, one of the original 
shareholders in the company (see Chapter 3).16
13 ACINDAR, Historia de una Voluntad de Acero (Buenos Aires, 1986), pp.78,79.
14 Garimaldi, Industria, Appendix: Table N°l; ACINDAR, Historia, p.79.
15 Garimaldi, Industria, Appendix: Table N°l.
16 BCRA, Informe, p.48; ACINDAR, Historia, p.78.
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Although the use of copies of old equipment designs and second-hand equipment enabled 
metallurgical producers to overcome shortages of imported iron and steel and surmount restrictions on 
technology transfers, the problem was the level of technology. Notwithstanding the good condition of the 
equipment and installations, output was affected by low capacity and inefficiency.17 During the Second 
World War this mattered little, as local steel producers were shielded from foreign competition. However, 
once peacetime conditions returned, the industry had to modernise its facilities in order to compete with or 
substitute imports. Under the Peronato, this was unfeasible. Government policy had other economic 
priorities, and imports of capital goods were unavailable in the late Forties owing to the severe domestic 
crisis and foreign exchange shortages (see Chapter 2).
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Argentine equipment lagged behind that of other steel 
producers. Furnaces had a much lower capacity than those used in the USA, where the standard capacity 
was 160 tons.18 They were even modest when compared with furnaces in steelworks erected in wartime 
in other ’small’ economies. The Altos Homos de Mexico (AHMSA), which became fully operational in 
October 1945, originally comprised two 65 ton furnaces.19 Argentine rolling mills were simple and 
outdated.20 The primitiveness of methods was clearly illustrated by ACINDAR. While modem rolling 
mills had its basic input of molten steel shaped into billets and slabs between rollers and subsequently 
transformed into finished goods, the process at ACINDAR started with the filling of a billet-shaped metal 
box with scrap. This box was placed in a reheating furnace to smelt its contents, and any material spilled 
over the edges of the billet was later axed by a worker. The contents of the box were then pushed with an 
iron crowbar into the rolling sections, where they were shaped into bars.21
17 Secretariade Industria y Comercio, Hierro Laminado sin trabajar (Buenos Aires, August 1947), p.50.
18 Estudio tecnico-economico de la produccion de acero semiterminado en la Republica Argentina 
presentado por ARMCO Argentina S.A., in Direction General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), Plan 
Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1946), pp.73,77.
19 William E. Cole, Steel and Economic Growth in Mexico (Austin, 1967), pp. 14,15.
20 BCRA, Informe, p.48.
21 ACINDAR, Historia, p.84.
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The continued use of obsolete equipment, with low capacity and output levels, made the emergent 
steel producers uncompetitive and inefficient. However, military concerns with the need for self-sufficiency 
in ’strategic’ commodities for national defence requirements had intensified during the Second World War 
and resulted in the preparation of the Plan Siderurgico Argentino (PSA). The requirements of this project 
were more complex than those of the private sector, whose facilities were semi-integrated and whose 
production was based on scrap (as seen in previous chapters). The PSA entailed the development of an 
efficient, modem and integrated iron and steel industry which, at least on paper, was to be internationally 
competitive. Successful completion of this undertaking again depended on transfers of foreign technology, 
and these were not easily forthcoming. Unlike in the Twenties and Thirties, as is seen below, the difficulties 
in obtaining imported equipment were owed to poor US-Argentine relations.
ARGENTINE-AMERICANRELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSA, 1942-1952
The greatest attempt to establish a modem heavy industry of the period was the PSA, which 
consisted of two projects devised in the early Forties. The first of these, the Altos Homos Zapla, was 
completed in wartime with Swedish technology despite the American economic boycott of Argentina and 
US efforts to coerce other countries (including Sweden) into cooperating with the embargo. The second 
project, the SOMISA steelworks, was at the core of the PSA and the most ambitious. Its successful 
completion depended on technology transfers from the USA, which were difficult given the tension in 
Argentine-Americanrelations. To understand why the relationship between Buenos Aires and Washington 
had a major effect on the PSA, this section first assesses the long-term strains which lay at the root of the 
problem.
The roots o f  antagonism and American assistance for industrial development
Tension and difficulty in relations had existed since the nineteenth century, and survived well into 
the twentieth century. Three factors played a part in this process: Argentine economic perceptions on what 
export-led growth might achieve, the expanding US role in the Argentine economy (particularly in foreign
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investment and trade), and both American and Argentine strategic considerations influenced by events in the 
Thirties and Forties. Concerning economic perceptions, the Republic and the United States of America 
appeared to have parallel development paths (both countries were world leaders in cereal exports until the 
Depression), and were regarded as rivals striving for leadership of the western hemisphere. Some Argentines 
believed that their country was destined for greatness and would overtake the USA. Since there was no 
realistic chance of Argentina playing a major role among the world powers, failure to achieve this aspiration 
became one of the roots of resentment against the Americans.22
The second cause of tension lay in the expanded US role in the Argentine economy. The United 
States of America increased exports to the Republic and made inroads into the economy which were 
concerned largely with industry. As seen in Chapter 2, penetration began in the meat-packing industry, and 
after the First World War and during the Twenties had fanned out to branches as metallurgy, machinery and 
vehicles, electric equipment and goods, and pharmaceuticals.23 This was made possible by shifts in the 
Anglo-Argentine connection and the triangular relationship that evolved between Argentina, Britain and the 
USA as a result of fundamental changes in the international economy after 1914 that included the dramatic 
growth of US influence.24 American expansion was increasingly resented by the Argentine ruling classes, 
not because it could threaten traditional Anglo-Argentine trade links but owing to the lack of reciprocity. 
While the Republic purchased US industrial goods, Washington was unwilling to purchase Argentine 
products in order to protect its domestic farming interests. The United States of America imposed tariffs 
and restrictive sanitary orders. The Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 imposed prohibitive levies on wheat, 
maize, meat, hides, wool, flax and sugar, thereby affecting major Argentine exports to the USA. There were 
other damaging exclusion measures, the most important of which was the decision in 1926 to ban fresh or 
frozen meat imports from regions infected with foot-and-mouth disease.25 Further rebuffs increased
22 Joseph S. Tulchin, ’The Origins ofMisunderstanding: United States-ArgentineRelations, 1900-1940’, 
in Guido Di Telia and D. Cameron Watt (eds.), Argentina between the Great Powers, 1939-46 (Basingstoke, 
1989), pp.34,35.
23 Eduardo F. Jorge, Industria y  concentracion economica (Buenos Aires, 1971), p.98.
24 Tulchin, ’Misunderstanding’, p.35.
25 Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States 1810-1960 (New York, 1964), p.352.
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Argentine resentment against the United States of America.
Starting in the Thirties, strategic considerations fuelled further discord between Washington and 
Buenos Aires. The United States of America capitalised politically on its increased influence over the 
Americas, and gained the trust of Latin American regimes by vowing to settle continental problems through 
a Good Neighbor Policy. The basic principles of the latter were non-intervention in the affairs of any 
country by any other, and the creation of permanent collective mechanisms to resolve continental problems. 
The policy comprised political principles cast in the Pan-American concept, economic principles presented 
as Inter-American economic cooperation, and military tenets moulded in the notion of hemispheric 
defence.26 However, with increased German, Italian, and Japanese aggression after 1936, the Americans 
shifted the emphasis of the Good Neighbor Policy towards its military aspects. In return for its pledge of 
non-intervention, the Roosevelt administration expected the republics south of the Rio Grande to join the 
USA in transforming the Pan-American system into a collective security organisation. From 1936 until 
1941, Washington attempted to persuade Latin American governments to view their foreign policy interests 
as identical with those of the USA and to pledge to regard an attack on one as an attack on all.27
Argentina vigorously resisted the attempt to establish a Pan-American military alliance and 
maintained a strict policy of neutrality. This posture reflected, as with the American approach to 
hemispheric defence, strategic considerations. Having developed and progressed in the remoteness of the 
southern extreme of South America, the Republic had been free to develop its own approach to world 
affairs. Nonetheless, the outbreak of the Second World War had serious implications. Military planners 
were concerned with national self-preservation and viewed as a serious possibility that, in the event of 
hostilities with the Axis, Argentina would be on its own. With no assistance available from the US 
Caribbean Defense Command, the country ’ s remote location and extended coastline made defence impossible
26 Mario Rapoport, Gran Bretaha, Estados Unidos y  las Clases Dirigentes Argentinas: 1940-1945 
(Buenos Aires, 1980), pp.240,241.
27 Randall Bennett Woods, The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the ’Good Neighbor’ 
(Lawrence, 1979), p.7.
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in the event of provocative action such as breaking relations with the Axis causing German retaliation.28
Since the Americans resented Argentine resistance to the Pan-American project and wartime 
neutrality, US-Argentine relations deteriorated sharply in the early Forties. As is seen below, this affected 
the PSA as cooperation with the Americans was essential for the realisation of the SOMISA steelworks. 
Therefore, the Republic was unable to emulate Brazil and Mexico, which successfully secured US assistance 
for their heavy industry projects by supporting the Allies. American collaboration in Brazilian and Mexican 
industrial projects contrasted sharply with the traditional attitude towards industrialisation in Latin America. 
Washington favoured limited industrial development in commodity exporting countries, with American 
capital being the source of investment in sectors which did not compete with North American industry.29 
The wartime policy shift was the result of strategic considerations and Pan-American defence priorities. 
Both Brazil and Mexico wanted to develop modem steelworks, and secured the necessary financial and 
technical assistance by pursuing their aspirations at a time when Washington was seeking hemispheric unity.
It must be noted that American motives for cooperating with the Brazilian and Mexican heavy 
industry projects differed. Washington provided assistance to Brazil on military grounds, and to Mexico 
for economic reasons. Brazil was politically and strategically important owing to its great northeastern 
’bulge’, which was mostly defenceless and stretched far into the Atlantic.30 The establishment or use of 
naval and air facilities in this region by American troops was critical to the hemispheric defence project, but 
was unacceptable to the Brazilians unless combined with American supplies for military re-equipment and 
assistance for their steelworks project. The United States of America reluctantly agreed to cooperate in 
Volta Redonda, paying the price exacted by Brazil not to thwart the hemispheric defence project and remain 
neutral.31 In the Mexican case, it was essential to reduce dependence on the Americans as a source of
28 Ibid., pp.9,13,15.
29 Gerson Moura, Autonomia na Dependencia (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p. 182.
30 R.A. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, Volume One: 1939-1942 (London, 
1981), pp.138,139.
31 Moura, Autonomia, pp. 150,153,154.
253
supply. Mexico relied heavily on the USA for supplies of basic foodstuffs and industrial products which 
Washington could not afford to supply in wartime.32 Furthermore, the Americans required Mexican 
strategic materials whose output had to be increased. Growth in the production of these exportables could 
only be attained with an economic expansion programme. To reduce Mexican dependency on US supplies 
and expand Mexican output of commodities essential to the war effort, the United States of America did 
everything possible to assist.33
The insufficiency of the capital available in Brazil and Mexico for the necessary investments and 
technology transfers was offset by the financial assistance furnished by the Americans. Brazil obtained a 
US$ 20,000,000 loan from the Export-Import Bank in September 1940 to purchase equipment in the United 
States.34 Further credits from the Export-Import Bank became necessary for the Volta Redonda project 
to proceed apace, especially with the substantial price rises in 1942 and 1943.35 Prices of American 
merchandise rose by 50% due to increases in shipping rates and insurance premiums, and costs of US 
materials increased as did the expenditure arising from contingencies. Furthermore, the Brazilians had 
decided to build additional installations at Volta Redonda.36 The increased expenditure caused by the war 
and purchase of additional equipment was covered by two Export-Import Bank loans: one for US$ 5,000,000 
awarded in December 1941, and another for US$ 20,000,000 granted in 1943.37 In the Mexican case, the 
Export-Import Bank also provided assistance. However, the precise figure aimed for the AHMSA steelworks 
is unknown; the funds destined for this project were part of US$ 50,000,000 loaned to the Mexican
32 Luis G. Zorrilla, Historia de las Relaciones entre Mexicoy los Estados Unidos de America 1800-1958, 
Volume II (Mexico, 1966), p.494.
33 Humphreys, Latin America, Volume Two: 1942-1945 (London, 1982), pp.46,47.
34 Humphreys, Latin America, Volume One, p. 138.
35 Departamento Administrativo do Servi?o Publico, Volta Redonda. Supplement to the Revista do 
Serviqo Publico, November 1945, p. 14.
36 Ibid., pp. 19,20.
37 Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, O Ferro na Historia e na Economia do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 
1972), pp. 152,163,164.
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Government for several schemes.38
Hence, both Brazil and Mexico were able to purchase American equipment. In the case of Volta 
Redonda, for which the firm Arthur G. MacKee won the tender to prepare the definitive project, concerns 
over the steady drift of the United States of America into the Second World War resulted in the bulk of 
materials being speedily purchased throughout 1941. This was a well-timed move, as many US firms 
showed little interest in Brazilian consultations after Pearl Harbor.39 In the case of AHMSA, which had 
secured assistance after the American entry into the war, purchases of capital goods were possible 
notwithstanding that industrial equipment was a highly restricted item in the USA. Acquisitions were viable 
as AHMSA was awarded the necessary priority rating by the War Production Board, which had an ulterior 
strategic short-term motive in doing so.40 Wartime demand for steel plates by American shipyards 
outstripped domestic supplies, and AHMSA could alleviate shortages owing to two reasons. First, Mexico 
was a neighbouring country and AHMSA would be relatively close to American shipyards. Second, the 
Mexican steelworks would be equipped to manufacture plates as the technical contractor was ARMCO, a 
firm which specialised in steel sheet and plate production and owned a subsidiary to help develop overseas 
steelworks projects (see below). Therefore, Washington had granted AHMSA the necessary priority rating 
for equipment purchases on condition that it supported the American war effort by supplying US shipyards 
with steel plates. Plate production from AHMSA was initially used to build ’Liberty Ships’, and only at 
the end of the war became available for the Mexican domestic market.41
Both Volta Redonda and AHMSA were completed by the end of the war, and showed what wartime 
cooperation with the United States of America could achieve. In sharp contrast, the PSA was developed 
as Argentine-American relations deteriorated and was thereby unlikely to succeed as US assistance would 
not be readily forthcoming. However, the effects of US policy towards the Republic only affected the
38 Zorrilla, Historia, Volume II, p.501.
39 Departamento do Servi5 0  Publico, Volta Redonda, pp. 12,13.
40 Cole, Steel, p. 12.
41 Ibid., pp.12,14,15.
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integrated steelworks project, the second phase of the PSA. As is seen below, the first stage of the Plan 
was completed, like the Fabrica Militar de Aceros in the Thirties, by circumventing restrictions on 
technology transfers.
The Altos Homos Zapla, Sweden and the circumvention o f the US embargo
The DGFM decision to develop heavy industry accidentally coincided with the breakdown in 
Argentine-American relations. At the Rio meeting in January 1942, Argentina had rejected the US initiative 
for a collective continental rupture with the Axis. As a result, the State Department became convinced that 
Argentine policy exposed a vulnerable flank in continental defences and that the Republic could become a 
Nazi base for espionage, subversion and financial machinations in the western hemisphere.42 To bring 
Argentina into line with the other Latin American countries, Washington resorted to political and economic 
pressure. By September 1942, the Board of Economic Warfare had adopted measures such as the arbitrary 
reduction of export quotas of some critical materials and restrictions on the supply of oil drilling equipment 
as a weapon in negotiations to get Argentine participation in a hemispheric petroleum pool.43 More 
critically for the success of the Altos Homos Zapla, for which Swedish assistance became essential owing 
to the nature of the project (see below), American measures also called for tighter controls over direct 
Swedish trade with Argentina.44
The Altos Homos Zapla (AHZ) project, which aimed to achieve domestic pig iron production, was 
problematic owing to the fact that it was charcoal-based (see Chapter 5). Although iron ore would be 
obtained from the Zapla deposit near the city of Jujuy, the absence of coking coal in the region could only
42 Rapoport, Gran Bretana, pp.248,250.
43 Carlos Escude, ’Boicot norteamericano contra la Argentina: 1940-1950’, Todo es Historia, No. 177, 
February 1982, p. 13.
44 US Directive on policy towards Argentina, 24 September 1942. Bank of England Archive, OV 
102/17.
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be offset with charcoal procured from the forests in Jujuy, Salta, Formosa, and Chaco.45 Given the nature 
of the technology required, and that the project was the first undertaking of its kind, foreign assistance was 
essential in the design and construction of the blast furnace.46 Despite the potential difficulties in obtaining 
foreign technology and technical assistance, the DGFM invited international tenders in May 1943. Shortly 
afterwards a positive reply from Svenska Entreprenad AB, a firm of general contractors created in 1933 to 
promote exports of Swedish engineering, was received and accepted.47 The Swedish firm satisfied the 
requirements to undertake the design and construction of the AHZ. It originated from one of the few 
countries which, endowed with iron and lacking coal, had from early on developed charcoal-based pig iron 
production. Around 85% of Swedish pig iron in 1913 originated from charcoal furnaces, and by the Fifties 
over 50% of Swedish blast furnaces still operated with charcoal. Given its dependence on this raw material, 
Sweden had carried out research to reduce charcoal consumption in blast furnaces and successfully improved 
the design of charcoal-fired blast furnaces.48 Furthermore, from the political perspective, Sweden remained 
neutral during the Second World War.
However, Swedish assistance was endangered by American policies towards Argentina and towards 
Swedish trade with Germany, countries associated with or occupied by the Third Reich, and neutral states 
such as Argentina. Washington was specifically embittered by the commercial policy of Stockholm towards 
Buenos Aires on three accounts. First, it enabled the Republic to circumvent the American boycott, which 
included the termination of shipments of critical materials such as iron and steel products.49 Second,
45 Survey on a national steel industry by Coronel Carlos J. Martinez, presented to the Union Industrial 
Argentina in 1943, in Ricardo Fernando Marcos, Altos Homos Zapla (Jujuy, 1980), unpaginated.
46 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Bases para la industria del acero en la Republica Argentina’, in Obras del 
General Manuel N. Savio (Buenos Aires, 1973), p.391; General Humberto Sosa Molina, Inauguracion del 
segundo alto homo Zapla (Argentine Republic, April 1951), unpaginated.
47 Marcos, Zapla, unpaginated; The General Export Association of Sweden, Modem Sweden (Stockholm, 
1937), p.416.
48 AB Svenska Industriforlaget, Industry in Sweden (Stockholm, 1953), pp. 154,155.
49 Letter from Winfield W. Riefler, Economic Warfare Division, United States Embassy in London, to 
G.H. Villiers, Ministry of Economic Warfare, 22 February 1943. Copy sent by W. Gallman, First Secretary 
at the United States Embassy in London, to J.V. Perowne, FO, 23 February 1943. FO 371 37104 N 
1290/480/42.
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Argentine neutrality resulted in access to and benefits from an exclusive trade with Sweden as well as safety 
in shipping, which was denied to actual belligerents or countries that broke off with the Axis.50 And 
finally, Argentina obtained various commodities from Sweden which, on account of wartime exigencies, 
other American republics could not acquire in sufficient quantities from the USA.51 Given these 
apprehensions, Washington included an extensive cutback in Swedish trade with Argentina when it coerced 
Stockholm into curtailing its trade with Germany and its associates. Sweden agreed to restrict exports to 
the Republic after 1 October 1943 to paper, wood pulp for paper making, and rayon pulp. Furthermore, it 
agreed not to supply Argentina with any goods to which the American Government would object.52 The 
latter arrangement was the one threatening to derail the DGFM contract with Svenska Entreprenad, as 
technology transfers for a heavy industry project in a country perceived as hostile was precisely what the 
United States of America would oppose.
Notwithstanding the danger posed by Swedish compliance with American policy towards Argentina, 
the DGFM succeeded in completing the AHZ project for two reasons. First, although it could not supply 
equipment, Svenska Entreprenad remained the technical contractor; second, with the American embargo in 
force, the DGFM circumvented restrictions on foreign technology transfers by making full use of its 
engineering capability. Concerning the role of the Swedish firm, it had been contracted before Stockholm 
was coerced into cooperating with the American embargo. Svenska Entreprenad was in charge of the project 
and its supervision, and remained the technical manager of the AHZ until 1948. Subsequently, as the blast 
furnace was in full working order and Argentine technicians had acquired the necessary skills, all activities 
at Zapla were placed under DGFM control.53 Regarding the circumvention of US trade restrictions, the 
Argentine military once again showed their capacity to build industrial installations and copy equipment
50 TelegramNo.1016 from Viscount Halifax, British Embassy in Washington, to the FO, 2 March 1943. 
For War Cabinet distribution. FO 371 37104 N 1330/480/42.
51 Letter from Riefler to Villiers, 22 February 1943. FO 371 37104 N 1290/480/42.
52 Declaration by the Royal Swedish Government, 30 June 1943, in Department of State, Foreign 
Relations o f the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, Volume II: Europe (Washington, 1964), p.814.
53 Ministerio de Guerra, Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, 1941 - 9 de Octubre - 1945 
(Buenos Aires, 1945), unpaginated; Pedro F. Castineiras, El Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 
October 1953), p. 15.
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designs. The Fabrica Militar de Aceros furnished the necessary materials (produced in accordance with 
Swedish designs) for the Zapla plant.54 The blast furnace was erected in one year and a half, it became 
operational in October 1945 and had an annual output capacity of 20,000 tons.55
Once the technical performance of Zapla was deemed satisfactory, the DGFM considered further 
development of the plant.56 It proposed to establish an integrated operation by increasing the number of 
blast furnaces to five, installing two or three Siemens-Martin furnaces, and completing the plant with a 
rolling mill.57 However, there were three major disincentives. First, the expansion of the AHZ became 
less urgent with the emphasis awarded in the PSA to the SOMISA steelworks project.58 Second, the 
technology was unsuitable for a modem plant. Although pig iron produced in charcoal-fired blast furnaces 
was of better quality than that made with coke and output was based exclusively on local raw materials, the 
utilisation of charcoal had serious drawbacks - as indicated in Chapter 5. Charcoal production consumed 
large tracts of woodland, the costs of transporting wood and using charcoal were prohibitive, firewood for 
charcoal production was inefficiently processed in primitive ovens, transportation of wood to the ovens was 
problematic, and charcoal had a low thermal value.59 The latter flaw was reflected in the modest size of 
the AHZ blast furnace - its height was 18 metres and its diameter 7 metres.60
Finally, there was the postwar domestic economic climate. The AHZ was the result of military 
wartime considerations, and the promotion of heavy industry and military-related industries became less
54 Ministerio de Guerra, Fabricaciones, unpaginated.
55 La Nation, 14 October 1945, p.6; Castineiras, Plan, p. 15.
56 Castineiras, Plan, p. 15.
57 Debate on the PSA, 8-9 May 1947, Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de 
Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.310.
58 Ibid.
59 United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), A study o f the iron and steel 
industry in Latin America, Volume II (New York, 1954), pp.157,165; Douglas A. Fisher, Steel Serves the 
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pressing for three reasons, (i) The Second World War ended in 1945. (ii) The Peronista regime elected 
in 1946 had other priorities (see Chapter 2). (iii) State funding and the availability of foreign exchange for 
purchases of imported equipment were restricted by the severe economic crisis of the late Forties. 
Notwithstanding the disincentives, the DGFM effected a limited expansion at Zapla since self-sufficiency 
in key commodities remained the military priority. A second blast furnace, nationally designed on the basis 
of the original Swedish plans, was erected by DGFM engineers and inaugurated in April 1951.61
The military ability to circumvent obstacles to foreign technology transfers, in this case the result 
of the US embargo and the foreign exchange shortages of the late Forties, was again demonstrated in the 
handling of the AHZ project. However, the DGFM was unable to skirt around the barriers to foreign 
technology transfers for its other major heavy industry venture. As is seen below, the SOMISA integrated 
steelworks involved a US firm and progress with this project was undermined by the sharp fluctuations in 
Argentine-American relations.
The Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina and US-Argentine antagonism
Sharp fluctuations in relations between Buenos Aires and Washington affected the pace at which 
the SOMISA steelworks project progressed. As the DGFM concentrated on the initial planning in 1943 and 
1944, American pressure on the Republic hardened due to the failure of selective coercion and the advent 
of a military dictatorship with fascist leanings. The two key recommendations in the programme devised 
by Secretary of State Cordell Hull were the non-approval of development projects for Argentina, and the 
ban on exports for the Armed Forces.62 Such measures were inspired by the US interpretation of the 
military regime’s aspirations of Argentine leadership in South America, and the conflation of the DGFM 
with the dictatorship. Washington viewed military projects to develop basic industries as a part of Argentine 
preparations for war, and was convinced that the regime rather than the DGFM participated in the sociedades
61 Sosa Molina, Inauguracion, unpaginated.
62 Escude, ’Boicot’, p. 15.
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mixtas being developed to produce ’basic’ commodities.63
However, despite the misgivings in Washington, the DGFM was in a position to circumvent 
American restrictions. The embargo was not being enforced by US big business. The war provided export 
and investment opportunities in Latin American markets formerly supplied from Europe, and US firms 
engaged in manufacturing activities to meet local requirements previously satisfied by imports.64 In 
Argentina, where British economic influence was rapidly waning, American corporations saw an opportunity 
to make substantial inroads by promoting industrialisation.65 The DGFM project attracted US interests 
from its inception, despite exhortations by the US Embassy in Buenos Aires that it was not the time to 
express interest in the project.66
The military, intending to involve private and even foreign capital in their heavy industry project 
(see Chapter 3), stipulated terms for the contest to award the tender to build an integrated steelworks. Any 
proposal had to include a foundry comprising two or three open-hearth furnaces with a capacity of 40-70 
tons in order to attain greater economic efficiency than existing national steelmaking equipment, and a 
blooming mill with a capacity of 350,000 tons which would result in products of better quality and price 
than those available locally at the time. In addition, tenders had to include provisions for complementary 
installations, and conditions were set for the location. As the plant was to be based on the use of scrap and 
a proportion of national raw materials, its site had to be in an area where transport was economically 
available. Minerals would be supplied from northern Argentina, while scrap production and the consumption
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of semifinished products from the proposed mill was to be centred in Buenos Aires and Rosario. The 
DGFM recommended the convenience of a riverside location, in the vicinity of one of the ports on the 
Parana river situated on the Buenos Aires-Rosario railway route.67
The successful proposal accepted by the DGFM was presented by the Argentine companies 
TAMET, La Cantabrica and SIAM Di Telia, and the local subsidiary of the US firm ARMCO. The project 
foresaw an initial annual capacity of 300,000 tons, which could be increased progressively to 800,000 tons - 
the current level of domestic demand. Additionally, the installations were planned in a way that capacity 
could be expanded through the provision of additional equipment. However, the proposal modified the 
terms on raw materials, recommending the use of foreign inputs in peacetime as these would be more 
economic and make for better quality. This modification had no effect on the site of the plant. In fact, it 
reinforced the need for a riverside location to accomodate import deliveries.68 More critically, the proposal 
opened the possibility of circumventing US export restrictions. The American firm ARMCO and its 
Argentine subsidiary, which like other US concerns were prepared to break the embargo, were to provide 
the necessary technological assistance.
Owing to the nature of the plant and wartime conditions, ARMCO was the only firm available that 
could be contracted as technical adviser and was awarded technical direction of the project only for the 
indispensable time required. As an incentive to a better fulfillment of its undertakings, ARMCO was 
awarded a shareholding in the proposed sociedad mixta that would own the planned steelworks.69 ARMCO 
would provide assistance through its global subsidiary, the ARMCO International Corporation, which 
received an initial fee plus royalties from production for its services.70 Its credentials as technical
67 Bases for the Mixed Company contest for the constitution of the Second Iron and Steel Unit of the 
DGFM plan, in DGFM, Plan, pp. 143,144.
68 Proposal presented by TAMET, La Cantabrica, SIAM Di Telia and ARMCO Argentina at the DGFM 
contest, 3 November 1944, in DGFM, Plan, pp.150,152,153.
69 Summation speech by Sosa Molina, Minister of War, during the debate on the PSA, Diputados, Ano 
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contractor satisfied DGFM requirements. The US firm owned a major Laboratory of Iron and Steel 
Research, where technology was developed and constantly improved, and its experience in designing, 
building and operating steelworks enabled it to solve problems relating to steelmaking.71 More crucially 
for Argentine self-sufficiency aspirations were the production lines in which ARMCO specialised. The 
American company had developed sheets which were employed to manufacture a wide range of products, 
from automobiles to furniture and appliances, and had diversified into producing finished goods such as oil 
storage tanks and pipelines from its sheet output.72 As part of its services, ARMCO would make its major 
registered processes available through licensing.73 This was critical to progress in self-sufficiency in oil 
supplies. The military government and its most influential figure, Peron, wanted to increase production from 
the state-owned Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) and make use of hitherto neglected natural gas 
sources. However, most of the capital plant of YPF was run down and outdated and equipment imports 
were difficult to obtain. Washington, having conflated the Argentine regime with fascism, had restricted 
exports of drilling equipment, refinery apparatus and spare parts, and maintained the controls after Peron’s 
election victory in 1946.74 ARMCO collaboration in the DGFM project provided Argentina with the 
possibility of producing iron and steel goods under license for the oil industry, which could then modernise 
and expand.
Nonetheless, the collaboration of ARMCO through its Argentine subsidiary continued to be subject 
to fluctuations in US-Argentine relations.75 In early 1945, there was opportunity for the DGFM project 
to succeed due to shifting American policy. Although officials still condemned Argentina for its 
undemocratic government and its neutrality, changes in the State Department facilitated Argentine re­
admission into the hemispheric community. Stettinius, who became Secretary of State in November 1944,
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and the new Latin Americanists in the State Department were pragmatic and believed that continental 
cooperation, secured through US trade and investment, would maintain American security in the western 
hemisphere.76 While Argentine delegations attended the hemispheric gathering held at Chapultepec in early 
1945 and the San Francisco meeting which was to set up the United Nations, ARMCO Argentina prepared 
its study on technical and economic aspects of Argentine steel production. Concerned with efficiency, the 
study recommended the use of the most modem equipment. It suggested the installation of a blast furnace 
with a capacity of 1,000 tons, which allowed for an annual output of 350,000 tons, and the use of four open 
hearth furnaces of 160 tons, which was the standard size in the USA and provided an annual capacity of 
400,000 tons. Finally, it advised the use of a duo-reversible blooming mill type of 44 inches that could roll 
up to 1,000,000 tons per annum.77
Steady progress with the preparatory work in early 1945 contrasted sharply with the limited 
headway the project made subsequently. Argentine-American relations deteriorated again with the 
appointment of Spruille Braden as Ambassador to Buenos Aires, which was facilitated by the divisions 
within the State Department, and widespread hostility of the US media and public to overtures towards 
Argentina.78 As Braden arrived in May 1945, there was renewed political turmoil in the military regime. 
Peron, who rose to power under the patronage of General Farrell in February 1944, served simultaneously 
as Vice-President, Minister of War, and Secretary of Labour and Social Security. He was the key figure 
behind the President and was preparing to take power himself.79 Braden argued that the danger of fascist 
influence on Argentina had bome fruit with Peron. He was convinced that a Peron regime intended to 
dominate neighbouring countries and create an autarkic bloc in the Southern Cone with the support of Nazi 
elements. Furthermore, Braden maintained that Argentine fascism, by pursuing an autarkic model which 
he believed would collapse into chaos and social unrest, was an entering wedge for Soviet influence in the
76 Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States (Boston, 1990), pp.89,90,91.
77 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, pp.73, 77,78.
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western hemisphere.80 Given the views of the US Ambassador, a deterioration in relations became 
inevitable.
Though recalled and appointed Assistant Secretary of State following the replacement of Stettinius 
by James Byrnes, Braden intensified his efforts to oust Peron.81 After the latter survived the dramatic 
events of October 1945, Farrell called elections for 24 February 1946. This call was welcomed by the 
Union Democratica (UD), the united and well organised opposition which conspired against the regime 
during the campaign and kept close contact with American officials.82 Braden’s antagonism to the 
possibility of Peron’s election victory became overt intervention on the eve of polling. He released the 
pretentiously entitled ’Consultation among the American republics with respect to the Argentine situation’ 
or Blue Book, the outcome of an investigation commissioned by the State Department which documented 
alleged Argentine wartime complicity with Germany, analysed the ’Nazi-fascist’ character of the post-1943 
regime and emphasised US lack of trust in Argentina.83 The release of the Blue Book unsuccessfully aimed 
to improve UD election prospects, and was widely interpreted as an overt attempt to undermine Peron. The 
latter, who understood the link between Braden and the UD, took advantage of the episode and hinged the 
final campaigning around the slogan Braden o Peron!.84
This episode, which contributed to the Peronista victory, adversely affected the progress of the 
DGFM project. The proposal had been formalised into the Plan Siderurgico Argentino (PSA) and submitted 
to the government in January 1946. The President paid little attention as the regime concentrated on the
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election.85 However, the PSA was studied by the two ministries with an interest in the project: the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Secretariat of Industry. Their responses, which only objected to ARMCO 
involvement, were influenced by overt US interference in domestic politics. The Ministry of Agriculture 
had two criticisms. First, that ARMCO was awarded technical direction without a tenders contest. Second, 
that ARMCO (as both shareholder and contractor) was granted a privileged position in a ’strategic’ 
industry.86 Such criticisms were unjustified. ARMCO was part of the successful tender at the contest held 
by the DGFM in 1944 and, as an incentive for it to effectively fulfill its undertakings as contractor, was 
allotted a shareholding in the company that would own the steelworks (see above). The Secretariat of 
Industry raised one objection: that there was no justification for the m$n 3,700,000 the State would pay 
ARMCO for preparatory work for the PSA.87 This claim reflects the lack of detail on calculations of costs 
in the arrangements. However, given the initiating role envisaged for the State in industrial development 
(see Chapter 3), this was the agreed State contribution to the m$n 4,000,000 estimated necessary to cover 
the three undertakings in the agreements on preparatory work. These were the preparation of specifications 
and plans for the steelworks, the calculation of the cost of the remaining work involved in the technical 
direction, and the purchase of materials necessary for the installation of the plant which were unrelated to 
technical management (eg, land, machinery, vehicles).88
Despite these criticisms against ARMCO, the prospects of the PSA improved once the uproar over 
the Blue Book receded. The American and Argentine Presidents made conciliatory gestures towards each 
other, and had their own motives for doing so. On the one hand, in the changed environment of the Cold 
War, the Truman administration was concerned with the communist rather than fascist threat and valued the 
creation of an Inter-American collective security pact. Therefore, powerful interests in the State Department,
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the Pentagon and Congress viewed the dispute with Argentina as divisive and the only remaining obstacle 
to the conclusion of a regional pact.89 On the other hand, Peron was aware that the implementation of his 
Five-Year Plan would not succeed if imports and finance from the United States of America were 
unavailable.90 However, indebted to his nationalist supporters, Peron could not overtly promote a close 
relationship with Washington. His solution was the highly opportunistic Tercera Position in foreign policy, 
which aimed to steer a middle ground between capitalism and communism. While Peron unexpectedly 
resumed relations and sought trade with Moscow, he reassured the Americans that Argentina continued 
firmly committed to continental defence and would support the USA in the event of war with the USSR.91
The problem was that more than conciliatory gestures were required of Peron. The White House 
expected the settlement of outstanding problems in bilateral relations and Argentine compliance with 
hemispheric obligations.92 To achieve these goals, Washington appointed George S. Messersmith as new 
Ambassador to Buenos Aires, where only a Charge d’Affaires had remained following Braden’s departure.93 
Nevertheless, Messersmith grew close to Peron and, appearing to accept his promises and actions at face 
value, concluded within months that Argentina had basically fulfilled its Chapultepec promises.94 Hence, 
Messersmith wanted to concentrate on the regional pact and promoting US-Argentine relations. He aimed 
to steer the Five-Year Plan along lines acceptable to Washington, providing US economic advisers and 
championing Argentine industrialisation as an exercise in cooperation between government and business.95
Improved US-Argentine relations enabled the PSA to make some headway. The PSA was accepted
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by Peron and submitted to Congress in July 1946. The site of the steelworks was selected in September that 
year. It was to be Punta Argerich on the Parana river, located 7 kilometres from San Nicolas and 232 
kilometres from the city of Buenos Aires along national highway N°9.96 Finally, the project was approved 
with media sancion by the Senate in November 1946 (see Chapter 3). However, the PSA had yet to be 
debated in the Chamber of Deputies, and there remained severe stumbling blocks that would affect its 
outcome. The pragmatic approach of Peron and Messersmith was unacceptable to Braden, still Assistant 
Secretary of State, and to two bitter nationalist actors on the domestic political stage: the Radical opposition 
party in Congress and the ’extremist’ wing within Peronismo. On the one hand, Braden remained 
determined as ever to undermine Peron, alienating the military by maintaining the arms embargo imposed 
in 1942.97 On the other hand, the nationalists were anti-American and represented a major threat to the 
enactment of the PSA. The greatest danger was posed by Peronista ’extremists’ (see below), who were 
supported by two powerful people within the Government: Evita, the First Lady, and Miguel Miranda, head 
of the Instituto Argentino para la Promocion del Intercambio (IAPI). Evita was more powerful, and her 
xenophobia and redistribution policies she championed were the source of many a defect of the regime.98 
The First Lady promoted policies which would not result in economic diversification and the deepening of 
industrialisation (see Chapter 2 for details on policy under Peron). Furthermore, she was against obtaining 
the American capital and technology necessary for development projects such as the PSA. Nationalistic anti- 
Yankee opposition could not be pacified by the shift in US policy towards Argentina. One major 
implication of this has been largely ignored in the secondary literature: the nationalist backlash against the 
Plan Siderurgico in the Chamber of Deputies.
The debate of the PSA was the final item at the Congress session of 8-9 May 1947 and was 
severely disrupted by one notorious incident, the speech by Peronista ’extremist’ Cipriano Reyes.99 The 
speech was xenophobic rhetoric based on the reading of a letter to Peron by the ciudadano Alejandro Olmos,
96 Gentile, ’Desarrollo’, p. 193.
97 MacDonald, ’Peron’, p.406.
98 Ibid., p.408.
99 La Nacion, Buenos Aires, 10 May 1947, p.l.
268
a communist activist with a ’terrorist’ record.100 Reyes argued that heavy industry should belong 
exclusively to the Nation, therefore rejecting its subjection to a foreign organisation, and claimed that the 
PSA responded to the interests of ARMCO Argentina, the powerful tentacle of a foreign organisation. He 
also asserted that within one year after SOMISA became operational, private capital could acquire the 
DGFM shares in the mixed company and turn the State into a junior partner, thereby enabling international 
consortiums such as ARMCO to bid for the entire package.101 These accusations were unsubstantiated, 
as strict restrictions had already been imposed on both foreign participation and private shareholdings in 
SOMISA during the first reading of the PSA Bill in the Senate and by the Congressional Committees which 
studied the proposal (see Chapter 3). In fact, a decision to restrict the ARMCO shareholding to a maximum 
4% of the equity capital had already been approved during the first reading of the PSA Bill in the Senate 
in 1946.102
The views expressed by Reyes reflected the xenophobia and nationalism of the ’extremists’, who 
were a minority among Peronista deputies. The latter grasped the significance of the proposal that ARMCO 
be both shareholder and contractor. The financial stake was awarded as a guarantee for efficiency in the 
work to be undertaken, and therefore there was concern that if the American firm only acted as technical 
adviser it could withdraw.103 Apprehensions over the fate of the PSA increased as Reyes went on 
explicitly to attack the ARMCO group. He charged ARMCO Argentina with being an international financial 
bandit and the real author of the PSA, and the ARMCO International Corporation with being a powerful 
organisation without frontiers that ’had stuck its claws in all the American countries’. Finally, Reyes 
conflated ARMCO business practices (ie, unspecified methods of being awarded contracts) with crime being
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committed under the shield of generous legislation.104 The result was uproar in the Chamber, but this did 
not lead to a vote by the government block to disallow Reyes continuing his speech.105 Peronista deputies 
were interested in the PSA proposals and not in ARMCO business methods, which were not necessarily 
illegal.106 However, with the support of the predominantly nationalist Radical deputies, Reyes 
recommended and secured the creation of an investigation committee which would examine the activities 
of the US firm.107 Since the latter was the only foreign enterprise offering technical assistance for 
SOMISA, the investigations threatened to derail the PSA. If ARMCO was found guilty of breaking the law 
before the PSA was approved by the Senate, the agreements awarding technical direction of the steelworks 
to ARMCO would have to be revoked.108
Peronista ’extremism’ was not the only nationalist element in the Chamber of Deputies which 
opposed ARMCO involvement in the PSA. The UCR, the leading opposition party, also had three 
reservations, (a) Monopolisation of the technical direction by ARMCO was regarded as the key problem, 
with the American firm being able to charge what it wished for technical management once the plant became 
operational, (b) As Reyes had claimed, the ARMCO shareholding was considered objectionable on the 
grounds that this would lead to economic and financial subjection of SOMISA by ARMCO. (c) Since it 
relied on a non-national corporation, the steelworks project would be ’stuck’ with foreign technology and 
assistance at a time when the objective was ’liberation’.109 However, these objections were unfounded. 
First, ARMCO was required to submit its technical direction proposal within three months of the constitution 
of the sociedad mixta (see Chapter 3). If unsatisfied, the DGFM could reject the project and allow the US 
firm to resubmit a more adequate proposal. Second, as seen above, the financial participation of ARMCO
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in SOMISA was severely restricted. Finally, the steelworks project could not go ahead without imported 
technology and licenses for specific product lines that only the American firm could provide.
Despite the various criticisms, the PSA Bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies. However, 
the investigation into ARMCO Argentina was held amid a climate of mistrust. Given the continued efforts 
of both nationalists and Braden to sabotage attempts at improving Argentine-American relations, a publicity 
campaign developed against ARMCO. Media attention centred on the controversy over the relationship 
between SOMISA and the US firm and, combined with the campaign against ARMCO in Congress, was 
damaging. Therefore, the Ministry of War was forced to release a communique stressing that ARMCO 
could not hold over 4% of the equity capital and was only to provide technical direction and the personnel 
essential for the success of the project.110 Notwithstanding the anti-ARMCO campaign, the investigation 
into the accusations made in the Olmos letter resulted in the charges against ARMCO Argentina being 
dropped on 7 June 1947. Similar charges against the subsidiary of the American firm had already been 
pressed by Olmos in January 1947, and had been rejected on the grounds that ARMCO business practices 
did not constitute any crime.111 Although the PSA was sanctioned by the Senate in June 1947, insecurity 
in US-Argentine relations and nationalist objections in Congress to the agreement between the DGFM and 
ARMCO led ARMCO Argentina to relinquish its right to subscribe shares in SOMISA. The decision was 
accepted by the DGFM.112
While the DGFM and ARMCO were still reeling from the nationalist onslaught in Congress and 
the media, there were substantial improvements in bilateral relations between Washington and Buenos Aires. 
Concern with communism led the Truman administration to break the deadlock with Argentina and pursue 
reconciliation. Peron himself, in spite of periodic outbursts of xenophobic rhetoric and denunciations of
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dollar imperialism for domestic consumption, was careful not to oppose American projects for the 
hemisphere.113 He pressed for early ratification of the Act of Chapultepec and the United Nations Charter 
by Congress, which clarified his intentions for Washington, and he manifestly desired to secure a place 
within the Inter-American system and the United Nations.114 At the Inter-American conference held in 
Rio, Argentine delegates were invited to join the new hemispheric treaty. They fully cooperated with 
Washington, and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in August 1947.115
Although this ’normalisation’ in US-Argentine relations came too late to prevent the onslaught on 
ARMCO, it enabled the American firm to remain involved as technical contractor. While the final 
preparatory work for SOMISA progressed, the DGFM was forced to tackle the excesses of government 
officials attempting to benefit from the steelworks project. The episode, which is one of the few 
documented cases of corruption, was first identified by Robert A. Potash from sketchy and sometimes 
inaccurate information in diplomatic correspondence from the American Embassy in Buenos Aires.116 
More recently released documents from the Confidential US State Department Central Files reveal the full 
story, at the centre of which was Miguel Miranda. As head of the IAPI, the State agency controlling foreign 
trade, Miranda was authorised to purchase supplies for State companies and the Army. He was also corrupt 
and his position in the IAPI, which was the exclusive purchasing agent abroad for Government entities, 
enabled him to arrange for kickbacks. IAPI purchasing contracts in North America were intentionally placed 
with little known suppliers rather than established sources, which facilitated payoffs.117 Miranda wanted 
to profit from contracts for SOMISA and, owing to existing agreements between the DGFM and ARMCO, 
had to go behind the backs of Peron and the DGFM. He signed three contracts with the obscure New York 
based firm Amer-Ind. The first was for preliminary work at a cost of US$ 100,000 and signed in June 
1946. The second contract, costing US$ 46,000,000 plus 10% profit share and signed in March 1947, was
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for the construction of an open-hearth steel plant, strip mill and tinplate mill. A final contract concluded 
in June 1947 was for building railways, docks, and complementary facilities. The contracts provided for 
three revolving funds to be established. Two of them, totalling US$ 5,500,000, would be set up in the 
United States of America to cover material and equipment costs and other expenses. The third, to be set 
up in Argentina, totalled m$n 500,000 to cover expenses and the payment of engineering.118 However, 
Amer-Ind lacked the financial and technical capability to implement the project. Before engaging in the 
venture, it had promised to pay Miranda and his IAPI associates an undisclosed portion of the anticipated 
profits. The Army became aware of the situation and took the matter straight to Peron, who promptly 
ordered the cancellation of the contracts.119
While stopping Miranda’s unsuccessful bid to profit from contracts for SOMISA, the military had 
simultaneously continued apace with final groundwork for the steelworks project. In October 1947, 
SOMISA received the proposed Definitive Plan of ARMCO.120 It comprised two proposals. One was for 
a plant which could produce annually 315,000 tons of semifinished steel products, and the other for a plant 
with an annual capacity of 500,000 tons. The SOMISA board opted for the latter suggestion, since it 
allowed for output expansion to 1,000,000 tons in the future. The main installations of the steelworks were 
to be: a port for raw materials; a plant for coke production that could handle both national and imported 
coal; a blast furnace with a daily capacity to produce 1,300 tons of pig iron; a plant with six Siemens-Martin 
furnaces for steelmaking; a rolling mill; a thermal power plant; and auxiliary services.121 The latter 
included equipment to unload ships and handle raw materials, docks, internal roads and railways, workshops, 
laboratories, and sewers and drainage.122 ARMCO would provide technical assistance for all installations
118 Department of State, Memorandum of conversation, Subject: Impending cancellation by IAPI of 
contracts with Amer-Ind Inc., 22 December 1947. 835.602/12-2247 BLPES, microfilm M(336):
Confidential US State Department Central Files: Argentina, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, Part II. Reel 10/19.
119 Despatch from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Secretary of State, Action No.3372, Subject: 
Status of Amer-Ind contracts, 31 December 1947, p.3. 835.602/12-3147 BLPES, microfilm M(336), reel 
10/19.
120 Gentile, ’Desarrollo’, p. 193.
121 Pedro F. Castineiras, Esto lo hicieron los argentinos (Buenos Aires, 1972), p.40.
122 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, p.78.
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except the auxiliary equipment and thermal power plant, for which no assistance was required.123
Having decided the location and capacity of the plant, the DGFM had to expropriate an area 
covering around 3,000 hectares for the steelworks, related industries, and storage of raw materials. An area 
of 290 hectares was placed at the disposal of the DGFM in order to allow the initiation of work, which was 
formally acquired on 20 May 1948.124 The DGFM, the ARMCO International Corporation and ARMCO 
Argentina had also signed the contract covering the design and technical direction for SOMISA. This 
contract was consultative and supervisory, and laid down that ARMCO would only draw up plans and 
specifications in such a way that tenders could be called for. As concessions for material purchases and the 
execution of work were not granted, competitive bids were to be called. Furthermore, no agents or 
intermediaries would act on behalf of the DGFM.125 Nonetheless, ARMCO intended to obtain all 
necessary supplies in the United States of America.126 It urged the purchase and use of some of the 
unused 1,000 ton blast furnaces built in North America during the Second World War, the use of standard 
US open-hearth furnaces of 160 tons, and heating the ingots poured with steel in soaking pits of the type 
built by Amsler-Morton, Salem Engineering or Surface Combustion.127
Despite its intentions, ARMCO was not assured of securing all the purchases in the USA, for two 
reasons, (i) As seen above, the contract with the DGFM required the call of tenders. And (ii) the prospects 
of obtaining US supplies were reduced by the progressive deterioration of Argentine dollar reserves. 
Concerning the issue of tenders, it generated unjustified fear in ARMCO of possible competition from the 
United Kingdom. British involvement in the project was unrealistic owing to conditions in both Britain and
123 Castineiras, Esto, p.41.
124 Ibid., pp.45,46.
125 Letter from J. Garnett Lomax, Minister (Commercial) at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to the 
South American Department, FO, 24 March 1948. FO 371 68090 AS 2155/1/2. Letter from Garnett 
Lomax to the South American Department, FO, 29 March 1948. FO 371 68091 AS 2274/1/2.
126 Despatch Overseas Trade (B) No.707 from Garnett Lomax to the Undersecretary, Export Promotion 
Department, Board of Trade, London, 16 June 1948. FO 371 68094 AS 3757/1/2.
127 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, pp.73,77,78.
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Argentina. On the one hand, deliveries from Britain could not be guaranteed in the aftermath of the war, 
and the British iron and steel industry was being restructured in the wake of nationalisation.128 On the 
other hand, Argentina could not afford purchases in Britain as the virtual depletion of sterling reserves had 
been aggravated with the acquisition of the British-owned railways.129 Regarding the effect of the dollar 
shortage, it led ARMCO unsuccessfully to seek financial advice on the possibility of obtaining US supplies 
on a 2-year payment term. The response received from American bankers was very cool.130
ARMCO was thereby forced to consider placing part of the orders in Europe, and instructed to 
provide some copies of its specifications to non-American groups. In Britain, which was determined to 
maintain what remained of the Anglo-Argentine economic connection, this was seen as an opportunity.131 
The British showed particular interest in the contract for the designs and specifications for ore-carrying 
steamers to transport iron to the steelworks. The contract with ARMCO apparently called for the 
presentation of designs within a year, and the ships had to be ready by 1951. In normal circumstances, 
ARMCO would have written the specifications in conjunction with a US shipbuilding firm and ensured that 
the final contract was placed with a shipbuilder of its choice.132 Since Argentina lacked the necessary 
dollars and US shipbuilding was notoriously expensive and rarely able to compete with British firms 
following the devaluation of sterling, London believed an agreement between ARMCO and a British firm 
might be possible.133 The representative of the British Shipbuilding Conference in Buenos Aires kept in 
contact with three DGFM members, and was informed that ’several’ 15,000 ton vessels of 12 to 15 knots
128 Letter from W. Strath, Engineering Industries Division, Ministry of Supply, to Walter Simon, HM 
Treasury, London, 21 November 1946. FO 371 51770 AS 7397/2/2. Letter from C.H. Davies, Export 
Promotion Department, Board of Trade, to Garnett Lomax, 7 December 1946. FO 371 51770 AS 
7608/2/2.
129 Noel Fursman, The decline o f the Anglo/Argentine economic connection in the years immediately after 
the Second World War: a British perspective (DPhil thesis, Oxford, 1988), p.369.
130 Despatch Overseas Trade (B) No.707, 16 June 1948. FO 371 68094 AS 3757/1/2.
131 Ibid. See also the remarks on the cover of the folder containing this document.
132 Despatch Overseas Trade (B) No.449 from Garnett Lomax to the Undersecretary, Export Promotion 
Department, Board of Trade, 22 April 1948. FO 371 68092 AS 2873/1/2.
133 Ibid.
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and 23 feet draught were required. He was also instructed to await advice from the British Embassy about 
approaching ARMCO or until the Conference advised British shipbuilders to approach ARMCO directly.134 
However, British expectations were not realised, frustrated by difficulties in both the Republic and the 
United Kingdom. As indicated earlier, the Republic suffered from both dollar and sterling shortages. On 
the other hand, British shipbuilders were afflicted by steel shortages following the war and therefore decided 
not to approach the US firm.135
The absence of foreign currency reserves to pay for equipment purchases prevented any further 
progress with SOMISA. The only alternative was external finance, but attempts to obtain funding for 
technology transfers in both Europe and the United States of America ended in failure. The most important 
failure occurred in Washington and, as is seen below, resulted from American policy towards Latin America 
generally and Argentina in particular. Regarding efforts to obtain funding in Europe, negotiations with 
French banking failed to deliver any results. The Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas offered to furnish a credit 
equivalent to US$ 116,000,000 to finance the acquisition of the whole equipment for SOMISA from French 
producers, but was in no position to award it. Even more odd was that the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 
was prepared to provide the whole sum despite the fact that the proposition required that only 51% of the 
material had to be of French origin. The repayment of the loan was to be extended over 7 years and could 
be spread to 10 years. However, given these circumstances, there are doubts as to the seriousness of the 
offer. In fact, France never confirmed it.136
While the French credit offer was ill-prepared and not entirely serious, attempts to secure external 
finance could have in theory succeeded. The Americans were in a position to provide credits and considered 
the natural source for funds. During the Second World War, the United States of America relied on its
134 Letter from Davies to Garnett Lomax, 5 June 1948. FO 371 68093 AS 3362/1/2.
135 Remarks on the cover of the folder containing Despatch Overseas Trade (B) No.707, 16 June 1948.
FO 371 68094 AS 3757/1/2.
136 Letter from H. Somerville-Smith, Export Credits Guarantee Department, to E.W.Playfair, HM 
Treasury, 3 October 1949. Copy sent by the latter to J.S.Lithiby, Bank of England, 4 October 1949. Bank 
of England Archive, OV 102/135. Reply from Lithiby to Playfair, 5 October 1949. Bank of England 
Archive, OV 102/135.
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Latin American neighbours for key strategic minerals, and Allied oil imports came principally from 
Venezuela. In addition, Brazil had also participated in the conflict.137 Given that Washington had 
furnished assistance to its regional ’allies’ in return for this cooperation, Latin American countries expected 
the USA to expand its wartime role and provide them with long-term development capital in the postwar 
period.138 However, the Americans deliberately refused to supply funds, for two reasons, (a) They were 
unwilling to provide assistance, (b) They used economic assistance as a lever to promote change in the 
increasingly nationalist Latin American republics.
Concerning US unwillingness to provide assistance, it arose from international conditions in the late 
Forties. Washington had other priorities in Western Europe created by the Second World War and the Cold 
War. Latin America, having suffered less than many other regions in the Second World War, emerged from 
the global conflict in relatively good economic shape. Therefore, the USA repeatedly avoided the issue of 
economic aid for its southern neighbours. Latin America was the only region in the world which in 1950 
did not benefit from American aid, excluding the poorly funded Point Four technical assistance programme 
established in 1949.139 The latter was part of the US strategy to ’contain’ communism and only a 
commitment to provide technical assistance for economic development in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Point Four, which was of little benefit and too vague to be defined as a programme, was initially allocated 
a modest US$ 35,000,000 in 1950.140 The little postwar new US investment made in Latin America went 
mostly into Venezuelan oil, and there was only a modest increase in lending by the Export-Import Bank.141 
Given this US refusal to provide assistance for industrial projects south of the Rio Grande, it was unlikely 
that SOMISA would obtain external finance for equipment purchases.
137 Stephen G. Rabe, ’The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 
1945-1952’, Diplomatic History 2 (1978) No.3, p.280.
138 Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, ’Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold 
War: Some Reflections on the 1945-8 Conjuncture’, Journal o f Latin American Studies 20 (1988) Part I, 
p.185.
139 Ibid., p. 186.
140 Julius W. Pratt, Vincent P. de Santis, and Joseph M. Siracusa, A History o f United States Foreign 
Policy (4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1980), p.401.
141 Bethell and Roxborough, ’Reflections’, p. 186.
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However, there was a second factor preventing Argentina from obtaining US credits. Some 
officials in Washington viewed economic support as a means to advance domestic reforms in the more 
nationalist Latin American countries. Notwithstanding the ’normalisation’ of Argentine-Americanrelations, 
the deterioration of the Argentine economy after 1947 provided the Americans with an opportunity to try 
and bring about the changes they desired. Washington was hostile to the Tercera Position, strict bilateralism 
in trade, state trading through the LAPI, and the firm Argentine refusal to join the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. As Peron needed external 
financial assistance, the United States of America had a weapon to curb the power of ’extremists’ within 
the regime, restrict the LAPI, erode Statist experiments, and improve conditions for foreign corporations.142 
’Normalised’ relations had not led to changes in Peronista policy, and the Argentine President was only 
forced to obtain American assistance at any cost when the economic situation became totally desperate.
Despite its reinsertion into the Inter-American system, the Republic continued to pay lip service 
to the Tercera Position and confronted the USA on every occasion at the United Nations. It used this same 
approach at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana from November 1947 
until March 1948.'43 For the Americans, Argentine actions at Havana were a deliberate attempt to 
sabotage the conference. Strained relations were further aggravated by conflicts in Washington. While the 
State Department attempted to work through Peron for change, the European Cooperation Administration 
(ECA) strove to force the abandonment of the LAPI and other statist apparatus by refusing to authorise dollar 
purchases of Argentine products for the Marshall Plan.144 The Republic had hoped to obtain the dollars 
necessary to cover import requirements of capital goods and other products by providing a substantial 
contribution of commodities for the Marshall Plan. However, the ECA indicated in June 1948 that the 
wheat crops of Europe, Canada and the United States of America could meet European demand. By the end
142 MacDonald, ’Peron’, pp.407,408,409.
143 Accounts of the conference proceedings can be found in Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and 
Argentina (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), pp.225-227, and Escude, ’Boicot’, pp.34,35.
144 Peterson, Argentina, p.475; MacDonald, ’Peron’, p.409.
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of 1948, Argentine sales barely amounted to US$ 3,000,000.145 The sacking of Miranda, one of the main 
’extremists’, in January 1949 due to the failure of his economic policy did not diminish the resolve of the 
ECA. Its influential officials wanted to use the growing Argentine domestic difficulties to destroy Peron. 
Nevertheless, the strategy was counterproductive. By the time the controversy was resolved by mid-1949, 
Peron had used it to divert attention away from the crisis and inflamed anti-Yankee resentment with 
xenophobic rhetoric.146
While both external and domestic factors (US unwillingness to dispense financial assistance for 
development projects, renewed trouble in US-Argentine relations, and the deepening Argentine economic 
crisis) prevented SOMISA from purchasing equipment in the late Forties, domestic conditions rather than 
fluctuations in American-Argentine relations frustrated the possibility of acquiring equipment for the 
integrated steelworks project by the early Fifties. Economic difficulties forced the Argentine President to 
bow to American wishes in order to get the foreign assistance he now desperately required. However, the 
aid obtained did not benefit SOMISA since it was utilised in more urgent matters related to the balance of 
payments crisis. As the regime took steps to improve conditions for foreign enterprises and to curb LAPI 
activities in the import trade, the State Department favoured the provision of funds. Accordingly, the 
Export-Import Bank granted a loan of US$ 125,000,000 in May 1950 with the sole purpose of placing the 
Republic on a current paying basis and enabling business houses to refund their financial obligations to 
American exporters.147
Even before SOMISA failed to reap any benefits from the US loan, the authorities seriously 
investigated the issue of whether the existing PSA proposal was too ambitious and should be suspended.148 
In practice, such an investigation was purely academic since the project was paralysed de facto. The severe
145 Peterson, Argentina, p.476.
146 MacDonald, ’Peron’, pp.409,410.
147 Ibid., p.409; Peterson, Argentina, p.480.
148 Letter from Sir Frank Nixon, John Brown & Thos. Firth (Overseas) Limited, to R.W. Jackling, FO, 
7 April 1948. FO 371 68091 AS 2359/1/2.
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crisis prevented any equipment purchases, or any heavy foreign exchange outlays. Furthermore, the original 
authorised capital of SOMISA was inadequate owing to the decision to increase the annual capacity of the 
projected steelworks from 315,000 to 500,000 tons and, more importantly, to rising costs arising from the 
economic situation. SOMISA petitioned the regime to increase the capital on several occasions (see Chapter
3). Although the necessary legislation was finally enacted in September 1950, the economic crisis forced 
the government not to make contributions to the augmented capital and to refuse the company the right to 
seek foreign loans to make up for State funding defficiencies.149 Therefore, SOMISA could not obtain 
the necessary technology or anything else. Even the purchase of land, which was modestly increased from 
290 to 349 hectares, was not completed in the late Forties as planned but many years later.150
There is one aspect of the September 1950 Congressional debate on the proposed increase in the 
authorised capital of SOMISA which merits attention. This was the unsuccessful attempt by the 
Radicalismo, which was vehemently anti-Yankee and determined to oppose Peronista legislative proposals, 
to revive the ARMCO issue. The latter had no significance and was irrelevant to the discussion given that, 
following the enactment of the PSA in 1947, the US firm had become the technical contractor and its 
Argentine subsidiary had rescinded any financial participation in SOMISA (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, 
deputy Arturo Frondizi raised the question of the American firm, which was followed up by a question from 
deputy Luis Dellepiane on the choice of ARMCO as contractor over the local firm TAMET. Deputy 
Eduardo J. Rumbo rapidly addressed both queries. Frondizi was countered with the argument that ARMCO 
was merely the constructor and had been chosen for this task on the basis of its long experience in the steel 
industry. Dellepiane was retorted that TAMET and other Argentine firms lacked the experience to embark 
on a project of such magnitude, and that therefore there could be no presumptiousness over the ownership 
of the most appropriate contractor (even if it happened to be an American firm).151 The fact that there 
were no further questions on ARMCO during the debate on an increase in the capital of SOMISA, and that 
the issue itself did not inflame any anti-Yankee passion as in the debate on the PSA (see above), again
149 Potash, Army, pp.107,108.
150 Castineiras, Esto, p.46.
151 Diputados, Ano 1950, Tomo IV, p.3466.
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reflects prevailing conditions in the early Fifties. The domestic economic crisis, rather than fluctuations 
in US-Argentine relations and criticisms of ARMCO, affected the little headway made in the PSA project 
and any possibility by SOMISA of obtaining the necessary technology.
CONCLUSION
Foreign technology transfers, which were essential to the development of modem, large-scale iron 
and steel production, were restricted for most of the second quarter of the century. In the Twenties and 
Thirties, this was owed to the deliberate policy of the leading West European steel producer-exporters (and 
the steel cartel they established), which aimed to retain control over their shrinking export markets by 
preventing the growth of the steel industry overseas. This policy was implemented by two means. First, 
the frustration of projects through non-cooperation by potential foreign suppliers of technology. And second, 
the acquisition of substantial stakes in overseas enterprises with potential to develop steel production, as 
exemplified by the participation of the ARBED group of Luxembourg in the rapidly expanding Talleres 
Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET. These tactics prevented the emergence of domestic steel production 
before 1939, at least in the private sector. In the Forties, despite the collapse of the steel cartel with the 
outbreak of the Second World War, restrictions on foreign technology transfers remained. These arose from 
US policy towards Argentina during the war, and American unwillingness to promote industrialisation south 
of the Rio Grande in the aftermath of the conflict. Argentine relations with Washington, which fluctuated 
sharply and even reached an all-time low, became the key obstacle in frustrating the DGFM project for an 
integrated steelworks, which depended on an American corporation for technical assistance. At the crucial 
moment when it had to be approved in Congress, the PSA was almost destroyed by a nationalist backlash 
triggered by Argentine-American antagonism.
Notwithstanding the controls on foreign technology transfers, this chapter has shown that on 
occasions the restrictions were circumvented. This was made possible by the capacity and ingenuity of local 
engineers, who demonstrated their ability to build industrial installations, copy foreign designs and adapt 
equipment. As a result, the Armed Forces were able to build the Fabrica Militar de Aceros in the Thirties
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and the Altos Homos Zapla in the Forties, and private metallurgical firms to engage in steelmaking during 
the Second World War in order to overcome import shortages. The difficulty was that, although the efforts 
of Argentine engineers allowed the emergence of domestic steel production, plants were far from being 
modem or efficient and equipped with machinery which was obsolete. In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, national steel producers needed to upgrade their facilities to remain competitive in the face of 
competition from imports. This could only be achieved through foreign technology transfers, which were 
not available owing to American policy and, by the end of the period, to domestic economic factors.
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Chapter 7
ECONOMICS AND MILITARY IDEOLOGY:
COSTS, PRICES AND THE GAP BETWEEN PLANNING AND POLICY OUTCOME
As seen in Chapter 4, the level of aggregate demand for steel appeared sufficient to support modem 
blast furnaces and steelworks. Table 7.1, which shows aggregate demand for steel in terms of crude steel 
equivalent for the major Latin American economies in 1947, indicates that total Argentine steel consumption
Table 7.1
CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF CRUDE STEEL IN THE PRINCIPAL
LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES IN 1947 
(in tons)
COUNTRY CONSUMPTION PRODUCTION IMPORTS
Argentina 1,212,000 150,000 1,062,000
Brazil 978,000 385,000 593,000
Mexico 699,000 321,000 378,000
LATIN AMERICA 4,173,000 897,000 3,276,000
Source: United Nations (UN), Department of Economic Affairs, World Iron Ore Resources and their 
Utilization (Lake Success, 1950), p.44.
was 1,000,000 tons. This accounted for almost 30% of total consumption in Latin America, and exceeded 
Brazilian consumption levels by almost 20%. However, the data also shows that domestic production in 
Brazil and Mexico was greater than in Argentina, with local producers supplying a substantial proportion 
of admittedly smaller markets. While domestic output only covered 12.4% of requirements in Argentina, 
it covered 39.4% in Brazil and 45.9% in Mexico.1 Unlike its Brazilian and Mexican counterparts, the 
Republic lacked an integrated steelworks. Production had been undertaken by a number of small plants 
where manufacturing was inefficient given the scale of operations and equipment was not being replaced 
despite becoming increasingly obsolete (see Chapter 6).2 These attempts to develop domestic iron and steel
1 Calculated from the data in Table 7.1.
2 United Nations (UN), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America IV (1959) No.2, pp.6,8.
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production, and more particularly the Plan Sidenirgico Argentino (PSA) devised by the military in the 
Forties, failed in economic terms. Two factors are at the root of the problem: (i) the limited market for 
rolled products, and (ii) raw material supplies.
Regarding market size, the level of total apparent consumption concealed the fact that, in the 
absence of industries consuming large volumes of iron and steel, demand for many types of finished goods 
was inadequate to support the use of modem rolling mills for large-scale production. The substantial capital 
outlays needed to establish even a small-scale iron and steel sector tended to impose a minimum size on the 
demand necessary to support economic production of finished goods (see below). If this could not be 
achieved, the installation of the most modem manufacturing plants and processes was unjustified.3 The 
production of a broad assortment of goods in relatively small volumes, which required many types and sizes 
of rolled steel, resulted in the inefficient use of rolling equipment and increased costs.4 Concerning raw 
materials, they were the predominant element affecting costs - and thereby final prices - of iron and steel.
Table 7.2
ESTIMATED BREAKDOWN OF IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION COSTS IN 1950
(as a percentage)
PRODUCT RAW MATERIALS LABOUR OTHER
Pig Iron 85 10 5
Ingots 70 18 12
Billets/Slabs 85 7 18
Source: Pedro J. Maristany, El problema siderurgico argentino (Buenos Aires, 1950), p.34.
Table 7.2, which shows the estimated cost breakdown of iron and steel production, reveals the extent to 
which raw materials determined the costs of key products. This had negative consequences for Argentina,
3 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, World Iron Ore Resources and Their Utilization (Lake Success, 
1950), p.23; Revista de la Sociedad Anonima Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET, July 1935, p.2.
4 Address delivered by Raul Prebisch, Executive Secretary of ECLA, at the inaugural session of the 
Latin American meeting of experts on steel making and transforming industries, Sao Paulo, 15 October 
1956. In UN, ECLA, Problems o f the steel making and transforming industries in Latin America, Volume 
1: Report of the Sao Paulo meeting (New York, 1958), p.36.
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as supplies of both national and foreign inputs were deficient. Domestic resources were expensive owing 
to their scarcity, poor properties and location in remote areas (see Chapter 5). Inadequate supplies only 
acted as a disincentive to national iron and steel production before 1939.5 Such discouragement did not 
prevent the Armed Forces from pressing for the development of heavy industry. When the military prepared 
the PSA proposal, they were advised that domestic raw materials should only be used during extreme 
emergency conditions and that the use of foreign inputs would be economically and technically more 
advantageous.6 However well intentioned, this strategy did not succeed as the project was being developed 
amidst international instability - ie, the Second World War and its aftermath, and the Korean War. Although 
imported raw materials were cheaper than national ones, they remained relatively expensive as sources were 
limited and transport requirements high. Therefore, the use of foreign inputs did not fully achieve the 
economies that might have been expected from their utilisation.
Given the market and raw material constraints, this chapter examines the possibilities of establishing 
a viable national iron and steel industry. It comprises four sections, the first of which argues that there was 
little incentive to undertake domestic production until 1939 owing to local factors and control of the market 
by leading foreign suppliers through the International Steel Cartel (ISC). The second part analyses the 
considerations behind military pressure to develop iron and steel production. It assesses military thinking 
on the role of an iron and steel industry in national development and shows that defence rather than business 
requirements were paramount. The third section examines the implications of the inefficient implementation 
of the PSA, which were reflected in the gap between the underlying assumptions of the project and the 
economics of national steel production. Finally, this chapter considers feasible alternatives to the Sociedad 
Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA) proposal, the centrepiece of the PSA, and the more modest military 
facilities at the Altos Homos Zapla (AHZ), thereby reinforcing the argument that the Armed Forces were 
guided by the concept of seguridad nacional.
5 Pedro J. Maristany, El problema siderurgico argentino (Buenos Aires, 1950), p.34.
6 Proposal presented by TAMET S.A., La Cantabrica S.A., SIAM Di Telia Ltda., and ARMCO 
Argentina S.A. at the contest held by the Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), 3 
November 1944, in DGFM, Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 150.
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PROJECTED COSTS OF DOMESTIC PROD UCTIONAND INTERNA TIONALPRICES BEFORE 1939
Although two small producers (the Talleres Metalurgicos Vulcano and the Fabrica Militar de 
Aceros) emerged before the Second World War, there was little to induce large-scale domestic steel 
production at least until 1939. There were three discouraging factors: raw material supplies, the type of 
equipment to be used, and lack of experience in the industry. Domestic raw materials were expensive in 
terms of both operating and transport costs as their poor quality resulted in large volumes of raw materials 
being necessary in iron and steel production. Greater tonnages of ore were required if the iron content was 
30%, which would not be the case if the iron content attained the minimum internationally accepted standard 
of 60%. In addition, enormous amounts of coke and thus coal were necessary if poorer ores were employed, 
and poor coal yielded less coke.7 Therefore, the use of national minerals was judged unrealistic, until the 
Armed Forces pressed for their exploitation in the drive for self-sufficiency in strategic industries (see next 
section).
Table 7.3
THE COST OF A ONE-TON STEEL INGOT IN ARGENTINA AND THE USA IN 1925
(in pesos)










Source: H. Foster Bain, Lasposibilidades de la manufactura de hierro y  acero en la Argentina (Buenos 
Aires, 1925), p.127.
Nonetheless, the possibility of undertaking local iron and steel production was considered before 
1939, and early studies suggested it was feasible if the substantial domestic scrap supplies and imported pig 
iron were employed. The only surviving calculations of the cost of a one-ton steel ingot for the Twenties
7 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.25.
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(see Table 7.3) are those in a report commissioned by the government in 1925. The cost of a steel ingot 
varied with the ratio of raw materials employed as steel production in Siemens-Martin furnaces combined 
both scrap and pig iron (see Chapter 1), with costs being lower when the proportion of scrap used was 
highest.8 However, there are two problems with these figures. First, the data was tailored to the 
requirements of the Minister of War. General Justo strongly favoured the development of arms-related 
industries (see Chapter 3) and had commissioned the report to boost the promotion of iron and steel 
production. The calculations deliberately omitted some significant elements affecting costs of production, 
namely the cost of transporting resources and the wages of the workforce. The report acknowledged that 
their inclusion would have made costs unfavourable when compared to estimated costs in the USA.9 
Estimates were thereby calculated on an inaccurate basis, and set prices in Argentina at m$n 9 for scrap and 
m$n 31 for imported pig iron. Research undertaken subsequently by the government revealed the extent 
of the distortion in these calculations. Scrap was actually priced at m$n 10 to m$n 20 per ton, and pig iron 
at m$n 60 to m$n 70 per ton.10 The second problem with the data is that of the raw materials suggested, 
scrap would be the preeminent one. In order for steel production to be economic, the proportion of scrap 
used would have to be greater than that of imported pig iron. However, the assumption that modem 
steelmaking could be based on scrap supplies was unrealistic. The danger was that heavy reliance on scrap 
as a raw material could result in the depletion of stocks, as ’small’ economies had much lower volumes of 
scrap available than in the industrialised countries.11 As seen in Chapter 5, this danger materialised in 
Argentina when iron and steel production was undertaken during the Second World War.
Two technical factors also affected the viability of a domestic steel industry, namely the type of 
equipment utilised and lack of experience. This was aptly demonstrated by the experience of the two small 
steel producers that emerged before 1939. Since foreign supplies of modem technology were restricted by
8 H. Foster Bain, Las posibilidades de la manufactura de hierroy acero en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 
1925), p.127.
9 Ibid., p. 127.
10 Ibid., p. 129; Sven Wassman, Sobre las posibilidades de una industria siderurgica en la Republica 
Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1927), p.6.
11 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.25.
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the leading steel producer-exporters, the operational Siemens-Martin furnaces were uneconomic. With a 
capacity of 7 to 8 tons rather than the more common type of 25 tons, they were inefficient and had a high 
fuel consumption.12 The impact of lack of experience in steel production is illustrated by the Fabrica 
Militar de Aceros. Major difficulties in the initial operation of its equipment had adverse effects on output 
and costs. When the plant opened in 1937, output was discontinuous as the furnace required adjustment on 
several occasions. The Fabrica Militar de Aceros implemented three ’schedules of production’ of steel 
ingots, each of which was ended when the military decided the Siemens-Martin furnace needed modifications 
and resulted in successive falls in production costs. The first ’schedule’ was effected in July and terminated 
with an output of 14 tons priced at m$n 2,120 per ton. A second attempt followed in September and 
completed with a cumulative output of 323 tons produced at m$n 149.50 per ton. A third ’schedule’ in 
November brought total output for 1937 to 691 tons, cumulatively priced at m$n 55.78 per ton. Having 
improved performance with the adjustments to the equipment, the plant increased its steel output to 5,535 
tons in 1938. However, owing to a fall in the value of the peso, production that year was priced at m$n 
82.13 per ton.13
The data for the Fabrica Militar de Aceros is unique, providing the only concrete evidence on costs 
of production in the interwar period. The critical figure is that for 1938, attained once the plant had 
undergone all necessary technical adjustments. It exceededthe Foster Bain estimates considerably (see Table 
7.3), even though output was based on a combination of raw materials in which scrap predominated over 
imported pig iron. Costs at the military factory only served to reinforce the acknowledgement that the 
estimates by Foster Bain omitted key elements in the calculation of domestic production costs, and thereby 
compared unfavourably with those of major producers such as the USA. Since the Fabrica Militar de Aceros 
and its civilian counterpart - the Talleres Metalurgicos Vulcano - were modest undertakings, leading 
Continental European exporters benefited from the absence of local competition. Determined to control both 
the international steel trade and the few remaining open markets, they colluded to monopolise the production 
and distribution of iron and steel. Their comprehensive alliance, commonly known as the International Steel
12 Wassman, Posibilidades, p.7.
13 Eduardo A. Garimaldi, Industria siderurgica argentina (Buenos Aires, December 1947), pp.30,31.
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Cartel, set its own export prices and was the main source of Argentine imports.
Pricing policies o f  the ISC
The steel cartel comprised export sales comptoirs for each specific commodity (see Chapters 1 and
4), which individually set prices. Full information on prices was restricted by the comptoirs to ISC 
members, with the understanding that these were minimum prices and higher prices than those stipulated 
could be charged, while distributors and consumers were merely informed about ISC price policies through 
the trade journals - they were not provided data regarding actual prices paid in business transactions of 
participants in the cartel.14 Merely serving as guides, these international prices were ’official’ or nominal 
prices. Within each comptoir, they were identified with a designated standard or base commodity with a 
set chemical composition, length, thickness, gauge, etcetera, and routinely connected to the North Sea or 
English Channel export ports.15 Denominated in paper £ until sterling devalued in 1931, prices were 
subsequently determined in gold £ in an attempt to profiteer. Though prices in gold £ were fixed, a 
conversion rate set to calculate prices in paper £ enabled the cartel to manipulate prices inconspicuously.16 
This was achieved by maintaining the conversion ratio when the value of the gold £ changed, through 
variations in the conversion ratio that did not correspond with changes in the value of the gold £, or by 
modifying the conversion rate when there was no corresponding change in the value of the gold £. The 
conversion factor, which was first changed on a monthly basis, was initially set at paper £ 1.463 per gold 
£ on 1 July 1933.17 No variations are recorded after June 1935, when the conversion factor was fixed at
14 Ervin Hexner, The International Steel Cartel (Chapel Hill, 1943), pp.178,179.
15 Ibid., p. 180,181.
16 Daniel Barbezat, ’A Price for Every Product, Every Place: The International Steel Export Cartel, 
1933-39’, Business History 33 (1991) No.4, p.77.
17 The conversion factor from gold £ to paper £ was set as follows: 1.489 in August 1933; 1.552 in 
September 1933; 1.553 in October 1933; 1.519 in November 1933; 1.486 in December 1933; 1.550 in 
January 1934; 1.625 in March 1934; 1.650 in September 1934; 1.675 in October 1934; 1.650 in November 
1934; 1.675 in January 1935; 1.700 in February 1935; 1.750 in March 1935; 1.725 in April 1935; 1.700 in 
May 1935; and 1.675 in June 1935. Hexner, Cartel, p.184.
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Table 7.4
EXPORT PRICES* FOR SELECTED STEEL COMMODITIES PER LONG TON, FOB ANTWERP 











Official Free Official Free Official Free Official Free
rate rate rate rate rate rate rate rate
Jun 1926 56.97 55.52 60.35 72.42
Dec 1926 66.19 65.83 75.29 70.92
Jun 1927 54.18 53.61 69.15 71.44
Dec 1927 54.86 50.29 68.01 72.81
Jun 1928 65.89 56.15 73.22 73.00
Dec 1928 70.56 58.23 72.87 74.94
Jun 1929 68.78 60.68 73.76 75.27
Dec 1929 62.58 58.29 73.90 77.48
Jun 1930 68.49 66.52 85.54 85.28
Dec 1930 63.04 54.97 71.10 95.29
Jun 1931 52.73 51.47 62.96 102.31
Dec 1931 51.33 50.41 63.77 111.66
Jun 1932 40.36 38.50 51.05 105.81
Dec 1932 49.86 39.83 57.31 103.44
Jun 1933 44.26 40.66 57.98 81.31
Dec 1933# 76.19 97.58 69.95 89.59 98.85 126.60 134.15 171.81
Jun 1934 89.56 106.60 86.78 103.29 116.34 138.48 155.47 185.06
Dec 1934 89.38 103.61 86.47 100.24 116.21 134.71 155.01 179.68
Jun 1935 90.78 99.96 87.38 96.22 117.30 129.17 156.57 172.41
Dec 1935 90.89 96.60 87.48 92.98 121.18 128.80 156.75 166.61
Jun 1936 90.99 96.97 87.58 93.34 121.32 129.30 156.94 167.25
Dec 1936 112.33 113.30 95.40 94.35 119.17 120.19 163.61 165.02
Jun 1937 160.80 163.21 130.56 132.52 164.00 166.46 154.08 156.39
Dec 1937 160.80 170.95 143.84 152.92 190.88 202.93 154.08 163.81
Jun 1938 140.64 167.27 130.56 155.28 164.00 195.06 154.08 183.26
Dec 1938 145.86 176.14 138.72 167.52 159.97 193.19 163.71 197.70
Jun 1939 145.86 173.57 131.58 156.58 159.97 190.36 163.71 194.81
* All prices quoted are as of the end of the month indicated.
# Owing to the existence of multiple exchange rates starting in late 1933, prices as from December 
that year are based on the official selling rate and the free market rate. Although importers 
purchased foreign exchange at the official rate, real prices are reflected in those calculated at the 
free market rate.
Source: Calculated from the data in Ervin Hexner, The International Steel Cartel (Chapel Hill, 1943), 
pp.190,191,193, which was measured in paper £ until sterling devalued in 1931 and in gold £ 
thereafter. The conversion factor from gold £ to paper £ was obtained from two sources. For the 
period December 1931 - June 1933, it was calculated by using information on the exchange rate 
between £ and the US$ in The Economist, 2 January 1932, p.45; 2 July 1932, p.45; 31 December 1932, 
p.1258; 1 July 1933, p.46. The data in Hexner, Cartel, p.184, is the source of the conversion factor 
for the period from December 1933 onwards, when it was manipulated by the ISC in its attempt to 
profiteer. The data on exchange rates from paper £ to m$n for the period June 1926 - June 1939 was 
obtained from Vicente Vazquez-Presedo, Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas (comparadas), Segunda 
parte: 1914-1939 (Buenos Aires, 1976), pp.282-283.
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paper £ 1.675 per gold £.18
The only existing data on nominal prices for selected commodities is that in The International Steel 
Cartel by Ervin Hexner. In order to undertake a speculative comparison between the costs of domestic 
production at the Fabrica Militar de Aceros (for which there is only data for 1937 and 1938) and those of 
imports from the steel cartel, Table 7.4 shows Hexner’s figures converted into nominal pesos. While £ 
prices in the original figures appear stable for most of the period except at the trough of the world crisis, 
this is not entirely the case when turned into pesos. The cost of importing commodities (and by implication 
crude steel) in the late Twenties and early Thirties was below the two existing figures for production costs 
at the military plant. However, import costs compared unfavourably subsequently as they increased steeply 
once economic recovery from the Depression was under way. Argentine importers faced both the 
manipulated conversion rate from gold £ to paper £ and a devalued local currency, which meant that they 
required larger amounts of pesos to purchase the paper £ necessary to pay for imports from the cartel. 
Moreover, prices of some ISC products in Argentina were part of a specialised geographic price structure. 
The latter was implemented by some comptoirs which were induced by business strategy, and aimed to 
eliminate competitors from outside the ISC in specific markets.19 Geographic pricing was effectively a 
method of price discrimination in which prices were higher in markets with fewer alternate suppliers - the 
United Kingdom in the Argentine case.20 At least on paper, these circumstances should have induced the 
development of local steelmaking. Nevertheless, this was not possible as the ISC sustained its position by 
controlling the market through a range of oligopolistic practices (see Chapters 1 and 6).
Cartel members implementing the pricing policies described above were the leading Argentine 
source of iron and steel. However, the situation was altered dramatically by the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The ISC collapsed, and wartime import shortages resulted in price increases and hoarding and 
speculation through the systematic retention of stocks. Round iron shapes were placed openly in the market
18 Barbezat, ’Price’, p.77.
19 Hexner, Cartel, p. 182.
20 Barbezat, ’Price’, p.77.
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at m$n 2,000 per ton, even though the import cost had only increased to a price band ranging from m$n 200 
to m$n 300. The Argentine authorities attempted to prevent pricing distortions, but failed. Sheets sold at 
between m$n 1,500 to m$n 2,000 per ton, notwithstanding that the price band was set officially at between 
m$n 850 and m$n 1,000.21
As seen in Chapter 3, these conditions provided the impetus for the advent of steel production in 
private metallurgical firms and for a sustained military effort to develop heavy industry. The most important 
of these attempts was that of the Armed Forces, which resulted in the initiation of national pig iron 
production, and the preparation of a detailed framework plan for the creation of a modem, large-scale 
steelworks. Though there had been major disincentives to undertake local iron and steel production before 
1939, economic nationalists within the Army Engineering Corps had been pressing for its creation. Their 
case was strengthened by the hardship generated by two world wars and the Depression, and the strong 
military influence on governments after 1930. Military pressures bore fruit in June 1947 with the sanction 
by Congress of the PSA devised by the Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM). However, since the PSA was 
guided by national defence rather than economic requirements, the ideology behind the project must be 
considered before assessing the feasibility of the Plan Siderurgico.
HEAVY INDUSTRY, THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE
Nationalist officers had two linked perceptions regarding the role of heavy industry: it was crucial 
to economic development, and production could meet both civilian and military needs. Such ideas were not 
peculiar to the Argentine military, as demonstrated by the Brazilian Armed Forces. Brazil had already 
developed charcoal-based iron and steel production (see Chapters 3 and 5), but this was regarded as 
insufficient by the Brazilian Army. The latter, guided by similar considerations to those of its Argentine 
counterparts, was determined to establish a modem, large-scale steelworks. This determination, which
21 Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), Informe sobre el mercado local e industria 
nacional en laminados de hierroy acero (Buenos Aires, May 1945), pp.56,57,58.
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became one of the primary goals of the Estado Novo regime, culminated in the Volta Redonda project.22
Iron and steel production was considered the engine that propelled the rest of the economy, and its 
possession was regarded as an indicator of the level of national development.23 A country which did not 
exploit its mineral wealth and was not industrialised was judged as weak. In Argentina, heavy industry was 
promoted as a means to convert the country into a great power, in the same way as the advent of this sector 
had transformed the Northern Hemisphere’s major powers in the past.24 The economic hardship generated 
by the Depression and two world wars encouraged the belief that the creation of an steel industry would 
contribute to attain economic ’independence’ based on industrial self-sufficiency.25 This ’emancipation’ 
was desirable on both economic and military grounds. From the economic perspective, domestic steel 
production would enable the manufacture of many iron and steel goods required by the major economic 
sectors.26 From the military viewpoint, nationally produced supplies of iron and steel would enable 
domestic manufacturing of war materiel. The latter, according to nationalists within the Armed Forces, 
would reduce dependence on overseas weapon suppliers - particularly in times of emergency.27
These assumptions about the relevance of industrialisation and heavy industry guided Argentine 
military thinking throughout this period. Although only fully developed during the Second World War, the 
project to create defence-related industries dates back to the Twenties and was gradually advanced by the 
Direccion General de Arsenales de Guerra - which was renamed Direccion General de Material del Ejercito
22 John D. Wirth, The Politics o f Brazilian Development 1930-1954 (Stanford, 1970), p.89.
23 Luis Garcia Mata and Juan Eugenio Maggi, Posibilidades para el desarrollo de la gran siderurgia 
en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1942), p.3; Altos Homos Zapla, Revista de adhesion al 25° aniversario de 
la primera colada del arrabio argentino (Argentine Republic, 1970), p. 10.
24 Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Ano 1923, Tomo III, p.593.
25 Consideration of the report from the Comision de Defensa Nacional on the Draft Bill of the PSA 
under revision, 13 June 1947, Senadores, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.226; General Humberto Sosa Molina, 
Inauguracion del segundo alto homo Zapla (Argentine Republic, April 1951), unpaginated.
26 Consideration of the report from the Comision de Defensa Nacional on the PSA, 27 November 1946, 
Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Senadores, Ano 1946, Tomo III, p.489.
27 Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), Fabricaciones Militares. Vision de una gran 
empresa (Buenos Aires, 1973), p.6.
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in 1936.28 Among the facilities established was the modest Fabrica Militar de Aceros, whose aim was steel 
production for military purposes. The outbreak of the global conflict in 1939 and fear over the possibility 
of war with Brazil, where the development of iron and steel production progressed steadily, heightened 
concerns about national defence. This resulted in a new project for a vast military-industrial empire (the 
DGFM), which was prepared and approved subsequently by Congress in 1941.29 As seen in Chapter 3, 
the DGFM was empowered to produce war materiel and basic inputs, and to extract the minerals required 
in their manufacture. It prepared numerous industrial projects, including the PSA for the creation of a large- 
scale iron and steel industry.
Although DGFM projects were designed to satisfy military requirements, official propaganda 
stressed that they also aimed to contribute to progress and were founded on realistic economic criteria.30 
On the surface, this appeared to be the case with the PSA. The general tenets defined in the Plan appeared 
economically sound. First, steel would be produced using the most economically advantageous mix of both 
domestic and imported raw materials, and the exploitation of national minerals would be promoted. Second, 
high quality steel was to be supplied to the processing and finishing industries at prices comparable to those 
prevailing internationally. Finally, these criteria would foster an efficient industry.31 Yet there was a 
major problem: the PSA did not constitute a national development plan. The PSA merely prescribed a set 
of principles which its supporters argued were clear, simple and easily applicable.32 However, it failed to 
explain how or when they would be attained. To constitute a national steel plan, this complex project would 
have required political vision and imagination in its inception as well as exhaustive studies on all the aspects 
of iron and steel production rather than the feasibility of an individual plant. The studies upon which the 
PSA and the SOMISA proposal were based had been undertaken by an interested party, and accusations have
28 See Chapter 3.
29 DGFM, Fabricaciones, p.6.
30 Alain Rouquie, Pouvoir Militaire et Societe Politique en Republique Argentine (Paris, 1978), p.392.
31 Review o f the River Plate, 18 April 1947, p .ll.
32 Consideration of the report from the Comision de Defensa Nacional on the PSA, Senadores, Ano 
1946, Tomo III, p.490.
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arisen that they were tailored to satisfy military objectives.33 Whatever the technical merits of the 
SOMISA proposal, the fact remained that the PSA was primarily the result of anxieties over ’strategic’ 
supplies. The DGFM was so determined to establish the industry that it insisted on developing a minimum 
production capacity at any cost, and the result was the economic failure of the PSA.
THE MILITARY PROGRAMME: THE PLAN SIDERURGICO ARGENTINO
The military-industrial empire wasted a valuable opportunity to develop an economically viable steel 
industry. Its two projects, particularly the SOMISA steelworks, were marred by inefficient implementation 
and tailored to seguridad nacional requirements rather than business considerations. Four major difficulties 
ensued, and these are assessed below, (i) The development of an integrated steelworks required capital 
outlays which neither the DGFM nor private firms could afford individually, (ii) The projections of costs, 
prices and expenses were sloppy and aimed to satisfy the political objectives of the military, (iii) Both 
domestic and imported raw materials were expensive, (iv) The range of goods to be produced at SOMISA 
and the AHZ was inappropriate.
Investment requirements o f  the SOMISA steelworks
As with heavy industry projects in other ’small’ economies, the SOMISA project required 
substantial capital outlays. Although the necessary investments did not exceed the level of foreign exchange 
reserves held in 1945, they were very high in relation to the total capital stock invested in the domestic 
economy. Measured in 1950 pesos, the capital stock invested in the domestic economy averaged m$n
173,130,000 (US$ 26,351,598 at the official exchange rate) in 1940-1944 and m$n 187,963,000 (US$ 
28,609,285 at the official exchange rate) in 1945-1949.34 The two propositions for an integrated steelworks 
submitted in 1945 by the US contractor for plants with an output capacity of respectively 315,000 tons and
33 Ricardo C. Noseda, La cuestion siderurgica (Buenos Aires, 1968), p.43.
34 Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (Berkeley, 1967), p.230; the conversion from 1950 m$n to US$ 
at the official exchange rate is based on the data in Vicente Vazquez-Presedo(ed.), Estadisticas Histdricas 
Argentinas: Compendio 1873-1973 (Buenos Aires, 1988), p.244.
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Table 7.5
PROPOSALS FOR INVESTMENT OF CAPITAL IN SOMISA 
(in US dollars)
CAPITAL GOODS FOR 315,000 TONS FOR 500,000 TONS
Blast furnaces 6,000,000 6,500,000
Coke ovens 3,900,000 5,200,000
Docks, equipment to unload 
and handle materials 1,200,000 1,500,000
Siemens-Martin furnaces 2,500,000 3,200,000
Soaking pits 1,000,000 1,300,000
Blooming mill 3,650,000 3,800,000
Services of water, roads 900,000 1,000,000
TOTAL 19,150,000 22,500,000
Plans, designs, supervision and 
getting the plant in working 
order (10%) 1,915,000 2,165,000
Source: Estudio tecnico-econdmico de la produccidn de acero semiterminado en la Republica 
Argentina presentado por ARMCO Argentina S.A., in DGFM, Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos 
Aires, 1946), p.79.
500,000 tons required outlays in the region of US$ 20,000,000 (see Table 7.5). In local currency, the costs 
were m$n 100,000,000 for a plant with an output of 315,000 tons, and m$n 140,000,000 for 500,000 
tons.35 The DGFM initially accepted the proposal for a plant with a capacity of 315,000 tons, and 
therefore the authorised capital of SOMISA was set at m$n 100,000,000.36 However, there were two major 
problems. On one hand, raising the necessary capital proved extremely difficult owing to the investment 
levels required and, on the other, the authorised capital turned out to be insufficient given domestic 
economic conditions in the late Forties.
35 Debate on the PSA, 8-9 May 1947, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.291.
36 Proposal presented by TAMET S.A., La Cantabrica S.A., SIAM Di Telia, and ARMCO Argentina 
S.A. at the contest held on 3 November 1944, in DGFM, Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1946), 
p.152.
296
As for raising the capital required for the development of the integrated steelworks, neither the 
DGFM nor private interests could raise the necessary amount individually. Although the necessary capital 
could have, at least on paper, been financed from foreign exchange reserves, it had to be furnished from the 
DGFM budget. This was not possible as the military-industrial empire had other financial commitments. 
The military expected to overcome this obstacle, and their lack of real commercial experience, by creating 
a sociedad mixta to run the steelworks (see Chapter 3). Consequently, although it was developing the 
economic capacity, the DGFM believed that the private sector should be encouraged and allowed to 
participate in the project. However, military hopes in the mixed enterprise did not materialise owing to two 
factors: (a) the squeezing out of the private sector from the project, and (b) domestic economic conditions 
in the late Forties. Regarding the role of private interests in SOMISA, it had been unrealistic to expect that 
the sector could afford to contribute large amounts of capital to the sociedad mixta. Of the capital of m$n
100,000,000, the State would subscribe m$n 90,000,000 and the private sector m$n 10,000,000; the 
proportion was subsequently modified by Congress to m$n 80,000,000 and m$n 20,000,000 respectively.37 
The private sector could not furnish such amounts, as demonstrated by ACINDAR - one of the large private 
steelmakers. In 1944, ACINDAR had a capital of only m$n 6,049,115 and had to resort to substantial 
external financing to fund its own projected plant at Villa Constitution (see Chapter 3). Funding of the 
latter was covered by a m$n 5,000,000 loan from the Banco de Credito Industrial, the placing of shares in 
the Bolsa (m$n 10,000,000 of preferential ones and m$n 18,000,000 of ordinary ones), and a suscription 
to m$n 1,600,000 of ordinary shares by the Republic Steel Corporation - the technical contractor for the 
project.38
Furthermore, the DGFM had expected the private sector would acquire control of SOMISA in the 
long run. This was not only financially unfeasible, but also politically opposed - particularly in Congress 
(see Chapter 3). The private shareholders, who were initially entitled to acquire a controlling stake of up 
to 90% in the mixed company, had their shareholding limited to an absolute limit of 49% and the State was
37 Ibid.; Recommendations of the Comisiones de Defensa Nacional, de Legislation General and de 
Presupuesto y Hacienda reviewing the Draft Bill of the PSA, 26 March 1947, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo 
I, p.258.
38 ACINDAR, Historia de una Voluntad de Acero (Buenos Aires, 1986), pp.85,86,87.
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awarded control of the steelworks.39 Concerning local economic conditions, capital raising was adversely 
affected by government policy. Although Peron had supported the development of heavy industry during 
the military regime of 1943-1945, it was no longer a priority once he was elected President in 1946 and the 
Second World War was over. The State had become leading investor in the economy and, given Peronista 
policies, new investments of capital were made in sectors which were not directly productive (see Chapter 
2).40 Economic failure by the late Forties prevented any large expenditure or foreign exchange outlays by 
the government. State contributions to the mixed company came in ’droplets’, and under prevailing 
regulations there was no permission to obtain foreign exchange nor to negotiate foreign loans.41
Not only were there difficulties in raising the necessary capital but, as indicated above, the 
authorised capital of SOMISA proved insufficient - for two reasons, (a) Final capacity would be greater 
than initially planned and there would be additional installations, as the military decided to increase the 
capacity of the basic plant from 315,000 to 500,000 tons per annum, (b) Economic conditions had adverse 
effects by the late Forties. Prices were higher than the ones calculated by ARMCO, which were based on 
those prevailing in 1944, and the cost of the steelworks bore no relation to the authorised capital owing to 
rising costs. When the Definitive Plan and Budget presented by ARMCO was approved in 1948, the cost 
of the steelworks budget exceeded the authorised capital of SOMISA by an undisclosed amount.42
The military pressed the regime for an increase in the authorised capital of the mixed enterprise 
to overcome the insufficiency. The necessary legislation was sanctioned by Congress in September 1950, 
but lacked detail as economic difficulties and a shortage of funds prevented the government from making 
any specific committments on its contribution to the capital increase. The amount up to which the capital
39 Consideration of the report from the Comision de Defensa Nacional on the Draft Bill of the PSA 
under revision, Senadores, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.226.
40 UN, ECLA, Serie Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo economico, V: El desarrollo economico de 
la Argentina, Primera parte - Los problemas y perspectivas del crecimiento economico argentino (Mexico, 
1959), p.12.
41 Pedro F. Castineiras, Esto lo hicieron los argentinos (Buenos Aires, 1972), p.42.
42 Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962 (London, 1980), pp. 107,108; 
Castineiras, Esto, pp.41, 65.
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would be increased was not determined, the government pledged to provide guarantees for financial 
operations related to the increase, and sources of finance were not identified.43 Economic difficulties 
prevented the State from making any contribution to the capital increase throughout 1951 or any purchases 
of equipment, and available funds were insufficient for local works due to substantial rises in internal prices. 
The only operations undertaken were those that did not incur major costs or require foreign exchange and 
could be implemented by using available means -ie, the levelling of terrain for the mill and workers’ 
housing.44
Hard currency shortages in the late Forties prevented the State from obtaining a loan from the 
Banco Central and external financing had to be arranged in either Europe or the USA, where equipment for 
SOMISA had to be purchased. To obtain the US$ 80,000,000 required, negotiations were started with the 
US Export-Import Bank and with French bankers.45 Since these negotiations failed (see Chapter 6), the 
PSA merely remained on paper. The difficulties in raising capital for the sociedad mixta combined with 
substantial problems, foremost of which was sloppiness in preparing the calculations for costs of production 
and delivery prices of SOMISA.
Projected costs and prices o f  the PSA
The SOMISA proposal, which encompassed calculations of expenses of operation and development 
as well as projected costs and prices, was prepared by the US firm ARMCO. However, despite the 
credentials of this company, the validity of the feasibility studies is questionable. As ARMCO was both 
technical contractor and shareholder, the studies were not executed by an independent source. It has 
therefore been suggested that the findings of ARMCO were tailored to meet military objectives.46 This
43 Consideration of the report from the Comisiones on the proposed capital increase for SOMISA, 28 
September 1950, Diputados, Ano 1950, Tomo IV, pp.3460,3467.
44 Castineiras, Esto, p.66.
45 Diputados, Ano 1950, Tomo IV, pp.3460,3467.
46 Noseda, Cuestion, p.43.
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Table 7.6
PROPOSED EXPENSES OF SOMISA 
(in pesos)

























Maintenance 10 years 
Siemens-Martin furnaces 100,000 100,000
Depreciation 10 years 
Siemens-Martin furnaces 300,000 300,000
Promotion and Exploration of 
Mines (m$n 2 per ton) 560,000 900,000
TOTAL EXPENSES 20,002,000 26,022,000
Total Cost Purchase Raw 
Materials 26,649,000 42,403,000
TOTAL COST 46,651,000 68,425,000
Sales of Products 34,287,000 54,736,000
DIFFERENCE 12,364,000 13,689,000
* Includes m$n 600,000 of permanent technical direction and m$n 2,287,000 of 30-year depreciation 
(3%).
Source: Aspectos primales del estudio tecnico-economico de la production de acero semiterminado en 
la Republica Argentina presentado by ARMCO Argentina S.A., in the Analisis de los aspectos 
tecnicos, economicos y financieros de la propuesta SOMISA, in DGFM, Plan, p.60.
suggestion could be bome out by the contrived nature of the calculations of the proposed expenses, costs 
of production and sales of SOMISA, which are shown in Table 7.6. The estimates were prepared towards
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the end of the Second World War, took no account of any peacetime change, lacked any details as to their 
basis, and omitted some important details relating to operating costs (which were calculated separately and 
are shown in Table 7.8 below). This could have been deliberate to make the PSA politically viable for the 
DGFM by masking the real extent of the losses to be incurred by the steelworks, as the level of expenses 
and costs could not be offset by the sales of products.
Table 7.7
PROPOSED SALES OF SOMISA 
(in pesos)




Other byproducts 2,325,000 3,576,000
Coke tar 1,040,000 1,600,000
TOTAL 34,287,000 54,736,000
Source: Aspectos primales del estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, p.59.
In the case of a plant with an output capacity of 315,000 tons, expenses and costs amounted to m$n
46,651,000 while the sales of products totalled m$n 34,287,000 - the former exceeded the latter by m$n
12,364,000.47 A similar situation arose for a plant with a capacity of 500,000 tons, where expenses and 
costs exceeded sales of products by m$n 13,689,000 (see Table 7.6). The value of sales of SOMISA 
products is disaggregated in Table 7.7. Apart from billets and slabs, SOMISA would engage in the sale of 
byproducts derived from metallurgical coke. It was argued that sales of byproducts such as distilled gas, 
benzol for engines, and coke tar would cover the cost of metallurgical coke. Therefore, coke was to be 
produced in special ovens which enabled the recovery of byproducts either for sale or use in the proposed 
steelworks.48 The private sector adherents to SOMISA argued that the sales of byproducts from the coke
47 Comments on the first draft of the PSA Bill from the Ministerio de Agricultura to General Sosa 
Molina, the Minister of War, Buenos Aires, 26 February 1946, in DGFM, Plan, p.38.
48 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, pp.73,77.
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ovens should permit production at the cost of imported coal (or slightly less).49 However, byproducts did 
not constitute the bulk of SOMISA sales and thereby would not cover the cost of coke or allow production 
at the cost of imported coal.
Table 7.8
PROPOSED COSTS OF PRODUCTION PER TON AT SOMISA
(in US dollars)
PRODUCTS FOR 300,000 TONS FOR 500,000 TONS
Pig Iron 16.16 15.17
Steel Ingots 22.89 21.37
Slabs 27.10 25.27
Billets 28.10 26.32
Source: Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, pp.86,87.
Table 7.9
REVISED CALCULATIONS OF THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION AT SOMISA
(in US dollars)
PRODUCTS PER NET TON PER METRIC TON
Coke 16.00 19.42
Pig Iron 25.55 44.51
Steel Ingots 36.70 30.99
Slabs/Billets 43.51 52.81
Tinplate n/a 156.57
Source: Pedro F. Castiheiras, El Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1953), pp.35,36,37.
As indicated above, one major element related to operating costs were omitted - whether 
deliberately or not is a matter of conjecture - from the calculations shown in Table 7.6. These were the 
costs of production at the integrated steelworks, and were calculated separately. The findings on costs for 
each stage of production submitted by ARMCO are shown in Table 7.8. They lack specific details as to 
how the figures were obtained, and thereby serious doubts have been raised over their validity. Changed
49 Proposal presented by TAMET, La Cantabrica, SIAM Di Telia and ARMCO Argentina at the contest 
held on 3 November 1944, in DGFM, Plan, p. 151.
302
economic circumstances in the late Forties forced a revision of the projections. Domestic costs and prices 
rose sharply, the foreign exchange necessary for purchases of imported raw materials was scarce, and sources 
of scrap (which as seen in Chapter 1 was used together with pig iron in steel production) were depleted. 
Projections were revised during the early Fifties, in which the costs for the various products were increased 
(see Table 7.9). As with the figures presented by ARMCO, there is no quantitative detail as to how the data 
was obtained, except a brief mention that it was related to costs effective in February 1951.50
Notwithstanding the questionableness of the various calculations, the SOMISA proposal aimed at 
least on paper at competitiveness in all three integrated stages of iron and steel production. It contemplated 
domestic manufacturing of pig iron at prices which competed with those of imports, and envisaged the 
production of steel ingots at low costs through the use of modem, large-scale techniques and rigorous control 
of the production process. Finally, the proposal argued that production of low cost steel ingots, which were 
to be subsequently reduced to adequate sizes for rolling, would enable domestic steel producers to compete 
with imports.51 Such expectations, however, did not materialise. The SOMISA steelworks when finally 
completed, and also the more modest military plant at Zapla, were hindered by high costs of production and 
delivery prices as a result of inefficient implementation by the DGFM. Emphasis on self-sufficiency by the 
military-industrial empire resulted in two key difficulties. First, an increase in costs consequent of using 
expensive raw materials (particularly domestic ones). And second, the range of production was 
inappropriate.
The impact o f  raw materials on costs and prices
During the early Forties, in the initial stages of preparing the integrated steelworks project, the 
DGFM envisaged the use of domestic raw materials. Since the price of iron and steel products was largely 
determined by raw material costs (see Table 7.2) and national resources were expensive, the military were
50 Pedro F. Castineiras, El Plan Siderurgico Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1953), pp.35,36,37.
51 Proposal presented by TAMET, La Cantabrica, SIAM Di Telia and ARMCO Argentina at the contest 
held on 3 November 1944, in DGFM, Plan, p. 151.
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forced to shift their position towards a combination of both local and foreign inputs. This decision 
acknowledged that imported raw materials would be both of better quality and cheaper. However, there 
were two problems, (i) The use of a proportion of national raw materials based on ’strategic’ grounds (see 
Chapter 5) also had negative cost implications, (ii) Although cheaper than domestic inputs, imported ores 
and coal were still expensive.
As indicated above, owing to wartime considerations, the original military proposal for an integrated 
steelworks recommended the use of domestic raw materials. Had this advice been incorporated in the PSA 
and the project been completed on schedule by the early Fifties, the utilisation of expensive national inputs 
would have resulted in soaring costs. Indications that this would have been the case are provided by pig 
iron production at Zapla, a relatively modest DGFM undertaking which was based entirely on local resources 
(see Chapter 5). Zapla pig iron, produced in a remote site in northwestern Argentina, had a major 
competitive disadvantage.52 Any locational advantage created by the proximity of sources of minerals and 
labour was offset by the poor quality of the raw materials and distance to the market, which respectively 
increased costs of production and final delivery prices. Since low-grade ores with an iron content of only 
40% were employed, greater tonnages of ore and charcoal were necessary and therefore already expensive 
inputs were required in higher volumes.53 Additionally, employment of charcoal increased costs, even 
though the use of this domestically produced fuel enabled the production of pig iron of better quality than 
that obtained with coke.54 Charcoal was expensive to obtain since vast tracts of forest had to be felled, 
an abundant labour supply was needed for felling in the absence of mechanisation, and transport of large 
volumes of wood was problematic. The relatively low thermal value of charcoal also precluded the 
installation of high-capacity blast furnaces.55
52 DGFM, Diagnostico de viabilidad y  alternativas del Establecimiento Altos Homos Zapla (Buenos 
Aires, December 1989), p.I-6.
53 UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Survey o f World Iron Ore Resources (New York, 
1955), p.221; UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.25.
54 Juan Manuel Checa de Codes, La industria siderurgica en Hispanoamerica (Madrid, 1953), p.21; 
DGFM, El hierro de Zapla (Buenos Aires, 1954), p.5.
55 Debate on the PSA, Diputados, Ano 1947, Tomo I, p.298.
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Although plant location and the quality of raw materials adversely affected costs of production and 
delivery prices of Zapla pig iron, as is seen below, the DGFM showed little concern with such matters since 
its prime consideration was the satisfaction of requirements by the military-industrial empire. The AHZ 
project was undertaken regardless of the fact, accepted by both the head of the DGFM and the government, 
that production would be uneconomic. General Savio acknowledged that costs would initially be very 
high.56 The government itself, in Decree No.6,670 of 8 March 1946 which declared pig iron production 
to be of interes nacional, recognised that the price would be high in relation to that of imported pig iron.57 
Savio hoped that Zapla pig iron ingots could be produced for m$n 75, m$n 100 or m$n 150 and marketed 
in Buenos Aires at a maximum of m$n 80.58 He did not explain the basis of his calculations, how these 
levels would be attained, nor did he justify the fact that pig iron would be marketed at one given price even 
if higher production costs were incurred. In the event, the expectations did not materialise. Although the 
initial cost of production and delivery price of Zapla pig iron is unknown, the Revista de Economia 
Argentina has estimated the production cost at m$n 110 or m$n 120 per ton and the delivery price in Buenos 
Aires at between m$n 160 and m$n 170.59 This level was higher than that suggested by Savio and prewar 
import prices. Nevertheless, due to the world shortage in late 1945 and early 1946, the price of Argentine 
pig iron was briefly lower than that of imports, which stood at m$n 370.60 With the restoration of iron 
and steel production and exports in the Northern Hemisphere, the uneconomic nature of domestic production 
became obvious. By 1948, pig iron cost between m$n 235 and m$n 340 per ton at Zapla, and was priced 
at between m$n 300 and m$n 375 in Buenos Aires.61 As raw materials and labour became dearer, costs 
rose further. In 1949, Zapla pig iron cost m$n 484 to produce and even more to market in Buenos Aires. 
This compared unfavourably both with other producers and imports. Measured in Argentine currency, the
56 General Manuel N. Savio, ’Bases para la industria del acero en la Republica Argentina’, in SOMISA, 
Obras del General Manuel N. Savio (Buenos Aires, 1973), p.391.
57 Secretaria de Industria y Comercio de la Nacion, Arrabio (Buenos Aires, October 1948), p.25.
58 Savio, ’Bases’, pp.390,391.
59 Revista de Economia Argentina XLV (1946) No.333, p.90.
60 Ibid.
61 Secretaria de Industria, Arrabio, p.23.
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cost of producing pig iron was m$n 282 in Brazil, m$n 209 in Belgium and Luxembourg, m$n 174 in the 
United States of America, m$n 168.7 in the United Kingdom, and m$n 150.5 in France.62 The high costs 
of local production encouraged protectionism, and tariffs raised the prices of the foreign product. However, 
the effect was simply to raise prices rather than promote domestic manufacturing. Local production was 
far below market requirements, and the increased prices of imported pig iron remained below those of the 
domestic product. In 1949, imported pig iron could be purchased at m$n 427 from Brazil, m$n 381 from 
the Netherlands, and m$n 340 from France.63
Table 7.10
AVERAGE NOMINAL PRICES OF SCRAP PER TON IN BUENOS AIRES
(in pesos)






* First six months
Source: UN, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Study o f  the prospects o f  inter-Latin 
American trade (Southern zone o f the region) (New York, 1954), p.109.
Given the case of Zapla pig iron, the DGFM proposal that national sources of scrap, iron ore and 
coal should be used in the integrated steelworks was detrimental to the project. Although no exact figures 
are available for costs of iron and steel production based on domestic raw materials, existing information 
on scrap and coal suggests that the use of national inputs had enormous economic disadvantages. Nominal 
prices of scrap rose steadily in the late Forties and early Fifties (see Table 7.10) as demand by private sector 
steel manufacturers outstripped supplies, stocks were depleted as railway materials - the leading source of 
scrap - were not renewed, and domestic costs increased. Prices of Rio Turbio coal were increased 
considerably by distance from the market, as demonstrated by data available for 1952. Although the cost
62 Monthly Journal o f the British Chamber of Commerce in the Argentine Republic, April 1950, p.39.
63 Ibid.
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per ton at the pit head was m$n 54, additional charges were incurred with rail transport to the Patagonian 
coast, loading and maritime transport to Buenos Aires on special coal transport ships. As a result, the 
delivery price at the dockside in Buenos Aires totalled m$n 144.64
Notwithstanding the disadvantages of employing domestic ores and coal, military thinking was 
primarily concerned with self-sufficiency. The DGFM called for tenders for a sociedad mixta to develop 
its steelworks project based on the use of national inputs.65 Nevertheless, the proposal submitted in 1944 
recommended that the projected plant employ a combination of both foreign and domestic minerals on two 
accounts: (a) national raw materials required mixture with foreign inputs for their improvement owing to 
their poor quality, and (b) economic grounds. The DGFM shifted its policy and accepted the 
recommendation.66 It recognised that the employment of foreign resources would contribute to reduce 
transport costs, which represented a substantial proportion of raw material costs and thereby costs of 
production at the mill. Since water transport was far cheaper than conveyance by rail, widely separated raw 
materials could often be shipped more economically between countries than within countries. Therefore, 
preference would be given to imported minerals on technical and economic grounds.67 Nevertheless, 
Argentina would remain at a disadvantage in terms of transport costs. This was reflected in three problems, 
(i) The SOMISA proposal had been formulated when available foreign sources of iron and coal were limited 
and not always the cheapest, (ii) With already high transport costs, the steelworks would employ a 
proportion of expensive domestic minerals for ’strategic’ reasons (see Chapter 5) and further increase costs, 
(iii) There were unforeseen specific locational factors which also affected the cost of transporting raw 
materials to the mill.
Regarding the restricted access to imported minerals, this mirrored conditions at the time when the
64 Luis Calliari, Elyacimiento PresidentePeron ’ en la cuenca carbonifera deRio Turbio (Buenos Aires, 
1952), p.59.
65 Bases for the Mixed Company contest for the constitution of the Second Iron and Steel Unit of the 
DGFM plan, in DGFM, Plan, p. 144.
66 Maristany, Problema, p.35.
67 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, pp.24,25,30.
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PSA was devised. The availability of foreign raw material suppliers was limited by the Second World War 
and the harsh circumstances of the early postwar period. Prices in the SOMISA proposal were based on 
the cost of Chilean ore and American coal, and included transportation charges that were likely to decline 
after the war.68 As with other PSA estimates, the basis of calculation is unclear owing to the lack of 
quantitative detail. However, there are three other flaws, (a) The suggested sources were not the cheapest 
as the lowest raw material assembly costs in Argentina would be attained by using Brazilian iron from 
Itabira and Chilean coal.69 (b) The possible renewal of inflows from traditional pre-1939 suppliers in 
peacetime was ignored. Imports of European raw materials and pig iron would not be prohibited, and would 
be cheaper than those of American origin.70 As ARMCO was a US firm and aimed to get companies 
contracting its services to place orders in the USA, the feasibility study barely mentioned the possibility of 
obtaining good quality coking coal in Europe or Africa at a lower cost than in the United States of America. 
It merely indicated that if this was the case, the use of these sources might be considered in order to achieve 
some economy.71 (c) The possibility of importing Chilean minerals was unrealistic as Chile had undertaken 
its own steelworks project and was unlikely to have export surpluses available. This was particularly 
important in relation to coal, given that the unavailability of the cheapest source would thereby force the 
Republic to turn to non-Latin American sources and increase transportation and assembly costs.72
As for the military decision on ’strategic’ grounds to utilise a proportion of national inputs, this was 
to be in the most economically viable combination with imported raw materials (see Chapter 5). This was 
not realistic given the cost and quality of national ores and coal, and that imported minerals - although 
cheaper than domestic ones - were still expensive. In fact, it has been estimated that if low-grade Zapla ores 
were used together with coal from South Africa (the nearest non-Latin American source), Argentine
68 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, p.86.
69 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.30.
70 Comments on the first draft of the PSA Bill from the Secretaria de Industria y Comercio to General 
Sosa Molina, Buenos Aires, 25 February 1946, in DGFM, Plan, p.36.
71 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, p.86.
72 UN, Departent of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.30.
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transport costs would be among the highest in the world.73 Finally, specific location conditions relating 
to SOMISA also increased transport costs to the steelworks and ultimately affected the final delivery prices 
of finished goods. On the surface, the chosen market-oriented location for the plant was ideal. San Nicolas 
was a greenfield site in the centre of the industrial belt that runs from La Plata to Santa Fe, and enjoyed 
good links with the rest of the country. Situated on the Parana river, it was close to major road and railway 
networks (see Map 3.2).74 The problem with this inland, upriver location was that by the time the mill 
became operational in the Sixties, there had been innovations that could not have been foreseen when the 
PSA was first devised. Because of technical changes in ore-carrying vessels, the river depth was too small 
for the most common types used.
The most common type of ore-carrying vessel developed in the Fifties were bulk-carriers. The 
latter, whose development was related to the growth of traffic in commodities and above all oil, were 
initially converted redundant oil tankers. Tankers were not restricted in size as other ships, as they could 
readily berth offshore in deeper water and rapidly load and discharge. Therefore, tankers could easily make 
use of the economies of large size and their size was increased rapidly, thereby making the smaller existing 
tankers uneconomic. Many of these redundant tankers, which were not small for other trades, were 
converted to bulk-carriers of between 10,000 and 25,000 dwt. They could engage in several bulk cargo 
trades and round voyages, carrying different cargoes for different stages of their trip. By the Sixties, tanker 
conversions had practically ceased and bulk-carriers were following the trend set by oil tankers. Vessel size 
increased, with the most favoured types being 35,000 to 40,000 tons and upto 75,000 dwt.75 As the size 
of carriers continued to expand, the riverside location of the steelworks was increasingly disadvantaged as 
regards river depth.76 Transport costs to the mill increased as smaller carriers rather than the more
73 Ibid.
74 Maristany, Problema, p.36.
75 UN, Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), The world market for iron ore (New York, 1968),
pp.100,101.
76 Kenneth Warren, World Steel (Newton Abbot, 1975), p.281.
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common types had to be used to carry ore to SOMISA.77 Locational disadvantages related to the riverside 
site combined with bottlenecks in the land transport system to have an adverse effect on final delivery prices 
of SOMISA products. Although 85% of the home steel market was located within 240 kilometres from the 
plant, distribution costs rose as road congestion in the Buenos Aires industrial region increased in the 
Sixties.78 Despite the disadvantages faced by SOMISA, the adverse consequences of location and raw 
material supplies on costs and prices were far more severe for Zapla. However, both SOMISA and Zapla 
had viability problems in terms of the market. SOMISA attempted to satisfy DGFM objectives of self- 
sufficiency in iron and steel products and therefore produced many goods which were uneconomic to 
manufacture nationally, and the AHZ had been specifically designed to meet military requirements.
The market and the range o f domestically manufactured products
In terms of market size, the country appeared to have a large enough aggregate demand which could 
sustain modem blast furnaces and steelworks (see Table 7.1). Given the level of aggregate demand, the 
study presented by ARMCO on the feasibility of SOMISA asserted that production could be undertaken on 
a scale that justified the use of modem, high performance equipment.79 However, actual consumption of 
steel was spread over a wide range of finished steel products, demand for some of which was inadequate 
to support the use of modem rolling mills. The structure of Argentine consumption of rolled steel goods 
broadly reflects the structure of total Latin American consumption of these products, which is shown in 
Table 7.11. The largest single category comprised flat products (sheets, plates and tinplate) and accounted 
for over 30% of the total use of steel.80 However, flats could not be produced efficiently. Since the 
combined consumption of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Pem and Uruguay totalled 500,000 
tons in the case of sheets and 200,000 tons in the case of tinplate, only the sum of several markets could
77 Ministerio de Defensa, Developing a Strategy for the Turnaround, Restructuring and Privatization o f  
Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA) (Buenos Aires, 16 January 1992), p. 14.
78 Warren, Steel, p.281.
79 Estudio tecnico-economico, in DGFM, Plan, p.71.
80 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.44.
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Table 7.11
CONSUMPTION OF FINISHED STEEL PRODUCTS IN LATIN AMERICA IN 1947
PRODUCTS VOLUME (tons) SHARE (%)
TOTAL 3,000,000 100.0
Sheets and plates 627,000 20.9
Tinplate 330,000 11.0
Bars and small sections 450,000 15.0
Wire products 445,000 14.8
Rails 251,000 8.4
Pipes 368,000 12.3
Structural shapes 266,000 8.9
Miscellaneous 263,000 8.7
Source: UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.45.
justify the installation of a continuous strip mill and the necessary auxiliary plant for production under 
optimum conditions.81 The second largest category consisted of bars and wire products, which again 
represented approximately 30% of steel consumption, and the remaining tonnage was spread over a wide 
range of goods - including rails, pipes and structural shapes.82 As with sheets and tinplate, demand for 
some of these goods was insufficient to warrant their domestic production. One of the most notorious cases 
was that of steel rails (see Chapter 4). While the minimum annual consumption of rails necessary for 
efficient national production was 100,000 tons, the combined consumption of rails in the above mentioned 
seven countries only amounted to some 160,000 tons.83
The SOMISA plant was designed to manufacture the broadest possible assortment of iron and steel 
goods, even though many of these were required in small volumes (rails, sheets and tinplate) and thereby 
uneconomic to produce. The use of modem equipment for large-scale production required heavy investment
81 UN, ECLA, Study o f the prospects o f inter-Latin American trade (Southern zone o f the region) (New 
York, 1954), p. 104.
82 UN, Department of Economic Affairs, Iron, p.44.
83 UN, ECLA, Prospects, p. 104.
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Table 7.12
PRODUCTION PROGRAMME FOR SOMISA 
(in tons)
PRODUCTS FIRST STAGE SECOND STAGE
Rails & accessories 100,000 140,000
Shapes 110,000 125,000
Plate 135,000 254,000
Hot rolled sheet 135,000 150,000
Cold rolled sheet 130,000 220,000
Tinplate 140,000 180,000
TOTAL ROLLED GOODS 750,000 1,069,000
Billet for private industry 132,000 318,000
TOTAL 882,000 1,387,000
Source: UN, ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin America TV (1959) No.2, p.10.
which adversely affected costs if capacity was only partially used, and thereby wide diversification in output 
could only be achieved at a considerable sacrifice in terms of costs.84 The initial production programme 
envisaged for when SOMISA was completed in the Sixties is shown in Table 7.12. It was to be 
implemented in two stages: the first starting in 1961, and the second from around 1965. As production was 
based on aggregate demand and the military bid for national self-sufficiency, operations were volume 
driven.85 Emphasis was on the achievement of specific targets, such as the ’Plan 1,100,000 toneladas’ of 
1966.86 The priority awarded to DGFM objectives was also evident in the more modest Zapla undertaking. 
The quality of the goods produced at the AHZ was regarded as the basis of competitiveness of the plant. 
More critically, when Zapla underwent expansion and became an integrated operation after the Fifties, stress 
was laid on the production of steel for military purposes and special types of steel. Although a share of 
output was aimed at meeting local civilian needs, the leading market of AHZ production was the DGFM.87
84 Ibid.
85 Ministerio de Defensa, Strategy, p. 13.
86 Jose Garcia Vizcaino, Tratado de politico economica argentina, Volume II (Buenos Aires, 1975), 
p.257.
87 DGFM, Diagnostico, p.III-3.
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FAILURE OF THE PSA AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE M ILITARY PROGRAMME
As seen above, the heavy industry project devised in the Plan Siderurgico was marred by inefficient 
implementation arising from four major problems. First was that enormous capital outlays were required 
for SOMISA, which neither the DGFM nor private sector industrialists could afford since the necessary 
investments. Second, the calculations of projected costs, prices and development expenses for the integrated 
steelworks were sloppy, with an unclear basis as essential quantitative detail was omitted. Third, the 
decision to use a mix of domestic and foreign raw materials in SOMISA had been guided by military 
considerations and adversely affected costs, as the utilisation of expensive national minerals had 
demonstrated in the case of the AHZ. In addition, the limited availability of foreign sources of raw 
materials and unforeseen locational factors increased the cost of imported minerals. Fourth and finally, the 
range of products manufactured was far from appropriate. Dictated by self-sufficiency ambitions, it resulted 
in the production of many iron and steel goods which were uneconomic to manufacture nationally.
Only one of these four problems, that concerning funding for the project, was resolved after Peron 
belatedly reversed his economic policies and openly strove to improve Argentine-American relations during 
his short-lived second presidency of 1952-1955. The Government made funds available for a contract signed 
with a French firm in 1952 for the construction of the deep-water port required for raw material deliveries. 
It also approved the purchase of a steel plate finishing mill manufactured in the United States for the Czech 
company Investa, which had been embargoed by the Americans following the Communist takeover in 
Prague.88 The impounded installations were auctioned in May 1954 by the US Treasury, which accepted 
an offer of US$ 9,000,000 by the DGFM.89 The title of the mill was turned over to SOMISA and the 
equipment, already crated at the Port of New York, was soon on its way.90
88 Potash, Army, p. 163.
89 Report on the purchase of the Czech equipment from Coronel Pedro F. Castineiras, representative 
director of SOMISA, to General Humberto D. Magallanes, president of SOMISA, Buenos Aires, 25 
September 1954, in Castineiras, Esto, p. 149.
90 Potash, Army, pp. 163,164.
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The most important Peronista policy reversal concerned the possibility of securing external 
financing for the acquisition of equipment. In March 1954, SOMISA agreed in principle to award the US 
firm Arthur G. McKee and Company the contract for the supply, assembly and installation of the blast 
furnace. This being the most expensive component of the plant, the critical problem was financing the deal. 
In sharp contrast to the government attitudes during the first Peron presidency, SOMISA was authorised to 
approach the Export-Import Bank directly. In March 1955, the sociedad mixta was notified that the Bank 
was prepared to provide US$ 60,000,000 towards the cost of purchases of equipment and services in North 
America.91 Although the military coup of September 1955 resulted in further delays to the project, the 
progress made with SOMISA during the three preceding years enabled the completion of the steelworks 
almost a decade beyond the period under study. However, the other difficulties affecting the implementation 
of the PSA were not resolved.
The DGFM project for large-scale, modem iron and steel production was uneconomic and flawed 
from its inception. Solely concerned with ’having’ the industry, the military-industrial empire undertook 
the PSA with little regard for the economic aspects of their enterprise - even though on occasions 
adjustments to some points of detail were forced upon them by circumstances. Tailored to seguridad 
nacional needs rather than business requirements, the PSA was not feasible economically. However, there 
is evidence that greater care in planning and consideration of the economic requisites of steel production 
could have resulted in a more viable industry. Confirmation that iron and steel production was economically 
feasible is provided in the recommendations of the early Nineties for the now implemented privatisations 
of the sociedad mixta and the AHZ. The viability of both military-inspired corporations could have been 
increased in two ways, (i) Both had to shift away from any use of expensive domestic raw materials, (ii) 
Production had to be reoriented.
By utilising foreign raw materials, costs of production could be reduced. In the case of SOMISA, 
this had already been done, but insufficient economy had been achieved owing to transport rates and, more 
critically, the use of a proportion of national ores and coal. As regards Zapla, uneconomic production had
91 Ibid., p. 164.
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been the norm due to total reliance on expensive local iron supplies. The feasible alternative suggested in 
the privatisation proposals was to stop employing Argentine inputs. This had far reaching implications for 
the AHZ, which would have to shift to the use of imported iron ore. Despite high transportation rates, ore 
could be obtained more cheaply in Brazil. To reach Zapla, it could be transported to the Argentine riverside 
port of Resistencia and subsequently along one of the three railway branches linking the Parana river with 
Jujuy (see Map 5.1). Such recommendation was accepted by the DGFM and resulted in the closure of the 
’9 de Octubre’ and ’Puesto Viejo’ iron deposits, whose exploitation was uneconomic.92
Concerning the reorientation of production, output had to satisfy market requirements rather than 
expensive military self-sufficiency ambitions in order to reduce high costs. As seen earlier, the market was 
limited and costs were increased by the inefficient use of rolling equipment. A broad assortment of goods 
was produced in relatively small volumes, which required many types and sizes of rolled steel. Costs could 
be reduced through standardisation and specialisation. Standardisation would have reduced the variety in 
types and sizes of rolled steel, thereby enlarging the market for the smaller number of types established with 
quality standards and specifications.93 Specialisation would have eliminated domestic production of goods 
which was uneconomic by restricting output from a given rolling mill to either sections, flats or tubes.94 
The specialisation proposal, which had already been mooted by ECLA in the Fifties, was critical for the 
viability of SOMISA and Zapla and thereby the feasible alternative suggested in the privatisation 
recommendations for both plants. SOMISA would have to downscale operations and rationalise or eliminate 
unprofitable production lines, restricting output to rolled flats, and ceasing production of billets, structural 
products and rails.95 These lines had to be abandoned as production resulted in cash losses and high cash 
operating costs which ensued from the inefficient use of finishing mills and the high costs of ingots 
employed in the manufacture of these products. The blooming mill supplying the billets, structural products
92 DGFM, Diagnostico, pp.II-14,11-16.
93 Address by Prebisch in UN, ECLA, Problems, p.36.
94 UN, ECLA, A study o f the iron and steel industry in Latin America, Volume I (New York, 1954), 
p.54.
95 Ministerio de Defensa, Strategy, p. 13.
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and rails should also have been closed.96 SOMISA might then have focused its operations on lower cost 
goods and concentrate on rolled flats, which were produced relatively efficiently. However, within the 
category of rolled flats, unimportant product ranges also needed to be eliminated to achieve economies.97 
In the case of the AHZ, objectives could have been reappraised and production reoriented. Since the 
satisfaction of strictly military goals was uneconomic, Zapla should have satisfied regional and national 
market requirements. To achieve these ends, the types of steel produced at the plant had to be those 
maximising productivity and profitability, and the basis of competitiveness had to be both costs and quality 
of production.98
CONCLUSION
As seen above, the establishment of modem, large-scale iron and steel production in Argentina had 
not been economically successful. Although there had been admittedly little opportunity to develop the 
industry before 1939, not least because of the practices of the ISC and the refusal by major steel producer- 
exporters to supply strategic ’lumps’ of technology, the ’window of opportunity’ created by the Second 
World War was wasted by the military-industrial empire. The DGFM was determined to ’have’ a steel 
industry and its project was primarily guided by defence rather than economic considerations, even though 
it was not exclusively for defence purposes. The successful implementation of the PSA was frustrated by 
political and economic factors. First, to meet the required investment levels, the military aimed to involve 
private interests through a sociedad mixta. This was not feasible for two reasons: (a) private Argentine steel 
producers were in no position to make vast financial contributions, and (b) Congress was opposed to 
substantial participation by the private sector. Second, the economic study supporting the establishment of 
SOMISA, prepared by ARMCO Argentina, was contrived in order to make the project politically viable for 
the DGFM. Third, the raw materials available at the time increased costs. This resulted from: (i) the 
decision to use a proportion of domestic minerals, and (ii) the fact that foreign raw materials remained
96 Ibid., pp. 14,27.
97 Ibid., pp.21,25.
98 DGFM, Diagnostico, p.III-3.
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relatively expensive, despite being cheaper than national ones, as sources were limited in the aftermath of 
the Second World War and during the Korean War. Finally, the range of goods to be manufactured was 
inappropriate.
The tragedy was that the PSA might have been more successful had the DGFM given priority to 
economic considerations, even if the project was only implemented in the Sixties. The PSA was ill- 
conceived and inefficiently implemented. Many subsequent problems relating to costs, raw materials and 
the market could have been avoided. The recommendations for the privatisation of both SOMISA and the 
AHZ are evidence that a more viable steel industry was feasible. With the two formerly military-controlled 
plants under private sector control since 1992 and the strategies recommended for the turn around of both 
enterprises now in place, there yet remains hope for success and that the costly lessons of the military 
experience with industry have been leamt.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has for the first time taken a detailed look at the early history of Argentine attempts to 
establish an iron and steel industry. It is an extension to the standard works on sectorial developments in 
industry by Adolfo Dorfman and Ricardo M. Ortiz, whose closing point is before the Second World War. 
The latter, as seen in the dissertation, provided the impetus for the development of iron and steel production 
and not the Depression of the early Thirties - unlike other import substituting industries in Argentina. 
However, development of the industry was far from smooth as a result of international and domestic factors, 
several of which were common to the period under study as a whole.
External constraints, by means of restricting sales of technology and of controlling production and 
distribution of iron and steel in increasingly limited overseas markets, were imposed by major iron and steel 
producer-exporters fearful of competition from growth of heavy industry in ’small, open’ economies as the 
Argentine. Before 1939, opposition arose from leading Continental producer-exporters suffering excess 
production problems resultant from changes in the international frontiers in the West European coal and iron 
basin after the First World War. As their response was increasing exports to ever shrinking overseas 
markets, they developed the most comprehensive attempt to control worldwide production and distribution 
of iron and steel: the International Steel Cartel (ISC). The latter, as the existing literature has pointed out, 
regulated the volume of crude steel exports and controlled all steel commodity exports through subordinate 
international sales comptoirs for specific products and licensed distributors in the importing countries. In 
addition, cartel members acquired substantial participation in firms in importing countries that had potential 
to develop steel production. As most of the secondary literature on the ISC has concentrated on these 
arrangement in the broadest of terms, this thesis has advanced knowledge on the subject by assessing the 
effects of ISC practices in an individual country which happened to be one of the few remaining ’open’ 
markets. The key findings are three, (i) The substantial shareholding of the ARBED-Terres Rouges group 
in TAMET, a dynamic firm that had been rapidly expanding by acquiring other metallurgical businesses, 
prevented this Argentine enterprise from achieving its potential to integrate operations and consider 
developing steelmaking capacity, (ii) Control of the market enabled the cartel to charge prices that when 
converted into nominal pesos were extortionate, (iii) The ISC had a negative effect on private sector
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enterprise, but was unable to prevent the establishment of the Fabrica Militar de Aceros. This venture 
skirted restrictions on technology transfers by purchasing equipment in the USA, which was then outside 
the cartel and whose relationship with Argentina had not yet broken down. Moreover, as this project had 
little support beyond military circles, the Armed Forces did not accept the assistance which usually was a 
part of contracts purchasing technology overseas and demonstrated that they could erect the plant themselves. 
They were guided by competent and ingenious local engineers, whose skills became all important during 
the Second World War when private metallurgical companies were forced to develop steel production for 
’in house’ consumption. As seen in Chapter 6, the firms La Cantabrica and TAMET adapted second-hand 
equipment, and ACINDAR copied old foreign designs. The problem was that growth of iron and steel 
production was buffered by wartime conditions, and therefore plant would have to be updated for the 
industry to subsist in peacetime. Since the country lacked the capital and technology, it tried to obtain US 
assistance which was not readily forthcoming. Consequently, the emergent sector struggled to survive at 
the critical juncture of the Forties.
The United States of America gained prominence in the international iron and steel trade after 
September 1939, as the ISC collapsed and Western Europe did not subsequently regain its prewar position, 
and it also became the leading source of capital and technology. Yet American goals did not differ from 
cartel objectives. Although the USA had supported wartime industrial development in some Latin American 
republics owing to strategic considerations, it was opposed to promoting industries in commodity exporting 
countries that could compete with North American manufacturing and thereby refused to provide any form 
of financial and technical assistance. In the Argentine case, it had an additional incentive as relations 
between Buenos Aires and Washington had severely deteriorated owing to Argentine wartime neutrality and 
the American conflation of post-1943 Argentine regimes with fascism. Nevertheless, the official American 
government attitude towards Latin America generally and Argentina in particular did not deter US big 
business from trying to make inroads in the region. These moves were not always successful, as Chapters 
3 and 6 have demonstrated in the case of the Argentine subsidiary of ARMCO and its involvement in a 
major steelworks project.
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External constraints combined with domestic factors to conspire against the successful development 
of iron and steel production. The most critical domestic constraint was the configuration of the national 
economy, which did not undergo a thorough structural transformation. This occurred regardless of the fact 
that Argentina had a concentrated market for manufactures and attained various thresholds (ie, a minimum 
per capita income, shifts in production away from the primary sector towards manufacturing, and the 
contribution of industry to growth) which structural analysts such as Hollis Chenery defined as benchmarks 
differentiating primary-oriented countries from semi-industrial countries. Furthermore, these criteria had 
been satisfied by the Twenties and therefore industrialisation could have apparently been deepened. Instead, 
rural commodity production and exports remained the key economic sector. The Argentinianist literature 
on industrialisation, which mostly starts from the correct assumption that a reappraisal of the development 
model was necessary after the weaknesses of export-led growth were exposed by the First World War, fails 
to clearly appraise what should have occurred. As seen in Chapter 1, the debate seems to have been 
misdirected and thereby achieved little in real terms. All the various writings have produced is a divergence 
in interpretation. The key controversy arose between those who believed that the industrialisation process 
was weakened from the outset by the obstacles it faced during the period of export-led growth, and those 
who affirmed that there was no contradiction between agrarian expansion and industrial growth. Both these 
propositions contain elements of truth, as observed when discussing the domestic historical context in 
Chapter 2 and market conditions in Chapter 4. Yet the debates blatantly ignored one of the most potent 
factors frustrating a thorough structural transformation of the economy: institutional failure. This dissertation 
overcomes this shortcoming in the discussion on Argentine industrialisation, demonstrating that the notion 
developed by Simon Kuznets that a country had to meet minimum political requirements for sustaining 
economic growth is reinforced by events in Argentina. Political instability characterised the period and, as 
seen in Chapter 2, a succession of different political groupings in government represented specific interest 
groups and lacked the will or ability to reform the economic structure. Given their nature, governments in 
office before the Second World War had no reason to seek change. The Radicals merely strove for 
accomodation within the existing system, and the Concordancia was restricted by the world crisis to 
introducing measures that dealt effectively with the grave economic situation. When the Second World War 
finally forced the Concordancia to acknowledge that the economic framework was no longer functioning,
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it was too late as the regime lacked legitimacy and was eventually overthrown. What was possibly the best 
opportunity to introduce economic change and deepen industrialisation arose at the start of the first Peronista 
presidency, which missed the chance by mismanaging economic policy and embarking on grandiose follies.
Although the governments of the day did little to promote industrialisation, there was one quarter 
which pressed for the development of sectors such as heavy industry. This was the Armed Forces, which 
acquired a powerful role as a result of political instability. Leading members of the Army, increasingly 
discontented over the precariousness of the traditional economic framework and the Argentine international 
economic position, became interested in the possibilities of economic change and industrialisation as a result 
of import shortages during the First World War, the restricted nature of industry existent in the Twenties 
and an increase in the labour supply resultant from rapid urbanisation. Technocrats from the Army 
Engineering Corps, convinced that they possessed the necessary technical skills to attain this goal, began to 
champion industrialisation and self-sufficiency as essential foundations for seguridad nacional and economic 
security. Military views were only reinforced by the economic difficulties created by the Great Depression, 
the deteriorating international situation during the Thirties, and the perception that the national security 
situation was worsening vis-a-vis Brazil (the leading Argentine rival in South America). The vehicle to 
achieve Army goals was the Direction General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM), the military-industrial 
emnpire created in 1941. The latter was responsible for the development of a whole range of key basic and 
weapons industries - not least iron and steel production. Since the DGFM was in no position to finance the 
scheme entirely from its budget and lacked commercial and technological experience, it hoped to establish 
several basic sectors with the cooperation from private and even foreign interests through a form of joint 
venture known as sociedades mixtas. More importantly, the latter were perceived by the military as 
transitory arrangements. As the State had no obvious commercial interest, it would provide the necessary 
assistance to develop output capacity and then withdraw once private enterprises were in a position to be 
left to their own devices.
As seen in Chapter 1, existing literature has made some references to sociedades mixtas in relation 
to the DGFM integrated steelworks project which was the centrepiece of the Plan Siderurgico Argentino
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(PSA) devised by General Savio. But these references are merely pointers, and therefore this thesis makes 
a major contribution to the historiography by detailing fully the negotiations to establish the Sociedad Mixta 
Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA) and their ultimate political failure. It demonstrates that this scheme was 
no illustration of deliberate State intervention in the economy, as it was to be developed as a mixed 
enterprise. When the DGFM held the contest for tenders to the project, three leading local metallurgical 
firms (La Cantabrica, TAMET and SIAM Di Telia) and the subsidiary of the major US steelmaker ARMCO 
presented the only detailed and successful proposal. Although the participation of the private sector and 
American interests was crucial to the success of the project, the thesis has shown that this was politically 
unacceptable. As so many authoritarian leaders, Peron initially did not control Congress despite the scale 
of his election victory in February 1946. During the Congressional debate on the PSA in early May 1947, 
the Radicals (the leading opposition party) and the ’extremist’ minority within the Peronista block objected 
to the extent of private sector participation and more particularly the involvement of a US firm in SOMISA 
on two accounts, (a) They regarded the intergrated steelworks as a ’strategic’ industry and opposed the 
entitlement given in the Plan for private enterprise to acquire almost fall control of the plant in the long­
term. (b) Their nationalist tendencies influenced their opinions on ARMCO Argentina, not least because 
Argentine-American relations were volatile. The assumption that private firms participating in the project 
could take control of the steelworks were groundless, as these companies were in no real financial position 
to make large-scale investments - let alone increase their shareholdings in the mixed enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the PSA came under heavy fire. The most serious challenge to its approval was that by 
Cipriano Reyes, whose spectacular outburst against ARMCO during the Congressional debate became 
notorious. In order to salvage its project, the DGFM was forced to accept the decision by Congress to 
seriously restrict private and foreign involvement in SOMISA.
This dissertation also reveals the extent to which the Plan Siderurgico also failed economically, a 
crucial fact that the existing historiography has largely ignored. The project cannot be defined as a plan or 
realistically be regarded as a sound proposal for an efficient iron and steel industry. On the surface the PSA 
appeared economically sound. It proposed creating a competitive, modem industry and comprised a number 
of facilities (the DGFM-owned Altos Homos Zapla and private sector manufacturers). However, it had two
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severe drawbacks. First, the PSA was merely a vehicle to achieve DGFM objectives and laid emphasis 
entirely on the integrated SOMISA steelworks project, a single plant whose design was tailored to military 
needs. And second, it lacked the political vision necessary in the formulation of a genuine national steel 
plan. The consequences were that the economic failure of the Plan was more severe than the political one, 
owing to three factors, (i) The military erroneously assumed that the creation of an iron and steel industry 
would automatically result in the development of other sectors requiring its products, (ii) Given the nature 
of the domestic market, the production of every conceivable iron and steel good required by the national 
economy in the name of self-sufficiency made little economic sense, (iii) The DGFM project required the 
use of a considerable volume of inadequate domestic raw materials discovered during the Second World War 
as part of the self-sufficiency drive.
Notwithstanding that the Argentine economy was the most advanced in Latin America, the thesis 
has shown that existing industry was limited. Its initial expansion stemmed from growth in domestic 
demand, as rises in per capita income led to a fall in the share of food consumption and an expansion as 
well as change in the composition of non-food demand. Since initially there was no market for intermediate 
goods, the need for iron and steel products arose mostly from sectors that required goods for final demand 
and could not sustain an efficient national iron and steel industry. The transportation sector, which had been 
the largest source of demand for iron and steel before 1914, declined as a consumer. This resulted from 
the altered economic circumstances after the First World War and financial difficulties of the railway 
companies, particularly the British-owned ones which controlled most of the network until 1948. In the 
absence of major steel-transforming industries, construction accounted for virtually Vz of consumption. 
Although it remained the principal user and a variety of building items had increasingly been manufactured 
locally and replaced imports in the Thirties, construction requirements for iron and steel changed over time. 
The metal content in construction gradually decreased owing to the substitution of cement for steel and a 
shift to low-cost housing projects. Local manufacturing of metallurgical products (other than building 
materials) could not provide the foundation for heavy industry either, as finished goods were produced in 
relatively small volumes.
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The military justified the establishment of an integrated steelworks as the essential pre-requisite for 
industrial growth, under the false assumption that merely implanting a steel mill would automatically lead 
to deeper industrialisation. Although this notion is similar to the concept of a ’lead sector’ bringing in new 
production functions and backward, lateral and forward linkages which was later developed by Rostow, the 
reality was far more complex. The PSA was tailored to military needs and failed to satisfy market needs. 
The few existing private sector iron and steel manufacturers specialised in a small number of items. The 
Altos Homos Zapla, the only domestic source of pig iron, was specifically designed to meet DGFM needs. 
The SOMISA steelworks aimed to produce all the iron and steel items that could possibly be required by 
the national economy in the name of self-sufficiency. However, as industrial development was limited, this 
entailed the production of a wide range of goods in relatively small volumes. This did not justify the use 
of large-scale equipment, which was thereby uneconomic.
This dissertation has argued that there were two alternatives to the establishment of an uneconomic 
iron and steel industry. One would have been extending planning to the development of other associated 
sectors. As seen in Chapter 4, this was done by the South Koreans in their heavy industry project, for two 
reasons: (1) they were aware that the development of light industries was insufficient to sustain long-term 
growth, and (2) the level of investments required in a steelworks tended to impose a minimum capacity. 
The second alternative for the military project, which was discussed in Chapter 7, would have been to 
specialise in those products that could be produced efficiently. This was the option recommended in the 
privatisation proposals for SOMISA and the Altos Homos Zapla in the Nineties, and was critical for the 
viability of both those DGFM facilities. In the case of SOMISA, operations would have to be downscaled, 
restricting output to rolled flats, and certain unprofitable production lines eliminated (ie, billets, structural 
products and rails). These lines had to be abandoned as production resulted in cash losses and high cash 
operating costs which ensued from the inefficient use of finishing mills and the high cost of ingots employed 
in the manufacture of these products. In the case of Zapla, objectives would have to be reappraised and 
production reoriented. Rather than strictly satisfy uneconomic military goals, the plant should have met 
regional and national market requirements. To achieve these ends, the types of steel produced at Zapla had 
to be those maximising productivity and profitability, and the basis of competitiveness had to be both costs
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and quality of production. That these recommendations made sense is evident in the fact that they were 
adopted when both military-controlled iron and steel plants were privatised in 1992, and resulted in SOMISA 
becoming a profitable enterprise over half a century after its original inception.
The military drive towards self-sufficiency in iron and steel was not only entailed in the range of 
production, but also in the utilisation of domestic raw materials. It has always been known that Argentina 
was not favourably endowed with iron ore and coal, but the actual extent of the problem has not been 
discussed in detail previously. This thesis has shown that the sources made available during the Second 
World War (Zapla iron and Rio Turbio coal) were inadequate. Location of the deposits was remote. Zapla 
was situated in the northwestern comer of Argentina and Rio Turbio in the extreme southwest of Patagonia. 
Zapla ores became part of a resource-oriented processing operation undertaken at nearby Palpala, which was 
facilitated by local factors -ie, the supply of labour and other services in the neighbouring city of Jujuy, the 
existence of railway links with the main market in Buenos Aires, and the availability of charcoal as fuel. 
A second iron ore deposit was pinpointed at Sierra Grande near the Patagonian coast at the end of the 
Second World War, but the lack of infrastructure and services in the area prevented their exploitation even 
though the quality and volume of its reserves was somewhat better than those already obtainable at Zapla. 
As regards Rio Turbio, exploitation pressed ahead as this was the largest domestic source of coal - even 
though (as in Sierra Grande and elsewhere in Patagonia) there were important deficiencies in terms of 
infrastructure and other essentials. Problems were aggravated by the fact that the quality of both ores and 
coal was poor. The iron content in the ores was well below internationally accepted standards, and the coal 
was unsuitable for use in steelmaking. Moreover, the level of reserves was insufficient. Argentine iron ore 
and coal deposits were substantial by national standards, but very modest when compared to those available 
in major producing countries. Given all these inadequacies, both the resource-oriented Altos Homos Zapla 
plant at Palpala (despite any locational advantages created by the proximity of sources of minerals and 
labour) and Rio Turbio were costly operations. Costs at the Altos Homos Zapla were also affected by the 
use of charcoal as fuel, as large tracts of woodland had to be felled and charcoal was produced inefficiently 
by suppliers scattered over northern Argentina. Although SOMISA was originally intended to be based on 
local inputs, their quality and costs resulted in a modified project largely based on foreign raw materials.
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This was not necessarily unfeasible, at least on paper, but the dissertation has demonstrated that there were 
two problems, (a) Because of the timing of the project, sources of imported inputs remained limited and 
thereby foreign resources, although cheaper than national ones, were still expensive and would not achieve 
the full economies expected from their utilisation. The severely restricted availability of imported raw 
materials was especially critical in the case of coal. The country was coal-fired and depended entirely on 
the United Kingdom for its supplies, at a particular juncture when the British could not provide the 
necessary volumes and when the value of the Anglo-Argentine ’special relationship’ had withered away. 
Had the integrated steelworks been completed on schedule by the early Fifties, they would have not obtained 
the coal they required, (b) The integrated steelworks had to employ a proportion of domestic inputs that 
enabled uneconomic mines to remain under exploitation. Given military requirements, this share would be 
increased in times of emergency and import shortages in order to continue steel production. DGFM 
concerns with production in times of war resulted in the decision to both maintain large stocks of raw 
materials at the steelworks and gradually build up a ’strategic’ reserve of essential inputs. This was purely 
based on seguridad nacional needs and economically unjustified given the cost of holding enormous 
stockpiles of minerals.
As a result of the many flaws in the PSA, costs of production and delivery prices turned out to be 
higher than anticipated. In the case of the Altos Homos Zapla, this was the result of major competitive 
disadvantages arising from the poor quality of the raw materials and distance to the market. Calculations 
of costs of production and delivery prices of Zapla pig iron did not specify the quantitative detail for their 
basis, and were so far above original estimates that high tariffs had to be imposed on imported pig iron to 
maintain a semblance of competitiveness. In the case of the integrated steelworks project, the financial and 
technical studies again lacked specific quantitative details in their calculation. For reasons which can only 
be the subject of conjecture, the estimates appeared to be of a somewhat contrived nature - particularly in 
the case of the proposed expenses, costs of production and sales of SOMISA, which omitted crucial details. 
There were also two additional problems, (i) The calculations supporting the PSA were based on costs and 
prices prevailing in 1944, and these had changed considerably in the early postwar period. This led to a 
revision of estimated costs of specific products in the early Fifties, but whether these were accurate is
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doubtful since their basis was not justified, (ii) The upriver location of the plant also had a negative impact. 
By the time the SOMISA steelworks became operational, there were technological changes in ore-carrying 
ships that could not have been foreseen. The Parana river was not deep enough to take the increasingly 
large ore-carriers. Thereby, as smaller vessels than those more commonly in use carried imported raw 
materials to the plant, transportation costs increased.
Guided by military rather than business considerations, both DGFM projects were an economic 
failure. The development of the SOMISA proposal beyond political objections to participation other than 
that of the State in the mixed enterprise and also the private metallurgical firms that had undertaken 
steelmaking during the Second World War faced further problems. This was owed to two particular 
constraints of the late Forties. Foremost were the priorities of Peronista economic policy. Instead of 
deepening industrialisation, mass consumption and the development of light industries, most of which existed 
and matured before 1943, were overemphasised. Given the heavy bias in favour of labour, private sector 
steelmakers faced increased costs - particularly in terms of wages. The second constraint in the late Forties 
was the effect of government policy on foreign exchange reserves. By effectively squandering foreign 
exchange, the regime did not maintain adequate reserves to cover unforeseen problems. SOMISA was 
deprived of the necessary foreign exchange allocation it required for equipment purchases overseas, and 
private metallurgical firms could not import raw materials or the necessary capital goods to modernise plant.
With the private sector producers struggling to survive in the face of renewed overseas competition 
after the Second World War and the military projects being tailored to defence rather than market 
considerations, the late Forties would appear to have been the end of the ’window of opportunity’ to develop 
domestic iron and steel production. Nonetheless, the thesis has shown that better management of the DGFM 
projects could have resulted in successful projects. Success would have been possible with the 
implementation of economic policies different to those adopted by Peron, or by reorienting the DGFM 
projects. The lesson of the Argentine experience at attempting to develop iron and steel production with 
adverse external and domestic factors was that the military way of establishing the industry showed how not 






1) Archivo General de la Nacion, Buenos Aires 
Fondo Documental Julio A. Roca (h), Legajo No.7.
b) British archives
1) Bank o f England Archive, London
OV 102 class files: 6; 14; 17; 123; 125; 133; 135; 148; 204.
2) Public Records Office, London
FO 371 class files: A 2502/2177/2; A 3660/2177/2; A 10000/2177/2; A 10435/2177/2; A 10701/2177/2; A 
10962/3188/2; A 11817/3188/2; AA 1531/1; AA 1531/6; AA 1531/8; AA 1531/9; AA 1531/12; AA 
1531/13; AA 1531/15; AS 2155/1/2; AS 2274/1/2; AS 2359/1/2; AS 2695/1/2; AS 2873/1/2; AS 3362/1/2; 
AS 3757/1/2; AS 7397/2/2; AS 7608/2/2; AS 3928/4/2; AS 6509/4/2; AS 6617/16/2; AS 44/43/2; AS 
221/43/2; AS 4651/43/2; AS 3708/101/2; AS 729/729/2; AS 3204/3204/2; N 1290/480/42; N 1330/480/42; 
W 12313/37/49.
3) British Steel pic, Northern Region Records Centre, Middlesborough
Dorman Long, Annual General Meeting on Board Meeting Files 1924-1970 00379-00385
Dorman Long, Directors Reports and Balance Sheets 1928-1962 04604
Dorman Long, Annual Account Files 1930-1949* 09033-9
(Items denoting an * have been subsequently transfered to the Cleveland County Record Office, 
Middlesborough)
c) British libraries
1) British Library o f Political and Economic Science, London
Microfilm M(331): Office of Strategic Services/State Department Intelligence Research Reports, Part XTV: 
Latin America, 1941-1961.
Microfilm M(336): Confidential US State Department Central Files: Argentina, Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 
Part II.
II: Printed material
a) Publications o f  the Argentine iron and steel companies 
ACINDAR, Historia de una Voluntad de Acero. Buenos Aires, 1986.
Altos Homos Zapla, Revista de adhesion dl 25° aniversario de la primera colada del arrabio argentino.
328
Argentine Republic, 1970.
Bruzone, Horacio N., Contribution de La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y  C. al progreso del pais. Speech by the 
president of the board of La Cantabrica on occasion of the inauguration of the Siemens-Martin furnaces and 
rolling equipment in its new industrial plant at Haedo, Province of Buenos Aires, 1 August 1941.
Castineiras, Pedro F., El Plan Siderurgico Argentino. Lecture delivered at the Escuela Nacional de Guerra, 
24 August 1953. SOMISA, Buenos Aires, October 1953.
Castineiras, Pedro F., Esto lo hicieron los argentinos. SOMISA, Buenos Aires, 1972.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 43° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1945’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 15 October 1945.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 44° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1946’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 16 September 1946.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 46° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1948’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 29 November 1948.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 47° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1949’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 16 January 1950.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 48° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1950’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 4 December 1950.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 49° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1951’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 10 March 1952.
La Cantabrica S.A.M.I. y C., ’Memoria y balance general correspondiente al 50° Ejercicio cerrado el 30 de 
Junio de 1952’. Boletin de la Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, 1 December 1952.
Maristany, Pedro J., El problema siderurgico argentino. SOMISA, Buenos Aires, 1950.
Noseda, Ricardo C., La cuestion siderurgica. Aceros del Plata, Buenos Aires, 1968.
OrganizacionTechint S.A., Boletin Informativo Techint. Various issues.
SOMISA, Obras del General Manuel N. Savio. Buenos Aires, 1973.
Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin S.A., Resena Grafica. Buenos Aires, 1928.
Talleres Metalurgicos San Martin TAMET S. A., Revista de la SociedadAnonima Talleres Metalurgicos San 
Martin TAMET (renamed TAMET). Various issues.
b) Official publications
1) Argentine
Argentine Republic, Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Aiio 1923, Tomo 
III; Ano 1939, Tomo IV; Ano 1942, Tomo I; Ano 1946, Tomo VII; Ano 1947, Tomo I; Ano 1948, Tomo 
II; Ano 1949, Tomo I; Ano 1950, Tomo IV; Ano 1951, Tomo I. Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion, 
Buenos Aires.
329
Argentine Republic, Congreso Nacional, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Senadores, Ano 1946, Tomo 
III; Ano 1947, Tomo I. Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion, Buenos Aires.
Argentine Republic, Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Programa de desarrollo de la cuenca de Rio Turbio, 
Tomo I. Buenos Aires, 1963.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos, Direccion Nacional de Servicios Tecnicos del Estado, 
Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Argentina, Ano 1948, Tomo II.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos, Direccion Nacional del Servicio Estadistico, Anuario 
Estadistico de la Republica Argentina, Anos 1949-1950, Tomos II and III.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Comercio e Industria de la Nacion, Subsecretaria de Mineria, Estadistica 
Minera de la Republica Argentina, Anos 1950-1952. Buenos Aires, 1958.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Comercio e Industria de la Nacion, Subsecretaria de Mineria, Estadistica 
Minera de la Republica Argentina, Anos 1953-1956. Buenos Aires, 1958.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Defensa, Developing a Strategy for the Turnaround, Restructuring and 
Privatization o f Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina (SOMISA). Draft Final Report prepared by Braxton 
Associates, Buenos Aires, 16 January 1992.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Economia de la Nacion, Secretaria de Estado de Industria y Mineria, 
Estadistica Minera de la Republica Argentina, Anos 1957-1961. Buenos Aires, 1965.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Education, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Revista de la Facultad de 
Ciencias Economicas. Various issues.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Guerra, Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, 1941 - 9 de 
Octubre -1945. Peuser S.A., Buenos Aires, 1945.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Comision Nacional del Censo Industrial, Censo Industrial de 
1935. Buenos Aires, 1938.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, El Comercio 
Exterior Argentino, Boletin numero 108. Buenos Aires, 1900.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, El Comercio 
Exterior Argentino, Boletin numero 160. Buenos Aires, 1913.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del 
Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina. Volumes for the period 1921-1942.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Estadistica 
Industrial de la Republica Argentina, 1938. Buenos Aires, 1940.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos de la Nacion, 
Estadistica Industrial de 1941. Buenos Aires, 1944.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Servicio de Publicaciones y Prensa, Iron. Buenos Aires, 1971.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas, Servicio de Publicaciones y Prensa, Siderurgia. 
Buenos Aires, 1973.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Industria y Comercio de la Nacion, Direccion Nacional de Mineria,
330
Estadistica Minera de la Republica Argentina, Anos 1945-1949. Buenos Aires, 1953.
Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Obras y Servicios Publicos, Grupo de Planeamiento de los Transportes, 
A long range Transportation Plan for Argentina, Main Report. Buenos Aires, 1962.
Argentine Republic, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Presidente de la Nacion Agustin P. Justo, Tarea que realizo 
el gobiemo nacional en el periodo 1932-1938, Volumes 3 and 5. Buenos Aires, 1938.
Argentine Republic, Presidencia de la Nacion, Carbon. Buenos Aires, November 1969.
Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, 
Comercio Exterior, Anos 1951-1954. Buenos Aires, 1959.
Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, 
Comercio Exterior, Anos 1955-1957. Buenos Aires, 1960.
Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, 
Comercio Exterior, Ano 1958. Buenos Aires, 1959.
Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Censo 
Industrial 1954. Buenos Aires, 1960.
Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, Hierro Laminado sin trabajar. Informe N°6. 
Buenos Aires, August 1947.
Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Industria y Comercio de la Nacion, Arrabio. Informe N°18. Buenos 
Aires, October 1948.
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Departamento de Investigaciones Economicas, Informe sobre el 
mercado local e industria nacional en laminados de hierro y  acero. Informe N°2 de la serie ’Informaciones 
sobre las actividades economicas en nuestro pais’. Buenos Aires, May 1945.
Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Oficina de Investigaciones Economicas, Revista Economica. Various issues.
Calliari, Luis, El yacimiento ’Presidente Peron ’ en la cuenca carbonifera de Rio Turbio. Lecture delivered 
at the Circulo Militar, 13 September 1951, and at the Facultadde Ciencias Economicas de la Universidad 
de Buenos Aires, 25 October 1951. Ministerio de Industria y Comercio de la Nacion, Buenos Aires, 1952.
Direccion General de Combustibles Solidos Minerales, Primer cargamento de carbon mineral de Rio Turbio, 
1° de Octubre de 1948. Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1949.
Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, Plan Siderurgico Argentino. Talleres Peuser S.A., Buenos 
Aires, 1946.
Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, El hierro de Zapla. Buenos Aires, 1954.
Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, 31° Aniversario, 9 de Octubre 1941-1972. Buenos Aires, 
October 1972.
Direccion General de FabricacionesMilitares, Fabricaciones Militares: Vision deunagran empresa. Buenos 
Aires, 1973.
Direccion General de FabricacionesMilitares, Pasado, presentey futuro de los Altos Homos Zapla. Buenos 
Aires, 1975.
331
Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, Diagnostico de viabilidady altemativas del Establecimiento 
Altos Homos Zapla. Final Report prepared by Booz Allen & Hamilton, Buenos Aires, December 1989.
Direccion Nacional de Investigaciones, Estadistica y Censos, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, 
Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Argentina: Comercio Exterior. Volumes for the period 1944-1947.
Foster Bain, H., Las posibilidades de la manufactura de hierro y  acero en la Argentina. Report prepared 
for the Argentine Republic under the supervision of General Agustin P. Justo, the Minister of War, and 
Tomas A. Le Breton, the Minister of Agriculture. Talleres Graficos del Instituto Geografico Militar, 
Buenos Aires, 1925.
Marcos, Ricardo Fernando, Altos Homos Zapla. Brochure on their creation and their importance within the 
Plan Siderurgico Argentino. Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, Jujuy, 1980.
Martin, Maria Haydee; De Paula, Alberto S.J.; and Gutierrez, Ramon (editors), Los ingenieros militares y  
sus precursores en el desarrollo argentino (1930-1980). Direccion General de Fabricaciones Militares, 
Buenos Aires, 1980.
Sanguinetti, Julio, La industria metalurgica nacional. Quinta Conferencia, Catedra de Defensa Nacional, 
Universidad Nacional de Cordoba. Cordoba, Argentine Republic, 1950.
Sosa Molina, General Jose Humberto, Inauguracion del segundo alto homo Zapla. Speech by the Minister 
of National Defence at the inauguration of the second blast furnace of the Altos Homos Zapla, 10 April 
1951. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Argentine Republic, April 1951.
Vazquez-Presedo, Vicente (editor), Estadisticas Historical Argentinas: Compendio 1873-1973. Academia 
Nacional de Ciencias Economicas, Instituto de Economia Aplicada, Buenos Aires, 1988.
Wassman, Sven, Sobre las posibilidades de una industria siderurgico en la Republica Argentina (Informe 
Sumario). Ministerio de Agricultura de la Nacion, Buenos Aires, 1927.
2) British
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the Market for Iron and Steel in the Argentine 
Republic. HMSO Press, London, 1922.
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Report(s) on the Financial and Economic Conditions o f the 
Argentine Republic. HMSO, London, 1921-1922.
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Report(s) on the Financial, Commercial and Economic 
Conditions o f the Argentine Republic. HMSO, London, 1924-1925.
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the Commercial, Economic and Financial 
Conditions o f the Argentine Republic. HMSO, London, 1927.
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Commercial, Economic and Financial Conditions in the 
Argentine Republic. HMSO, London, 1928.
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in the Argentine Republic. HMSO, 
London, 1929-1935.
Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade, Report(s) on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the 
Argentine Republic. HMSO, London, 1937-1939.
Board of Trade, Export Promotion Department, Overseas Economic Surveys, Argentina, October 1947.
332
HMSO, London, 1948.
Board of Trade, Commercial Relations and Exports Department, Overseas Economic Surveys, Argentina, 
May 1956. HMSO, London, 1956.
British Iron and Steel Federation, Statistics o f the Iron and Steel Industries, 1936. London, 1936.
British Iron and Steel Federation, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 27 (1952) No.4.
3) Miscellaneous
Brazil, Departamento Administrative do Servifo Publico, Volta Redonda. Supplement to the Revista do 
Serviqo Publico, November 1945. Imprensa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro.
Chenery, Hollis; Robinson, Sherman; and Syrquin, Moshe, Industrialization and Growth. Published by 
Oxford University Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, 1986.
Cody, John; Hughes, Helen; and Wall, David (eds.), Policies for Industrial Progress in Developing 
Countries. Published by Oxford University Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Washington, 1980.
Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census o f the Commonwealth 
o f Australia, 30 June 1947, Statistician’s Report. L.F. Johnston, Commonwealth Government Printer, 
Canberra, 1952.
Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Trade, Industries Division, Steel Industry o f Australia. 
Melbourne, November 1958.
Communaute Europeene du Charbon et de 1 ’Acier, Nous sommes deja 155.000.000... Paris, November 1951.
Instituto Latinoamericano del Fierro y el Acero (ILAFA), Argentina. National monograph of the series 
’Economia Siderurgica Latinoamericana’. Santiago de Chile, 1963.
Korea Development Institute, Korea’s Economy: Past and Present. Seoul, May 1975.
League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section, Memorandum on the iron and steel industry. 
Document for the International Economic Conference, Geneva, May 1927.
Macedo Soares e Silva, Edmundo de, O Ferro na Historia e na Economia do Brasil. Biblioteca do 
Sesquicentenario, Volume 9. Comissao Executiva Central do Sesquicentenario da Independencia do Brasil, 
Rio de Janeiro, 1972.
Sweden, The General Export Association of Sweden, Modem Sweden. Stockholm, 1937.
Sweden, AB Svenska Industriforlaget, Industry in Sweden. Stockholm, 1953.
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, International Cartels. A  League of Nations 
Memorandum, Lake Success, 1947.
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, World Iron Ore Resources and their Utilization. Lake 
Success, 1950.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Survey o f World Iron Ore Resources. New 
York, 1955.
333
United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Economic Survey o f Asia and the Far 
East 1963. New York, 1964.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far 
East XXIII (1972) No.l.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, European steel trends in the setting o f the world market. 
Geneva, 1949.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, The European steel industry and the wide-strip mill. 
Geneva, 1953.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Railways and steel. Geneva, 1957.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Long-term trends and problems o f the European steel 
industry. Geneva, 1959.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Comparison o f steel-making processes. New York, 
1962.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, The world market for iron ore. New York, 1968.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America / Economic Commission for Europe / Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, A study o f trade between Latin America and Europe. Geneva, January 1953.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, The economic development o f Latin America and 
its principal problems. Lake Success, 1950.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey o f Latin America 1949. New 
York, 1951.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Study o f the prospects o f inter-Latin American 
trade (Southern zone o f the region). New York, 1954.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, A study o f the iron and steel industry in Latin 
America. New York, 1954.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Problems o f the steel making and transforming 
industries in Latin America, Volume 1: Report of the Sao Paulo meeting. New York, 1958.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Serie Analisis y proyecciones del desarrollo 
economico, V: El desarrollo economico de la Argentina. Mexico, 1959.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Bulletin for Latin America IV (1959) 
No.2.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, The economic development o f Latin America in 
the post-war period. New York, 1964.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Statistical Bulletin for Latin America I (1964) 
No.2.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, El proceso de industrializacion en America 
Latina. New York, 1965.
334
United States of America, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, The 
Argentine Iron and Steel Industry and Trade. Trade Information Bulletin N°776. United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1931.
United States of America, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Foreign Relations o f the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, Volume II: Europe. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1964.
c) Contemporary newspapers and periodicals
Business Conditions in Argentina, various issues.
La Epoca, 10 September 1918.
La Metropole, 12-13 July 1947.
La Nacion, 14 October 1945 and 10 May 1947.
La Res, 5 January 1958.
Metalurgia, various issues.
Monthly Journal o f the British Chamber o f Commerce in the Argentine Republic, April 1950.
Revista de Ciencias Economicas, XXVIII (1927) no.69.
Revista de Economia Argentina, various issues.
Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, No.337, April-June 1960.
Revue Economique Internationale, IV (1926) No.2.
The Board o f Trade Journal, various issues.
The Economist, various issues.
The Review o f the River Plate, various issues.
The Times, 2 October 1924.
B) SECONDARY SOURCES
I: Monographs and articles
Adelman, Jeremy, Frontier Development: Land, labour and capital on the wheatlands o f Argentina and 
Canada, 1890-1914. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
Aguinaga, Carlos, and Azzareto, Roberto, Ni decada ni infame, del ’30 al ’43. Jorge Baudino Ediciones, 
Buenos Aires, 1991.
Albert, Bill, South America and the First World War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
335
Alhadeff, Peter, ’Dependency, historiography and objections to the Roca Pact’, in Abel, Christopher, and 
Lewis, Colin M. (eds.), Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State. The Athlone Press, London,
1985.
Alhadeff, Peter, ’Public Finance and the Economy in Argentina, Australia and Canada During the Depression 
of the 1930s’, in Platt, D.C.M., and Di Telia, Guido (eds.), Argentina, Australia and Canada. Macmillan, 
London, 1985.
Allen, G.C., A Short Economic History o f Modern Japan, 1867-1937 (revised edition). George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1972.
Allen, Robert C., ’International Competition in Iron andSteel, 1850-1913’, The Journal o f Economic History 
XXXIX (1979) No.4, pp.911-937.
Andrews, P.W.S., and Brunner, Elizabeth, Capital Development in Steel. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1951.
Angueira, Maria del Carmen, and Tonini, Alicia del Carmen, Capitalismo de Estado (1927-1956). 
Biblioteca Politica Argentina, Volume 155. Centro Editor de America Latina, Buenos Aires, 1986.
Baer, Werner, The Development o f the Brazilian Steel Industry. Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1969.
Banco de Analisis y Computation S.R.L. (ed.), Relevamiento Estadistico de la Economia Argentina 1900- 
1980. Buenos Aires, 1982.
Barbezat, Daniel, ’A Price for Every Product, Every Place: The International Steel Export Cartel, 1933-39’, 
Business History 33 (1991) No.4, pp.68-86.
Bethell, Leslie, and Roxborough, Ian, ’Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: 
Some Reflections on the 1945-8 Conjuncture’, Journal o f Latin American Studies 20 (1988) No.l, pp.167- 
189.
Bienfait, Jean, La Siderurgie Japonaise. Centre de Recherches Europeennes, Lausanne, 1965.
Bisang, Roberto, Maduracion tecnologica, acumulacion economicay generacion de ventajas comparativas. 
Mimeo, Sussex, 1989.
Boas, Ernest Arthur, Latin America’s Steel Industry. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1968.
Boehm, E.A., Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia. Longman Australia Pty. Ltd., 
Camberwell, 1971.
Bullock, Alan, ’Steel and National Tensions’, Steel Review, No.10, April 1958, pp.9-15.
Bunge, Alejandro E., Una nueva Argentina, 2nd ed. Hypamerica Ediciones Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1984.
Bum, D.L., The Economic History o f Steelmaking, 1867-1939. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1940.
Burzaco, Ricardo, Las alas de Peron. Editorial Da Vinci, Buenos Aires, 1995.
Butlin, N.G., Australian Domestic Product, Foreign InvestmentandBorrowing 1861-1938/1939. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1962.
Chambers, Edward J., ’Some Factors in the Deterioration of Argentina’s External Position, 1946-1951’, 
Inter-American Economic Affairs VIII (1954-1955) No.3, pp.27-62.
336
Checa de Codes, Juan Manuel, La industria siderurgico en Hispanoamerica. Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 
Madrid, 1953.
Cho, Lee-Jay, and Kim, Yoon Hyung (eds.), Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea. East-West 
Center, Honolulu, 1991.
Cochrane, Peter, Industrialization and Dependence. University of Queensland Press, Saint Lucia, 1980.
Cole, William E., Steel and Economic Growth in Mexico. University of Texas Press, Austin, 1967.
Corbiere, Emilio J., ’ManuelN. Savio, pionero de la industrialization argentina’, Todo esHistoria, No.158, 
July 1980, pp.39-40.
Comblit, Oscar, ’Inmigrantes y empresarios en la politica argentina’, Desarrollo Economico 6 (1966-1967) 
No.24, pp.641-691.
Cortes Conde, Roberto, and Gallo, Ezequiel, La formacion de la Argentina modema. Editorial Paidos, 
Buenos Aires, 1967.
Cortes Conde, Roberto, ’Export-Led Growth in Latin America: 1870-1930’, Journal o f Latin American 
Studies 24 (1992) Quincentenary Supplement, pp. 163-179.
De Vries, Johan, ’Benelux 1920-1970’, in Cipolla, Carlo M. (ed.), The Fontana Economic History o f  
Europe, Volume 6. Collins/Fontana Books, Glasgow, 1976.
Dearden, John, Iron and Steel Today (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, London, 1956.
Di Telia, Guido, ’Economic Controversies in Argentina from the 1920s to the 1940s’, in Di Telia, Guido, 
and Platt, D.C.M. (eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1880-1946. The Macmillan Press, 
Basingstoke, 1986.
Di Telia, Guido, and Zymelman, Manuel, Las etapas del desarrollo economico argentino (2nd ed., revised). 
Editorial Paidos, Buenos Aires, 1973.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F., ’An Interpretation of Argentine Economic Growth since 1930: Part I’, Journal 
o f Development Studies 3 (1966-1967) No.l, pp.14-41.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F., ’An Interpretation of Argentine Economic Growth since 1930: Part II’, Journal 
o f Development Studies 3 (1966-1967) No.2, pp. 155-177.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F., Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic. Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1970.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F., ’Argentina, Australia and Brazil Before 1929’, in Platt, D.C.M., and Di Telia, 
Guido (eds.), Argentina, Australia and Canada. The Macmillan Press, London, 1985.
Diebold, William Jr., The Schuman Plan. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Frederick A. 
Praeger, New York, 1959.
Dieguez, Hector L., ’Argentina y Australia: algunos aspectos de su desarrollo economico comparado’, 
Desarrollo Economico 8 (1968-1969) No.32, pp.543-563.
Dieguez, Hector L., ’Gastos militares y desarrollo economico: la experienciahistorica de Japon’, Desarrollo 
Economico 22 (1982-1983) No.87, pp.337-350.
337
Dorfman, Adolfo, Historia de la industria argentina. Solar/Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1970.
Dorfman, Adolfo, Cincuenta anos de industrializacion en la Argentina. Ediciones Solar, Buenos Aires, 
1983.
Drosdoff, Daniel, El gobiemo de las vacas (1933-1956). Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972.
Ernesto Tomquist & Co., The economic development o f the Argentine Republic in the last fifty years. 
Buenos Aires, 1919.
Escude, Carlos, ’Las restricciones intemacionales de la economia argentina, 1945-1949’, Desarrollo 
Economico 20 (1980-1981) No.77, pp.3-40.
Escude, Carlos, ’Boicotnorteamericanocontra la Argentina: 1940-1950’, Todo esHistoria, No. 177, February 
1982, pp.8-40.
Escude, Carlos, Gran Bretaha, Estados Unidosy la declinacion argentina: 1942-1949 (2nd ed.). Editorial 
de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1983.
Eshag, Eprime, and Thorp, Rosemary, ’Las consecuenciaseconomicas y sociales de las politicas economicas 
ortodoxas aplicadas en la Republica Argentina durante los anos de postguerra’, Desarrollo Economico 4 
(1964-1965) No. 16, pp.287-343.
Falcoff, Mark, ’Economic Dependency in a Conservative Mirror: Alejandro Bunge and the Argentine 
Frustration, 1919-1943’, Inter-American Economic Affairs 35 (1981-1982) No.4, pp.57-75.
Falcoff, Mark, and Dolkart, Ronald H. (eds.), Prologue to Peron. University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1975.
Ferns, Harry S., Argentina. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971.
Ferrer, Aldo, La economia argentina. Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1963.
Ferrer, Aldo, The Argentine Economy. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967.
Fisher, Douglas A., Steel Serves the Nation. United States Steel Corporation, New York, 1951.
FitzGerald, E. V.K., ’ECLA and the Formation of Latin American Economic Doctrine’, in Rock, David (ed.), 
Latin America in the 1940s. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994.
Fodor, Jorge G., and O’Connell, Arturo A., ’La Argentina y la economia atlantica en la primera mitad del 
siglo XX’, Desarrollo Economico 13 (1973-1974) No.49, pp.3-65.
Fodor, Jorge, ’Peron’s Policies for Agricultural Exports, 1946-1948: Dogmatism or Commonsense?’, in 
Rock, David (ed.), Argentina in the Twentieth Century. Duckworth, London, 1975.
Fodor, Jorge, ’Argentina’s Nationalism: Myth or Reality?’, in Di Telia, Guido, and Dombusch, Rudiger 
(eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1946-1983. Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1989.
Fogarty, John, ’Staples, Super-Staples and the Limits of Staple Theory: the Experiences of Argentina, 
Australia and Canada Compared’, in Platt, D.C.M., and Di Telia, Guido (eds.), Argentina, Australia and 
Canada. The Macmillan Press, London, 1985.
Fontaine, Maurice, L ’Industrie Siderurgique dans le Monde. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950.
338
Fursman, Noel, The decline o f the Anglo/Argentine economic connection in the years immediately after the 
Second World War: a British perspective. DPhil thesis, Oxford, 1988.
Furtado, Celso, Economic Development o f Latin America (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1976.
Gallo, Ezequiel, ’Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina, 1880-1930’, in Carr, 
Raymond (ed.), Latin American Affairs. St. Antony’s Papers, No.22. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1970.
Gallo, Ezequiel, and Cortes Conde, Roberto, La republica conservadora. Hyspamerica Ediciones Argentina, 
Buenos Aires, 1986.
GarciaHeras, Raul, Transportes, negociosypolitico: la Compahia Anglo-Argentina de Tranvias, 1876-1981. 
Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1994.
Garcia Mata, Luis, and Maggi, Juan Eugenio, Posibilidades para el desarrollo de la gran siderurgia en la 
Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1942.
Garcia Vizcaino, Jose, Tratado de politico economica argentina, Volume II. Editorial Universitaria de 
Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1975.
Garimaldi, Eduardo A., Industria siderurgico argentina. Biblioteca del Oficial, Volume 352a. Circulo 
Militar, Buenos Aires, December 1947.
Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962.
Gillingham, John, Coal, steel, and the rebirth o f Europe, 1945- 1955. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991.
Goldwert, Marvin, Democracy, Militarism and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966. University of Texas 
Press, Austin, 1972.
Gravil, Roger, ’La intervention estatal en el comercio de exportation argentino entre las dos guerras’, 
Desarrollo Economico 10 (1970-1971) Nos.39-40, pp.395-428.
Gravil, Roger, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939. Dellplain Latin American Studies, No. 16. 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1985.
Gravil, Roger, and Rooth, Timothy, ’A Time of Acute Dependence: Argentina in the 1930s’, The Journal 
o f European Economic History 7 (1978) Nos.2-3, pp.337-378.
Greene, David G., Steel and Economic Development: Capital-Output Ratios in Three Latin American Steel 
Plants. Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1967.
Guy, Donna J., ’La industria argentina, 1870-1940: Legislation comercial, mercado de acciones y 
capitalization extranjera’, Desarrollo Economico 22 (1982-1983) No.87, pp.351-374.
Halperin Donghi, Tulio, ’Cancion de otoiio en primavera: previsiones sobre la crisis de la agricultura 
cerealera argentina (1894-1930)’, Desarrollo Economico 24 (1984-1985) No.95, pp.367-386.
Hemmer, Carlo, L ’Economie du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, Volume 2. Editions Joseph Beffort, 
Luxembourg, 1953.
339
Hexner, Ervin, The International Steel Cartel. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1943.
Hikino, Takashi, and Amsden, Alice H., ’La industrialization tardia en perspectiva historica’, Desarrollo 
Economico 35 (1995-1996) No. 137, pp.3-34.
Hirschman, Albert O., The strategy o f economic development. Westview Press, Boulder, 1988.
Hogan, William T., Economic History o f the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States, Volumes 3 and 
4. D.C. Heath & Company, Lexington, 1971.
Humphreys, R.A., Latin America and the Second World War, Volume One: 1939-1942. The Athlone Press, 
London, 1981.
Humphreys, R.A., Latin America and the Second World War, Volume Two: 1942-1945. The Athlone Press, 
London, 1982.
Ingot (pseudonym), The Socialisation o f Iron and Steel. Victor Gollancz Ltd. for the New Fabian Research 
Bureau, London, 1936.
Inwood, Kris E., The Canadian charcoal iron industry, 1870-1914. Garland Publishing Inc., New York,
1986.
Johnson, John J., Political Change in Latin America. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958.
Johnson, William A., The Steel Industry o f India. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1966.
Jorge, Eduardo F., Industria y  concentracion economica. Siglo XXI Argentina Editores S.A., Buenos Aires,
1971.
Kirkpatrick, Colin H., and Nixson, Frederick I., The industrialisation o f less developed countries. 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983.
Korol, Juan Carlos, and Sabato, Hilda, ’Incomplete Industrialization: An Argentine Obsession’, Latin 
America Research Review XXV (1990) No.l, pp.7-30.
Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economic Growth. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.
Kypriotis, M., Les Cartels International. Librairie Technique et Economique, Paris, 1936.
Lachmann, Kurt, ’The Hermann Goring Works’, Social Research VIII (1941) No.l, pp.24-40.
Larra, Raul, Savio: el argentino que forjo el acero. Ediciones Anfora, Buenos Aires, 1980.
Lattuada, Mario J., La politica agraria peronista (1943-1983), Volume 1. Biblioteca Politica Argentina, 
Volume 132. Centro Editor de America Latina, Buenos Aires, 1986.
Lauderbaugh, Richard A., American Steel Makers and the Coming o f the Second World War. UMI Research 
Press, Ann Arbor, 1980.
Lewis, Colin, ’Anglo-Argentine Trade, 1945-1965’, in Rock, David (ed.), Argentina in the Twentieth 
Century. Duckworth, London, 1975.
Lewis, Colin M., ’Railways and Industrialization: Argentina and Brazil, 1870-1929’, in Abel, Christopher, 
and Lewis, Colin M. (eds.), Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State. The Athlone Press,
340
London, 1985.
Lewis, Colin M., ’Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Manufacturing and Industrial Policy in the Argentine, 1922-28’, 
The Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History XVI (1987-1988) No.l, pp.77-108.
Lewis, Paul H., The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1990.
Llach, Juan Jose, ’El Plan Pinedo de 1940, su significado historico y los origenes de la economia politica 
del peronismo’, Desarrollo Economico 23 (1983-1984) No.92, pp.515-558.
Love, Joseph L., ’Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange’, Latin American 
Research Review 15 (1980) No.3, pp.45-72.
Luna, Felix, Peron y  su tiempo (2nd ed.). Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1993.
MacDonald, Callum A., ’The US, the Cold War and Peron’, in Abel, Christopher, and Lewis, Colin M. 
(eds.), Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State. The Athlone Press, London, 1985.
MacDonald, Callum A., ’The Braden Campaign and Anglo-American Relations in Argentina, 1945-6’, in 
Di Telia, Guido, and Cameron Watt, D. (eds.), Argentina between the Great Powers, 1939-46. The 
Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1989.
MacDonald, Callum A., ’End of Empire: the Decline of the Anglo-Argentine Connection 1918-1951’, in 
Hennessy, Alistair, and King, John (ed.), The Land that England Lost. British Academic Press, London, 
1992.
Macpherson, W.J., The Economic Development o f Japan c. 1868-1941. Studies in Economic and Social 
History. Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987.
Mandelbaum, Kurt, The Industrialisation o f Backward Areas. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1945.
McCallum, E.D., The Iron and Steel Industry in the United States. P.S. King & Son, Ltd., London, 1931.
McDougall, Walter A., France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1978.
Milward, Alan S., The Reconstruction o f Western Europe, 1945-1951. Methuen, London, 1984.
Morard, Nicolas, Fonctionnement et perspectives de la Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de I 'Acier. 
Editions Universitaires, Fribourg, 1962.
Most, Benjamin A., Changing Authoritarian Rule and Public Policy in Argentina, 1930-1970. Published 
for the University of Denver by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991.
Moura, Gerson, Autonomia na Dependencia. Editora Nova Fronteira, Rio de Janeiro, 1980.
Nattan-Larrier, C., La Production Siderurgique de I'Europe Continentale et V Entente Internationale de 
TAcier. Rousseau & cie., Paris, 1929.
Newton, Ronald C., The ’Nazi Menace’in Argentina, 1931-1947. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992.
Novick, Susana, I  API: augey decadencia. Biblioteca Politica Argentina, Volume 136. Centro Editor de 
America Latina, Buenos Aires, 1986.
O’Connell, Arturo, ’La Argentina en la Depresion: los problemas de una economia abierta’, Desarrollo
341
Economico 23 (1983-1984) No.92, pp.479-514.
Ortiz, Ricardo M., Historia economica de la Argentina, Volume II. Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1955. 
Overy, Richard J., War and Economy in the Third Reich. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
Page, Joseph A., Peron: a biography. Random House, New York, 1983.
Panaia, Marta; Lesser, Ricardo; and Skupch, Pedro (eds.), Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo, 
Volume 2. Siglo XXI Argentina Editores S.A., Buenos Aires, 1973.
Peco, Franco, L ’acier face aux theories economiques. Nuove Edizioni Milano, Milan, 1971.
Peffer, E.Louise, ’Cordell Hull’s Argentine Policy and Britain’s Meat Supply’, Inter-American Economic 
Affairs X (1956-1957) No.2, pp.3-21.
Pelaez, Carlos Manuel, Historia da Industrializaqdo Brasileira. APEC, Rio de Janeiro, 1972.
Peralta-Ramos, Monica, The Political Economy o f Argentina. Westview Press, Boulder, 1992.
Peterson, Harold F., Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960. State University of New York, New York, 
1964.
Phelps, Vernon Lovell, The International Economic Position o f Argentina. University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 1938.
Piccirilli, Ricardo; Romay, Francisco L.; and Gianello, Leoncio (eds.), Diccionario Historico Argentino, 
Volume VI. Ediciones Historicas Argentinas, Buenos Aires, 1954.
Porcile, Gabriel, ’The Challenge of Cooperation: Argentina and Brazil, 1939-1955’, Journal o f Latin 
American Studies 27 (1995) No.l, pp. 129-159.
Potash, Robert A., El ejercitoy la politica en la Argentina, 1928-1945 (10th ed.). Editorial Sudamericana, 
Buenos Aires, 1982.
Potash, Robert A., The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962. Athlone Press, London, 1980.
Pounds, Norman J.G., The Geography o f Iron and Steel (5 th ed., revised). Hutchinson University Library, 
London, 1971.
Pratt, Julius W.; De Santis, Vincent P.; and Siracusa, Joseph M., A History o f United States Foreign Policy 
(4th ed.). Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1980.
Prebisch, Raul, ’Cinco etapas de mi pensamiento sobre el desarrollo’, El Trimestre Economico 50 (1983) 
No. 198, pp. 1077-1096.
Prebisch, Raul, ’Argentine Economic Policies since the 1930s: Recollections’, in Di Telia, Guido, and Platt, 
D.C.M. (eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1880-1946. The Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1986.
Rabe, Stephen G., ’The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945- 
1952’, Diplomatic History 2 (1978) No.3, pp.279-294.
Ramacciotti, Carlo, La Comunita Europea del Carbone e dell’Acciaio. Quademi del Centro de Azione 
Europeistica, I.C.A.S., Rome, 1953.
342
Randall, Laura, An Economic History o f Argentina in the Twentieth Century. Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1978.
Rapoport, Mario, Gran Bretaha, Estados Unidos y las Closes Dirigentes Argentinas: 1940-1945. Editorial 
de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1980.
Recchini de Lattes, Zulma, ’El proceso de urbanization en la Argentina: distribution, crecimiento y algunas 
caracteristicas de la poblacion urbana’, Desarrollo Economico 12 (1972-1973) No.48, pp.867-886.
Reuter, Paul, La Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de VAcier. Librairie Generate de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, Paris, 1953.
Rieben, Henri, Des Ententes de Maitres de Forges au Plan Schuman. Collection de la Nouvelle Ecole de 
Lausanne, Lausanne, 1954.
Rivet, Daniel, L ’acier et Vindustrie siderurgique. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1978.
Rock, David, Argentina 1516-1987. I.B. Tauris & Company Limited, London, 1987.
Rock, David, El radicalismo argentino, 1890-1930. Amorrortu editores, Buenos Aires, 1992.
Rock, David, Authoritarian Argentina. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993.
Rodriguez Goicoa, J., ’Hay que acelerarel ritmo siderurgico de la industria nacional’, Tecnoqulmica, March 
1942, pp.5-6.
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul N., ’Problems of Industrialization in Eastern and Southeastern Europe’, Economic 
Journal LIII (1943) Nos.210-211, pp.202-211.
Rostow, W.W., ’Leading Sectors and the Take-Off, in Rostow, W.W. (ed.), The Economics o f Take-Off 
into Sustained Growth. The Macmillan Press, London, 1963.
Rostow, W.W., The Stages o f Economic Growth (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
Rouquie, Alain, Pouvoir militaire et societe politique en Republique Argentine. Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1978.
Sabato, Jorge Federico, Not as sobre la formacion de la clase dominante en la Argentina modema (1880- 
1914). Mimeo, CISEA, Buenos Aires, May 1979.
Sanchez Hurtado, Carlos, Evolucion Historica de la Industria Siderurgico Chilena e Ibero-Americana. 
Editorial Nascimento, Santiago de Chile, 1952.
Sanguinetti, Julio, Nuestro potencial economico industrial y  la defensa nacional. Biblioteca del Oficial, 
Volume 331. Circulo Militar, Buenos Aires, April 1946.
Savio, General Manuel N., ’Politica de la production metalurgicaargentina’. Lecture delivered at the Union 
Industrial Argentina, 1942, in Alberti, Bias, Fuerzas Armadas y Nacionalismo Economico. Ediciones del 
Mar Dulce, Buenos Aires, 1982.
Scarone, Hugo, ’Savio y el acero’, Todo es Historia, No. 124, September 1977, pp.75-85.
Schumpeter, E.B. (ed.), The Industrialization o f Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940. The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1940.
343
Schvarzer, Jorge, La industria que supimos conseguir. Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1996.
Singer, H. W., ’The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries’, American Economic 
Review XL  (1950) no.2, pp.473-485.
Skupch, Pedro R., ’Nacionalizacion, libras bloqueadas y sustitucion de importaciones’, Desarrollo 
Economico 12 (1972-1973) No.47, pp.477-493.
Smith, Peter H., ’Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930’, Desarrollo 
Economico 7 (1967-1968) No.25, pp.795-829.
Smith, Peter H., Politics and Beef in Argentina. Columbia University Press, New York, 1969.
Solberg, Carl E., Oil and Nationalism in Argentina. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1979.
Solberg, Carl E., ’YPF: The Formative Years of Latin America’s Pioneer State Oil Company, 1922-39’, in 
Wirth, John D. (ed.), Latin American Oil Companies and the Politics o f Energy. University of Nebraska 
Press, Lincoln, 1985.
Stocking, George W., and Watkins, Myron W., Cartels in Action. The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 
1946.
Thorp, Rosemary, ’A Reappraisal of the Origins of Import-Substituting Industrialisation, 1930-1950’, 
Journal o f Latin American Studies 24 (1992) Quincentenary Supplement, pp. 181-195.
Trask, Roger R., ’The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949’, 
Diplomatic History 1 (1977) No.3, pp.271-284.
Trask, Roger R., ’Spruille Braden versus George Messersmith: World War II, the Cold War, and Argentine 
Policy, 1945-1947’, Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 26 (1984) No.l, pp.69-95.
Tulchin, Joseph S., ’The Origins of Misunderstanding: United States-Argentine Relations, 1900-1940’, in 
Di Telia, Guido, and Cameron Watt, D. (eds.), Argentina between the Great Powers, 1939-46. The 
Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1989.
Tulchin, Joseph S., Argentina and the United States. Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1990.
Van Hissenhoven, Paul, Le Mouvement des Grains dans le Monde. Editions CERES, Brussels, 1938.
Vazquez-Presedo, Vicente, Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas (comparadas), Segunda parte: 1914-1939. 
Ediciones Macchi, Buenos Aires, 1976.
Vedoya, Juan Carlos, ’Mosconi, el petroleo y los trusts’, in Vedoya, Juan Carlos, and Alen Lascano, Luis 
C., El petroleo nacional. Todo es Historia, Buenos Aires, 1976.
Vergne, Luis Enrique, ’El acero argentino: una batalla nacional’, Todo es Historia, No. 158, July 1980, 
pp.20-38.
Villanueva, Javier, ’El origen de la industrializacion argentina’, Desarrollo Economico 12 (1972-1973) 
No.47, pp.451-476.
Walter, Richard J., Politics and Urban Growth in Buenos Aires: 1910-1942. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993.
Warren, Kenneth, World Steel. David & Charles Limited, Newton Abbot, 1975.
344
Wassman, Sven, ’La siderurgia en la Argentina’, Revista de Economia Argentina XXVI (1931) No. 155, 
pp.401-409.
Whitaker, Arthur P., The United States and Argentina. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1954.
Wilkins, Mira, The Maturing o f Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974.
Windett, Nancy, Australia as Producer and Trader 1920-1932. Oxford University Press, London, 1933.
Wirth, John D., The Politics o f Brazilian Development 1930-1954. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1970.
Wood, Bryce, The Dismantling o f the Good Neighbor Policy. University of Texas Press, Austin, 1985.
Woods, Randall Bennett, The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment and the ’Good Neighbor'. The 
Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1979.
Wright, Winthrop R., British-Owned Railways in Argentina. University of Texas Press, Austin, 1974.
Zorrilla, Luis G., Historia de las Relaciones entre Mexico y  los Estados Unidos de America, 1800-1958, 
Volume II. Editorial Porrua S.A., Mexico, 1966.
345
